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Show Though shaken up, F. E. was unhurt in the accident. He extricated himself from the trees and immediately began the search for his partner. Upon reaching the terminus of the slide, he spotted a boot sticking out of the snow, just below a small tree. The victim was caught around the tree, his back uphill, barely covered with snow. F. E. immediately administered mouth to mouth respiration. No more than 12 to 15 minutes had elapsed from the release of the slide to the discovery of the injured patrolman. After approximately an hour and a half, F. E. concluded that he could not help his friend. He left the body at 2: 05 p. m. and reached a patrol phone at 2: 20pm. RESCUE At 2: 00 p. m. Forester E. H. received the report of a possible avalanche accident on the ski hill. He was informed that Patrolmen R. P. and F. E. had not been heard from in over two hours. He was asked to take charge of rescue operations. At this time, the call was received from F. E. and a party of seven was dispatched to the exact location. Two medical doctors were included in this party. Several other volunteers arrived to join the search party. To avoid additional slide hazard and to account for all personnel, no other parties were sent to the scene. By 3: 30 p. m. the body of R. P. was removed from the area, and all personnel were off the hill. The victim suffered a fractured leg. Death was due to suffocation. AVALANCHE DATA The slide occurred on a 45 degree slope. The entire hill on which the slide had occurred was closed during the search and removal of the victim, and after his removal. Further control work was continued the following day, 13 March, to insure safety of the area. COMMENTS It has repeatedly been emphasized in training programs and publications that avalanche release and cornice breaking by cutting or stamping with skis should be done only on slopes where accidents will not have serious or fatal consequences. This type of avalanche control by ski release should be employed only on small slopes. Slide paths of the magnitude involved in this accident should be controlled only by explosives. An improperly located and unsafe belay position was also, in part, responsible for this accident. The belayer was below the fracture line when the cornice broke off. The secondary cause was an inadequate rope. The weathered, 3/ 8 inch manila rope was too short, necessitating the improper placement of the belayer, and was not strong enough to hold when the slide occurred. A regular nylon climbing rope with a very safe belay is required for cornice control work. The forces generated by sliding snow are every bit as large as those encountered in the most severe mountaineering fall. This accident illustrates the lesson that nothing can be left to chance, and no deviation from known safe practice can be considered as acceptable in 102 |