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Show EXTRACT. 7 propositions of the government were submitted to them in council, and the Indians were satisfied to accept them. But, as the represene atives of the Cheyennes did not feel authorized to sign a treaty, the Commissioner was com elled to return without completing his work. The negotiation was leg in such a condition as to hold out the expec-tation that a treaty will be concluded at an early day. The superintendent of Indian affairs for the northern superinten-dency and an experienced officer of this department were appointed commissioners to negotiate with the Chippewas of Red Lake and Red River. Here, again, the negotiations were impeded by the absence of one of the bands, whose assent was deemed essential by the Indians themselves. The delegates from the Red Lake band demanded a most extravagant price for their land, and maintained their demand with so much persistance, that the commissioners deemed it impossi-ble to conclude a treaty, at that time, upon terms acceptable to the department, and so broke up the conference. The department was influenced, in the terms it offered, by the fact that the Senate had rejected a treaty, negotiated in 1851, by the Hon. Alexander Ramsay, then Governor of Minnesota, and ex officio superintendent, by which the Indians agreed to sell the most valuable portion of their country, including the valley of the Red River of the North, for the sum of $230,000. It was, therefore, deemed necessary to demand a larger cession for that sum, while the amplest reservations were contemplated for Indian occupancy. The Indians have since expressed regret for their conduct, and asked to be permitted to visit Washington to conclude a treaty. Permission has been given them, and it is expected that a treaty will be shortly conduded. In the administration of our Indian affairs the aid of the military arm of the government is often indispensable, and at all times a cordial cooperation and a friendly understanding between the Indian agents and the officers of the army are required for the success of this service. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the supervision of the Indian Bureau might be retransferred to the War Department with great propriety and advantage. If all the officers of the government, who are brought in contact with the Indians, and intrusted with their business, were under the immediate order and control of one depart-ment, they would necessarily feel a more direct responsibility, which would certainly secure greater efficiency. |
