Thick ethical concepts and the fact-value distinction

Over the last few years, the ‘fact-value distinction' (FVD) has become increasingly unfashionable, due in part to a number of arguments adduced against it. I myself do not believe the FVD can be maintained, and I think there are good arguments against it. But I have my doubts about the cogency of one of the arguments often invoked against it. This argument turns on ‘thick ethical concepts' (TECs); I will refer to it as the ‘TEC-argument'. The TEC-argument is attractive because it proceeds from an uncontroversial premise-that we grasp and use TECs-to a substantive and controversial conclusion-that something is wrong with the FVD.2 This sounds too good to be true; and it is. I intend to show that although the TEC-argument is frequently invoked, it has never actually been made.