Private persons and minimal persons

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Publication Type pre-print
School or College College of Humanities
Department Philosophy
Creator Millgram, Elijah
Title Private persons and minimal persons
Date 2014-01-01
Description It's a commonplace that privacy can now be abridged and abdicated in ways that weren't routinely possible until very recently. I want here to draw attention to an alternative configuration of the mind that these techniques make available, which I will call the minimal person. My explication of minimal personhood is going to take the long way around. I will have to explain what the ethical and political concept of privacy has to do with the older and very different philosophers' notion of logical privacy: this part of the discussion will connect the recent debates over extended cognition and first-person authority to one another. To get into a position where I can do that, I will have to explain how personhood and the laws of logic are also related topics. And to do that, I will start out with an exercise in what Paul Grice and, following him, Michael Bratman have called `creature construction.'1
Type Text
Publisher Wiley-Blackwell
Volume 45
Issue 3
First Page 1
Last Page 31
Language eng
Bibliographic Citation Millgram, E. (2014). Private persons and minimal persons. Journal of Social Philosophy, 45(3), 1-31.
Rights Management (c) Wiley-Blackwell The definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com ; This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Millgram, E. (2014). Private persons and minimal persons. Journal of Social Philosophy, 45(3), 1-31, which has been published in final form at DOI: 10.1111/josp.12071.
Format Medium application/pdf (portable document)
Format Extent 1,507,218 bytes
Identifier uspace,18977
ARK ark:/87278/s6m93jrt
ID 712691
setname ir_uspace
Reference URL https://collections.lib.utah.edu/details?id=712691
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