Ryle and the para-mechanical

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Publication Type Journal Article
School or College College of Humanities
Department Philosophy
Creator Benham, Bryan
Title Ryle and the para-mechanical
Date 2000
Description The thesis of this paper is the unconventional claim that Gilbert Ryle is not a logical behaviorist. The popular account of Ryle clearly places his work in The Concept of Mind (1949) in the camp of logical behaviorist.1 The object of this paper, however, will be to illustrate how the conventional interpretation of Ryle is misleading. My argument is not an exhaustive account of Ryle, but serves as a starting point for understanding Ryle outside of the behaviorist label that is usually attached to his work.
Type Text
Publisher New Mexico West Texas Philosophical Society
Volume 22
First Page 10
Last Page 16
Subject Behaviorist; Logical behaviorism
Language eng
Bibliographic Citation Benham, B. (2000). Ryle and the para-mechanical. Southwest Philosophical Studies, 22, 10-6.
Rights Management (c)New Mexico West Texas Philosophical Society
Format Medium application/pdf
Format Extent 501,708 bytes
Identifier ir-main,2215
ARK ark:/87278/s6fn1qdj
Setname ir_uspace
Date Created 2012-06-13
Date Modified 2021-05-06
ID 703090
Reference URL https://collections.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6fn1qdj