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Show No. 60- 6 BRIDGER BOWL. MONTANA 23 December I960 ACCIDENT SUMMARY B. S., the victim of this avalanche and an excellent deep snow skier, had had three years experience in the Ski Patrol. His work has included checking out suspected avalanche areas. At 2: 30 p. m., 23 December, he entered Bridger Bowl to check avalanche hazards in the area. His account speaks for itself. " I had checked out Avalanche Gulch, and had called it safe for skiing. I then went to check out Bridger Bowl. Although I knew better, I was checks ing them out alone. " As one enters the Bridger Bowl, there is an area which is very susceptible to slabbing. Here the wind consistently blows from the south, along the face, and then drops into the bowl. I was so confident that the Bowl would check out that I opened the area to the public with the avalanche danger sign at the entrance to the Bowl, an error which later proved to be very critical. This mistake could very easily have cost a skier his life. " The wind had been blowing for the previous two days, and had indeed created a slab at the entrance to the bowl. I even heard and felt the slab settle as I entered the Bowl about twenty feet below the cliffs, but I refused to turn back. Then the slab fractured about ten feet above me, to a depth of about one foot ( down to the cup crystals). All the slab below the fracture slid, giving an area about fifty by fifty feet. The snow below this, which was not slab, did not slide to any extent, but provided a sliding surface for the slab. The slab was soft and fairly dry; the snow below was for the most part settled powder. " When the slide hit, I tried to get my skis pointed straight down the hill, but didn't have much luck due to the boiling of the snow. I tried swimming, but this is very difficult to accomplish with skis on, for the instant they are pulled out of being parallel with the fall line the feet are pulled uphill with respect to the rest of the body, causing a rol1. I rolled about three times in the slide. " Although the snow was fairly dry, there was no tendency toward suffocation. However, I may have done very little breathing while the slide was running, for when the slide stopped, I was very much out of breath. This could also be explained by my excited state, but whatever the reason, it is very important. If the snow had been a little drier and had I been buried a little deeper so that there was more pressure against my mouth and nose, I would have suffocated, because once the slide stops, there is no chance to protect the face from the snow, and the deep panting would suck in the snow just like a vacuum cleaner. " Returning to the moving slide, about half way down I lost one ski. The right ski stayed on by means of the arlberg strap, even though the safety binding had released. This windmilling ski made it even more impossible 62 |