Forms and sensibles: Phaedo 74B-C

In Phaedo 74b6-c6 Plato offers an important argument for the proposition that such things as "the equal itself," i.e. such things as are often called "Forms," are distinct from sensible objects. The argument is especially important because it is one of a very small number of explicit arguments-perhaps only two-that Plato gives for this proposition. I wish to isolate this argument to concentrate on what I take to be its philosophically most interesting features as an argument for the existence of Forms distinct from sensibles. I am not here concerned with its other interesting features, such as its role in Plato's argument for the kind of a priori knowledge that he calls "recollection." I am especially interested in what must be presupposed if the argument is to be thought cogent (though I certainly do not believe that it is in fact cogent), and what is likely to have been presupposed by Plato. I am also concerned to show just how narrow a basis Plato wishes to use for the argument. In particular, I would like to make it clear how little of his view about Forms is presupposed in the argument, and how little of that view one can infer simply from interpreting the argument itself, as contrasted with the surrounding context.