Contextualizing emergency powers and climate crisis in liberal democracies

This thesis develops a theoretical framework for and responds to concerns regarding the use of emergency powers to combat climate change in liberal democracies. Consensus in the scientific community maintains that the window for acting to mitigate the worst effects of climate change is rapidly narrowing. Emergency powers enable governments to create and implement policy quickly by circumventing normal democratic channels. In the name of the greater good, leaders empowered by emergency orders may ignore norms viewed as essential to maintaining liberal democracy. Surveying Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and Locke this thesis develops a theoretical framework in which the use of emergency powers is justified to combat the existential threat climate change poses to the state and humanity while recognizing the paradoxical tensions this creates. This thesis goes on to counter objections to using emergency powers to address climate change, including that climate emergency politics results in a narrow definition of climate change mitigation and adaptation, enables executive overreach or creeping authoritarianism, and permits infringement of individual rights.

CONTEXTUALIZING EMERGENCY POWERS AND CLIMATE CRISIS IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES by Erik Fronberg A Senior Honors Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of The University of Utah In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Honors Degree in Bachelor of Science In Political Science Approved: __ Steven Johnston, PhD Thesis Faculty Supervisor ____________________________ Brent Steele, PhD Chair, Department of Political Science Eunbin Chung, PhD Honors Faculty Advisor ____________________________ Sylvia D. Torti, PhD Dean, Honors College May 2022 Copyright © 2022 All Rights Reserved ABSTRACT This thesis develops a theoretical framework for and responds to concerns regarding the use of emergency powers to combat climate change in liberal democracies. Consensus in the scientific community maintains that the window for acting to mitigate the worst effects of climate change is rapidly narrowing. Emergency powers enable governments to create and implement policy quickly by circumventing normal democratic channels. In the name of the greater good, leaders empowered by emergency orders may ignore norms viewed as essential to maintaining liberal democracy. Surveying Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and Locke this thesis develops a theoretical framework in which the use of emergency powers is justified to combat the existential threat climate change poses to the state and humanity while recognizing the paradoxical tensions this creates. This thesis goes on to counter objections to using emergency powers to address climate change, including that climate emergency politics results in a narrow definition of climate change mitigation and adaptation, enables executive overreach or creeping authoritarianism, and permits infringement of individual rights. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………………ii INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………...1 PART 1: EMERGENCY IN CONTEXT…………………………………………………4 PART 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK………………………………………...……7 PART 3: RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS…………...………………………………20 CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………….34 REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………..37 iii 1 INTRODUCTION Decades of hesitation to adequately address global warming have left little time for states to take the actions necessary to prevent its catastrophic and irreversible effects. Global warming is approaching climate tipping points at which the impact of natural feedback loops in climate systems will result in an irreparably damaged planet inhospitable to human society (Ripple et al., 2019). This threat’s urgency and magnitude have driven the international securitization of climate change, resulting in the growing popularity of climate emergency declarations issued by bodies across all government levels. These climate emergency declarations have been especially popular in states with longstanding liberal democratic regimes (Davidson et al., 2020). This thesis adds to the climate discussion by establishing a theoretical framework for using emergency powers in liberal democracies to address the climate crisis and countering objections to using emergency powers to address climate change. The UN Brundtland Report introduced the world to climate change as a securitization topic in 1987, offering an “urgent call” for international cooperation on a slew of environmental issues, including global warming (The World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). Despite this bold call to action and sound science supporting climatic predictions, whether climate change should be included on the security agenda remained a hotly contested topic into the first decades of the 21st century. The term “climate emergency” was not widely used until late 2018, when a series of youth climate strikes in part inspired by the activism of Swedish student Greta Thunberg 2 garnered international media attention. It has since appeared frequently in media coverage of climate issues and scholarly work1. The increased popularity of climate emergency in public discourse has gone hand in hand with government declarations. As of September 2020, at least 1,217 local governments and seven national governments had made climate emergency declarations, most of them in 2019 and almost exclusively in liberal democracies (Davidson et al., 2020). In addition to the numerous local jurisdictions and several states that have made declarations, international organizations have also made strides towards recognizing climate change as an emergency. The European Union issued a climate and environmental emergency declaration in November 2019 (The European Parliament, 2019), and in December 2020, UN Secretary-General António Guterres called on leaders in all countries to acknowledge the climate crisis through similar declarations (Green & Abnett, 2020). Efforts in the United States—arguably the most influential leader in the international climate regime both as the world’s largest single carbon emitter and a global icon for democratic ideals and economic prosperity—have not resulted in a formal emergency declaration. However, President Joe Biden has made addressing climate 1 A keyword search on the Elsevier database Scopus for “climate emergency” reveals that while only 16 scholarly articles were published on the subject in the decade prior to 2019 that number rapidly climbed to 21 in 2019 and 100 in 2020. The rapid popularization of climate emergency went so far as to earn it recognition as Oxford Dictionary’s 2019 Word of the Year (Oxford Languages, 2019). 3 change one of his administration’s top priorities and, on January 27, 2021, issued Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad (The White House, 2021). While the order carries the full weight of law, it does not circumvent existing laws to address urgent climate issues, an extraordinary power reserved for emergency action. The order repeatedly reminds its audience that all actions are to be taken “to the extent consistent with applicable law.” Despite calls from fellow party members (Frazin, 2021), Biden has been reticent to issue a formal emergency declaration—and understandably so. Democratic regimes typically approach emergency powers with caution, holding them in reserve for use in only the most extraordinary circumstances, including war, epidemic, large-scale natural disasters, or terrorism. Policymakers must carefully weigh the threat of climate change against the erosion of democratic norms and values that can accompany states of emergency. The recent securitization of climate change comes in the wake of serious reflection on the role of emergency measures in liberal democracies. The terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 and the ensuing “war on terror” with its pervasive and enduring antiterrorist measures have shaped discussion on how emergency powers operate within existing and emerging understandings of law, legitimacy, and legality (Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006). The COVID-19 pandemic, ongoing at the time of this thesis’ completion, has sparked a new debate on public safety, governance, liberty, executive accountability, and democratic backsliding that will undoubtedly shape the conversation surrounding the utilization of emergency powers to address climate change. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine has heightened interest in energy independence in European states reliant on Russian fossil fuel exports 4 (Benshoff, 2022). It is not yet clear whether this will lower carbon emissions by accelerating a transition to renewable energy or whether higher energy prices on the global market will delay plans to transition away from coal, the cheapest and most carbon-intensive fossil fuel (Tollefson, 2022). Surveying Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and Locke, this thesis develops a theoretical framework for approaching emergency powers and climate change in liberal democracies which recognizes the paradoxical tension between protecting democracy’s essential features and responding to existential threat. It goes on to respond to three objections to instituting states of climate emergency: (1) that climate emergency declarations encourage an inappropriately narrow conception of climate change mitigation and adaptation, (2) that a state of climate emergency will enable executive overreach in wellestablished democracies and contribute to creeping authoritarianism in vulnerable democracies, and (3) that states of climate emergency will lead governments to infringe on individual liberties. The first objection is technical in that it hinges on a limited definition of climate emergency. The latter objections are political in nature, relating to fears of democratic backsliding. Humanity’s failure to mitigate the climate crisis tragically positions democratic states to either turn to emergency powers to effectively address the threat despite its potential impact on democratic processes and values or cling to traditional government process that fail to rise to the occasion, surrendering modern civilization to an irreparably altered planet. EMERGENCY IN CONTEXT This thesis adopts the definition of emergency used by Nomi Lazar in her work States of Emergency in Liberal Democracies (Claire Lazar, 2009). Lazar claims that 5 emergencies are characterized by two “symptoms:” urgency and scale. Urgency means that an emergency constitutes an immediate threat that cannot be addressed through ordinary, lengthy policy and legislation processes. Urgency does not have to be temporally limited. A situation may be urgent for an extended period before being resolved; however, the longer the period, the greater potential for a legislative solution to arise. Thus, time limits on emergencies are intuitive (p. 8-9). Scale entails that an emergency affects a wide range of people. This range is relative to the size of the jurisdiction facing the situation. While a local flood event may not be an emergency for an entire state, it may be an emergency for a local municipality. Emergency powers are defined as formal powers that allow for deviation from the standard policy and legislative process to address emergencies. Emergency powers are most often utilized by the executive officer in a government. Guidelines for the use of emergency powers are typically outlined in the constitutions of liberal democratic states or established by their legislative bodies. Climate change requires urgent action and impacts all people, clearly fitting Lazar’s criteria. Responding the most recent IPCC Adaptation Report, UN SecretaryGeneral António Guterres summarized the urgent threat of climate change: “Delay means death,” (2022). Scientific consensus maintains that the window for avoiding the worst effects of climate change is rapidly narrowing. This urgency and climate change’s catastrophic potential are well-documented. The most recent report of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) identifies threats to individuals and vulnerable communities, including water insecurity, food insecurity, flooding, heatwaves, wildfires, and displacement (IPCC, 2022). Researchers have linked climate change to increased 6 severity of hurricanes and wildfires, increased distribution of tropical diseases, and displacement of what the world bank estimates will be over 140 million persons by 2050 (Elsner et al., 2008; Krawchuk et al., 2009; Rigaud et al., 2018; Tidman et al., 2021). Most alarming is the possibility of anthropogenic warming triggering climate tipping points at which the effects of global warming become immediate, catastrophic, and irreversible (Lenton et al., 2019). Climate is determined by the complex interactions of global systems. A disruption in one system can have global consequences. Rapid loss of polar ice sheets, collapse of the North Atlantic gulf stream, and dieback of the Amazon Rainforest are just a few of the climate tipping points that would have cascading global impacts (Caesar et al., 2018; Lenton et al., 2008; Pereira & Viola, 2018). Tipping points that trigger positive feedback loops that further accelerate global warming are of particular consequence. Loss of ice sheets exposes open seas or land, surfaces with a much higher warming potential than ice. Forests like the Amazon are among the world’s largest carbon sinks, and their loss would result in higher atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations, further accelerating warming. A world beyond a climate tipping point is a world in which the impacts of global warming, including frequent and extreme natural disasters, massive sea-level rise, and famine, are unavoidable. The synergistic destruction of a global cascade triggered by climate tipping points would overwhelm society’s ability to respond with existing resources and infrastructure. Competition for scarce resources would occur internationally between states, at a regional level between localities, and locally between individuals. This competition would breed conflict and displace millions, if not billions, of people. In short, climate change has the potential to plunge society into 7 chaos. These predictions are not hyperbolic. In the words of Pope Francis, “Doomsday predictions can no longer be met with irony or disdain,” (2015). LIBERAL DEMOCRACY DEFINED Having defined one component of this thesis’ topic, emergency, we can now define the second: liberal democracy. For the sake of this thesis, liberal democracies are those that broadly meet the criteria described by Derbyshire & Derbyshire in “Political Systems of the World” (1989). That is, they (1) hold free elections; (2) limit government power allowing for a pluralistic society; (3) guarantee human rights including freedom of expression and assembly and the security of person through an independent judiciary; and (4) maintain a skilled and impartial civil service accountable to the government of the day that is in turn accountable to the electorate. As with most classification systems in the social sciences, these criteria establish a gradient, with states varying in degree of conformity with democratic standards at any given point in time. Currently, most governments in the western hemisphere, Europe, and Australasia are considered liberal democracies alongside some scattered states in Africa and Asia (Explore the Map, 2021). THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Liberal democracy traces its ideological roots to Europe’s eighteenth-century Age of Enlightenment. During that era, a series of political philosophers developed a theoretical foundation for governance that influenced the evolution of western institutions. In what follows, I survey four of these thinkers, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and Locke, who provide valuable insight into emergency and its import on liberal democracies. Hobbes considers emergency a permanent state remedied only by permanent consolidation of sovereign power in a single executive, an arrangement 8 incompatible with liberal democratic norms. Rousseau advocates for an institutionalized dictatorship to address crisis but places restrictions on the dictator that would inhibit necessary climate actions. Kant argues that responding to existential threats is a moral imperative but fails to reconcile conflicts between incompatible moral imperatives. Locke’s conception of executive prerogative accommodates emergency action while acknowledging the tragic paradox it presents for democracy. The Hobbesian, Rousseauian, and Kantian approaches to emergency prove inadequate in addressing challenges of climate change. Locke alone provides a philosophical framework flexible and expansive enough to enable effective climate action in democratic regimes. Hobbes’s Leviathan details his conception of the state of nature as one of perpetual emergency. Men are more or less equal in ability and potential. Out of this equality arises a commensurate desire to gain wealth and glory. Because resources and opportunities for glory are limited, people will inevitably come into conflict resulting in a perpetual state of war. Hobbes observes that individuals in a state of war have no norms moderating conflict, so “nothing can be unjust” and “force and fraud” become “the two cardinal virtues,” (Book 1, Chapter XIII). Hobbes argues that the insecurity stemming from this state of perpetual war logically guides people to the first law of nature: that men will seek peace. Obtaining peace requires following the second law of nature: one must “be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself” (Book 1, Chapter XIV). Hobbes argues that men must enter into a social contract in which all members of the community are limited to the liberties allowed by the second law of nature. 9 Hobbes’ perception of the state of nature as one of war entails a state of perpetual emergency, leading him to conclude that the only way to ensure the social contract’s viability is to bind individuals together in a commonwealth with undivided sovereignty, regardless of the institutional form it takes. The people’s consent authorizes the sovereign to act on their behalf. Decision making is consolidated, providing the sovereign authority unilateral ability to take action to protect the commonwealth: “And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of them all; whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means; it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the Soveraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence; and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of discord at home and Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are lost, for the recovery of the same (Book 1, Chapter XVIII). Within Hobbes’ framework, the sovereign has absolute authority to determine what is and is not a threat to the commonwealth and may act unilaterally and by any means necessary to accomplish his objectives. Though Hobbes focuses on war, crime, and sedition, the principles are transferable to the climate crisis, which presents an existential threat to the state2. 2 While of minimal import to this thesis which focuses on states of exception, anthropogenic climate change could also be read as a threat to Hobbes’ social contract by 10 While Hobbes’ thought develops an ethical justification for society to intervene to address climate change, his authoritarian conception of the social contract is not compatible with liberal democratic norms. Addressing a state of perpetual emergency by concentrating power in a single executive violates the democratic norm that citizens should be able to engage in the decision-making process. In democracies, the governed, whether by participating in decision-making assemblies directly or electing representatives to legislative bodies, influence political outcomes. This participation popularizes sovereignty, a situation that Hobbes would find untenable. To accept Hobbes’ position is to accept that there is no place for meaningful democracy in effective governance. Hobbes’ framework may therefore be useful to authoritarian regimes looking to justify their climate change mitigation strategies but cannot be used by states wishing to maintain their democratic character. Regardless of how democracy is achieved, democratic decision-making is, by its nature, slower than its authoritarian counterpart. Matters of legislation are discussed and debated, which can take weeks or months, sometimes years. But emergencies require urgent action. Democratic states are thus placed in a difficult ontological position, balancing a self-defining need to maintain violating the second law of nature in that the activities of some are harming others. The current climate change crisis is primarily driven by anthropogenic carbon emissions, primarily generated by industrial and transportation activity related to wealthy western lifestyles yet climate change disproportionately harms the poor of the global south (Ripple et al., 2019). 11 potentially slow democratic processes and a practical need to respond quickly to crises. Can democracies respond to emergencies while still maintaining the integrity of their institutions, or are emergencies democracy’s nemesis, presenting a tragic situation in which democracy ceases to exist through either contradiction of its essential principles or failure to respond to existential threats? Rousseau, Kant, and Locke, argued that democracy can respond to crises, and it is to their writings I turn next in this survey3. Jean-Jacques Rosseau recognized that a democratic state, like any other, would encounter circumstances that threatened its existence but believed that institutionalizing emergency response in a state’s constitution would safeguard democracy. While public decision-making in Rousseau’s idyllic republic would predominately be confined to a citizens’ assembly in which the “general will” of the people could be ascertained, Rousseau recognized that crises require the speed and flexibility that come from consolidating decision-making power into a single authority. Rousseau outlined his 3 Hobbesian thought may have more to contribute to the climate crisis discourse. In the liberal democratic model, states of emergency only require a temporary deviation from normal processes. The urgency of emergency requires suspension of democratic norms to allow for immediate action. Once the crisis has been resolved, emergency powers are revoked and society returns to normal democratic governance. Climate change is not a state of emergency that can be resolved in a short period. In fact, the damage done to the climate may drive humanity into a state of perpetual precarity, put another way, the Hobbesian state of nature. The Hobbesian critic may attempt to challenge democracy’s efficacy in responding to the perpetual insecurity that arises from the climate crisis. 12 solution in Book IV, Chapter 6 of On the Social Contract. Drawing inspiration from Machiavelli and the early Roman Republic, he called for temporary dictatorship in times of crisis. Unlike Hobbes’ sovereign, Rousseau’s dictator does not possess sovereign authority (a position Rousseau considers incompatible with democracy) but instead holds commissarial authority derived from the people (de Wilde, 2019). Rousseau sees the dictator not as a challenge to the people and their liberty but rather as an empowering appendage to the people who retain the power to revoke the dictator’s authority at any time. Rousseau understood the potential for such a powerful figure to abuse his position and outlined three restrictions to temper this danger: (1) dictatorships are reserved for only the “rare cases” when “there is no doubt about the general will” and “the existence of the country is at stake,” i.e., existential threats (IV, 6; 3, 4 and 11), (2) dictatorships have terms “fixed for a very brief period that is never to be prolonged” with the dictator exhibiting great haste to get rid of the position (IV, 6, 6), and (3) dictatorships are subordinate to the “general will” of the people’s assembly; temporary ability to legislate does not mean that the dictator can make permanent reforms to the constitution of the state or in any way diminish the people’s power (de Wilde, 2019). Any deviation from these three criteria and the dictator threatens to become a tyrant, subverting democracy. Rousseau’s dictator is given liberal ability to act to address the crisis but is temporally limited by his term. While dictator, he may do anything, but no action will extend beyond his term (IV, 6, 4). This includes the ability to temporarily suspend laws but not the ability to permanently abolish them. The dictator is limited to protecting the existing constitution and does not have authority to remake it. If he overstays his term, alters the 13 constitution, or uses his power for purposes other than addressing the existential crisis facing the state, he threatens to become a tyrant and can be removed from his position by the people’s assembly. Rousseau’s dictatorship attempts to strike an appropriate balance between the need to protect democratic norms and the need to respond to crises but fails to construct an adequate framework for addressing climate change. As established earlier in this thesis, climate change presents an existential threat to the state, fulfilling the first of Rousseau’s restrictions. However, addressing climate change requires violating the latter conditions that require the dictator’s laws to expire after his term ends. Climate change cannot be resolved in a matter of weeks or months. To be truly effective, policies made during a state of climate emergency must continue indefinitely. Restricting carbon emissions, relocating people out of flood-prone areas, and investing in sustainable infrastructure are not momentary solutions. If everything goes back to business as usual as soon as emergency conditions are lifted, the threat of climate change returns. Even if immediate and dramatic action takes place to cut carbon emissions, it will take decades before temperatures stop increasing (Herring & Lindsey, 2020). Rousseau’s position requires changes instituted in states of emergency to expire after the brief period of dictatorship. This restriction does not allow for an adequate response to climate change, yet violating it, according to Rousseau, is tyranny. Working purely from Rousseau’s position, effectively responding to climate change’s existential threat cannot be justified. On the scale balancing protecting democratic norms and adequately responding to crisis, Rousseau’s constitutional dictatorship tips towards protecting democratic norms. The ethics of Immanuel Kant can be used to develop a framework that strikes a balance 14 more favorable to addressing climate crisis. In Metaphysics of Morals, Kant distinguishes between perfect and imperfect duties. Perfect duties are absolute matters of virtue derived a priori and fulfill the categorical imperative that one can will them to be a universal law. Imperfect duties are relative and depend on circumstance. Individuals are morally obligated to fulfill perfect duties but are only commended for fulfilling imperfect duties. Essentially, perfect duties must be done in all situations, and imperfect duties should be done dependent on the circumstances in which one finds themself. Unlike Rousseau, Kant sees the state of nature much in the same way as Hobbes, as one “devoid of justice,” and recognizes the necessity to form a civil society in which individuals are subject to “public lawful external coercion” (p. 312). Because the state of nature is so reprehensible, the formation and preservation of a civil state is a matter of absolute duty. The operation of the state according to democratic norms and the civil liberties of its citizens are certainly valued but are contingent on the existence of the state itself and are thereby considered imperfect duties. In circumstances in which the state faces an existential threat, the imperfect duties of following democratic norms and protecting civil liberties should be followed to the extent that they are compatible with what must be done to preserve the state. In Kant’s ethical framework, the safeguards Rousseau felt were essential to prevent a dictator from becoming a tyrant remain significant as imperfect duties but can be ignored when in conflict with the higher duty of preserving the state. Since the climate crisis is an existential threat to the state, Kantian ethics justifies disregarding Rousseau’s requirement that emergency action must be limited to a short term. 15 Although a framework built on Kantian ethics resolves the dilemma presented by Rousseau’s limited dictatorship, Kant’s absolutism regarding the necessity to fulfill perfect duties does not provide the moral flexibility needed to navigate emergency action. Nomi Lazar explores this limitation in her work States of Emergencies in Liberal Democracies. She argues that Kant fails to resolve situations in which two perfect duties come into conflict writing: “A sovereign might do what he thinks necessary in an emergency, so long as it would not be contradictory for his action to be willed a universal law. But where this could justify the violation of a leader’s other perfect duties – which Kant claims is impossible, but which experience suggests is common – it seems a statesman must simply do nothing” (2009, p. 64). Lazar is not alone in her assessment that experience demonstrates that what Kant sees as perfect duties frequently come into conflict in emergencies. Michael Ignatieff, for one, makes the case in his book The Lesser Evil that morally reprehensible actions are justified in states of emergency to achieve a greater good. His book focuses on the existential threat of terrorism, a situation which he argues “requires violence” and “may also require coercion, deception, secrecy, and violation of rights” to address (Ignatieff, 2004). Some justify equally troubling actions in wartime. The popular theory that Winston Churchill sacrificed Coventry to a German air-strike to protect his intelligence network is one example (Shoesmith & Kelly, 2010). Ignatieff’s assertion and the argument that wartime is exceptional would be deeply troubling to Kant, who maintained that treating humans as ends and not as means is a matter of absolute duty independent of circumstance. 16 Proponents of Kantian ethics may argue that the emergency actions necessary to address climate change do not require morally reprehensible acts that must be avoided as matters of perfect duty. Thus, advocates for states of climate emergency accordingly avoid the morally dubious path that advocates for states of emergency to address other crises must navigate. While it is true that no one currently argues that addressing climate change requires torture, deception, war, or other morally difficult areas, the future regarding climate change and what actions may be needed are uncertain. The actions required may become more extreme as the impacts of climate change become more immediate and severe. Forced relocation for climate adaptation and restricting access to critical resources during times of scarcity are just two morally fraught strategies that may become necessary to address the climate crisis.4 While a future in which morally dubious actions are necessary remains a possibility, Kantian ethics’ potential for selfcontradiction when addressing emergency presents a stumbling block for adequately addressing the climate crisis. 4 Deep ecology, the fringe philosophy that all living beings should be weighed without regard to their instrumental value to humanity, may promote radical measures to combat climate change with morally fraught implications. Critiques of deep ecology use the term “eco-fascism” to describe a totalitarian state that would require its denizens to sacrifice their own interests for environmental benefits (Zimmerman, 1995). In such a state, reprehensible strategies that decrease the human population in order to reduce the burden on the environment could be contemplated such as forced sterilization or human culling. 17 John Locke’s political theory allows for flexible action to address emergencies and outlines means for executive accountability. Locke’s political theory departs from that of Hobbes, who advocates for consolidation of power in an undivided sovereign, and Rousseau, whose people’s assembly constitutes a single public sovereignty, in its institutional separation of legislative and executive powers. In Chapter XIII of his Second Treatise on Government, Locke argues that legislative authority is derived from the people empowering them to alter the legislative body as they see fit (Locke, 1689). While a legislative body may only need to occasionally meet as circumstances demand, the continual need for enforcement of the legislation leads to the creation of a separate executive empowered by the legislative body (thus, indirectly by the people) to administer law (XII). Like Rousseau and Kant, Locke recognized that democracies would encounter unforeseeable circumstances requiring urgent action best addressed by a consolidated decision-making power. He acknowledged that in democracies “the lawmaking power is not always in being and is usually too numerous, and so too slow for the dispatch requisite to execution, and because, also, it is impossible to foresee and so by laws to provide for all accidents and necessities that may concern the public” (XIV, 160). Like Rousseau, he provided institutional safeguards to mitigate the abuse of power, but his are not overly prescriptive. He considers the executive responsible for recognizing when “a strict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm,” and it is his “prerogative” to intervene for the “good of society” until a legislative solution can be developed (XIV). Prerogative is not a permanent delegation of power, but rather subject to continued review by the people through the legislative body: 18 “And therefore, they have a very wrong notion of government who say that the people have encroached upon the prerogative when they have got any part of it to be defined by positive laws. For in so doing they have not pulled from the prince anything that of right belonged to him, but only declared that that power which they indefinitely left in his or his ancestors’ hands, to be exercised for their good, was not a thing they intended him, when he used it otherwise,” (XIV, 163). Any authority given to the executive or taken by prerogative at the discretion of the executive in the past, can be revoked by the people. Prerogative is synonymous with emergency power. Because whether the acts of an executive are justified can only be determined in retrospect based on the consequences “to the good or hurt of the people” (XIV, 161), Locke warns that constitutions can lead to institutional stalemates writing: “Between an executive power in being, with such a prerogative and a legislative that depends upon his will for their convening, there can be no judge on earth. As there can be none between the legislative and the people, should either the executive or the legislative, when they have got the power in their hands, design, or go about to enslave or destroy them, the people have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to Heaven,” (XIV, 168). The “appeal to Heaven” refers to the inevitability of violence to resolve issues of institutional stalemate. We can infer from this passage that institutions in which the legislative body does not depend on the executive for convening are better suited to provide accountability for the use of emergency powers. This appeal also recognizes the 19 tension between democratic decision making which demands oversight and effective emergency action which must act unencumbered by deliberative processes. Summarizing Locke’s framework, emergency powers are justified if the following three conditions are met: (1) it is for the public good, (2) existing law is inadequate to address the situation, and (3) it is in response to an urgent situation in which the legislature cannot reasonably convene and arrive at a decision. Safeguards that ensure executive accountability include: (1) executive action is subject to review by the legislative body, (2) emergency powers expire when the legislative body can convene and arrive at a decision addressing the issue, and (3) the legislative body does not depend on the executive to convene. Climate change meets the three conditions that justify emergency powers within Locke’s framework. Addressing the existential threat of climate change is certainly for the public good. Since global warming continues unabated, we can assume the existing law does not adequately address the situation. Legislative bodies have proven inadequate, failing for decades to mitigate climate change. None of Locke’s safeguards, which allow for broad executive action while encouraging legislative oversight, are barriers to addressing the climate crisis. Locke’s discussion of executive prerogative lends itself to a tragic reading of democracy. Locke acknowledges that there are times when the public good demands than an executive act “without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it,” (XIV, 160). At times the best thing for a democracy to do is disregard its own laws in order to preserve the state. Effectively responding to climate change is in the best interests of democracy, and it requires usurping the slow deliberative processes that characterize democracy in favor of nimble emergency powers. This deviation requires us 20 to see the state from broader temporal view. Although an executive may usurp normal democratic channels by utilizing emergency powers for a time, by preserving the state they enable the longevity of democracy into the future. Failure to respond to an existential threat like climate change ensures the cessation of democracy as the state breaks down. Surveying the political theory of Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and Locke, I have evaluated four frameworks for approaching the use of emergency powers to address climate change in liberal democracies. While the theory of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant prove inadequate for addressing the climate crisis in democratic states, Locke’s political philosophy can be incorporated into an effective theoretical framework. This framework, in brief, is as follows. Anthropogenic climate change presents an existential threat to the state and demands urgent action. The existential nature of the climate crisis justifies suspension of democratic norms as necessary to preserve the state. A constitutionalized emergency response provides for temporary suspension of democratic norms to make the necessary changes to address climate change. Legislative oversight provides institutional safeguards for executive accountability regarding the use of emergency powers. Paradoxical tensions between democratic processes and effectively addressing emergencies are a tragic reality that should be acknowledged but should not impede taking the necessary steps to preserve the state. RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS Critics of using emergency powers to address climate change present three primary objections that can be placed in two categories. The first category is technical objections and includes one objection: climate emergency declarations encourage an 21 inappropriately narrow conception of climate change mitigation and adaptation. The second category is political objections related to democratic backsliding and includes two related objections: (1) states of climate emergency will enable executive overreach in well-established democracies and contribute to creeping authoritarianism in vulnerable democracies and, (2) states of climate emergency will allow government to infringe on individual liberties. In this section I present the essential tenets of each objection and offer rebuttal by pointing out how the concerns that these objections arise from are either misguided or can be addressed through institutional means. Emergency declarations can be crafted to approach climate change holistically, provide clear guidelines for executive accountability, and be sensitive to the burden placed on individual liberty and vulnerable communities. Some prominent environmentalists have become vocal critics of climate emergency politics, arguing that climate alarmism misses the mark and reduces the debate to a narrow view of climate. Notable figures who fall into this category include the Danish author and think tank director Bjørn Lomborg, American author and environmentalist Michael Shellenberger and his frequent coauthor Ted Nordhaus, and Cambridge Geography Professor Mike Hulme. While the specific objections of each of these figures are unique with some better grounded in science than others, the common thread linking them is an aversion to “climate alarmism.” Climate alarmism is a term used by those skeptical of the threat posed by global warming (the “non-alarmists” for the sake of this thesis) to describe those advocating for immediate and extensive action to address the climate crisis. Unlike climate deniers who reject the overwhelming body of evidence that the planet is warming and that human activity is responsible for it, climate 22 non-alarmists largely accept climate science and warming projections but contest their associated social implications. Non-alarmists want to expand the narrative beyond climate emergency to discuss alternatives for technological adaptation. The titles of some of their books, chapters, and articles are illustrative of their positions. Lomborg’s 2020 book How Climate Change Panic Costs Us Trillions, Hurts the Poor, and Fails to Fix the Planet includes chapter titles like “Extreme Weather or Extreme Exaggeration?,” “You Can’t Fix Climate Change,” and “Why Do We Get Climate Change So Wrong?.” Schellenberger’s 2019 book Apocalypse Never: Why Environmental Alarmism Hurts Us All includes equally provocative chapter titles including “It’s Not the End of the World,” “Greed Saved the Whales, Not Greenpeace,” and “Have Your Steak and Eat It, Too.” Even Hulme, by far the most even tempered of the authors highlighted, has published articles and blog posts with click-bait titles including “Sleep-Walking into Totalitarianism” and Climate Emergency Politics Is Dangerous. Climate non-alarmists reject the claim that climate change is an existential threat, arguing that to say so inappropriately narrows the climate debate. They cling to an overly optimist belief that technological advancement will solve climate issues or allow humanity to adjust to an altered climate. Non-alarmists’ arguments are typically based more in opinion than in rigorous analysis. These arguments are most succinctly articulated by Hulme in his 2019 article Climate Emergency Politics Is Dangerous. In his article, Hulme argues that climate change is “the central issue of our times” but that climate emergencies are unjustifiable because (1) climate change will not result in human extinction and (2) addressing climate change should include looking at all of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development 23 Goals not just reducing carbon emissions. Hulme’s first point is not a strong critique of climate emergency because it suggests that anything less than human extinction cannot rise to the level of a climate emergency. This line of reasoning is deeply problematic. Emergency powers have never been reserved for issues related to human extinction, the number of which can be counted on one hand: nuclear war, asteroid impact, solar flares, and climate change. To argue that climate change is only worthy of consideration as an emergency if it has the potential to result in human extinction is to argue that states of emergency addressing other situations including war, pandemic, terrorism, and natural disasters are not justified. Adhering to Hulme’s argument severely limits liberal democracies’ ability to address threats that, while not threatening humanity as a whole, certainly threaten a state’s existence or the lives of a significant portion of their populations. This sweeping repudiation of centuries of emergency policy demands greater justification than Hulme provides. Hulme’s second argument can be addressed because it is not a critique of using emergency powers to address climate change but rather a critique of climate reductivism. Climate reductivism is narrowing the focus of climate issues to carbon emission mitigation alone. Hulme argues that policymakers focused on carbon emission mitigation strategies may become focused on hitting carbon emission reduction goals without considering the larger social and ecological context of environmental issues. For example, it might be appropriate to allow India to continue increasing its carbon emissions even if it contributes to global warming because it will pull millions of people out of poverty. Climate reductivism fails to take other sustainability goals like poverty reduction into account. Hulme takes for granted that climate emergencies are inherently 24 reductive, an assumption that has since been shown to be unsubstantiated. Research published in the journal Urban Climate in 2020 reveals that existing climate emergency declarations are not reductive, but in fact address a wide variety of sustainability issues beyond reducing carbon emissions. In a review of over 1,000 climate emergency declarations Davidson, et al. found ten principles frequently included in climate emergency declarations. Several of these principles went beyond climate reductivism, including social mobilization; adapting to a changing climate; coordination, partnerships, and advocacy for action; and equity and social justice. Each of these principles address sustainability issues beyond reducing carbon emissions, presenting a more holistic approach to combatting climate change. Hulme’s concern is resolved by crafting declarations that address more than just reducing carbon emissions, a practice that appears to already be standard. Political objections to climate emergency declarations are rooted in a fear that states of emergency amplify democratic backsliding. These political objections can be categorized into two related categories: (1) those concerning executive power; and (2) those concerning rights and liberties. These categories overlap in cases where the executive power is the purported violator of rights and liberties; nevertheless, the distinction is useful in structuring our discussion. Democratic backsliding, also called “autocratizing,” is the weakening or loss of political institutions that maintain democratic regimes (Bermeo, 2016). As noted earlier, liberal democratic states existing along a gradient with their level of conformity to liberal ideals and democratic processes varying over time. A state increasing adherence to democratic standards is “democratizing” (in the case of states transitioning political regimes) or simply “strengthening democracy” (in 25 the case of well-established democratic states). A state decreasing in adherence to democratic standards is backsliding. Democratic backsliding takes many forms ranging from gradual processes in which nearly imperceptible changes accrue overtime (for example, polarization of electoral politics) to overt transitions from democracy to authoritarianism (for example, a political d’état). The specter of emergency powers as a tool for executive aggrandizement looms large among fears of democratic backsliding. This negative perception stems in part from emergency powers association with two of history’s most infamous authoritarian leaders, Julius Caesar and Adolf Hitler, who secured the demise of the democratic regimes in which they respectively rose to power. The Roman dictatorship is the classic example of institutionalized emergency powers in a republican state. When quick and decisive action was needed, most often to respond to external military threats, the Roman Senate appointed a citizen to the office of “dictator,” investing him with expansive authority to address the crisis. Intuitional safeguards, such as term limits, and strong social norms ensured that appointees concluded their dictatorship in haste. These safeguards were ignored by Caesar. After emerging from a brutal civil war waged against his rival, Julius Caesar infamously had himself declared dictator perpetuo—dictator for life—a capstone to his rise to power. With only nomenclature left to change, the path was paved for Caesar’s nephew to initiate the Roman Empire in the wake of his uncle’s assassination. Echoing the Roman dictatorship, modern democratic states (nonextant and present) typically allow for expansion of executive powers in times of crisis. Article 48 of the 20th century Weimar Constitution allowed the President to suspend normal democratic processes and civil liberties in times of crisis. The President was obligated to immediately 26 inform the Reichstag (German parliament) of the emergency measures taken, and the Reichstag could revoke the executive power and rescind any actions taken. Adolf Hitler, then Chancellor of Germany, infamously utilized this law to seize dictatorial power in the wake of the hysteria surrounding the Reichstag fire through the Reichstag Fire Decree approved by President Hindenburg and Enabling Act passed by the Reichstag (Feldman, 1996). The Reichstag Fire Decree and Enabling Act tied subsequent decrees to Article 48, giving Hitler’s totalitarian rule a thin guise of constitutionality. While observing that states of emergency have coincided with the transition from democracy to totalitarianism, we should distinguish emergency powers as causal or as incidental to democratic backsliding. If the former proves the prevailing case, climate emergency declarations present a clear danger to democracy; if the latter, these declarations should be viewed as neutral factors in the present erosion of democratic institutions. Current scholarship hypothesizes that the root causes of democratic backsliding are more gradual and ambiguous than the use of emergency powers and include political polarization, populism, economic inequality, and the gradual erosion of basic political norms (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; IDEA, 2021). These factors answer the fundamental why of democratic backsliding rather than the more superficial how. Reexamining the Roman Republic and Weimar Germany we can see how these more fundamental factors trigger transitions to totalitarian rule. Julius Caesar rose to power on a wave of populist sentiment propelled by tension between economic classes. He solidified his totalitarian power through executive aggrandizement and violence long before declaring himself dictator perpetuo. His fabricated state of emergency must be seen as mendacious justification to legitimize his consolidation of power, not as a casual 27 mechanism in his authoritarian rise. The Weimar Republic was likewise plagued by political instability, economic insecurity, and the charismatic rise of a populist leader in Hitler. These factors, set in motion long before the Reichstag Fire Decree and Enabling Act, propelled Hitler’s authoritarian rise. Transition from democracy to totalitarianism does not happen overnight, but rather emerges from deeper, often long-standing societal rifts. For further evidence that emergency powers do not independently trigger democratic backsliding one can look to the broad use of emergency powers in the United States today. As of April 2022, the Federal Register of the United States listed 42 National Emergencies currently in effect, the oldest—ordering sanctions in response to the Irian hostage crisis—dating back to the Carter administration. That democracy has continued in the United States under these conditions without falling into despotism is uncontested. Critics of climate emergency declarations miss the mark by obsessing over emergency powers when their attention would be more effective in preventing democratic backsliding if focused on its fundamental causes rather than on the incidental means authoritarians consolidate power. Democratic backsliding does not have to manifest in a dramatic transition from democracy to outright totalitarian rule. Disrupting the checks on executive power by circumventing the legislative branch unnecessarily is democratic backsliding in that it constitutes a weakening of democratic institutions. Separation of executive and legislative powers and the checking of power between these branches of government are essential features of many modern liberal democratic regimes, most notably the United States. The United States Supreme Court’s 1952 case Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer—commonly called the Steel Seizure Case—is a useful case study in evaluating 28 whether the President has overstepped his executive purview in using emergency powers. In April 1952, President Truman issued an emergency order nationalizing the American steel industry to prevent a scheduled strike by the United Steelworkers of America. Truman’s impetus was that steel production was essential to facilitate the United States ongoing engagement in the Korean War, at the time entering its third year of conflict. Truman argued that it was within his executive purview as Commander-in-Chief to seize corporate property to ensure the continued engagement in Korea, despite the absence of a formal declaration of war from Congress. The Supreme Court disagreed and rescinded the executive order, returning steel production facilities to the industry and allowing the strike to move forward (Tresolini, 1954). In his concurring opinion, Justice Robert Jackson outlined a three-level framework to evaluate the legitimacy of a President’s emergency action. (1) When acting with the “expressed or implied” authorization of Congress, a President’s action is most legitimate. (2) When acting in ways neither authorized nor denied by Congress, a President’s action is weaker and must be evaluated in light of the “imperatives” of the event (i.e., whether the situation rises to the occasion of an emergency). (3) When acting contrary to explicit Congressional will, a President is at their weakest point and their actions should be subject to the highest scrutiny. Jackson argued that Truman’s actions fell into the third category as the seizure violated three Congressional statutes regulating how to respond to labor strikes in critical industries. Truman’s actions were subject to the highest scrutiny, and the steel strike was deemed an insufficient threat to justify circumventing Congress (Tresolini, 1954). In contrast the Steel Seizure Case, a climate emergency declaration issued by a U.S. President today would be evaluated favorably 29 under Jackson’s framework. The United States Congress has repeatedly failed to pass any legislation addressing the climate crisis. The most recent legislation with substantial provisions addressing climate change, the Build Back Better Act, was narrowly defeated in the U.S. Senate in early 2022. In the absence of any definite guidance from Congress authorizing or prohibiting the President from addressing the climate crisis, any emergency action taken by the President would fall into Jackson’s second level of executive scrutiny. The action’s legitimacy would therefore be dependent on whether the climate crisis meets the criteria of an emergency which, as established earlier in this thesis, it does. As an example of the use of eminent domain during a state of emergency, the Steel Seizure Case is a convenient transition into the second political category of concern: that states of emergencies threaten civil rights and liberties. Eminent domain, the government right to seize private property for public use, is widely recognized as a legitimate arm of statecraft, but is moderated in liberal democracies by safeguards that protect individual property rights including a right to fair compensation for any property appropriated by the government. Eminent domain is distinguished from a state’s regulatory power which is rooted in their inherent right to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public. Property owners are not entitled to compensation for regulations that limit how their property can be used; however, liberal regimes typically acknowledge that some regulations are so onerous that they deprive an owner of any economic value and merit compensation (Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council). States of emergency facilitate the seizure of property in ways that some may view as violating the property rights protected by liberal democratic 30 regimes. Two distinct categories of takings should be distinguished when considering takings in the context of the climate crisis (1) corporate seizures and (2) managed retreat. Effective climate change mitigation will require halting fossil fuel extraction and consumption. It is not only conceivable, but likely necessary, for governments to nationalize the energy sector to facilitate the transition away from fossil fuels given the scale and urgency the overhaul requires. Nationalization may appear radical to a modern audience, but liberal democratic states have a long history of appropriating industries during times of crisis. The United States, for example, nationalized a variety of private industries to support war efforts and address economic peril in the 20th century. During the First World War, President Wilson nationalized railroads and telecommunications (Hanna, 2020). In response to the Great Depression, President Roosevelt nationalized a myriad of private industries ranging from gold reserves to retail chains and introduced new government-run entities that out-competed rivals in other industries. Over the course of World War II, Roosevelt would go on to nationalize over sixty domestic companies and seventeen subsidiaries of foreign companies (Hanna, 2020). While Truman failed to nationalize the steel industry during the Korean War, he was successful in nationalizing 195 railroads, which he placed under Army jurisdiction through 1952 (Hanna, 2020). The Supreme Court did not override Truman’s seizure of the steel industry on the grounds that nationalization was unconstitutional, rather that the mechanism he used inappropriately circumvented Congress. More recently, airport security in the United States was nationalized in the wake of the 9/11 attacks (Hanna, 2020). Fears that governmental seizure of corporate properties in the fossil fuel industry violate rights protected by democratic states disregard the long history of nationalization in liberal 31 democracies like the United States. Those criticizing climate emergency declarations on the grounds that they enable governments to seize private property have the impossible duty of defending the fossil fuel industry as exceptional despite the diverse circumstances and wide range of industries involved in prior instances of nationalization. While mitigating climate change requires seizing corporate property, adapting to climate change requires managed retreat. Managed retreat is the forced relocation of populations living in hazardous areas (Hino et al., 2017). The impacts of climate change such as sea level rise, increased wildfire frequency, and desertification will make areas across the globe uninhabitable. Populations currently residing in at-risk areas may need to be relocated in order for governments to effectively manage adaptation strategies. For example, governments managing an increased risk of flooding may choose to sacrifice one neighborhood to create a floodplain to mitigate risk for a larger area. If individuals are unwilling to relocate, compulsory managed retreat is necessary to ensure that the mitigation strategy is implemented. The use of force Compulsory managed retreat utilizes eminent domain, but governments must reevaluate whether compensation for affected property owners is merited. A property that will be underwater due to sea-level rise, flooded in any extreme weather event, or frequently burned-over by wildfires has little economic value. Governments should consider future conditions, not present land values, when determining fair compensation. Managed retreat presents an equity challenge in countries like the United States where racial, ethnic, and income minorities are disproportionately exposed to environmental and climate hazards (EPA, 2021). It is tragic that these communities shoulder an unjustifiable climate burden, and climate emergency declarations should be sensitive to issues of equity and race. Though enabling strategies 32 like compulsory managed retreat through climate emergency declarations presents ethical challenges related to equity, the greater danger to disadvantage communities is failing to act decisively to address the climate crisis. Sensitivity to the discourse surrounding climate justice, which acknowledges the inequitable burdens of marginalized communities and peripheral states due to climate change (Alves & Mariano, 2018), shapes climate emergency declarations, but does prohibit them. Civil liberties beyond property rights such as the right to free expression and privacy have been the focus of most scrutiny of emergency measures. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a timely case study in how governmental action in times of crisis can test a society’s commitment to these rights and liberties. In 2020, 124 countries declared a state of emergency in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in order to mobilize resources, slow transmission, and protect vulnerable populations (Kemp, 2021). At least 83 governments around the world that have used these public health emergencies as justification to infringe on activities related to the freedom of expression (Human Rights Watch, 2021). This is expected in illiberal regimes; however, the offending governments include well-established or developing democracies on every inhabited continent such as Australia, Puerto Rico, Greece, Brazil, India, and Ghana among others. According to the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law’s COVID-19 Civic Freedom Tracker, 62 countries have measures impacting free expression, 156 affecting assembly, and 61 affecting privacy (2022). The restrictions follow naturally from what is needed to address a pandemic: speech restrictions that moderate misinformation, limitations on assembly to mitigate transmission, and invasions of privacy to assist in contract tracing. Whether these violations are justified in the face of the danger posed by COVID-19 is an 33 ongoing debate, but undoubtedly the already incomprehensible death-toll would have been even greater without these measures. Parallel challenges to civil rights and liberties can be imagined in the context of climate change. Climate change discourse has long been plagued by misinformation and scientific denialism. Some fear that governments empowered by states of emergency will overcorrect and unfairly censor any speech critical of efforts to address the climate crisis. Climate non-alarmist and New York Post writer Bjørn Lomborg directed this criticism at social media companies that actively fact-check climate related posts in a February 2022 opinion piece. The article reads more as a heated personal tirade against Facebook— which had flagged two of Lomborg’s factual yet provocative posts—than it does a calm argument against censorship. It is overwrought of Lomborg, an author privileged with an expansive platform for disseminating his opinions to millions, to depict himself as a victim of censorship after having a couple posts flagged on social media. What level of responsibility social media companies should have to fairly and effectively mitigate misinformation on their platforms is a legitimate question worthy of the burgeoning body of literature dedicated to the topic, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis. For my purposes, it suffices to say that Lomborg’s grievance is insignificant when viewed alongside the very real damage that climate misinformation has done in delaying action to address the urgent and expansive threat of climate change. How addressing the climate crisis will impact privacy is uncertain. Before 2020, digital health certificates, location tracking apps, and mass surveillance were conceivable government tools, but it was the COVID-19 pandemic which instigated their large-scale implementation. The same will likely be true of climate emergency. Emerging 34 technologies can be used to monitor energy use and carbon emissions at the household and individual level. Remote sensing technologies can facilitate satellite tracking of point source polluters, and private companies have already begun assembling global databases tracking greenhouse gas emissions by location (Mishra, 2020; Parker, 2022). Other technologies such as location tracking apps and consumer algorithms could conceivable assist in mass surveillance in ways that monitor carbon emissions. Microsoft’s Planetary Computer and Dynamhex’s Energy Data API are examples of tools that aim to eventually allow users to view energy usage not only at their own address, but anywhere in the world. Prairie Village, Kansas, for example, has already contracted with Dynamhex to develop an online platform for residents to explore energy usage in buildings across the city (City of Prairie Village, 2022). The tool has raised privacy concerns among residents worried that it may be used to devalue and tear-down older properties (Hicks, 2022). Tools like those in Prairie Village can be seen as enabling a culture in which neighbors can spy on and shame each other based on emissions. However unpleasant, such a culture could prove a greater benefit than burden by creating social pressure to reduce carbon footprints. Carbon emissions, which cause clear negative externalities for the global community, should not remain secret. CONCLUSION Climate change demands immediate action by governmental bodies in order to avoid climate tipping points that would result in irreparable damage to the environment needed to sustain modern human society. Climate emergency declarations can mobilize governments to respond with the urgency and scope required to address this issue, but entail a departure from normal democratic processes. In this thesis, I have surveyed the 35 political theories of Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant and Locke, to develop a theoretical framework that reconciles the seeming contradiction between the need to address emergencies and the need to maintain democratic institutions. My argument has been a defense of climate emergency declarations, and I have shown criticisms that climate emergencies are reductive or accelerate democratic backsliding to be uncompelling in the face of the existential threat that climate change presents to humanity. Investigating states of climate emergency has led me to reflect on the role of societal values in maintaining democracy and protecting the planet. Reflecting on the injustice of growing up in a Japanese American internment camp during World War II, actor and activist George Takei explained that democracy is only as good as its citizenry: “Our democracy is a people’s democracy. It is as great as its people can be, but also as vile as people are…Our democracy is vitally dependent on people who cherish our ideals,” (Galo, 2015). Takei experienced injustice at the hands of a democratic regime representing the deepseated racial prejudices of its majority population. While institutional safeguards may insulate democratic decision-making from the “instability, injustice, and confusion” of popular sentiments (Madison, 1787), democracy can never be entirely isolated from the values cherished by its citizens. I fear democratic decline in modern states not because we face emergent challenges but because democratic norms are being devalued. I fear that democracy may fail to address climate change not because the democratic toolkit is too limited but because people do not value the earth. Democratic states have failed to address climate change for over half a century, not because of poor science, fear of democratic backsliding, or failure to reach consensus on the best mitigation strategy, but 36 because society has prioritized capitalist interests, facilitated climate denialism, and undervalued natural systems. Meditating on this history, the words of Aldo Leopold in his 1949 work, A Sand County Almanac appear prophetic: “It is inconceivable to me that an ethical relation to land can exist without love, respect, and admiration for land, and a high regard for its value. By value, I of course mean something far broader than mere economic value; I mean value in the philosophical sense. Perhaps the most serious obstacle impeding the evolution of a land ethic is the fact that our educational and economic system is headed away from, rather than toward, an intense consciousness of land, (p. 223). Love land. Respect land. Admire land. Without these ideals no measures, no matter how prompt or wide-reaching, provide a holistic and sustainable solution to the exploitation of the environment driving the climate crisis. We accept without question limitations to rights and liberties that maintain the harmony of society, but not those required to preserve the environment. Only when the old adage “your right to swing your fist ends where my nose begins,” encompasses not only interactions between humans but also a land ethic, will emergency measures that impact property rights, privacy, or freedom of expression be accepted as a matter of course. Humanity failed to address climate change when there was adequate time for normal democratic deliberation. 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