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Show 326 TilE LILY ANO TilE TOT~;lf. not in ·proper order to be used successfully. 1Iis argument was not deficient in fvJ·cc or propriety. Ccrt:liuly, with l1i~ own SC\'CU ships, all brought together, tmd all his strength in compact order and fit for scn·icc, he might reasonably hope to fitll successfully upon the divided forces and scattered squadrons of Lis cncmy,aud sweep them equally from sea and land. llut. Laudonuicrc had his argument also, and it wus not without its significance. Jlc OJlposcd tbc scheme of Hibault entirely; rcprcscntiug the defenceless condition of the fortress, and tbc danger to the fleet at sc:L1 nnd UJlOD the coast, during a. season pt·ovcrbially distinguished by storms and Lunicancs. flis counsel was approved of by other captains; but Ribault, an old soldier and sea captaiu, was too eager to engage the enemy to listen to arguments that seemed to padake of the pusillanimous. lt was very evident that he did not regard L'ludonniere as the best of ad\'isers in the work of war. lie took his own head ac{~onliugly, and commanded all soldiers that belonged to his command to go on board their vessels. Not satisfied with this force, he lessened the strength of the garrison by taking a. detachment of its best men, leaving few to keep the post but the im·alids, who, like Laudonniere, were suffering:, or but just recovering, from the diseases of the climate in midsummer. Laudonniere expostulated but in vain, against this appropriation of his garrison. On th; eighth of September, Rihault left tho roadstead in pursuit of the Spaniards, and Laudonniere never beheld him again. That very day Lhc skies were swallowed up in tempest!. Such Wmpests were never beheld before upon the coast. The storms prevailed for several days, at tho end of which time, apprehending the worst, Lnudonuierc mustered his command, and proceeded to put the fortress in the best possible conditiop of defence, To repair tbQ 327 portions of the wall which bad been thrown down, to restore the palisades stl·etching from the fortress to the river, \Vas a work of equal necessity and difficulty; which, with all the diligence of the l?rcnchmen, advanced slowly, in consequence of the violence nud long continuance of the stormy weathe1·. The whole force left in the garrison consisted of but eighty-six persons supposed to bo capable of bcm·ing arms. Of their doubtful eflicicncy we may boldly infer from these facts. Several of them were mere boys, with sinews yet unhardened into manhood. Some were old men, completely hon de combat from the general exhaustion of tl1eir energies; many were still suffering from green wounds, got in the war with Olata Utina, and others again were wholly unpro,, idcd with weapons. Relying upon the assumption that he should find his enemy at sea and in force, Hibault had shipped the garrison of its real manhood. JJis vessels being better sailers lhan those of the Spaniards, he took for granted tbat he should be able to interpose, at any moment, for the Sllfet.y of La Caroline, sl10uld any demonstration be made against it. This was assuming quite too much. It allowed nothing for the caprices of wind and wave ; for the sudden rising of gales and tempests; and accorded too little to the cool prudence, :md calculating generalship of Pedro Melendez, one of the most shrewd, circumspect and successful of the Spanish generals of the period: nor, wai\•ing these considerations, was the policy of Ribnult to be defended, when it is remembered that l1c had been specially counselled that the Sp:mit~.rds had made their lodgments in force upon the shores o£ Florida, not many leagues, by land, from tho endangered fortress. His single virtue of courage blinded him to the danger from the former. lie calculat-ed first to destroy the fleet of the enemy, thus cutting off all resource and all escape, and then to descend |