| Description |
In the closest decisions made by the Supreme Court of the United States, there is one justice whose vote shapes their ruling. This "swing justice" is the figure that determines the outcome of the ruling and is crucial to the opinion that is written on the case. It is their opinions and beliefs that have the most weight when the decision is a close one, as they are the deciding vote on the matter. While the most common justice to serve in this position is the justice at the ideological median of the Court, there are significant cases of the swing justice being a member other than that median justice. Following the theories of notable political scientists and legal scholars such as Lee Epstein, Peter Enns, and Andrew Martin, this thesis contends that in many cases the identity of the swing justice depends on the strategic legal issues at play and not ideological factors. My research has shown that rather than being the same justice who sits in the middle of the ideological spectrum, the swing justice rotates depending on the issues being discussed and the legal considerations made by each member of the Court. Thus, the same justice that is the swing justice on a case about search and seizure could normally be a staunch member of the liberal block but differs on this issue due to certain outstanding factors. This behavior goes beyond the traditional legal view of grouping justices based on ideology and instead argues an approach based in public perception, legal theories, and other non-ideological considerations. My thesis therefore supports the findings of recent legal scholars and further argues that ideology is not the only factor to consider when dealing with the Supreme Court. |
