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Show Hingkley Journal of Politics 2006 causing inescapable burdens. To maximize scarce resources, NCLB should follow the example of Community Development Block Grants (CDBG). In the CDBG program, the federal government appropri-ates funds in block grants to be utilized on the municipality level to address needs determined by municipal officials. Recipients are still accountable for the distributed funds but federal guidelines provide flexible direction, while the spending is determined by local leaders (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2006). Increased expenditures on testing will never convert into improved education unless an investment is made into school, teacher and student resources beforehand. Testing should be an indicator of Progress in certain areas but not the end-all for school improvement. Title I and Title II Part D are excellent step-Ping-stones that allow principals the flexibility to address their school needs either by hiring counselors, reading spe-cialists, offering after-school programs or purchasing resources. Such financing flexibility needs to be available for all schools to first meet their needs and then to offer developmental programming. The P: Penalties/Enforcement ^he state of Utah serves as a potential example of the consequences of failure to achieve AYR Out of 62 categories for students from low income and non-English speaking background, the state is not in compliance with 37 categories. If the Title I and Even Start issues are not resolved, the potential loss of federal funds would total $53 million. For a state with the lowest per-pupil spending in the nation, it can ill afford to lose these funds (McFarland, 2006b). Moreover, it aPpears the state has a long way to go to meet the requirements. Federal review has been completed for 31 states, and ^tah ranks 8th from the bottom according to Utah's NCLB c°ordinator (McFarland, 2006b). Chicago students have experienced non-compliance first-hand. Windy city schools and their 80,000 students, for example, failed to meet state test scores for two consecutive ^ears and could consequently not serve as a federally funded Provider of supplemental services (Ashford, 2005). Chicago °es not have sufficient city resources to finance remedial Pr°grams and has now temporarily lost federal aid. That ^slates into $53 million in federal funded tutoring services lt have been temporarily disrupted. The 80,000 affected ^nicago kids are trapped in poor-performing schools and now, ecause of the inflexibility of the NCLB statute, are isolated y°m additional academic services which, by the same law, ^V are required to receive. Under NCLB, after two years of a school's "failing" to eet standards, students are permitted to transfer to another puolic or private school. To date, this option has been avail- ie more in theory than in practice. In the 2003-04 school ^r> 6.2% of American students were eligible to switch chools but less than 1.7 percent actually did so. For Utah schoolchildren, the figures are comparable. In the 2004-05 school year, 11 schools with a total enrollment of 6,325 students failed to meet federal requirements two years in a row, yet only 90 students transferred (McFarland, 2006a). One potential explanation, according to National School Board Association Associate Executive Director Michael Resnick, is that when a school doesn't meet NCLB standards, it might not reflect the quality of education at the school. "A school may fail to meet NCLB goals because a single subgroup of students does poorly on the standardized tests. If parents believe their own children are doing well, there's little incentive to exercise their choice option... parents want to send their children to neighborhood schools (Stover, 2005). Analysis: Increased scrutiny has brought the public focus to struggling schools and highlighted inequalities between schools. The unintended consequences of the enforcement policies are to push schools, teachers and students into a high-stakes poker game of universal standards without taking into account substantial growth over several years. "NCLB is not about helping kids, it's about labeling schools, and sanctions and consequences, not... about improvement," charged Utah State Superintendent of Public Instruction Patti Harrington (Toomer-Cook, 2005). The "one-size-fits-all" mandate of NCLB assumes that every school in every location has the means to hire highly-qualified teachers and retain them, assumes that a state standardized test is the lone means for student achievement, and assumes that the achievement gap can be closed and reading and math proficiency attained by 2013-2014- Worthy goals, definitely; but misguided goals, according to opponents. Lauren Resnick and Chris Zurawksy, editors of Research Points, a publication of the American Educational Research Association write, "with the addition of accountability-and without a curriculum that defines broader educational goals- narrow tests... become the de facto curriculum" (Resnick & Zurawksy, 2005, p. 15). Compare such an ultimatum to another public service, that of law enforcement. While every citizen would wholeheartedly support eliminating all violent crimes by 2014, they would not be as keen to support the program if prosecution of property crimes were neglected. However, if police and community efforts succeed in reducing violent crimes by 2014, then the program should be considered successful and the police department should not be penalized for "failing" to meet the 100% goal. Schools are faced with that quandary. NCLB mandates that schools invest in testing, but the unintended consequences are that testing becomes the top priority. With limited amount of resources, educators must be allowed optimum flexibility to best address their students' needs without being overly dependent on "teaching to the test" to preserve their school and their job. Kids aren't naive, they recognize the 33 |
