Message from the President of the United States, in answer to a resolution of the Senate relative to the British establishments on the Columbia, and the state of the fur trade &c.

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[ 39 ] their way, and see what will be the result of the reeent depredations ~om­mitted on the Santa Fe route. Should these occurrences pass unnoticed, and nothing should be done to ch~ck them, ;ve may anticipate a war with th.c Pawnees at some period not f:.:~r dtstant. \\ h~n they ?orne to that det.er~l­nation, they will remove (for they have noth111g to bmd them to the1r vll­] ages, where they no~v reside a part of each year) to !he head waters of the south branch of the nver Platte, and there operate with the Arapahoes, Ke­awas, and Blackfoots. These several nations ean muster altogether seven thousand warriors, four thousand of whom would be suft1cicnt to take care of their women and children, while the balance of them go to war. They can subsist themselves altogether, convenient to almost any one point, from the 25th to the 38th degree of longitude, and from the northern to the southern boundary of that portion of our territory. This whole region of country abounds in buffalo and other gamP.. Any one acquaintcu with the range of these animals may (if they do not finu them at the spot where they wish to use them) procure them not far off. They arc so numerous that it appears to me that their numbers would increase annually, even were the con .. sumption of them twice or thrice what it now is. By the foregoing statement, I have endeavored to give you my opinion of the force, situation, and disposi­tion of the several bands of Indians from whom we may expect the greatest immediate danger, and also their means of subsistence in the country where their operations against us will be carried on. I will now enumerate the bands with whom we have friendly intercourse, but whose friendship, as I h~ve befor~ observed, is, in my opinion, very precarious. The several tribes, ~s tar as we have extended our acquaintanec west of the fl.ocky mountams, can, I. pr~s~me, must~r from six to eight thousand warriors. They are . locate~ 111 different sectiOns of that country, where our principal fur trade 1s earned on. On the Missouri, above the mouth of the Platte, we have the ~1ahaws, who can furnish about fuur hundred warriors; the Pan­caes, two hundred and fifty warriors; the several bands of Sioux 2 500 war­riors; the Shawn€es, 400; the Arickaras, 600; the Mandans ;nj Menata­rees,_ 700; the Crows, 800. On the western boundary of the State of Mis­so ··ri, the Osages, I suppose, can furnish 1,000 warriors; the Ioways, 250; the Kanzas about 400; and the several tribes, or parts of tribes, recently locat­ed there by the General Government, perhaps from six hundred to one t.hou­s~ nd warr~ors. I however know but little about these last mentionell In­dians: the~r nu~1bcrs may. be greater or less than I have mentioned. Agree­ably to this estimate, whiCh I feel assured will not differ in any great de­gree from th~ e~act nu~b~r, the whole of the tribes with whom we have in­tet: cours~ w1thm ~he limits of the United States, and west of the State of Missourl, can furmsh about twenty-two thousand warriors from three to fo~r tho~sand of ~h.om are located immediately upon the w~stern border of Missoun, and w1tlun four or five days' march thereof· twelve or fifteen hundred of the number, the Pawnees, are now threat;nino· us with war· s~veral.hun.dred others of this number, the late emigrants v;e~e a short tim~ smce' (mstigated by. the Br1.t 'I sh G overnment) slaughten· n' g our 'c i· ti· zens upon our. nort?ern frontier, and continued to do so as long as that Government d~si~~d .1t. They ha? no good cause for their hostility. They lived within t e Imit~ of the terntory of the United States, from which they could not r~treGat without the support of the British, and they well knew that when t at t overnhm eUn t ·c eased, to provide for them , th ey wou ld aga·i n b e d epcn d - an upon t e lUted States for territory on which they could subsist them- 5 [ 39 J ~elves. Notwithstanding all these circumstances, calculated to induce them to cultivate our friendship, or at least to observe a neutral course at the flrst suggestion of the British, they raised the tomahawk ao-ain t 'us. \Yhal faith can be placed on the frientlship of the.e people? Th~~y \vcll know that they may at any time repeat th.eir depredations upon us with impunity; that, should the U mtcd States provtdc the means to punish them, they can sue for peace at any time, with a certainty of obtaining it, and of being rcslorcu to ti1cir former homes a~d pri v.ilcges. Under such circumstances, what have they to fear from rcpeatmg the1r outrages upon us? And ho"v different i~ the situation of these Indians now from what it was upon our northern frontier before rhc late war; located upon our we~tcrn frontier, where in th eir rear they have a wilderness of fifteen hunured miles in extent, peculiarly adapted to the usc of Indians, the greater portion of it literally covered \Vilh buffalo and other game; strongly fortified by nature with the Rocky mountains, \vherc their retreat can be safely covered, without a strong force to oust them; and behind their natural fortifications, they have their old friends, the British emissa­ries, preparing materials for rekindling the war fires, should it become ne­cessary. If these Indians should ever be again disposed to raise the toma­hawk against us, (and l have not the least doubt of it) they cannot desire a more eligible position than they now occupy. The facts generally herein enumerated ::tre not stated as information com­ing from others, but from my own personal observations. The conclusions which they h~ve led me to must, I think, appear reasonable to all who will properly consider them. If so, it must forcibly appear that our \vcstern frontier, and our citizens engaged in their lawful and laudable pursuits in that country, want the protection of the General Government; and that not less than five hundred troops, equipped as proposeu, will afforu that protection. Our citizens immediately interested in the country in question ought roa­sonably to expect this protection as a matter of right; and the Government ought, in my opinion, to feel the reasonableness of their claim, 3nd afford it as a matter of course. The military command, as proposed, should not be stationary at any one point, but traverse the country from place to place, wherever the 1rood of the service may seem to require. In this way the officers might acqu~·c a know­ledge of the country in which they would have to operate, and also the In­dian character, where it could be <lone leisurely, and wjthout injury to the troops. The latter would be necessary, and the former almo~t indispensa­ble, because such is the situation of the country, that the safety of the com­mand might, in some degree, depend upon this information; for instance there. are.scct~ons of t~e coun~ry for 50 to 100 miles in ex.tcnt, in pursuin~ certain directiOns, entirely w1thout water, and other portions of it almost equally destitute of 3ubsistence for men or horses. There arc also inacces­sible mountains, offering appearances of easy access, which would cause great fatigue and delay in attempting to cross them; while others, of much n1orc rugged appearances, can be easily penetrated, when the!r avenues arc ·well known. 'fhese and numerous other circumstances of equal importance require that the officer commanding troops in that country should have a knowledge of them before expeditious movements throu::?;h the country should become indispensable. The troops, t0o, by moving about as pro­posed, would be daily acquiring a knowledge of tbeir duty, having so fre­quently to harness their horses, cross large and difficult ri vcrs, securino· camps on different situations, and in a variety of ways become much mor~