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Show "What Virtue There Is in Stone" and Other Pungent Talk on the Early Utah Frontier BY HOWARD A. CHRISTY A s ONE EXAMINES THE THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS that make Up the historicad record of the pioneer days in Utaih it is impossible not to be stairded, intrigued, amd sometimes aimused by the communications of those who lived the momentous amd trying events of those times. All au:"e interesting amd mamy aire fascinating. Whereas most of the speech or writing of common folks wais not much different from today, the lamguage used by prominent persons is aistonishingly different Leaders in high political amd ecclesiaistical offices often spoke amd wrote in a mamner that would shock us today if individuads in similair positions were to speak or write in a similair mamner. On the other hand, ais often ais not heaurers seem to have reacted ais strongly as the speakers. In this essay I quote and discuss some of the language of those times- the strong counsel, the colorful rhetoric, the dairk humor, the use of euphemisms, amd, in many instances, tough talk-tough to the point of sounding hard heaurted amd meam spirited from today's perspective. Additionally, I comment on the effect, or lack of it, such communications might have had on the intended audience. Wais the communication effective.^ That is, did the recipient respond obedi-endy.^ Dutifully.^ Defiamdy.^ Smilingly.^ Or not at all? The essay cam therefore be read on two levels: it cam be enjoyed as colorful lamguage or it cam be perused as rhetoric I concentrate on communications for the record (e.g., minutes of conferences and militia reports to higher authority) amd communications for effect (e.g., orad discourses to the people and orders and letters of counsel to subordinate militia commanders)-all deading with policy regarding amd conflict with the locad Indiams during the eairly 1850 s. This colorful materiad is tadcen from church and territorial Mr. Christy is the senior editor of the office of Scholarly Publications at Brigham Young University. Pungent Talk .901 archives, most of it readily avadlable but litde of it hitherto published The materiad treated here is but a taist(; of those rather vast resources; still, it is a representative taiste and one that adlows for some focus. In the winter of 1850 waur erupted in Utaih Valley neau* present-day Provo. There had been trouble brewing since the preceding summer between the newly airrived white inhabitants of Utaih Fort amd the Utes neairby. The white presence wais resent^rd amd some hostile feelings were exchamged In the fall of 1849 a locad Indiam wais accosted, ostensibly for steading a shirt off the line, by three setders. The Indian wais shot down, his stomach slit open ("nepo'd," or "open'd" spelled backwards in the cryptic vernaculair ofthe day), filled with rocks, amd the body dumped in the river. The Indiam's mutilated body wais found by members of his band who then "kicked up afiiss." ^ Isatac Higbee, the ecclesiastical and militairy leader at Utaih Fort, sent a letter to Brigham Young that mentioned trouble with Indiams bui: slyly avoided mention of the killing. Young responded with counsel that, had it been acted upon, would probably have averted further bloodshed and war In reply to your letter ofthe 15th instant, requesting counsel concerning the Indians. We reply, tal^e care ofyour com, Brethren, and grain of all kinds, and pursue the course prepared in our former letters and counsel to you. Stockade your fort and attend to your affairs, and let the Indians take care of theirs. Let your women and children stay in the fort, and the Indians stay out, but, while you mix with them promiscuously, you must continue to receive such treatment from them which they plea.se to give. This is what we have told you continually, and you will find it true . . . . ... A steady amd upright and preserving course may yet restore or gain the confidence ofthe Indians, and you be safe. ^ Here aire the elements of Brighairn Young's most consistent policy toward the Indiams: he admonished his chaurges to " stockade their forts" amd maintadn am "upright amd preserving course." Simple, straight-forwaurd, amd sensible as that policy w;is, it was, ais will be seen, possibly the most unpopular policy he ever enunciated There is no evidence that Young's counsel to Isaac Higbee had much positive effea on the Provo settlers, amd the tension amd hostility continued to build In latejamuauy 1850 a delegation from Utaih Fort came to Great Sadt Lake City for am audience with the First Presidency, 'SeeBrigham Young Manuscript History, 1850:17-18, LDS Archives, Salt Lake City (hereafter cited as HBY). ^'Journal History ofthe Church," October 28, 1849, LDS Archives (hereafter cited asJH). 302 Utah Historical Quarterly with the intention of getting miHtia support for a campaign against the Indiams to quell the disturbamce-or, in the words appended to the Brighaun Young Collection, in the au-chives ofthe church, they asked for "the privilege of defending themselves and chaistising the Indians."^ Here aure the minutes of that meeting, which wais attended by Brighaun Young, his counselors, Damiel H. Wells (the newly eleaed commamder of the tertitoriad militia), and others: Higbee [Isaac]: The Indians are continually killing our cattle and stealing horses, and they shot at our boys-we have lost between 50 and 60 head The Indians fired two guns at our boys-and they found one ox with 4 arrows-another with a tomahawk in it-they say the Mormons are [cowards]-they want to fight and will live on our catde-they say they mean to keep our catde-and go get the other Indians to kill us. Pratt [ Parley P. ]: My own mind is I can only see 3 ways- the place be abandoned-or we see to defend-or leave them [the Utah Valley setders] to destruction. Higbee: We cannot defend our catde unless there is a company of men-there are 25 [Indians] close by-and 50 or 75 on the other side of the lake. Pratt I feel it best to kill the Indians. Higbee: Every man and boy held up their hand to kill them off-we have 60 men and our arms-they say we are afraid to kill them. Pratt Walker's [Ute ChiefWalkara] men are different to these There can be no communication [with setdements further south] without a setdement at Utah. Willard Richards: My voice is for war and exterminate them. Brigham Young I say go and kill them (all hands held up). Higbee: We thought we should want help to do it Young. Tell Dimmick Huntington to go and kill them-also Barney Ward-let the women and children live if they behave themselves. Pratt I would taike the women and children and clothe them and [illegible word] make them do what we want and don't let them prowl about Young We have no peace until the men are killed off-never treat the Indian as your equal There are a company of 50 men- get them and take them up with you. They [the Indians] strengthened up the last year and they gather men from other tribes to come and steal our catde and horses. * ^Brigham Young Collection, January 31, 1850, microfilm reel 80, box 47, folder 6, LDS Archives (hereafter cited as BYC). " C hastise" was the favorite term for punitive action against Indians during these times. *Ibid. Pungent Talk 303 In seeming total contradiction of his policy and subsequent counsel, Brigham Young ordered the destruction of the Ute people in Utadi Vadley. But other evidence indicates that Young's extermination order wais given only when failure of the setders to adhere to his defensive policy forced him to take ruthless action to madntaun control of the vitad lines of communication to adl the setdements south of Salt Lake Valley. ^ Whatever his motivation, or whether he wais justified in such a draistic move, he wais resolute. If it had to be done, it should be done forcefully amd thoroughly. Note the very cleaur terms, paurticulaurly "exterminate^' amd "kill" These men-or at leaist Willaurd Richards, who took the minutes for this confidentiad meeting- certainly minced no words. Orders for the caunpaign were drafted immediately. Special Order No. 2, addressed by General Wells to Capt George D. Grant, states in relevant part "You are hereby ordered . . . to cooperate with the inhabitants of sadd Valley in quelling and staying the operations of all hostile Indians and otherwise act, as the circumstances may require, exterminating such, as do not separate themselves from their hostile clans, amd sue for peace."^ Agaun, "exterminating" wais used, ais well ais "quelling." Brigham Young ca. 1850. Marsena Cannon photograph USHS collections ^hat Young took this action reluctandy, and only later found out what had provoked the trouble in the first place, is discussed in Howard A. Christy, " Open Hand and Mailed Fist Mormon- Indian Relations in Utah, 1847-52," Utah Historical Quarterly 46 (1978): 224-27. ''Utah Territorial Militia Correspondence, ST-27, 3 microfilm reels, reel 1, doc 5, Utah State Archives, Salt Lake City (hereafter cited as UTMC). 304 Utah Historical Quarterly Gramt's force plunged south through deep snow in sub-zero cold, linked up with the Utadi Fort contingent, amd on Februaury 7 launched am aissault aigaunst the Indiams, who were entrenched on the far side ofthe river neau* the fort The two foes exchamged fire for severad hours; then the Indiams broke contaa amd withdrew, leaving severad dead, amd escaped up Rock Camyon to the eaist A report of the river batde (amd its indecisive results) wais dispatched to General Wells in Great Sadt Lake City adong with a request that he come to Utah Valley amd personally take chaurge of further operations. He left immediately, appaurendy determined to see that his orders, backed up by instructions from Brigham Young "not to leave the vadley until every Indiam wais out," were cauried out in full. ^ To this point all significamt communications seem to have been straughtforwaurd But follow-up orders to Grant the saune day Wells left for Provo were euphemistic by comparison. Wells admonished Grant to "taike no hostile prisoners" amd "let none escape but do the work up cleam."^ And further communications were also couched in euphemistic language. On February 13 General Wells wrote a dispatch to Governor Young, which reads in significant part Captain Lyde retraced his steps and joined Captain Grant about dark who was found encamped at this place with 15 or 20 Indians Daniel H. Wells. USHS collections 'Daniel H. Wells, "Daniel H. Wells' Narrative," Utah Historical Quarterly 6 (1933): 126. *UTMC, Special Orders No. 10, February 9, 1850, reel 1, doc 16. Another example of euphemistic language is in the orders to militia Col. John Scott, who a year earlier was sent against a band of Indian catde thieves near present-day Pleasant Grove "to take such meaisures as would put a final end to their depredations in future." All four men in the resulting skirmish were killed, their families taken prisoners. SeeJH, February 27 and28, 1849, and March 10, 1849; seealso HoseaStout Diary, 8 vols., 4:48-56, and Oliver B. Huntington Diary, pp. 53-55, both in the Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. The term "depredation" was commonly used to identify all sorts of unfriendly acts by Indians, for which they were more often than not "chastised." A classic recent example of euphemism comes from the Vietnam War where the sardonic expression "terminate with extreme prejudice" was coined for the assassination of certain marked individuals. Pungent Talk 305 It appears that they came rather through fear than otherwise and seemed [illegible three-letter word] to give up refusing to smoke the pipe of peace. We shall deal with them in the most summary manner as soon as another day favors us with light and proceed in quest of other Indians in this direction.^ The dispatch seems purposely vague, amd the hastily written holograph is difficult to read, but it is apparent that prisoners were in hand and that some forceful action would be taiken against them the next day. Wells substamtiadly clarified what he meant by "summary" in a postscript, dated February 14, that he appended to the February 13 dispatch: " Pleaise to maike some suggestions in relation to the disposaJ of some 15 or 20 Squaws amd children who probably belonged to some 11 waurriors who met their fate in a small skirmish this morning."'^ Ambiguity notwithstamding, the two staitements taken together indicate that Wells, already under instructions " not to leave the valley until every Indiam was out" and who had only a few days before ordered Captain Gramt to "take no hostile prisoners," either ordered or approved the shooting down of prisoners in cold blood.' ^ It is important to note that there is no category "hostile prisoners" in the rules of war. A prisoner, regaurdless of his deportment, is expected lo be humamely treated. Brighaun Young responded the next day to "the cheering amd gratifying intelligence of your success over your enemies yesterday morning, in which the courage, and valor ofthe boys, as heretofore wais manifested. If the Indians sue for peace, grant it to them, according to your descretionaury Judgment in the caise-If they continue hostile, pursue them until you use them up-Let it be peace with them or extermination'' ^'^ Did Governor Young misunderstamd Wells's covered lamguage.^ It is haurd to believe that Young would have complimented the shooting of prisoners, hostile or not, as being a courageous or valorous act It is possible that in his haiste Young missed the all-importamt point ''UTMC, Daniel H. Wells to Brigham Young, February 13-14, 1850, reel 3, doc 1,309. 'libid., postscript One particularly wordy and self-justifying euphemism was penned by Edward W. Tullidge to describe another incident of shooting down Indian prisoners who apparently attempted to escape- in this case in 1851. Tullidge wrote that a posse under the command of Orrin Porter Rockwell "deemed it unwise to turn the thieves in their power loose to commit more depredations and perhaps shed the blood of some useful citizen and they were sacrificed to the natural instincts of self-defense." Tullidge, Tullidge's Histories {SaitLake City: EdwardW. Tullidge, 1889), 2:83-84. In the case of the Utah experience, altnough both clear language and euphemisms were employed to describe atrocities, it appears that clear language was more prevalent in confidentiad, "your eyes only," correspondence, and euphemisms were oitener employed in more open communications such as orders to militia units and reports intended for the record. '^UTMC, Brigham Young to Daniel H. Wells, February 15, 1850, reel 3, doc 1,312 (emphasis Brigham Young's). 306 Utah Historical Quarterly about the Indiams having surrendered before they "met their fate," a possibility that would explaun his comment regaurding gram ting peace to the Indiams if they sued for it Surely, surrender should have been considered am acceptable first step towaurd a suit for peace. Whatever his understanding of Wells's report and postscript. Young still urged extermination for those who remauned hostile. On the other hand, perhaps Wells intended nothing more tham that Indiams were killed in the line of duty amd Young understood the dispatch as such. Nevertheless, Wells's comments of Februaury 13 foretelling the actions ofthe next morning, amd Young's response, strongly imply that selective extermination wais fully intended by both pauties, even if it meant killing prisoners. One might aisk how atrocities are normally reported or otherwise handled by military authorities. How, say, might an officer report am atrocity committed (with or without orders) by an individuad or unit under his command.^ First, he might not report such am event at adl. An officer would almost instinctively resist the urge to report something that would possibly redound to his discredit or disgrace-or serve to thwart his aims. Isaac Higbee's silence regaurding the above-mentioned killing amd disemboweling of an Indian is a useful example. Second, he might forthrighdy amd accurately tell the truth, especiadly if the incident was the responsibility of somebody else, or if the incident wais so obvious that attempting to hide it might ultimately have serious repercussions. Third, he might report am incident, but in the fewest words and in the best light Fourth, he might give a euphemistic account, especiadly if he is reporting an action to the party sanctioning it in the first place. And fifth, he might give a deliberately false account that would cover or justify whatever occurred. Or several such approaches might be employed. The killings on February 14 are a case in point The episode wais reported in different ways amd in different mediums. The immediate report from the battlefield, using euphemistic(amd possibly misleading) lamguage, is described above. But there is also a secondary account of the incident-am account that in its severad versions hais become the stamdaurd in popular histories- that states that the prisoners somehow escaped from their captors amd were shot down ais they attempted to flee across the frozen laike. But in the light of Generad Wells's communication of Februaury 13-14, an escape wais highly unlikely. Surely, Wells would have reported am escape because it would have provided him a militaurily acceptable justification for killing the Indiams. That the Tangent Talk J07 secondary account lacks amy explamation of how the Indiams might have made good their escape adso invites suspicion. The account only hais it that the Indiams somehow mamaged to get away, with their weapons, and without even the hint of a scuffle; then, instead of escaping south into the hills or mau-shes, where they had a reaisonable chamce of eluding pursuit, they stupidly dashed out onto the frozen lad^^e where they could be eaisily spotted, chaised down, amd killed one by one. The only rationad explanation for such am eventuadity is even worse tham that indicated by Wells in his report to Governor Young-the possibdity that the prisoners -were told to run out onto the ice, in the "time-honored" fashion of warfare where prisoners have been allowed to mad^e a "run for i t " ^^ The more-or-less officiad account of the incident is a classic exaunple of fewest terms and in the best light "Upon reaching Promontory Point at the south end of Utadi Lake, the volunteers encountered amd killed a pauty of Indiams, except the women amd children, all of whom were spau-ed; the women, in accordamce with the Indiam custom, claimed the protection ofthe volunteers." ^"^ And, finadly, there is am account written by Wells mamy yeau-s later which simply states that "we encountered the Indians near the north end on the west side of the mountain, eaist ofthe south end of UtaUi Lake, amd completely defeated them." ^^ Note that more space was given to describing humanitariam care ofthe widows and children in the official account, and getting the location straight in Wells's later account What really happened.^ It is possible that none of the above accounts accurately describes the event The most plausible answer indicated by the conflicting evidence is that the Indians surrendered to the militia, were deliberately killed while in captivity, and that false or misleading reports ofthe atrocity were deliberately submitted. Such an ' ¥ o r accounts ofthe February 14 killings seeJohnW. Gunnison, The Mormons, or Latter-day Saints ... (Philadelphia, 1852), p. \ M; and I^ovo: IHoneer Mormon City, comp. Writer's Program, Work Projects Adminstration(Portland, Ore.: Binfords and Mort, 1942), pp. 58-59. Gunnison's account, although not published as a government document, can be considered a report for the record in that he was on active duty with the U. S. Army at the time the above tide was published. Other accounts ofthe killings and subsequent decapitations of the Indians can be fou nd in the autobiography of Epsy J a n e Williams Pace and tne supposedly eyewitness account in the autobiography of Aoner Blackburn, both in Archives and Manuscripts, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University. See adso Christy, "Open Hand and Mailed Fist," p. 226. That the Indian prisoners could have been "given a chance" to escape, then shot down, is not a ridiculous possiblity. Such a twisted rationale to ease the guilt of brutal killings occurred in Utah seven years later. The militiamen who planned and carried out the Mountain Meadows Massacre, although willing to kill the men of tne Fancher party themselves, apparently determined to allow the Indians to slaughtf r the women and children so that" no Mormon would be forced to shed innocent blood." See Juanita Brooks, The Mountain Meadows Massacre (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1950), p. 73 and passim. '^H, February 14, 1850. 'Veils, "Narrative," p. 126. 308 Utah Historical Quarterly eventuality is entirely consistent with past mditary practice. That is, atrocities have been commonly committed on the battlefield and false accounts of such dark deeds have been commonly reported to higher authority. And as discussed later, such an eventuality in the case of 1850 is also consistent with later actions against Indians in Utah. Hostilities with the Utes ceaised, only to flare up agaun in 1853- but under much different circumstamces. Between February 1850 amd July 1853 the strategy regaurding Indiams had once again changed back to the more magnanimous approach recommended by Brighaun Young before the events of February 1850, but other fartors overwhelmed any hope of peaceful accommodation. ^^ Young, determined to put an end to the Utes' practice of stealing children from surrounding non-Ute tribal groups for sade to the Mexicans, in April 1853 signed a proclamation that prohibited the slave trade in Utah Territory-which action precipitated the Walker War. In this instance Young not only had to dead with the Utes, but he adso had to dead with his own people. When it becamne obvious that Ute fury over the proclamation would likely lead to wau". Governor Young delivered an address from the Tabernacle pulpit apparently intended to put everyone on guard The speech, which can be entitled his "Watch Address," used hard language: Take up the history of the first settling of America, and you cannot read of a colony ever being settled in the midst of savages, without having trouble, and suffering more from them than this people have in Utah. What is the reason? It is because these people did not know how to take caure of themselves. We can scarcely read of one colony founded among the aborigines in the first settling of this country, wherein the tomahawk of wild Indians did not drink the blood of whole families. Here there have been no such deeds committed; because when we first entered Utah, we were prepared to meet all the Indians in these mountauns, and kill every one of them if we had been obliged so to do. This preparation secured us the p e a c e . . .. ' ^ h e new strategy has since been popularly known as Brigham Young" s " feed them rather than fight them policy." For a discussion ofthe reverszd of strategy tnat developed after the events ofthe winter of 1850 see Christy, "Open Hand and Mailed Fist," pp. 215-35. Not that the strategy was followed with any enthusiasm-either during the Walker War or during the Black Hawk War that occurred in the mid-1860s. For evidence of other recorded instances of "chastisement," to include summary executions of prisoners, see UTMC, letter of Erastus Snow, July 27, 1864, reel 2, d o c 1,307, pp. 3-4; Col. Daniel D. McArthur to Mai. R. Bendey, January 21, 1866, reel 2, doc 1,307 pp. 11-12; Brig. Gen. Warren S. Snow to Col. William B. Pace, March 18, 1866, reel 2, doc 822; Brig Gen. Warren S. Snow to George A. Smith, March 18, 1866, reel2, doc 823; and commander ofthe San Pete Military District to Daniel H. Wells, April 14, 1866, reel 2, d o c 835. See also the Tullidge account at note 11 above. The last outright attempt to exterminate Indians occurred in 1851 when a militia commander requested arsenic and/or strychnine to poison the water and food supplies of a sizeable camp of Indian men, women, and children. There is no evidence that the request was honored See UTMC, Capt William McBride to Daniel H. Wells, J u n e 24, 1851, reel 3, doc 1,328. Pungent Talk 309 1 have prayed many times, and had a man at the door to watch for the murderers who thirsted for my blood. Then he would pray, and I would watch. What for.^ To kill the blood thirsty villain. I would not go and seek for him, but when he came to kill me in my own home I wished to be prepared to disembody his spirit, to save my own tabernacle, and send his down to the dust, and let him go to the place prepared for murderers, even to hell.''' Hau'd lamguage, indeed. A month later Young aigain addressed his people, but this time his rhetoric wais ;cdong different lines. The tough tadk gave way to irony amd gende ridicule in what could be entided his "Cats amd Kittens Address." But the message, amd the intent, seems to have been the saune You will find that there will be cats and kittens leaping out ofthe bag continually. "What can come next, I wonder.^" I do not know; but this I know, the Lord Almighty will not suffer the Saints, neither the world, to slumber upon their oars The time is passed for them to fold their hands, and say, "A litde more sleep, a little more slumber, a little more folding ofthe hands." This people luill never see that day, for the Lord will keep them on the alert all the time; they will continually have something to contend with; to keep them from dropping to sleep, and it is no matter to me as to what means he shall use to do it'8 Whatever the merits of the lamgiaage amd style employed in the above two exaunples, the extamt evidence gives no hint that the counsel had the intended effect Actuadly, the first speech may have had am opposite effect Aside from seeming to be entirely consistent with a purely defensive strategy, a crossed signad may have resulted from the very toughness ofthe lamguage used. There is no way to prove that this address generated or reinforced am offensive spirit on the pau't of militia leaders in Utaih Vadley, but it is at leaist ironic that when the first shot was fired in amger, the first militia response wais immediately to go into the attack, figuratively to go out amd "kill those blood thirsty villains." The waur caune, again triggered by the killing of am Indiam by a white setder, albeit in this case the a a wais unintentional, '^ and for the next severad months mostof Governor Young's hard rhetoric would be reserved not for the villaun at his door but for the setder down the road. "JD, May 8, 1853. '*Ibid., June 19, 1853 (emphasis Brigham Young's). 'Tor circumstances leading up to the commencement of hostdities, see Howard A. Christy, "The Walker Wan Defense and Conciliation as Strategy," Utah Historical Quarterly 47 (1979):396- 401. 310 Utah Historical Quarterly When the shooting commenced Young issued two general orders. Generad Order One, dated July 21, wais precise amd clear-and devoid of colorful rhetoric It essentiadly ordered all in the territory, first, to go on the defensive, and second, to extend conciliation to the Indiams. Specificadly, the order required that adl offensive action in response to the marauding Indians was to cease forthwith, that all setders and militia were to return to their setdements and fort up, amd that adl stock wais to be put under guaurd The closing paragraphs read: VIII We wish it distinctly understood that no retaliation be made and no offense applied but for all to act entirely on the defense until further orders. IX It is desirable... that no threats or intemdations [sic] be made or exersied [sic] toward the Indians no more than if nothing unusual had occured [sic] to disturb peaceful relations heretofore existing. ^° But early reports indicated that mamy opposed such a strategy and that most of its provisions were ignored, especially by militia commanders who seemed to have had aggressive action uppermost in their minds. That is, regardless ofthe wishes of higher authority, "using up" wais preferred over " n o retadiation being made." Determined to see his defense amd conciliation strategy strictly carried out, and almost at amy cost, on July 25 Governor Young issued Generad Order Two, which lamguage leaves no doubt ais to his intent The entire order deserves reading: I Colonel G. A Smith is hereby assigned to the command of all the Military Districts ofthe Territory South of Great Salt Lake County amd is strictly enjoined and commanded to enforce Orders No. 1 of the 21st instant II It is distincdy understood that all the people shall assemble into large and permanent forts amd no man is at liberty to refuse to obey this order without being dealt with as our enemy. III All surplus stock that is not particularly needed for teams and milk must be driven to this city and placed in the charge of the Presiding Bishop of this city until further orders. IV Colonel Smith is fully authorized and required to carry out the instructions which have heretofore been occasionally given by the Governor and other authorities ofthe Territory in regard to defense and all the people are now required to obey these instructions as Colonel Smith shall direct ^\JTMC, General Order No. I.July 21, 1853, reel 3, doc 1,334. Pungent Talk Jii V Colonel George A. Smith's instructions and orders will be those ofthe Executive ofthe Territory, and we will be sustaiined by him in enforcing the orders which in his judgment he may think proper. ^^ By placing George A Smith in commamd over the entire war zone. Governor Young neady preempted all other militia commanders who may have opposed his strategy. And he could not have chosen a better man for the job. Although Smith had had little or no part in militia activity previously (both his rank of colonel and his Southern Militia Department commamd were initiated on the spot by General Order Two), he was a powerful figure in every respect He was a giamt of a man in body and a forceful and resolute man in style amd personality. And he was am aposde who was extremely loyid to Brigham Young. Additionally, Young made the order personad. That is, he seemingly determined that by General Order Two he would make General Order One stick by informing everyone that such orders would now be carried out in person by a powerful individuad everyone knew would resolutely do his duty. But Young didn't stop there. He instructed Smith, with General Orders One amd Two firmly in hand, to travel to every settlement south of Great Salt Lake City to make absolutely sure that every setder wais informed. Then, apparently still not satisfied, he dispatched to Smith, who had already departed south, the following additional letter, which reads in part We now as the First Presidency of tlie Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, as Governor, Superintendent of Indiam Affaris of Utah Territory and Commander in Chief of the MiHda and Lieutenant General of the Nauvoo Legion, Appeal to you, the Com-mandates [sic] of all the Military Districts South, to all the Officers and Authorities ofthe Church ofthe Legion and ofthe Territory, aind to all the People, And say unto you all do not in the least degree relax your efforts . . . to save your grain, your stock, and all your property, And Fort up strong and permanent that your Families and your selves may be living and that you not be massacred by the Indians, and do not feel afraid that we want your property because we have ordered Surplus Stock to be driven to this place in order to keep you from feeding Indians with it, for we do not want it but expect that you will,draw it out when you can take care of it, although you had better put it into the Church tithing herd . . . . And we say further that inasmuch as you do not second our efforts, carry into effect our orders and instructions, and listen to our counsel, we shall ^'ibid.. General Order No. 2, July 25, 1853, reel 1, doc 288. SI2 Utah Historical Quarterly consider you ais aliens and not Brethren, as enemies and not friends; that we shadl not hold you by our Fadth nor aissist you by our influence nor our works. Enough hais been sadd; works and not words aure now required. Let your works speaik and show for itself Respectfully your Brethren in the Covenant of Truth Brigham Young, Heber C. Kimbadl, amd Willard Richards Brigham Young, Governor, Superintendent of Indiam Affairs^^ Although there is no humor in this terse, clear directive, in retrospect one cam smde to see to what extent Governor Young went to assure that he meamt business; note the formality ais to tides and ecclesiaistical lamguage-and agaun the generad absence of rhetorical embellishments. But did these last two communications have amy better effect^ Surprising as it may seem, in the case of numerous individuals, and of at leaist one entire setdement, not at adl. The people of Cedaur City, or perhaps more importamt their leaders, openly mutinied despite the best efforts of both Brigham Young amd George A. Smith. Appaurendy, these settlers could not accept the temporary loss of their cattle- to say nothing of having to teaur down adl outbuddings and to crowd into a hastily constructed fcrt What followed is a sad episode of haurd heauted defiamce met with haird heaurted force. Agaun, read it from the record- in this case George A. Smith's report, written in journal style, of his expedition to warn and instrua the people of the southern setdements. August 7 Had Adjutamt Greene read Generad Orders I amd 2 amd letter to the people at the meeting house in Pau"owam. 2 amd a quaurter p.m. Headed agaun for Cedaur Fort At 3:20 p.m. read express regarding a mutinous outbreak amnong the citizens of Cedaur Fort, and am open opposition to carrying the Governor's orders into effect Arrived Cedar Fort about 5 p.m. Had General Orders I and 2 amd letter read again We learned that severad men of this fort had risen in the morning opposing Lt Col. James A Litde amd Captain J. L Smith who had been chosen by the people amd appointed by Lt Col. William Kimbadl to carry out the Governor's order in relation to the surplus stock of this place. Some of them had threatened to shoot their stock and to shoot amd bayonet men. 8 August Kimball arrested 5 men. Again addressed citizens in the evening relative to their fort, Indian aggressions, amd proteaion. 9 August I spent the morning among the citizens. ^^ "ibid., Brigham Young et al. to George A. Smith, July 30, 1853, reel 1, doc 314. ^^bid., George A. Smith to Daniel H. Wells, August 12, 1853, reel 1, doc 357. This is an extensive journal account of Smith's entire trip to the southern districts. Pungent Talk George A. Smith USHS collections 313 Appaurendy the amger amd defiance of the Cedar City setders was widespread, haursh, and sustained. A week later, aifter a short visit to Paro-waui. Smith found that the people at Cedai' Fort were still openly defiamt Determined to achieve compliance, he "gathered all officers amd leaders, read [reread] General Orders 1 and 2, instructions [no doubt the July 30 letter from the First Presidency], then aisked the officers if they would exonerate [him] from adl further responsibilities relative to their surplus stock-they unanimously answered no.''^"^ The determined Smith continued his resolve: One ofthe officers very gravely began to thamk God, that they would have an aposde with them to help bear their burthens [sic] (referring to chap. F. L Richaurds, who wais intended to stay). When on seeing their spirit manifested and the desire to throw all responsibility off from themselves, or to someone else, and not to obey the orders, I said immediately, they could not have him, amd ordered him to be ready to march with me in one hour, telling them I would not risk the life of any good men with them, or with any people that would not obey those orders of the governor. I then spoke of men obtaining amd holding influence by their works, etc [W]hen I sat down Maj. M. Cauiithers presented his resignation, which I accepted, and after giving them some strong advice requiring them to obey the Governor's orders, and to see them carried out, . . . I dissolved the council and at 3 !^ o'cl PM started for Paurowan, taking Chaplain Richards along with me. ^^ It appeaurs that the "grave thamking of God" for Aposde Richards was intended ais a direa insult to Aposde Smith-amd perhaps even to the Prophet Brighaun Young-to which insult Smith immediately responded with some" strong advice." Smith did not return to Cedar City, however, his August 15 joumad entry indicates that the people of Cedar City finally acquiesced but only aifter the aurrests of severad of their 'Ibid, '^bid. 314 Utah Historical Quarterly number and the threat of direct force. Smith stated that "catde from Cedaur Ft arrived," and on August 17: "Left Parowaui, aur(rived] Beaver, withcattler^^ At this point it is only faur to state that, sensible as the defense amd conciliation strategy wais, full compliamce required enormous personad sacrifice. Literally, the setders had to abamdon everything they had strived so haurd to budd for themselves. Some communities complied, some did not For prime exaunple, it is interesting to compaure the colleaive response of the people of Cedaur City amd that of neaurby Paurowaui, a setdement of compaurable size amd circumstamces. Both communities were relatively distamt from the open fighting, both were given the saune orders, amd both suffered the saune sacrifices. But where the people of Cedau" City openly rebelled, the people of Parowan willingly complied Smith had property in Parowam amd wais therefore a citizen of that community, which may have generated a positive attitude towaurd him there, but it is appaurent that the attitudes of locad leaders toward higher authority generadly made the big difference. ^^ This episode is only the most dramatic example of what turned out to be continued opposition to the defensive strategy. There are numerous exaunples of written admonitions to carry out the general orders-to setders far from the action as well as those in imminent danger. That individuals as far away as Ogden (seventy-five miles north of the nearest hostilities) questioned the need to fort up amd to send stock to Sadt Lake Valley- south toward the fighting- is understamdable. No matter. For example, Generad Wells admonished David Moore, the Weber District militia commander, that "if men resist or refuse to obey orders likejas. Davis put them in irons with ball and chaun."^^ Unfortunately, regaurdless of the style employed, appeals to the setders for constraunt were either too late or were ignored, amd the '^bid.(emphasis Smith's). '^For further details on the events in Cedar City and Parowan see ibid., reel 1, doc. 357; and reel 3, docs. 1,348 and 1,352. See AsoDeseret News, October 15, 1853. George A. Smith was also a property owner in and citizen of Provo where hewas received almost as rudely as he was in Cedar City. See note 28 below. ^^UTMC, Wells to Moore, September 1, 1853, reel 1, doc 375. For other examples see ibid., reell, docs. 317,328,410, and424, and reel 3, docs. 1,337 and 1,359. On his return north and upon passing through Provo, Smith was so furious with the lackadaisical atdtude regarding forting up there that he ordered Col. Peter W. Conover, the Provo district militia commander, court-martialed for "noncompliance." Conover was relieved of his command but was soon reinstated. Not that Smith enjoyed taking such actions. In the case of charging Conover and receiving harsh opposition to it- this after an exhausting and trying nine- hundred- m lie trip to the southern settlements and the mutiny there- he wrote: "Myheadache increased to that extent that produced blindness that 1 was obliged to get a mjui to lead me home." See ibid., reel 1, docs. 353, 356, 358, and 359, and reel 3, doc 1,363. Ihingent Talk 315 bloodshed that resulted wais entirely unnecessary. Killings led to retadiation and more killings. A tragic caise in point is the incident that occurred at Nephi Fort on October 2, 1853, only a week after severad Indians were shot down in cold blood at Manti Fort Probably in retadiation for the Mamti Fort killings, Indiams crept up on and slaughtered four setders, who had gone out to bring in paut of the wheat harvest, ais they slept in their unguarded caunp at Fountain Green on the mountain road between Mamti amd Nephi. When the mutilated bodies were brought into Nephi Fort the next morning, the setders were dismayed amd enraged Knowing of a caunp of supposedly friendly Indians neaur the fort, a mditia paurty wais sent out to bring them to the fort, ostensibly for questioning. Accounts of what happened next vaury drasticadly. The militia commander* s account explained that the Indiams "were told to lay down their au'ms but they refused amd showed fight I ordered their aurms taken whereupon two shot aurrows amd woun ded one white in the aurm amd one aurrow went through the coat of amoth<?r upon which I ordered them to be fired upon."^^ Eight ofthe Indiams were kiUed But Martha Spence Heywood, a resident of that place, entered quite amother account in her journal. She wrote that the grisly sight ofthe men murdered at Fountain Green "actuated our bretheren . . . to do quite ais baurbaurous am act the following morning, being the Sabbath. Nine Indians coming into our camp looking for proteaion amd bread with us . . . were shot down without a minute's notice." ^^ Another joumad entry, by Adelia Almira Wdcox, amply backs up Mrs. Heywood by reporting that the Indiams "were shot like so mamy dogs, picked up with pitchforks [put] on a sleigh amd hauled away."^^ As might be expeaed, only the Nephi miHtia commander* s account found its way to Great Sadt Laike City, where, ais in the caise ofthe killing of prisoners in 1850, it was boiled down to the baurest minimum for the record In the Brighaun Young mamuscript history for that date adl that is given is ichat "in a skirmish at Nephi, Juab Vadley, eight Indiams were killed and one squaw amd two boys tadcen prisoners." ^^ ^^TMC, George W. Bradley to Daniel H. Wells, October 2, 1853, reel 1, doc 396. ^^uanita Brooks, ed., Not by Bread Alone: The Jownal of Martha Spence Heywood 1850-56 (Salt Lake City: Utah State Historical Society, 1978), p. 97. ^'Adelia Almira Wilcox Memoirs, October 2, 1853, Utah State Historical Society, Szdt Lake City. ^^JH, October2, 1853. Seealso Christy, "WalkerWar," pp. 411-12. 316 Utah Historical Quarterly The militia field report of the incident could be true, but it is unlikely. As in the case ofthe 1850 atrocity, the story raises serious questions. In particulaur is the statement that the Indians refused to give up their weapons but were nonetheless adlowed inside the fort That the militia would have been foolish enough to aUow eight Indians into the fort with their weapons and that at leaist two ofthe Indiams could have been adroit enough to draw arrows and shoot while surrounded with militia aurmed with guns is at best suspect In mid-October, following the above-described rash of killings on both sides, Brigham Young may have begun to despair that his people would ever comply either with friendly counsel or terse orders. On Oaober 16 he personally, appeaded to three of the setdement militia commanders: "Brethren we must have peace. We must cease our hostilities and seek by every possible means to reach the Indians with a peaceful message." ^^ No colorful rhetoric No tough talk. No threats. Although this message could be interpreted ais a directive. Young rather seemed to be beseeching these men to seek peace rather than seek more blood amd thereby perpetuate the war. Not that Young was wead?.ening in his resolve; nor would he ever stoop to groveling. But few will aurgue that he wais not a praigmatic mam, one capable of reversing a decision or taking a new tack if it might solve the problem at hand. Indeed, the defensive strategy employed in the 1853 Walker War wais a draunatic reversal of previous, much haurder, meaisures. The evidence indicates that at some point Young may have decided that the Walker Waur must end no matter what price had to be paid- perhaps even if it meant begging for compliamce Thus, his Oaober 16 letter can be considered still amother style of communication, a humble request indicating a willingness to pay whatever price necessaury to gadn am objective, am objective that, in the case ofthe Walker Waur, seems in retrospea to have been worthy and justified^* In the face of continuous opposition by the setders, the strategy decreed by Governor Young was stubbornly insisted upon and paun- ^^BY, Brigham Young to Peter W. Conover, Stephen Markham, and George W. Bradley, October 16, 1853. Brigham Young's actions leading up to and during the peace negotiations seem to corroborate his pragmatism. As a first gesture, severad months before the peace parley, he offered total amnesty. Then, when the peace parley commenced, he went to the tent of his substantially defeated adversary and blessed a child. And, when Chief Wcdkara, seemingly as a last gesture of defiance and pride, demanded that Young trade for a slave-recall that Young& s prohibition ofthe slave trade is what brought on the war in the first place-without hesitation Young handed over the two blankets and gun that were asked-and apparendy took the child For a discussion ofthe peace negotiations see Christy, "Walker War," pp. 415-18. Pungent Talk 317 fully forced through to the very end. Even after the fighting had long ceased and a peace was about to be negotiated. Young had occaision to hurl one last stinging rebuke-and threat-at a bishop in Utaih County for not "suitably responding" to one of his requests. I made a public caJl in your place yesterday for some fat catde to take to Walker which has not been suitably responded t o . . . . If there is the least hindramce or difficulty in obtiining go upon the range and pick them up and send them . . . . I must and will have amd if the people have not learned that when I order a thing to be done I mean to have accomplished it is time they had. And this will leave them a lesson. I am determined not to hold amy person in fellowship who will tred lightly on things of God. ^^ Many communications during this period aure just ais faiscinating- and haurd hitting. Two communications aure pauticulaurly interesting, one for its dark humor amd the other for its eloquence. George A Smith, in his "Setde in Forts!" address, presented at general conference in Oaober 1853, declaured I went to every settlement, and attempted to encourage them to fort but failed to accomplish anything towards getting them to obey the word of the Lord on this matter . . . . Sometime in the summer, however, a man known in these mountains by the name of Walker, found that the people cared nothing about God, nor the instructions of Brother Brigham, and Brother George A. Smith. So he said, "I wonder if you will mind me," and in less than one solitary v/eek he had more than three hundred families on the move; houses thrown down in every direction, and I presume one hundred thousand dollars worth of property wasted. ^^ Smith went on to state that "if the cou nsel of President Young had been observed, not one of the Sadnts would have lost their lives by am Indiam"^^-an observation that is well borne out by the evidence. Indeed, offensive action taken or provoked by individual settlers in the first instance and by mditia units in defiance of orders thereaifter was at the root of ^^ry death ofthe wau*-wliite amd Indian. Notice adso that, like Brigham Young, when appropriaite to "tell it Hke it is," George A. ^^YC, Brigham Young to Bishop Blackburn, May 8, 1854, reel 32, box 13, folder 13. ^^iscourse of George A. Smith at the semiannual conference ofthe church, October 7, 1853, Deseret News, November 24, 1853. Such discourses could also be rather long-winded. Smith's discourse of October 7, although both sharply focused and witty in places, also rambled on at length. ^''ibid. For an in-depth discussion ofthe war that leads to this same conclusion, see Christy, "Walker War," pp. 404-20. 318 Utah Historical Quarterly Smith could do so with equad clarity. In the case of his Oaober 7 discourse he employed both colorful rhetoric, here, amd straight talk, there. Smith ended that speech with appaurent humor, although he might have been at leaist pautly serious: Walker himself has teaised me for a white wife; amd if any ofthe sisters will volunteer to marry him, I believe I cam close the war forthwith . . . . If any lady wishes to be Mrs. Wadker, if she will report herself to me, I will agree to negotiate the match." ^* But no rhetoric of the period exceeds the following communication for sheer eloquence. To a query ais to what to do about am Ogden settler who had refused to tad^e down amd remove his house to the fort, Generad Wells, taddng part of his text from a previous letter written by the First Presidency, answered: Now in the caise of Brother Baurnes, my council to you is go to him show him this letter offer to aissist him kindly to remove his house ais cau'efully as possible into the fort, amd ten chances to one in my opinion he will prompdy comply.... [ W] e should sustain ourselves free and unbiased in all of our official acts and seek to conciliate the feelings of adl good men amd still pursue the even tenor of our way regardless of every obstacle. You remember the old proverb "If gentle means will not prevadl["-]"if neither grass nor tufts will amswer then I wdl try what virtue there is in stone." This is the case with us precisely[;] the authorities have preached to us[,] to this People(,] adl the day long to build forts to secure ourselves[;] have kindly told us time amd aigain [that] the first we know the Indians would be upon us[;] butalltonoavaul[. But] we find that Capt Wadker cam elucidate the subjea in a clearer more striking amd Effectual manner. I aun actually ashamed to confess that our People have to learn by what they suffer all the day long instead of profiting by their own paist Experiences. As it was saud of Israel of old so now it may well be applied: "My people do not consider! How short aure their memories! How forgetful!" ^^ It is interesting to contemplate how mamy times in history men have been deaf to the biblical complaunt "My people do not consider! 'Ibid. '\JTMC, Daniel H. Wells to David Evans, August 24, 1853, reel 3, doc 1,359, which borrows substantially from Brigham Young, Heber C. Kimball&cto Allen Weeks,July26,1853, inibid., reel3, doc, 1,337. Wells's (Young's.^) tantalizing references to "grass nor tufts" and "what virtue there is in stone" are nowhere to be found in the scriptures-nor could they be found in the several concordances and collections of proverbs at hand. (The letter to Allen Weeks somewhat less elegantly puts it, "if tufts and grass only will not prevail stones must be used."j Only Wells's "My people do not consider" could be found, in another context, at Isaiah 1:3. The closest proverb founu is from Pierre Corneille's Heraclius, which in translation, and rather less elegandy than Wells, reads: "Severity is allowable where gentleness has no effect" pungent Talk 319 How short are their memories! How forgetfuL'" This eloquent quotation of aun amcient lamentation raises the question of just how effective such communications ever aure, especially when severe sacrifices au'e asked or demamded. Perhaps most people respond only to what they wamt to heaur regaurdless ofthe style employed-or respond only to force direcdy applied, even at the risk of imminent death. In the caise ofthe Utah frontier, leaders employed every style of communication they knew, including shocking harshness, to warn of and guaurd against the damgers ahead amd then applied corrective meaisures when the waurnings went unheeded Sometimes they got positive results and sometimes thery were ignored or outright defied. The caises of Cedaur City amd Parowam during the Wadker Waur aure the best example of this contraist Often, ais in the extreme case ofthe citizens of Cedar City, when it came to push giving way to shove, when "giaiss nor tufts" did not "amswer," the only workable "virtue" seemed to have been in stone. |
