A great divide: the 1994 election and the polarization of American politics

In the midterm elections of 1994, the Republican party achieved an impressive victory in Congress, winning fifty four seats in the House of Representatives and eight seats in the Senate from the Democrats. Newt Gingrich and his "Contract With America" successfully nationalized the party platform and assisted the Republicans in achieving their goal of becoming the majority party in Congress. Because of this, SOME political analysts categorize 1994 as a "realignment." However, the 1994 victory was not necessarily a realignment as it was a reaction to the existing government. Evidence shows that voter discontent with both President Clinton and the Democrats in Congress due to scandals and accusations of corruption played an intrinsic role in the Republican victory. The 1994 election was historic not solely due to Gingrich and the Republicans' aggressive campaigning nor a voter endorsement of conservatism, but also a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of the Democrats. Low voter turnout, weak Democratic candidates in competitive districts, President Clinton's unpopular attempts at reform, and numerous scandals hurt the Democrats in Congress and greatly contributed to the Republican takeover. However, it is clear from the subsequent results in Congressional elections such as 2006 and 2010 that the Republican party under Gingrich played a large role in polarizing the two parties' respective platforms and thus the voter reaction to national crises.

A GREAT DIVIDE: THE 1994 ELECTION AND THE POLARIZATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS by Kathryn Stone A Senior Honors Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of The University of Utah In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Honors Degree in Bachelor of Arts In Political Science Approved: _______________________ Dr. Matthew Burbank Supervisor ________________________ Dr. James Gosling Chair, Department of Political Science _________________________ Dr. Matthew Burbank Department Honors Advisor ________________________ Dr. Sylvia D. Torti Dean, Honors College May 2013 ABSTRACT In the midterm elections of 1994, the Republican party achieved an impressive victory in Congress, winning fifty four seats in the House of Representatives and eight seats in the Senate from the Democrats. Newt Gingrich and his “Contract With America” successfully nationalized the party platform and assisted the Republicans in achieving their goal of becoming the majority party in Congress. Because of this, SOME political analysts categorize 1994 as a “realignment.” However, the 1994 victory was not necessarily a realignment as it was a reaction to the existing government. Evidence shows that voter discontent with both President Clinton and the Democrats in Congress due to scandals and accusations of corruption played an intrinsic role in the Republican victory. The 1994 election was historic not solely due to Gingrich and the Republicans’ aggressive campaigning nor a voter endorsement of conservatism, but also a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of the Democrats. Low voter turnout, weak Democratic candidates in competitive districts, President Clinton’s unpopular attempts at reform, and numerous scandals hurt the Democrats in Congress and greatly contributed to the Republican takeover. However, it is clear from the subsequent results in Congressional elections such as 2006 and 2010 that the Republican party under Gingrich played a large role in polarizing the two parties’ respective platforms and thus the voter reaction to national crises. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ii INTRODUCTION 1 THE 1994 ELECTION AND ITS MEANING 2 THE REPUBLICAN MAJORITY IN CONGRESS 18 IMPACT OF POLARIZATION ON U.S. POLITICS 33 CONCLUSION 41 REFERENCES 43 APPENDIX 47 iii 1 INTRODUCTION The outcome of the 1994 election completely changed the balance of power in Congress in a way few had anticipated and altered a long-established pattern of Democratic Congressional control. With a net gain of 54 seats in the House of Representatives and eight seats in the Senate, 1994 marked the first time since the Second World War that the GOP was firmly in control of Congressional proceedings. This pivotal moment in modern political history had a significant impact on public policy and political ideology on a national scale from that point forward. Was this “Republican revolution” a realigning election? Or did the Republican party simply attain a surprising and impressive victory only to perceive it as a political mandate and alienate both its party members and its voter base? To explore this issue, it is imperative to discuss the definition of a “realignment”, and whether or not 1994 represented a realignment or merely a victory borne of frustration with the majority party and a desire for change. Subsequent elections, most notably the midterm elections of 2006 and 2010 suggest that 1994 was not a realignment because it did not form a new and permanent coalition of voters. Thus, after 1994 the Republicans enjoyed a short-lived prosperity in Congress that was reversed in subsequent elections. Some political analysts point to the appeal of conservatism and the famous “Contract With America” as the keys that won the Republicans the election in 1994. Chris Edwards and John Samples wrote in their analysis of the midterm results that “The Contract With America, which was signed by virtually all House Republican candidates, was a key element of the 1994 campaign” (2005, p.vii). The Contract was essentially a nationalized party platform for the GOP that focused on specific issues that were 2 designed to both distance Congress Republicans from the entrenched Democratic government and to draw voters to the conservative cause. However, when comparing the success of 1994 to the results of the elections in 1996, 2006, and 2010, what happened in 1994 seems more of short-term good fortune than a resounding conservative “realignment.” There were many factors affecting the election results that ushered in the “Republican Revolution”: disillusion with the Congressional Democrats, frustration with President Clinton’s policies, low voter turnout in Democratic areas, poor quality Democratic candidates in competitive districts, and of course the widespread and aggressive campaigning strategy employed by Republicans. “Although the Contract had little impact, Republicans did succeed in nationalizing the elections to a much greater degree than was usual in recent elections” (Klinker, 1996, p. 7). Despite this nationalization, what happened in 1996 illustrates quite effectively that Gingrich and the Republicans did not have long-standing popular support for their policies, but rather enjoyed a brief resurgence in due to the weakness of the Democrats. The 1994 Midterm Election and Its Meaning To explain the 1994 election and its aftermath, it is important to put the election into political context, beginning with the 1992 elections. After the 1994 election, for the first time in forty years, both the legislative chambers and the executive branch were under the rule of the Republican party. Although the GOP had enjoyed presidential dominance in the Reagan years, which continued during the administration of Reagan’s successor—and former vice president— George H.W. Bush, the party did not control Congress. The Democratic victory in 1992 was clouded in political uncertainty. The House Democrats lost 9 seats to the GOP, while newly-elected President Clinton received 3 only 43% of the popular vote. While the Republicans had lost their last foothold in the legislative process with Clinton’s victory over Bush, the 1992 election results represented more of an opportunity than a victory for the minority party and its conservative agenda. Bader (1996) argued that 1992 was a major turning point for Republicans. No longer having to worry about how their agenda might affect a sitting president, the GOP was able to form a cohesive and organized plan to nationalize their candidates and party platform and retake Congress from the greatly weakened Democrats in the midterm elections two years later. The first two years of the Clinton administration proved divisive and tumultuous ones for the nation, and the public began to express dissatisfaction with the elected Democrats in Congress. Clinton’s first two years in office were eventful ones. Barely one month after assuming office, the young president faced a terrorist attack on the World Trade Center that killed six people. The World Trade Center attack and the Waco Siege, in which four federal agents and eighty two civilians were killed in an ongoing standoff involving federal firearm laws, were important in that it increased President Clinton’s desire to thwart terrorist attacks and gun violence, and he proposed more funding for counterintelligence and more stringent crime legislation throughout his presidency as a result. (Franken, 2004, p. 42) However, Clinton’s focus on crime was of concern to many of his Republican colleagues in Congress, specifically when the Assault Weapons Ban of 1994 was passed by a Democratic Congress and signed into law by President Clinton. This deeply divisive issue was a clear indicator of the partisan atmosphere that would prove politically important in later years. The Assault Weapons Ban and “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” which allowed gays to serve in the military provided they did not discuss 4 their sexual orientation, created a noticeable chasm in a Congress that was forced to face these two issues, and made voters increasingly wary of Democratic legislation. Clinton faced both voter apathy and Congressional backlash due to these controversial decisions. Despite being a centrist white Southerner president (with an equally moderate vice president, Al Gore), Clinton had trouble getting anything through Congress in 1993 and 1994. Some observers believe that President Clinton tried to do too much, taking on energy reform, health care reform, and budget reform, and as a result was not able to focus on his priorities (Edwards & Samples, 2004, p.44). The president’s ambitious agenda had unfortunately painted the picture of an ineffective president, and voters did not respond well to his attempts at reform. Public outrage also stemmed from the House banking scandal of 1992, when it was discovered that members of the United States House of Representatives were allowed to overdraw their House checking accounts without risk of being penalized by the House bank (Wolly, 2006, p. 1). The Representatives faced no consequences to their credit score nor were they required to pay overdraft fees. In addition, the House members were allowed to overdraw their accounts so long as the overdraft would not exceed the amount of the member’s next paycheck. This situation, in effect, allowed members of the House to create unauthorized payday advances for themselves, which they would repay later on. The scandal sparked intense criticism of the “special rules” afforded to members of Congress. Although more than 450 Representatives were involved, twenty two were singled out by the House Ethics committee. Of these twenty two, nineteen were Democrats. House minority whip Newt Gingrich, well on his way to becoming the leader of the Republican party, saw an opportunity to undermine the Democrats. Gingrich, along 5 with seven freshmen Republicans known as the “Gang of Seven” chose to publicize the scandal, despite the fact that Gingrich himself had 22 overdrawn checks. Gingrich correctly assumed that this scandal would be far more detrimental to Democrats than Republicans. Representative Jim Nussle (R-Iowa), a member of the Gang of Seven, made a famous speech concerning the scandal, wearing a paper bag over his head to complain about the “shameful” ethical behavior of the House. Gingrich also demanded that thenSpeaker Tom Foley appoint special counsel to investigate and reveal the results of the investigation to the voting public. The result was a deep disapproval of the Democratic party in the eyes of the voters. Also during Clinton’s first term was the Congressional Post Office scandal which ended in the conviction of House Ways and Means Committee chairman Dan Rostenkowski on charges of mail fraud. Rostenkowski was accused of having employees on his payroll who did no actual work, “using Congressional funds to purchase gifts for friends and to supplement personal transportation, tampering with grand jury witnesses, and trading in officially purchased stamps for cash at the House post office” (Johnston, 1994, para. 7). Rostenkowski eventually pled guilty to mail fraud and lost his seat in the House, then went on to serve 17 months in prison. Gingrich and the “Gang of Seven” again used this scandal to their advantage, arguing that it was symptomatic of deep dishonesty from Congressional Democrats. These Congressional scandals, in addition to rumors swirling about President Clinton’s alleged infidelities, contributed to an image of the Democrats as a party that had retained control for too many years and had become corrupt. The stage was set for a Republican takeover. Gingrich, who was at the time the minority whip in the House, had high hopes for 6 the resurgence of the Republicans, but knew the necessity of mobilizing and nationalizing the party in the 1994 election cycle (Bader, 1996; Balz & Brownstein, 1996). A Kentucky special election a few months prior to the 1994 takeover provided an opportunity for Gingrich to “test the waters” concerning his ambitious goals for retaking the House and Senate. In a surprising upset, Democrat Joe Prather lost the supposedly “safe” seat after his opponent successfully tied Prather to Clinton’s failing policies and waning popularity (Balz & Brownstein, 1996, p.19). Gingrich predicted that Clinton would be the Democrats’ biggest liability in the upcoming election. According to Bader, Gingrich convened with future GOP leaders in the House including Dick Armey (R-TX), Tom DeLay (R-TX), and Bill Paxon (R-NY) to discuss the road to retaking Congress. In the interest of consolidating the party ideology into a nationalized platform, the Republican leadership settled upon several conservative values to stress to the American voters, including: security home and abroad, limited government, economic opportunity, individual liberty, and personal responsibility. Gingrich knew that the Republican party was deeply divided on certain issues, and sought to deemphasize those issues by encouraging accessibility and inclusiveness. (Bader, 1996, p.181-183) Dick Armey was in charge of creating a document outlining ten specific points to present during the campaign of 1994. This document would be known as the “Contract with America” (see Appendix A). If successful, Gingrich and the Republican leaders agreed, the Contract would serve as a legislative agenda for a new Republican-controlled House. The purpose of the Contract was to both to distance the Republicans from the intense mistrust surrounding the entrenched Democratic leadership, but to additionally offer conservative alternatives 7 to long-standing Democratic policies. Gingrich and Armey, who would become the House majority leader after the election, went through an elaborate process of “surveying Republican candidates, through focus groups and questionnaires, to find out which issues would help them most in their campaigns” (Gimpel, 1996, p. 18). The goal was to include issues that would attract the hard-core Republican voters without adding anything that might scare off moderates or create bitter fights among party members. Many of the Contract's policy ideas originated at The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank. The GOP enlisted the aid of Larry Hunter, a former White House staffer during the Reagan administration and chief economist of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a prominent lobbying group. Using writing from former President Reagan's 1985 State of the Union Address, the Contract explicitly laid out the proposed actions of the Republican party if elected to the majority in Congress for the first time in forty years. Many future GOP House leaders contributed to the writing of the Contract, including Newt Gingrich (R-GA), Robert Walker (R-PA), Dick Armey (R-TX), Bill Paxon (R-NY), Tom DeLay (R-TX), John Boehner (R-OH) and Jim Nussle (R-IA) (Gayner, 1995, para. 5). Among the proposals were tax cuts, a permanent line-item veto, measures to reduce crime and provide middle-class tax relief, and constitutional amendments requiring term limits and a balanced budget (see Appendix A). Advocates for the document described the Contract as “revolutionary” in that it committed to offering specific legislation for a vote. Critics, however, expressed wariness and argued that the legislation offered no realistic legislative goals or tangible results, and was largely propaganda that did not advocate change but was designed to win the election for the GOP (Coleman, 1996, p. 204). The design of the Contract, however, was to present the precise plan of the Congressional 8 representatives, and in doing so created a Congressional election had been run broadly on a national level, the first of its kind since 1918. The Contract promised that “on the first day of the 104th Congress, the new Republican majority will immediately pass [reforms] aimed at restoring the faith and trust of the American people and their government” (Gill, 2000, para. 6). If the first 100 days of the session were devoted to the Contract, the second hundred days were to be dedicated to implementing the Republican "revolution" through budgetary reform. The first step was passing a budget resolution that would explicitly state the overall guidelines and priorities. It would set goals for expenditures (which were to be cut) and for revenues (taxes would also be cut) and for the projected deficits (which were to decline until the budget was balanced within seven years). In addition to passing the budget resolution, there would be the consideration of appropriations bills, which would specify programs to be cut or eliminated. The Contract’s aim was to “market” conservatism to voters in a positive way. However, the Contract was introduced late in the campaign season, and despite heavy advertising (including an ad in TV Guide) “at that point only 34 percent of adults had heard of the Contract with America” according to a 1994 Gallup poll (McSweeney & Owens, 1998, p. 42). The Contract was more designed to nationalize and galvanize Republican politicians into sharing one unified message, and was less about appealing to the voters. The Contract was also seemingly very inclusive to all conservative politicians during the election season. The National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) created a central “command center” that sent out talking points, debate rebuttals, and provided marketing tips for campaign managers. The party and any congressional members in “safe” Republican seats contributed funds to contentious elections. Gingrich 9 was relentless in encouraging the party and fellow party members to donate heavily to Republican challengers in close elections. Confident in his party’s chances, Gingrich promised committee chairmanships to the most generous of the Republican incumbents if the GOP retook the House. Despite its supposedly open and inviting premise, however, some Republicans were less than enthusiastic about the Contract. Moderate conservatives especially expressed wariness at the direction Gingrich was taking “their” party. Congressman Amo Houghton (R-NY) expressed his displeasure that the moderate voice was not evident in the writing and proposed execution of the Contract. “I’m a Northeastern Republican. This thing was driven by Texas and the South. . . The support of the moderates for Newt has been passive” (Gimpel, 1996, p. 19). Bill Goodling (RPA), who would become the chair of the Education and Economic Opportunities Committee, argued that the Republican party had centralized because of the Contract, but not necessarily in a positive way. “No. I didn’t participate. This was done by the Speaker [Gingrich] and Mr. Armey, period. There wasn’t much input from anybody.” (Gimpel, 1996, p. 20) Gingrich’s goal of consolidating the party and nationalizing the platform had the unintended consequence of creating rifts among the conservatives in Congress. These seemingly small issues would later deeply divide the party and prove disastrous in later elections. In addition to the Contract, Gingrich used and encouraged his fellow party members to use negative campaign ads against opponents, employing what was referred to as the “Atwater” technique— push polling and aggressive, negative ads— that had become so prominent during the 1988 presidential election. Lee Atwater was a political consultant and Republican strategist that served as an advisor to both President Reagan 10 and George H.W. Bush and became well known for employing a technique known as “push polling.” This practice involves contacting voters under the pretense of conducting an opinion poll when in fact the real purpose is to provide potential voters with false information about an opponent. While this sort of practice was technically legal and often successful, it was considered by many to be “dirty politics.” This same technique was later famously used against John McCain in the 2000 Republican primary by the George W. Bush campaign team. The proven effectiveness of this tactic was obvious, especially in 1994. Former Representative Ben Jones, Gingrich’s challenger at home in Atlanta, was critical of his opponent’s tactics. “All you have to do is turn on the TV. He [Gingrich] accuses his opponents of using 'Stalinist' tactics, of being 'enemies of normal Americans' and says when he gets control of the House, he will use subpoena power against them. That's the kind of rhetoric we heard in the 1950's from Joe McCarthy, and he's already got more power than McCarthy” (Seelye, 1994, p. A1). The result of this was an increasingly negative atmosphere permeating an election that was supposedly centered on change and moving forward. The use of “dirty” political tactics and negative ad hominem attacks suggests that the Republicans were not as confident about the changing ideology of the nation as it might have appeared. The use of these methods further implies that 1994 was not a “realignment” that expressed voter approval of the conservative ideology and the Contract, but rather that voters were persuaded through the use of aggressive and negative campaigning to turn against the Democratic members of Congress. Despite the extensive campaigning and the use of funds, it is unlikely that Gingrich would have succeeded in the “Republican revolution” had it not been for the greatly weakened Democratic party. The Contract was less suited to addressing real 11 policy problems and more suited to providing a clear distinction during a campaign (Gimpel, 1996, p. 21). Nevertheless, Gingrich promised change, and voters were inclined to listen. The banking scandal had shaken confidence in the Democrats. Additionally, Clinton’s struggle to get legislation through a Democratically-controlled Congress painted the picture of an ineffective majority party and an unproductive president (Bader, 1996, p. 65-68). The fact that both the legislative and executive branches were Democratic blurred the lines between the two, intensifying voter apathy towards the “corrupted” government. In addition, Jacobson (1996) notes that there were different reasons for retirement among Congressional Republicans and Democrats. Although the number of retirees was roughly the same between both parties, approximately 65 percent of Republicans left to pursue a higher office, while 71 percent of Democrats did not (Jacobson, 1996, p. 214). This difference implies that Democrats were forced to retire rather than risk electoral defeat. And suffer electoral defeat they did. Perhaps most shocking was the defeat of the Speaker of the House, Tom Foley, against Republican opponent George Nethercutt. Foley had opposed term limits for Washington state’s elected officials, but in 1992 Washington voters approved a referendum that set term limits. Foley filed suit with the federal court and won, the ruling stating that state laws could not dictate term limits for elected federal officials. Nethercutt, however, used this to his advantage when he claimed Foley was “bringing suit against the state of Washington.” Nethercutt also promised that if elected, he would not serve more than three terms (though he actually served five). Nethercutt triumphed, and Foley became the first Speaker of the House to lose reelection since the American Civil War era (Klinkner, 1996, p.138). Also defeated in their reelection 12 campaigns were prominent Democrats Dan Rostenkowski (due to his involvement in the aforementioned Post Office scandal) and Jack Brooks, a Democrat from Texas and the House Judiciary chairman. Brooks was heavily criticized in his home state for supporting the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act despite his personal opposition to it and his life membership in the National Rifle Association. Other defeats included Richard H. Lehman (D-CA), a six-term incumbent in California’s 19th district who lost to the challenger George Radanovich by seventeen points, one of the largest margins of defeat for an incumbent. Thirty four incumbent Democrats lost their seats in 1994, while Republican incumbents were reelected by almost universally large margins over their Democratic challengers. “The Democratic candidates for the House in 1994 were, on the whole, weak and ill-prepared to combat Gingrich’s Contract” (Klinkner, 1996, p.12). In states with highly publicized races, the Republican party poured money and resources into the campaigns, and the Democrats, reeling and in disarray, could not compete. Furthermore, voter turnout in 1994 did not help the Democrats. According to the report by the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate— a non-partisan, nonprofit research organization—approximately 75 million eligible Americans voted in the 1994 election, a 38.8% turnout — up 2.3 percentage points from 1990. An estimated 108,000,000 eligible Americans did not vote, however (Gans, 1995, para. 2). This result implies that Gingrich did not fully succeed in “galvanizing” the voters into voting for the conservative cause, as the turnout was not substantially larger than in the past. Only 39% of those eligible voted in the Congressional elections of 1994. Overall turnout did increase in every region in the nation, except New England and the farm states. New England, of course, is a well-known liberal region of the country, and a lack of increased 13 turnout likely hurt the Democrats. Additionally, Republican turnout went up in every region of the country, while Democratic turnout went down everywhere except the far western states and the Middle Atlantic. There were major surges in turnout in Tennessee and Virginia and substantial turnout increases in many of the most populous states, including Florida, Maryland, Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania. However, it is important to note that voter turnout declined in several states with tight or highly publicized races, including: Alabama, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio, and Vermont (Gans, 1995, para. 4). These results advance the argument that American voters were not as supportive of the Republicans as the initial results might have indicated, and that there was equal mistrust and wariness of both parties. This is further exemplified by the fact that despite a slight increase in voter registration, the number of people who claimed not to be affiliated with either party went up by 36 percent. Both Republicans and Democrats saw a decrease in voter identification with their respective parties, based on survey data collected during the 1994 election season (Gans, 1995, para. 4). The Democrats were also hurt by the fact that, according to the Committee’s analysis of Census Bureau data, the voter participation rates of people with incomes of $15,000 or less went down by 21%, a voter bloc that traditionally supported the Democrats. Additionally, only 20% of young citizens aged 18-24 voted, dropping from the 25% it had been during the surge of the 1992 presidential race (Gans, 1995, para. 5). This statistical reality does not bespeak a realignment like the one that occurred in 1932, when more than fifty percent of the electorate voted overwhelmingly Democratic in a 57% to 39% landslide. The Republicans in 1994 enjoyed their largest margins of victory in regions that were already “safe” GOP areas: The Midwest, the 14 Rocky Mountain States, and the Southwest. Republicans did, for the first time, achieve a large margin of victory in the South, largely due to Clinton’s unpopularity in the region and the GOP’s aggressively conservative campaign. If realignment occurred in any form during 1994, it was in the South. Gans (1995) states in his analysis of the 1994 election that the trend in the South is readily apparent. Since 1970, “the Republicans have reversed what was a 18.5% to 10.0% deficit in House votes into the 17% to 13% majority it enjoyed in the 1994 election” (Gans, 1995, para. 6) The long-standing dominance characterized by Franklin Roosevelt’s Democratic party coalition had broken up in the South, where social conservatism and fierce loyalty to “states’ rights” made the Republican party platform much more appealing to voters. Nevertheless, with the exception of the South, strong evidence seems to point to voter disapproval of the Democrats rather than wholehearted endorsement of Republicans. While a large increase in turnout would be consistent with a possible realignment, 1994 showed only a small increase in overall turnout compared to previous midterm elections in 1990 and 1986. The New York Times reflected the views of a stunned nation after the results came in. “Everything in Washington is changed by Tuesday's Republican sweep. The question is for how long” (Apple Jr., 1994, para. 1). Despite the negativity surrounding the 1994 elections, the GOP had triumphed; no Republican incumbent had lost. With a gain of 54 seats in the House and 8 in the Senate (nine when Richard Shelby of Alabama switched parties the day after the 1994 elections), the Republicans finally had control of both the Senate and the House for the first time in half a century. In retrospect, it was apparent that the Republicans had modeled their Congressional victory after their numerous successful presidential campaigns (Klinkner, 1996, p.7). They had successfully tied the problems in 15 Congress with the Democrats to Clinton’s White House, painting both as a picture of ineffectiveness and, at times, villainy. They preyed upon the mistrust of the voters and deftly handed off the blame to the Democrats for all unpopular Congressional decisions, including the 1994 assault weapons ban. Clinton later blamed the assault weapons ban for the crushing defeat suffered by Democrats in 1994 (2004, p. 635). In the aftermath of the Republican electoral victory, some analysts called 1994 a “realignment.” For example, Ladd argued that 1994 was a continuation of what he termed a “postindustrial realignment” (1995, pp. 1-3). But was 1994 a realigning election? The concept of a realigning election stems from V.O. Key’s (1955) concept of “critical” elections. Key argues that such an election first and foremost has a relatively high level of electoral participation, which 1994 did not. Further the election would have to mark a "sharp break" with previous election patterns to be considered a critical election. While 1994 did see a surge in Southern support for Republicans, it was not a definitive enough change to be proven as support for the GOP; it could have simply been a reaction against Clinton. Third and most importantly, the realignment would have to persist over a long period of time and affect all levels of government (Key, 1955, p. 3-4). Wide, sweeping change clearly did not occur for the Republicans as they lost their historic majority bit by bit, beginning in 1996 and culminating in the Democratic sweep of 2006. Unlike the 1932 election, the Republicans did not have a large percentage of Americans voting for them, nor did their policies prove popular when the Democrats staged a comeback in 1996. In examining the concept of realignment, one finds that, indeed, such periods in American history are preceded by a certain set of characteristics in order to create the proper atmosphere for such a political upset. Each period of realignment in American 16 politics was initiated with a “critical election.” Examples of this include 1896 and 1932. In these years, the voters were presented with a concrete choice on a critical issue that transcended the normal party lines or coalitions. Both of these election years were marked by a crisis in values, where the fraying of “traditional society” at that time had reached a breaking point. In the 1850s, “the polarizing issue was the extension of slavery, and in the 1930s, it was the extension of the power and size of the federal government” (Schramm, 1994, para. 3). In 1932, for example, the voters rejected the orthodox views of the incumbent Republican administration with respect to economic policy, and urban working class voters joined the Democratic electoral coalition. In both of these elections, the American voters were faced with a clear choice between very differing views of where America stood as a nation, and of the principles by which the country would be governed. As a result, in each case, an enduring majority party was formed that dominated American politics for at least two generations; in 1932 it was Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Democratic party. Through the years of 1932-1936, FDR gave a persuasive argument for voting Democratic, due to the large appeal amongst many diverse groups. Roosevelt argued that it was the purpose of the federal government to ensure a certain level of security for the American people. FDR was successful both electorally and intellectually, and he was able to wield a new and enduring majority. This political dominance of the New Deal and “Roosevelt's party” did not last all the way until 1994, however. As the long-standing “liberal consensus” ideology began to wane in popularity, conservatism began to consolidate into a distinct set of ideals. Historian Gregory Schneider identifies several constants in American conservatism: “respect for tradition, support of republicanism, 'the rule of law and the Christian 17 religion', and a defense of 'Western civilization from the challenges of modernist culture and totalitarian governments'” (2009, p. xii) To that end, 1968 and 1980 were both victorious elections for the Republican party. Lyndon Johnson's passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act alienated the Southern businessmen that had formed an integral part of Roosevelt's “New Deal Coalition.” With those voters no longer bound by shared economic ideals and now deeply divided on the issue of race, the GOP was able to expand support for the Republicans across the South after 1968 (with the exception of 1976) due to the party's appeal to social conservatives, especially white voters who were angered by desegregation. By 1980, the central leader of the Republican Party was movie-star-turned-politician Ronald Reagan, whose policies called for lower taxes, a strong anti-Soviet policy, and reduced government spending and regulation. Reagan used his charisma to express his support of American values and the benefits of smaller government. Using his popular 1984 advertising slogan “It's morning again in America” Reagan promised an economic renewal after the slowed economic growth and inflation of the 1970s. While his public support remained strong throughout his two terms in office, his policies were problematic; his economic policies—centered around tax cuts and increased defense spending—resulted in a greatly increased deficit. Despite the economic and market hardship that ensued from this policy, Reagan remained immensely popular with voters. While these elections were without question important ones in terms of the presidency and public image, it is difficult to argue that either 1968 or 1980 were realignments because control of Congress did not change. The election of 1994 was no exception. While Congress was taken by the Republicans, a mere two years later the GOP 18 failed to oust Clinton from the White House and additionally lost seats to the Democrats in Congress. According to the realignment theory first set forth by Key, 1994 cannot qualify as a significant and permanent shift in electoral coalitions. What then, if anything, made 1994 different from preceding years? Did Gingrich and the Republican Congress simply assume a change in ideology based on voter frustration with the long-standing Democratic regime? It appears that way, considering the Republican animosity towards Clinton throughout his time in office that ultimately backfired. After a campaign that promised change and cooperation, the Republicans proved from 1994-1996 that they were unwilling to align themselves with the Democratic president. Gingrich in particular was antagonistic towards President Clinton, which would ultimately lead to Gingrich’s political downfall. Following the House GOP's triumphant 1994 election victory, Gingrich sent all the Republican freshman House members copies of the GOPAC memo suggesting they refer to their opponents as “traitors” (Franken, 2004, p. 68). It became abundantly clear in the years following 1994 that the aggressive campaign tactics used to achieve Republican victory were destined to characterize the legislative decisions of the new Republican Congress. THE REPUBLICAN MAJORITY IN CONGRESS New Speaker Gingrich made it clear from the opening of the 104th Congress on January 4, 1995 that operations in Washington would henceforth be remarkably different than it had been under the Democratic government. The ceremony was accompanied by all of the presentation and media coverage of a presidential inauguration. The Republicans were officially claiming a mandate from the 1994 elections, based on the policy proposals laid out in the Contract. The opening session lasted 14 and one half 19 hours (a record), finally adjourning at 2:25am on January 5. The exuberance of the House Republicans was palpable. No preceding congressional class had successfully campaigned on such a definitive policy platform, and they intended to deliver their promises to the people. Newt Gingrich emphasized the historical significance of the Republican agenda: "...what we're doing is a cultural revolution with societal and political consequences that ultimately changes the government. That is a vastly bigger agenda than has been set by any modern political system in this country" (Drew, 1996, p. 275). Despite these declarations of change and prosperity, the new Congress soon implemented new methods of control. These “methods” caused a significant amount of alarm among liberals and moderates alike, as the party that had promised to limit government suddenly started exerting more centralized control. According to Representative Mickey Edwards (R-OK): "Newt changed the way committee chairs were selected. His insistence was on how often you voted with your party. How much money you raised for the party. Not how much seniority you had” (quoted in Dubose, 2011, para. 10). Gingrich down-sized congressional-committee staffs by one third and “cut staff budgets from $222.3 million to $156.3 million” (Dubose, 2011, para.12). Gingrich abolished three committees and 25 subcommittees. The Committee on Committees was shut down and its authority to make committee assignments assumed by the Steering Committee, which Gingrich controlled. He eliminated budgets for all 28 legislative service organizations. Additionally, Gingrich set out to “intimidate directors of other offices” such as Robert Reischauer in the Congressional Budget Office. Gingrich spokesperson Tony Blankley said at the time “It's our intention to largely replace CBO with more moderate economists” (Dubose, 2011, para.14). The Republicans demanded 20 roll backs on some of the reforms of the 1970s that they referred to as the "subcommittee bill of rights" (Owens, 1997, p. 21). In the 104th Congress, full committee chairs would now be able to designate subcommittee chairs and control majority party subcommittee staffing and budgets. According to Edwards, “It all came to head with the Contract with America, when the Republican members stood on the steps of the Capitol and pledged as a unit to support this partisan document” (quoted in Dubose, 2011, para. 9). Despite the impressive victory and the supposed unity of the Republican party, the first years of the “revolution” were fraught with turmoil, resulting in a further deepening of the divide between Republicans and Democrats. Gingrich told the New York Times that his goal was “to reshape national policy, or, in his phrases, 'renew American civilization' and 'redirect the fate of the human race'” (Seelye, 1994, p. A1). Despite this lofty goal, it seemed unlikely that the Republicans would enjoy unbridled legislative freedom, especially with a Democratic president still in office. Nevertheless, the Republicans doggedly set forth to enact their “Contract with America” given their new majority in Congress. While Gingrich expressed concerns over how to change the fate of the human race, “...his Republican allies seem less daunted, saying Mr. Gingrich has almost single-handedly revitalized the party's dispirited ranks and set the terms of the national debate with his 'contract with America,' the platform on which more than 350 Republican candidates for the House have pledged to run.” (Seelye, 1994, p. A1) While the Contract had given the GOP the strength and ability to mobilize as they had not done so before, they had made many promises to an American public that they were now expected to implement, which could only happen if the Republicans made a concerted effort to cooperate with President 21 Clinton. Unfortunately, such cooperation did not happen. Gingrich, as Speaker, was particularly antagonistic towards Clinton and confrontational with the Democrats in Congress. Before the election, many critics had been alarmed by Gingrich's ability as minority whip to thwart legislation, and it seemed that trend was destined to continue as the 104th Congress came to order. His former colleagues, including Representative Mike Synar of Oklahoma, “who considers Mr. Gingrich a friend, says he is 'a control freak.'” (Seelye, 1994, p. A1) A group of conservative Republicans (and Gingrich specifically) in the House were especially concerned with balancing the budget via tax cuts, and welfare reform. Interpreting the victory of 1994 as an endorsement of conservative ideals rather than an expressed frustration with the Clinton administration was a strategic error according to some political analysts. This mistake would prove extremely costly for the GOP throughout the ensuing years as Congress and Clinton fought bitterly over legislation (Nelson, 1997, p. 75). The first several months of 1995 were characterized by the push to pass the Contract items, an effort that ultimately overwhelmed the House and pushed aside most other priorities. The Contract was used very skillfully to force through a lot of legislation in a short period of time. The Contract was invoked by the GOP leadership as a “moral commitment” to pressure House Republicans to delegate power to their leaders and vote for measures that in ordinary circumstances they might not have (Bader, 1996, p. 78). The 100 days commitment added pressure to act without contemplation. While the Contract sped through the House with appalling ease, the Senate was entirely another issue. Senators had not signed the Contract, and many expressed wariness with Gingrich's 22 heavy-handed leadership of the House. “Of the 21 legislative items in the Contract, only 13 passed the Senate and eight eventually became law” (Bader, 1996, p. 78). Furthermore, the 104th Congress was a clear indication of a significant change, not in the political ideals held by the American people, but in the ideology of the two major parties. While it is not unexpected that the new Republican Congress would seek to rectify what they saw as some of the “ills” of their Democratic predecessors, the mobilization of conservative forces under Gingrich seemed less a voluntary comingtogether as, over time, it became more of an obligatory membership in a party with a set of clearly defined rules and partisan views. A small group of conservatives, with Armey and Gingrich at the forefront, claimed that the Contract was a set of rules for the party to adhere to, in all forms of legislative action (Gimpel, 1996, p.37). The hundreds of House members that had pledged to follow Gingrich's Contract were now virtually bound by it in all their votes. Acquiescing or attempting to compromise with liberals and go against the tenets of the Contract in any way was simply not acceptable, especially in the House. Mickey Edwards said that Gingrich, the chief architect of the Contract and new face of the Republican party, "made the Congress a much more partisan institution" (Dubose, 2011, para. 4). This animosity between the two parties— referred to as Team Gingrich and Team Clinton by many on the Hill— proved to be an extremely potent rivalry that characterized the legislative proceedings for the entirety of Clinton's presidency. Nineteen ninety five proved a tumultuous year—for both parties. The budget President Clinton sent to Congress featured “a modest reduction in projected deficits over five years, but also projecting $200 billion deficits over the next five years” (Owens, 1997, p. 8). Clinton felt that he got little credit for his 1993 budget reduction efforts and 23 saw no need to take any political risks for moving the budget toward balance. The House and Senate budget resolutions each proposed “the elimination of hundreds of programs and several cabinet departments” (Drew, 1996, pp. 208-9). After conference committee meetings to establish the dissimilarities between the two versions of the budget resolution, it was finally passed by both houses on June 29 on party line votes. The resolution called for budget savings of “$894 billion (over projected spending) over seven years and a tax cut of $245 billion” (Sinclair, 1997, pp. 188-189). While the budget resolution set parameters for the critical spending cuts that would be necessary to conceivably balance the budget within seven years, the specific details still had to be made in committees and reported to the floors of the two chambers for votes. The Republican leadership in the House chose to make many of the most controversial decisions through the appropriations subcommittees rather than through the standing committees that would ordinarily consider significant changes to programs. Tight leadership control of the appropriations committee was asserted even before the beginning of the 104th Congress when Newt Gingrich announced that he was bypassing the three senior Republican members of the committee and appointing Robert Livingston, a Republican from Louisiana, as chair of the Appropriations Committee. Gingrich met with Livingston and the appropriations subcommittee chairs and impressed upon them the centrality of their role to the overall Republican agenda, telling them: “You're going to be in the forefront of the revolution....You have the toughest jobs in the House. If you don't want to do it, tell me” (Maraniss, 1996, p. 87). Gingrich also insisted that each of them write him letters to affirm that they would follow through on their duty. Majority leader Dick Armey instructed the authorizing committee chairs that they were to work 24 with the appropriations subcommittees in making the cuts. As the appropriations subcommittees focused on the programs under their jurisdiction, the authorizing committees had to change the large entitlement programs whose funding did not go through the appropriations committees. The committees then had to meet to decide how to make the cuts that had been ordered by the budget resolution. Large cuts to entitlement programs was the conservative answer to the budget resolution, and confrontation over the details of the cuts were a sticking point amongst Republicans. In addition, the measure faced harsh criticism from Democrats. The cuts deemed necessary for a balanced budget were particularly difficult to execute given that the GOP had excluded a good portion of federal spending, notably Social Security, from possible cuts for political reasons. In order to comply with the budget resolution the Republicans intended to “cut $270 billion from Medicare, and $183 billion from Medicaid” as well as forcing deep cuts in other entitlement programs (Sinclair, 1997, p. 189). The Senate budget committee, under the leadership of future presidential candidate Bob Dole, suggested the elimination of 100 programs as well as the Department of Commerce. The House voted to abolish more than 280 programs and do away with the Departments of Education and Energy, in addition to Commerce. Budget committees in both chambers demanded severe cuts or elimination of “Clinton's Goals 2000, national service program, the National Endowments for the Arts and Humanities, and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting” (Drew, 1996, pp. 208-209). The reconciliation bill had to include compromises between the House and Senate in many policy areas. In September of 1995, as the end of the fiscal year drew near, the appropriations bills had not been agreed upon, and a continuing resolution was passed in order to keep government programs funded temporarily. The 25 resolution kept the government running until November 13 while Congress debated the fate and future funding of the programs the Republicans hoped to abolish. By late October the compromises among the dissenting Republicans had been finalized, and there was enormous pressure for them to vote for their party's budget resolution proposal, despite many individual members who described themselves as “moderate conservatives” expressing serious reservations over the legislation. Democrats were, unsurprisingly, in open opposition to the proposed cuts in programs that they had supported over the years. Many Democrats complained that drastic cutbacks had been slipped into the bill at the last minute without hearings, and they did not have sufficient time to consider them or offer alternatives. Despite this criticism, the resolution passed in the House on October 26 passed by 227-203, the largest reconciliation bill ever. According to Newt Gingrich the bill was “...the most decisive vote on the direction of government since 1933” (Sinclair, 1997, p. 199). The next day, a clearly-divided Senate passed its reconciliation bill 52-47. The conference committee to reconcile the House and Senate versions of the bill consisted of 43 senators and 71 members of the House, and following weeks of negotiations over hundreds of programs, each branch of Congress had approved the final version by November 20. However, during these deliberations the Republicans made a critical error, one that likely contributed to Clinton’s 1996 presidential victory. In late 1995, the conflict between Congress and Clinton had reached a breaking point. By the end of the fiscal year on September 30, only two appropriations bills had been passed by Congress and signed by the president. Congress was forced to pass an emergency resolution to keep the government open from October 1 onward, until a budget could be agreed upon. Clinton, 26 for his part, refused to cut the budget to meet Republican demands, because doing so would conflict with his administration’s interests in education, the environment, Medicare, and public health programs. Gingrich (and by extension the Republican House), was fundamentally opposed to raising the debt limit. When the temporary resolution expired on November 13, Congress passed an additional continuing resolution to send to President Clinton. But President Clinton found the bill to have a number of provisions that he deemed unacceptable. It cut funding for many programs substantially and pressured the president to acquiesce to a balanced budget by 2002. The Treasury Department was also prohibited from using trust funds to pay interest on the national debt under the new resolution. The Republican strategy was to “threaten a possible government shutdown and default on the national debt to force the president to agree to their budget and policy priorities” (Edwards & Samples, 2005, p. 64). Given that the Republicans did not have enough votes to override a presidential veto and expressed disinterest in compromising with Clinton, the GOP was forced to find an alternate strategy with which to pressure the president. The strategy they decided upon was the issue of the statutory debt limit and the threat to shut down the government. The Republicans assumed was that the penalties of these two actions would be so serious—both from a public and political perspective—that the president would agree to their demands. The United States had never before defaulted on its loans, and a potential inability to finance the debt could easily lead to a financial meltdown that would virtually destroy the stability of financial markets and substantially increase the cost of future borrowing to the U.S. Treasury. “The Republicans’ willingness 27 to risk the financial stability of the country demonstrated their commitment to their own policy goals” (Edwards & Samples, 2005, p. 69). While the consequences of shutting down the government were not nearly as drastic, there was a significant disadvantage to the disruption of services, the administrative costs of administering a shutdown, and the inconvenience of citizens depending on government programs. The Republican newcomers were especially committed to having their way because they felt that they had been elected to carry out their agenda in cutting government programs and balancing the budget. In October, Gingrich had told a university audience that if the Democrats did not go along with Republican demands, “Fine, they won't have any money to run the parts of the government they like, and we'll see what happens” (quoted in DeParle, 1996, p. 61). Clinton received the continuing resolution with its “unacceptable” provisions on November 13, and unsurprisingly, he vetoed it. The president was instead preparing to publicly criticize the deep cuts that the Republicans intended to make in popular programs such as Medicare, education, and environmental protection as well as programs to help the poor, such as Medicaid, food stamps, and welfare. According to Clinton's autobiography, “their differences resulted from differing estimates of economic growth, medical inflation, and anticipated revenues” (2004, p. 673). When the government shut down on November 14 about 800,000 government workers were ordered to stay home, with only those necessary for essential services or where funds for programs had been appropriated. Gingrich stood his ground, insisting that the Medicare cuts were essential to the Republican agenda, and it became a key battleground between the parties. “The Medicare fund was projected to go into the red within a decade, and regardless of which party did 28 it, changes had to be made soon” (Edwards and Samples, 2005, p. 76 ). Additionally, Republicans pledged to shift public policy away from direct government funding of services toward private insurance. But the GOP became politically vulnerable when President Clinton “capitalized on the popularity of Medicare and accused the Republicans of slashing it” (Drew, 1996, p. 318). The two sides had distinctly different visions on how the U.S. should advance public policy programs, and this disagreement came to the forefront in the dispute over Medicare. The Republicans wanted to slash governmental expenditures and rely on the private sector, while the Democrats sought to preserve governmental funding of social programs, even if costs had to be trimmed. In the battle for public opinion President Clinton had the benefit of contrasting the Republicans' objective for “cutting Medicare by $270 billion with their proposed tax cut of $245 billion, arguing that they wanted to cut Medicare for the elderly in order to pay for a tax cut tilted toward the wealthy” (Drew, 1996, p. 321). Throughout the fall of 1995 Clinton continually reminded voters that Democrats aimed to defend Medicare, Medicaid, education, and the environment from Republican cuts. The reconciliation bill put into one piece of legislation all of the Republican priorities, including Medicare cuts, putting Medicaid into a block grant, turning welfare back to the states, cutting taxes by $245 billion, and the specific programs cuts and eliminations that had been included in the appropriations bills. It cut the Earned Income Tax Credit for the working poor, as well as food stamps and other welfare programs. The final bill, which proposed to cut federal spending by $894 billion over seven years, was finally approved in both houses of Congress and finalized on November 18th, and Gingrich proclaimed it “a fundamental change in the direction of government” (quoted in Drew, 1996, p. 328). When the 29 reconciliation bill with the provisions that the president had objected to arrived at the White House, Clinton vetoed it on December 6. In a symbolic gesture President Clinton used the same pen to sign the veto message that President Johnson had used to sign Medicare legislation in 1965. With much of the government shut down, pressure for both sides to negotiate mounted, though polls showed that the public “blamed the Republicans more than the Democrats for the shutdown” (Drew, 1996, p. 334). Finally on November 19 a deal was reached to reopen the government, and a continuing resolution was sent to the President for his signature. As the Republicans had demanded, the President agreed to a resolution that called for a balanced budget in seven years, to be monitored by the Congressional Budget Office. Gingrich called the agreement, “one of the great historic achievements in modern America” (quoted in Drew, 1996, p. 340). On November 19, the government shutdown ended and the 800,000 government workers went back to work as the continuing resolution took effect; it would last until December 15. President Clinton had finally agreed to the major demands of the Republicans (a balanced budget in seven years scored by CBO). He was not, however, obligated to follow the Republican policy priorities in attempting to achieve that balance. In December, it became clear that a solution between the White House and Congress would not be forthcoming. The White House suggested another continuing resolution in case there was no agreement by December 15, when the existing resolution expired. Senate Majority Leader Dole was inclined to agree to another continuing resolution, but Speaker Gingrich was under heavy pressure from freshmen Republicans in the House not to agree to one. Dole's political instincts told him that Congress and the 30 Republicans would again be blamed for the second shutdown, but Gingrich told President Clinton in budget negotiations: "If I go back and try to get a long-term continuing resolution without a budget from you, the next time you'll be dealing with Speaker Armey” (quoted in Drew, 1996, p. 352). The Republicans wanted to be sure that the Clinton administration would agree to a specific balanced budget containing their priorities. Representative Scott Klug (R-WI) said, "We felt that the only way to get the White House to be serious was by keeping the government closed” (quoted in Drew, 1996, pp. 354-355). With no new continuing resolution, the existing one ran out on December 16 and the government again shut down. But since several appropriations bills had been passed, the shutdown this time sent only 280,000 workers rather than the 800,000 of the earlier shutdown. Public pressure continued to mount for some resolution. On January 2 Dole declared that "Enough is enough," and convinced the Senate to pass a continuing resolution to allow the government to reopen. While Gingrich was still under pressure, he felt that negative publicity from the shutdown was hurting the Republicans and that it was time to pass a continuing resolution. On January 3 and 4, Gingrich spent 22 hours in meetings with Republican House members to discuss opening the government. Hearing the displeasure of the conservatives but understanding that some of the moderates were worried about the public reaction to the shutdown in an election year, Gingrich decided that it was time to end the shutdown (Maraniss, 1996, p. 16). Gingrich told the House Republicans, “You don't like the job I'm doing as Speaker, run against me” (quoted in Drew, 1996, p. 367). On January 6, Congress ended the 21 day shutdown by passing a continuing resolution to open the government until January 26. That same day, the 31 president delivered a proposal to balance the budget in seven years, but the Clinton proposals detailed much lower cuts in Medicare, Medicaid, and welfare than the Republican plan. The government was open, but the issues dividing the two sides did not disappear. As the 1996 election approached, it became abundantly clear that the tone in Washington was fundamentally different, and arguably more contentious than any preceding Congress before. The Republicans’ intransigence in their policy platforms was defended by the GOP with surprising ferocity. Even though most of the Contract with America had not become law, the Republican Congress had certainly changed the tone of the debates in Congress in only a year. Many domestic programs were cut, and the framework for considering public policy had clearly shifted to the right. Through two government shutdowns the Republicans insisted on winning all of their policy priorities; even (or especially) minor symbolic ones such as shutting down the National Endowments for the Arts and Humanities. Republican animosity towards the president during the fall of 1995 led to Clinton's resurgence in public opinion polls and a viable bid for a second term. Fenno observed in his book Learning to Govern, in 1996 the Republicans "...did something few people thought could be done when they took over the Congress — they reelected President Bill Clinton to a second term....The scope of that political transformation is mind-boggling and virtually impossible to pull off. But the Republicans had done it" (1997, p. 47). The Republicans were blamed heavily for the events of 1995, and it was the mistakes made during the budget battle that undoubtedly played a major role in Clinton’s reelection. The Democrats also gained two seats in the 32 House, although Republicans maintained the majority in both houses. Once Clinton began his second term, the animosity between the president and Speaker Gingrich did not lessen; in fact, it seemed to intensify. Gingrich went so far as to encourage the House to impeach Clinton for perjury and obstruction of justice, charges relating to various infractions but most notably an improper relationship that the president allegedly had with a former White House intern. The impeachment trial did not work as the Republicans had expected, and this event spelled the end for Gingrich’s reign as Speaker. Far from being popular, many Americans were unwilling to support impeachment or removal of the president from office. Polls conducted throughout 1998 and into early 1999 showed that only about one-third of Americans supported Clinton's impeachment or conviction. However, one year later, when it became apparent that the partisan Senate would not convict the president, “half of Americans said in a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll that they supported impeachment, but 57% approved of the Senate's decision to keep him in office and two thirds of those polled said the impeachment was harmful to the country” (Holland, 1999, para. 1-2). The 1998 midterm elections saw the Democrats picking up five seats in the House, a serious defeat for Republicans who had hoped to gain from the Lewinsky scandal. Gingrich resigned as speaker in January 1999 following the poor showing of Republicans in the 1998 midterm elections. Clinton, for his part, finished his term with a high job approval rating but a low assessment of his moral character, which would indirectly impact the events of 2000 and the image of both parties. IMPACT OF POLARIZATION ON U.S. POLITICS It is interesting to note that if one looks back to 1968, there was a remarkably 33 different ideological atmosphere than was seen in 1994 and onward. George Wallace, a third party presidential candidate in 1968, compared the ideologies of the two major parties before being famously quoted as saying, “There ain’t a dime’s worth of difference” between the two (Theriault, 2008, p. 6). Anthony Downs, a public policy and administration scholar at the Brookings Institute, attempted in 1957 to use economic theory to understand politics. Downs reasoned that as these political organizations fought for the middle with the goal of capturing the pivotal “median voter,” political parties would converge along the ideological spectrum on either side of the median voter. Downs's theory is known as the “median voter theory.” With this theory, Downs provided an explanation for why political parties, in a two party system, would have similar ideological positions rather than distinctive positions. However, by the end of the twentieth century, neither of the parties seemed to be acting in accordance with this expectation. By the time the Republicans swept the House and Senate in 1994, both congressional parties had polarized against each other, and social issues that began to take on more prominence at the turn of the century came to the forefront of debate on Capitol Hill. While polarization has been a common fixture amongst the two main parties and cannot be wholly attributed to the atmosphere and actions of the 1990s Congress, there are many that would argue that the aftermath of 1994 became the first indication of widespread and permanent polarization that had begun in the 1970s. As Mickey Edwards claimed, “Newt made Congress a much more partisan institution” (quoted in Dubose, 2011, para. 4). What began in 1968 with the passage of the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act broke apart coalitions that had been in place since FDR’s presidency. The Republican party was once one that housed Northeastern moderates and the 34 Democrats held onto their Southern conservatives and Northern liberals. Deeply divided by Johnson’s historic signing of civil rights legislation, prominent Democrats like Strom Thurmond changed sides, becoming Republicans. Thurmond claimed that the Democrats had “forsaken the people to become the party of minority groups, power-hungry union leaders, political bosses, and businessmen looking for government contracts and favors... invaded the private lives of people by using the powers of government for coercion and intimidation of individuals” (Cohodas, 1994, p. 359). Yet even the defection of numerous Southern Democrats did not spark a realignment, because Democrats continued to hold the House, even through the presidential success of Reagan and George H.W. Bush. After 1994, it became apparent that the lines of partisanship between the two parties were clearly defined, and after decades of waning party affiliation in the United States, voters were once again choosing sides. Gingrich and Clinton’s budget battle was a clear indication of this, but other factors were involved as well. The two party system in the U.S. that had been effectively dominant since the 1912 election virtually guarantees a certain level of polarization. As a result of the increasing number of “safe” partisan districts, party primaries have become battlegrounds where party activists can oust longstanding incumbents who they believe are not as ideologically strong as activists would prefer. This pattern became increasingly noticeable during the twenty first century. For example, in 2010 long-time incumbent Senator Robert Bennett of Utah was defeated by the grassroots tea party movement, with their candidate Mike Lee going on to win the seat. Other long-standing Republican Senators that had once encouraged bipartisanship were forced to become more conservative to win elections, including John McCain of Arizona and Orrin Hatch of Utah. While Democrats were also seen as trending liberal, it 35 has been at a different pace than their conservative counterparts. Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson wrote in their book Off Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of American Democracy, "The parties are indeed moving apart, but by no means at the same rate or from a fixed central point. Rather, Republicans are galloping right while Democrats are trotting left" (2005, p. 27). Lobbyists and interest groups have also played an increasingly large role after the “Sunshine Rules” put in place by Watergate have made Congress more open, requiring recorded votes and open committee meetings. The emergence of new media, including the intense popularity of talk radio such as Rush Limbaugh, Howard Stern, and Sean Hannity and 24-hour cable news stations including Fox News and MSNBC have contributed to the partisanship by examining Congressional votes and speeches with a heightened sense of scrutiny. This increased partisanship was apparent during President Clinton’s two terms in office. Gingrich’s nationalization of the Republican party in 1994, while having the intended effect of winning the election, inadvertently backfired on the Republicans. When the GOP had tied Clinton to the Democratic Congress, they did not expect the same tactic to be used against them after the Republicans took back the White House in 2000. While the September 11, 2001 attacks instilled in the nation a renewed sense of unity and patriotism and thus allowed the Republicans to weather the 2002 midterm elections with few consequences, by 2006 voters turned against what Democrats called the “failure” of the now-Republican Congress and president. Unlike 1968 and 1980, where the country voted for a Republican president but still supported Democrats in the House, 1994 marked the beginning of an “all or nothing” strategy. If the executive branch was doing something unpopular, Congress felt the brunt of it during the next midterm 36 elections. Likewise, if Congress was deemed to be failing in its legislative duties, the executive branch was affected. More so than ever, the two branches became intertwined and interdependent upon one another in public opinion. Partisanship and polarization became increasingly apparent as both parties struggled to appease an angry American public. To argue that 1994 was a realignment that brought on permanent change is not supported by evidence; rather, 1994 simply increased the level of polarization within Congress and the voting public and created an electoral process largely based on reactionary partisan surges. In 2000, George W. Bush ran an ultimately successful campaign as a “compassionate conservative.” Hoping to capitalize on Clinton’s moral fallacies, Bush portrayed himself as a modest, happily-married Christian conservative. Bush ran on a platform of education reform, an issue that had largely bipartisan support. Moderate voters especially were attracted to Bush’s soft-spoken and humble manner. Al Gore, the Democratic candidate, was the former Vice President under Clinton but had the unfortunate disadvantage of being associated with the “morally repugnant” president. The contrast was stark: Gore frequently portrayed himself as more knowledgeable on the issues, while Bush was a “Washington outsider” and supposedly free from the influence of Washington. After a hotly contested election, the state of Florida remained too close to call for more than forty days, as recount after recount ensued. Finally, the conservative United States Supreme Court issued a ruling in Bush v. Gore to end the recounts, the state of Florida was called for Bush, and the “compassionate conservative” was elected president. Bush’s presidency was ushered in under a Republican Congress and began with 37 the proposal of the No Child Left Behind Act, a reform of education that Bush had promised in his platform during the election. The act generated bipartisan support in Congress and the belief that Bush was truly a “moderate” conservative (unlike Gingrich and other prominent Republican leaders of the 1990s) No Child Left Behind was passed by the House and Senate in May and June of 2001, respectively, but was on hold through the summer as “Bush took the longest presidential vacation since Lyndon Johnson’s presidency” and spent most of June and July at his ranch in Texas (Franken, 2004, p. 54). In September 2001, all plans for education reform were put on hold as the world shook. The most militarily powerful nation on Earth suffered a cataclysmic terrorist attack on one of its major cities, and 3,000 innocent lives were lost in the tragedy. Immediately, an outpouring of sympathy around the world ensued for the United States. Bush and the Republican Congress responded by invading Afghanistan. The first year of Bush’s presidency in 2001 was characterized by foreign policy issues and Bush’s education crusade. As such, the polarization was not as apparent as both parties in Congress and the American public banded together in the wake of the tragedy. It would not last long, however. The No Child Left Behind Act was finally signed into law of January of 2002, but not before the U.S. Senate had experienced a partisan upheaval. Jim Jeffords, a Republican senator from Vermont, unexpectedly quit the GOP to become an independent who caucused with the Democrats. This defection gave the Democratic party the majority in the Senate for the first time since 1994. Jeffords reportedly quit over a disagreement with the Senate Republicans’ “refusal to fully fund the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, which Jeffords had helped pass as a House member back in 1975” (Noah, 2001, para. 2). Though this gave Democrats temporary control of the 38 Senate, the Republicans regained both houses in 2002. The significance of these events was not in the legislative nature (Jefford’s defection did not impact legislation in the 107th Congress overmuch) but rather the partisan stigma attached to it. Jefford’s frustration and alienation from his party is particularly noteworthy, as he had been a liberal Republican for decades. This instance pointed to a clear divergence in party ideologies during the first years of the Bush administration. Largely due to the patriotism that ensued from the war on terror and his aggressive foreign policy in such matters, Bush enjoyed firm support from his fellow Republicans in Congress and from conservative voters in his 2004 reelection campaign. However, it was now abundantly clear that his days of being a “compassionate conservative” were over, and that his agenda concerning foreign policy especially was decidedly conservative. Bush told reporters "I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. It is my style" (Stevenson, 2004, para. 3). Bush’s concept of “pre-emptive” war with Iraq caused a major rift in the party between traditional conservatives and those who embraced the president’s policies. While the war in Afghanistan had largely been supported on a bipartisan basis and a sense of patriotic duty, the war in Iraq was entirely another matter. Bush spent his so-called “political capital” alarmingly quickly, and after failing to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, his approval rating began to plummet. The economy was in trouble, the U.S was deeply in debt, and in the space of five years the nation was embroiled in two wars overseas. Conservatives both in Congress and in the media from Senator Chuck Hagel to Ann Coulter to Newt Gingrich began to lampoon the president “they had once treated with something close to worship” (Kabaservice, 2012, p. 36). A great many Republicans 39 accused the president of having the same faults as his father: he had failed because he had abandoned the anti-government faith. What had been minimal admonitions in the conservative endorsement of Bush in 2004—his passage of a prescription-drug benefit and education reform, his self-identification as a “compassionate conservative”— “blossomed into evidence of a wholesale betrayal” (Kabaservice, 2012, p. 48). Bush had also managed to alienate the social conservative wing of the party with his “liberal” acts, including appointing Scott Evertz—an openly gay man—to the head of the Office of National AIDS Policy (Tzemach, 2001, para. 1). Despite publicly supporting a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage in 2004, Bush and his administration made no actual effort to see this issue to fruition as they had with the No Child Left Behind Act. This, combined with his “preemption” doctrine, greatly angered many conservatives, who argued that the GOP must return to its “traditionalist” roots. In addition, the 2006 elections were disastrous for the Republican party. Similar to 1994, Bush's unpopularity was a major deterrent to voters, and they blamed Congress for the president's poor handling of the Iraq War, Hurricane Katrina, and Social Security reform. There were also numerous scandals associated with the Republican-controlled Congress, which not only mirrored the atmosphere of the 1994 election but aided the Democrats in picking up thirty one seats in the House and five in the Senate. By 2010, however, the economic crisis and sweeping changes to healthcare law had frightened selfproclaimed “independents” into voting Republican once again. The GOP picked up sixty three seats in the House and six in the Senate. As the tea party gathered steam during the 2010 election and frustration with Barack Obama caused voters to turn to the GOP once more, it gives cause to look back 40 and reflect. It seems that it was not so much the Republican party that changed, but rather the issues discussed that has caused such a split between the two parties. Today, both parties are characterized by a certain set of concrete ideals, some stereotypical and watered down for the general public but for the most part fairly accurate. The Democrats are still the party of the minorities, the safe haven for the poor and disenfranchised, proponents of civil rights and civil liberties and favor an active role of the government in both aspects of society and the economy. The Republicans are essentially the opposite; they endorse limited federal government, strong state and local governments, a free market system with limited regulation, and are proponents of traditional social values. Perhaps it is impossible to pinpoint exactly where this change formally began, but there is no doubt that the election of 1994 put Republicans in a position to enact legislation and effect change. Where did the GOP deviate from “traditional conservative values” as some tea party activists claim? Some would argue that Bush abandoned his conservative principles. Some would blame Gingrich for his heavy-handed control of the House. Some would say that the Republicans never actually strayed from their conservative ideals, but Bush’s public unpopularity forced the party to distance themselves in the hope of reelection. “Indeed, Bush's presidency, far from being a subversion of modern American conservatism, represents its fulfillment. For most of the president's tenure, many of the same folks who now brand him as an incompetent or an impostor happily backed his agenda” (Greenberg, 2007, para. 6). Much of it likely has to do with the voters. The Republican party in 2009 was forced to “re-brand” themselves just like they had in the wake of Clinton’s first victory back in 1992. Voters had become disillusioned in the face of a failing economy and two expensive foreign wars. The GOP feared the outright 41 rejection of conservatism itself, and thus Republicans in Congress were desperate to rebuff Bush and claim that his policies were “not conservative.” But Bush was arguably just as conservative as Reagan, if not more so. In 2003, Bill Keller of the New York Times even wrote a “definitive 8,000-word article in the Sunday magazine called ‘Reagan's Son,’ which detailed striking similarities in the two men's personal styles, policies, and even staffing” (Greenberg, 2007, para. 12). It seems unreasonable to suggest that the Republican party could have become so conservative in eight years that even George W. Bush seemed too liberal for the party. The recent Republican rejection of the grassroots tea party movement proves that the GOP is not as conservative as it could be. “So are conservatives unhappy with Bush because he let down their causes? No. They're miffed that Bush, in pursuing those very causes, alienated two-thirds of the voting public. Starting with Katrina in the fall of 2005, and proceeding through the worsening civil strife in Iraq, the revelations of the wiretapping and U.S. attorney scandals, and growing discontent with domestic problems like health care, Americans lost faith in Bush's agenda” (Greenberg, 2007, para. 10). CONCLUSION Nineteen ninety four was not a realigning election as 1932 was. To be a realignment means to make a sharp and dramatic break with previous electoral patterns. The claim that 1994 represented such a realignment is not supported by the evidence. Voter turnout was nearly the same as it had been in the elections of 1990 and 1992. The Clinton administration was receiving sharp criticism for its handling of many prominent national issues, but rather than a wholehearted acceptance of conservative values, voters sought to punish President Clinton for a perceived failure to properly govern. The 42 Republicans assumed a mandate from the electoral victory and were proven to be utterly mistaken in their assumption. The Republican Congress, with Newt Gingrich as their figurehead, oversaw many bitter legislative battles with President Clinton that ultimately resulted in two government shutdowns and a substantial loss of support for the Republican party. In examining the 1994 election and its subsequent effects in U.S. politics, one can see the emergence of a pattern that is easily recognizable in the electoral process for Congress today. Gingrich and the GOP “overplayed their hand” and it had lasting consequences for both parties. In the present day, the effects of the 1994 election still reverberate throughout the U.S. Congress, though many of the major players in that election and subsequent Congress have since retired. An increased level of partisanship is now evident in both parties, brought on by many factors. New and intensive media coverage of politics, an increased focus on divisive social issues such as gay marriage in the early 2000's, and the definitive link established between the White House and Congress has changed the way that the United States weathers the election process. “Party polarization in Congress is real and significant; it is not likely that we have seen the end of this trend, though it is likely that we have already seen the most dramatic changes in the trend” (Theriault, 2003, p. 21). The elections are now fully nationalized in a way no one in 1994 could have anticipated. 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That historic change would be the end of government that is too big, too intrusive, and too easy with the public's money. It can be the beginning of a Congress that respects the values and shares the faith of the American family. Like Lincoln, our first Republican president, we intend to act "with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right." To restore accountability to Congress. To end its cycle of scandal and disgrace. To make us all proud again of the way free people govern themselves. On the first day of the 104th Congress, the new Republican majority will immediately pass the following major reforms, aimed at restoring the faith and trust of the American people in their government: FIRST, require all laws that apply to the rest of the country also apply equally to the Congress; SECOND, select a major, independent auditing firm to conduct a comprehensive audit of Congress for waste, fraud or abuse; THIRD, cut the number of House committees, and cut committee staff by one-third; 48 FOURTH, limit the terms of all committee chairs; FIFTH, ban the casting of proxy votes in committee; SIXTH, require committee meetings to be open to the public; SEVENTH, require a three-fifths majority vote to pass a tax increase; EIGHTH, guarantee an honest accounting of our Federal Budget by implementing zero base-line budgeting. Thereafter, within the first 100 days of the 104th Congress, we shall bring to the House Floor the following bills, each to be given full and open debate, each to be given a clear and fair vote and each to be immediately available this day for public inspection and scrutiny. 1. THE FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT A balanced budget/tax limitation amendment and a legislative line-item veto to restore fiscal responsibility to an out-of-control Congress, requiring them to live under the same budget constraints as families and businesses. 2. THE TAKING BACK OUR STREETS ACT An anti-crime package including stronger truth-in-sentencing, "good faith" exclusionary rule exemptions, effective death penalty provisions, and cuts in social spending from this summer's "crime" bill to fund prison construction and additional law enforcement to keep people secure in their neighborhoods and kids safe in their schools. 3. THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT Discourage illegitimacy and teen pregnancy by prohibiting welfare to minor mothers and denying increased AFDC for additional children while on welfare, cut spending for welfare programs, and enact a tough two-years-and-out provision with work requirements to promote individual responsibility. 49 4. THE FAMILY REINFORCEMENT ACT Child support enforcement, tax incentives for adoption, strengthening rights of parents in their children's education, stronger child pornography laws, and an elderly dependent care tax credit to reinforce the central role of families in American society. 5. THE AMERICAN DREAM RESTORATION ACT A $500 per child tax credit, begin repeal of the marriage tax penalty, and creation of American Dream Savings Accounts to provide middle class tax relief. 6. THE NATIONAL SECURITY RESTORATION ACT No U.S. troops under U.N. command and restoration of the essential parts of our national security funding to strengthen our national defense and maintain our credibility around the world. 7. THE SENIOR CITIZENS FAIRNESS ACT Raise the Social Security earnings limit which currently forces seniors out of the work force, repeal the 1993 tax hikes on Social Security benefits and provide tax incentives for private long-term care insurance to let Older Americans keep more of what they have earned over the years. 8. THE JOB CREATION AND WAGE ENHANCEMENT ACT Small business incentives, capital gains cut and indexation, neutral cost recovery, risk assessment/cost-benefit analysis, strengthening the Regulatory Flexibility Act and unfunded mandate reform to create jobs and raise worker wages. 9. THE COMMON SENSE LEGAL REFORM ACT "Loser pays" laws, reasonable limits on punitive damages and reform of product liability laws to stem the endless tide of litigation. 10. THE CITIZEN LEGISLATURE ACT A first-ever vote on term limits to replace career politicians with citizen legislators. Further, we will instruct the House Budget Committee to report to the floor and we will 50 work to enact additional budget savings, beyond the budget cuts specifically included in the legislation described above, to ensure that the Federal budget deficit will be less than it would have been without the enactment of these bills. Respecting the judgment of our fellow citizens as we seek their mandate for reform, we hereby pledge our names to this Contract with America.