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Show ,untlanr to &bow tbac agents 11a1-e pocketed the funds appropriated by 112 ( ; ~ \ ~ e r l ~ ~ unel~dldt r,i ven the Illdians To scarvntioo. I t cannot be C doubted that 1nhian wars have originated from tbis cause. The Sioux war, in Minnesota, is snpuosed to have been produced in this way. For a loie time these officei<have been selectedfrom uartisan ranks. not so I I I L I ~ ~ J -aOc~c ount ot houe>cy or qnnliricntion as for'devorion to l,irtx in-terc..; ts and rbcir w i l l i ~ ~tgo ~ap~prly~ [~he lno~teyo f the 111dinnst o pro-mote thc fiellisl~ ticl~en~eosf local i~o l i f i c i a~\~V~e .d o not doubt chat ~~~ ~ ~ ~- ~ ~ ~~ some such men may be iu the service of the Bureau now; and this leads us to suggest that Uongress pass an act fixing aday (not later than the 1st of February, 1869). when tbe offices of all superintendents, agents, and special agents shall be vacated. Such persons as have proved themselves comvetent and faithfill may be re-aupointed. Those who have proved nuit will find themselves removed wiihout an opportunity to dirert attention from their own unmorthi~iessb y professions of party zea1.x The wise expedient, recommended for ridding tbe service of unworthy agents already io otlice, was not adopted by Congress, but has been rir-t u a l l ~p ut into effect by the order of the President requiring the uomi-nation of all ludian ageuts to come from the several religious bodies of the country. This opinion respecting the transfer to the War Department *as ren-dered before any well-defined plan for civilization had been adopted, and at a. time when the Iudian service, under civilian managemeot, mas in its most unsatisfactory condition, and when opeu hostilities or a very. precarious condition of peace existed among more than half the Iudians of the country. That the conclusions thus reached by military officers of the rank and experience of Generals Sherman, Harney, T e r r ~a, nd Augur were safe and \vi6'e, the e~perienceo f the last seven years has fully demonstrated. And if the civil arm of the Government was best adapted to the work required then, i t i s difficult Lo see how it can be otl~erwisen ow. when. with the excevtion of a ort ti on of the Sioux In- J l a~l siu irontdnn and Dakota, a1111 three or foni thousaud vagmllt ~ r t e s and Au:lt!hea in Nrw Jlerico, tha. whole ludian [~op~l luciiso q~u~ie t, anal, excevfnuder the most blundering and efos8iv ininst treatment. mill oaus'e no apprehensions of war or ~ e r i o n s ' d i ~ c uhlet r~e after. ~ t ' f i v e . ~ i x t hosf the Indian agencies no soldier is ever seen or needed. At one-half of the remainderrsoldiers are only required to act as a posse to as-sist the agent in making arrests of to:bul&t men ; and even this posse could be milch more cheaplyand efficiently provided by dispensing with soldiers and increasing the force of United States marshals wherever needed for the control and discipline of Indidus. So far, then, as eleven-twelfths of the Indian agencies are concerned, the question of pntting them under the control of the War Department has uo more pertinency than that of putting the alms-house and city schools under the metro-politan police. A standing army and an ordinary Indian agency have no comlnon end in view. On the contrary, whenever it is at all pos-sible to control the Indians without force, the purposes sought to be accomplished under a policy of civilization are always materially hin-dered by the presence and example of soldiers. The first lesson to be given the Indian is that of self-support by labor with his own hands-- the last lesson which a man in uniform teaches. But more, and above all, the inevitable demoralization of iutemperance and lewdness which comes to a reservation from a camp of soldiers makes it ot the highest Loonsequence that the connection of the Army with the Indians be kept |