Who you gonna call?: Domestic responses to the threat of nuclear terrorism

The World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001 demonstrated the threat of terrorism in the twenty-first century-and made the prevention of nuclear terrorism all the more pressing. Despite the newfound attention to nuclear terrorism, the possibility of nuclear attacks, and, later, nuclear terrorism, had been a concern of the U.S. government since the early decades of the Cold War. Accordingly, the National Intelligence Estimate reports increasingly addressed the possibility of a covert Soviet nuclear attack and attempts of terrorist groups to acquire and deploy a nuclear weapon. The measures taken to prevent either of these possibilities from becoming a reality took a variety of forms. Preventing the smuggling of nuclear weapons or materials into the U.S. became an overarching mission through more stringent port and airport security and the inception and application of foreign assistance programs, including the Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA) and the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. The security of nuclear weapons and materials within the United States itself also received repeated scrutiny, resulting in numerous revisions of Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) guidelines regulating the transportation of nuclear materials. Prevention, while an important aspect of protection, was only the first step. Following an attempted extortion involving a nuclear bomb in 1974, the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) was created, meant to be a group of specialized scientists who could locate and either safely detonate or disarm a nuclear weapon. This thesis examines how the U.S. government developed these responses-preventive and reactive-to the growing threats of nuclear terrorism.

WHO YOU GONNA CALL?: DOMESTIC RESPONSES TO THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM by Candace Oman A Senior Honors Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of The University of Utah In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Honors Degree in Bachelor of Arts In History Department Approved: ____________________ Dr. L. Ray Gunn Supervisor ____________________ Dr. Isabel Moreira Chair, Department of History ____________________ Dr. Wesley Sasaki-Uemora Department Honors Advisor ____________________ Dr. Sylvia D. Torti Dean, Honors College May 2014     ABSTRACT The World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001 demonstrated the threat of terrorism in the twenty-first century—and made the prevention of nuclear terrorism all the more pressing. Despite the newfound attention to nuclear terrorism, the possibility of nuclear attacks, and, later, nuclear terrorism, had been a concern of the U.S. government since the early decades of the Cold War. Accordingly, the National Intelligence Estimate reports increasingly addressed the possibility of a covert Soviet nuclear attack and attempts of terrorist groups to acquire and deploy a nuclear weapon. The measures taken to prevent either of these possibilities from becoming a reality took a variety of forms. Preventing the smuggling of nuclear weapons or materials into the U.S. became an overarching mission through more stringent port and airport security and the inception and application of foreign assistance programs, including the Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA) and the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. The security of nuclear weapons and materials within the United States itself also received repeated scrutiny, resulting in numerous revisions of Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) guidelines regulating the transportation of nuclear materials. Prevention, while an important aspect of protection, was only the first step. Following an attempted extortion involving a nuclear bomb in 1974, the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) was created, meant to be a group of specialized scientists who could locate and either safely detonate or disarm a nuclear weapon. This thesis examines how the U.S. government developed these responses—preventive and reactive—to the growing threats of nuclear terrorism.           ii   TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ii INTRODUCTION 1 PREVENTING EXTERNAL NUCLEAR THREATS 6 SAFEGUARDING U. S. NUCLEAR MATERIALS 16 NEST: REACTING TO NUCLEAR THREATS 21 CONCLUSION 40 BIBLIOGRAPHY 42       iii   1 INTRODUCTION The spike in national interest in protecting the United States from terrorist attacks— particularly those involving weapons of mass destruction—following the Al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center buildings comes as no surprise. However, the public’s anxiety about terrorism had grown substantially even before that. A 1998-99 opinion poll reveals that eighty-four percent of the public already saw “international terrorism as a ‘critical threat.’”1 So when author Graham Allison declares that, after 9/11, “the security bubble in which we lived burst, and ordinary men and women across the country discovered fear,”2 it is a feeling that could just as accurately describe the aftermath of the detonation of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The immense power and destruction of the weapon invented and deployed at the behest of the United States government made citizens uneasy. That unease only grew with the USSR’s successful test of its own atomic bomb in 1949 and the country wanted protection from annihilation. The U.S. government responded, just as it did in the wake of the September 11th attacks. Accordingly, even before the twenty-first century “War on Terror” began, the U.S. had already taken steps towards securing its nuclear arsenal and materials, as well as establishing measures to prevent foreign nuclear threats from being smuggled into the country. Recognizing the steps already taken, their success, and their cost is informative in determining whether more needs to be done or if the current measures deterring terrorism already cost too much—monetarily and in political and private rights.                                                                                                                 1  Richard  Falkenrath,  “Analytic  Models  and  Policy  Prescription:  Understanding  Recent  Innovation  in   U.S.  Counterterrorism,”  Studies  in  Conflict  &  Terrorism  24  (2001):  160,   http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=4485925&si te=ehost-­‐live  (accessed  September  28,  2013).     2  Graham  Allison,  Nuclear  Terrorism:  The  Ultimate  Preventable  Catastrophe  (New  York:  Henry  Holt,   2005),  124.         2 United States’ Assessment of Nuclear Threats from 1951 to 1986 The Soviets’ acquisition of an atomic bomb certainly posed an overt threat to the security of the United States, but would a possible Soviet attack be overt? In 1951, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)—as prepared by a collaboration of intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Staff, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and others—assessed the USSR’s capabilities for “clandestine attack” and believed the U.S. was vulnerable to such an attack.3 Scientists—most famously J. Robert Oppenheimer— warned government officials of the ease with which an atomic weapon could be dismantled and shipped into the United States. The inability, at the time, to reliably detect the presence of an atomic weapon, or its parts, and prevent entry into the country made the vulnerability very apparent. Not only did the Soviets possess the materials, knowledge, and the motive to place an atomic bomb in the continental U.S., they also had the opportunity to do so. The United States could posture, but it did not have the technology to assuredly prevent a bomb’s entry if the USSR made the attempt. Echoing Oppenheimer’s suggestion to open every container that could conceivably hold a bomb,4 alerting customs inspectors “to watch for shipments of the weight and size characteristics of a bomb”5 was the best method to prevent smuggling available. Policies designed to stop atomic weapons from reaching the country were an important first step in addressing nuclear threats, but others would follow. If the Soviets                                                                                                                 3  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  NIE-­‐31,  Soviet  Capabilities  for  Clandestine  Attack  against  the  US  with   Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction  and  the  Vulnerability  of  the  US  to  Such  Attack  (mid-­‐1951  to  mid-­‐1952),   August  30,  1951,  Top  Secret,  http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb267/01.pdf  (accessed   April  4,  2013).   4  Jeffery  Richelson,  Defusing  Armageddon:  Inside  NEST,  America’s  Secret  Nuclear  Bomb  Squad  (New   York:  W.  W.  Norton,  2009),  1.   5  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  NIE-­‐31,  32.           3 managed to smuggle a nuclear bomb into the country, what then? The NIE believed that “prevention requires not only detection and identification abroad and at home, but also instant and effective counteraction.”6 The country’s national security resided in the ability to respond to every stage of a nuclear threat, from diplomatic arrangements, preliminary prevention, and the prospect of a bomb already in the country.7 In 1968, the NIE report again looked into “The Clandestine Introduction of Weapons of Mass Destruction into the US.” With the arrival of Communist China on the political scene—and, in 1964, the nuclear scene as well—the USSR was no longer the only credible threat to U.S. national security, though it certainly remained the most serious. Despite the technological advancements of the previous seventeen years, the NIE reported that “nuclear weapons with weights of up to 1,500-2,000 pounds could be brought across US borders by common means of transport without great difficulty.”8 However, the report also suggested that the Soviet Union would only launch a clandestine attack in coordination with a larger attack.9 With this strategy, the ability to safely dismantle or detonate whatever nuclear weapons the USSR managed to secrete in the U.S. became increasingly urgent. The U.S. had to prepare to counteract both a conventional Soviet attack and the potential of “clandestine” bombs. Either could wreak devastating damage. Twenty years into the Cold War, the universally accepted policy of deterrence supported an increase in military spending to better prepare a United States response to any Soviet attacks. The ability to respond to domestic events also needed to                                                                                                                 6  Ibid.,  11.     7  Jeffery  Richelson,  Defusing  Armageddon,  1.     8  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  NIE  4-­‐68,  The  Clandestine  Introduction  of  Weapons  of  Mass   Destruction  into  the  US,  June  13,  1968,  Top  Secret,  7,   http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb267/02b.pdf  (accessed  April  4,  2013).   9  Ibid.,  12.           4 be addressed in order to enhance national security overall. The subsequent NIE report, in 1970, did not perceive the threat of a clandestine Soviet attack to be any more serious than it had been in 1968. The report did, however, highlight Soviet hesitation to attack the U.S. because, regardless of the damage of the Soviet’s initial assault, the U.S. would retaliate.10 In 1976, these intelligence estimates took a turn, focusing on the threats posed by terrorists rather than those China and the USSR represented. The interagency Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) prepared a report titled, “The Likelihood of the Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons by Foreign Terrorist Groups for Use Against the United States.” After assessing the difficulties terrorist groups would face in acquiring the components of a nuclear bomb without a country’s aid, whether political or financial, the committee determined that a nuclear terrorist was “unlikely in the next year or two.”11 The memorandum expressed the belief that if terrorists acquired the materials, they would be more likely to target U.S. presences in foreign countries than attacking the U.S. directly. If the U.S. proved unable to protect its, or its allies’, interests following a terrorist attack on U.S. citizens or representatives in foreign locations, then terrorists would achieve a public victory. Terrorists, as inherently political groups, can succeed not only through the casualties or damages they cause, but also the message their violence conveys to the world at large.12                                                                                                                 10  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  NIE  4-­‐70,  The  Clandestine  Introduction  of  Weapons  of  Mass   Destruction  into  the  US,  July  7,  1970,  Top  Secret,   http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb267/04.pdf  (accessed  April  4,  2013).     11  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  IIM  76-­‐002,  The  Likelihood  of  the  Acquisition  of  Nuclear  Weapons  by   Foreign  Terrorist  Groups  for  Use  Against  the  United  States,  January  8,  1976,  Secret,  2,   https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/359467-­‐2-­‐iam.html  (accessed  April  4,  2013).   12  Ibid.,  2-­‐3.         5 The next NIE report, produced in 1986, stated that the U.S. intelligence community still believed that an event of “high-level nuclear terrorism” to be unlikely, which they defined as the “most technically difficult, malevolent, and harmful types of nuclear acts.”13 The sheer difficulty for terrorists to acquire the materials necessary for a nuclear weapon, most notably the highly enriched uranium, without significant monetary and political resources undoubtedly contributed to the collaboration’s conclusion. Additionally, the report’s threat estimation took into consideration the possibility that such an event would alienate terrorists’ supporters, undermining their overall political goals, because of the massive casualties or other consequences of such an act. With those obstacles in mind, the report recommended that any changes in terrorist behavior or ideology be carefully monitored, as even minute variations might significantly affect a group’s decision whether or not to pursue the use of atomic weapons.14 After World War II and the Cold War that followed, the threat nuclear weapons posed continued to evolve. As the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China demonstrated, countries could provide the funding and other resources necessary to produce an atomic bomb. Soon, however, they were not the only danger. The threat of terrorism increased as the twentieth century drew to a close. The United States government remained aware of the various kinds of nuclear threats, shown by the efforts to reevaluate the nature of those threats every few years, and recognized the need for effective responses to these threats, particularly those posed by terrorists. The first section of this paper addresses the steps taken to prevent nuclear threats from entering the U.S.                                                                                                                 13  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  NIE  6-­‐86,  The  Likelihood  of  Nuclear  Acts  by  Terrorist  Groups,  April   1986,  Secret,  excised  copy,  1,    https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/359470-­‐5-­‐nie.html   (accessed  April  4,  2013).   14Ibid.,  1-­‐4.           6 through ports, airports, and other means. The second section discusses efforts to put sufficient safeguards in place in order to control the country’s nuclear materials, civilian and military. The third, and final, section elaborates on forces the U.S. can deploy to stop or minimize immediate nuclear threats, specifically the Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST). PREVENTING EXTERNAL NUCLEAR THREATS The NIE reports produced during the early decades of the Cold War clearly demonstrated that keeping foreign nuclear weapons and materials out of the country was vital in preventing terrorist attacks against the U.S. The obvious first steps to deny terrorists any opportunities to smuggle nuclear weapons or materials into the country meant securing the various entrances into the country, most notably through airports and maritime ports. Providing support—whether ideological, financial, etc.—to U.S. allies so that they could minimize their vulnerabilities to the threat of terrorism, in turn minimized the vulnerabilities of the U.S., because of its political and economic contact with those countries. This support included programs that sponsored better radiation screening equipment at ports and airports, antiterrorism training for foreign security forces, and the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which offered aid to enhance other countries’ security for the nuclear weapons and materials they possessed. These types of programs enabled the U.S. to prevent threats even before they arrived at the country’s borders and bolster security of nuclear weapons and materials to deny terrorists’ access worldwide.       7 Foreign Support: Preventing Terrorism through International Programs One of the first international efforts to control both nuclear weapons themselves and the knowledge of how to build them was the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, more commonly known as NPT, in 1970. The primary objective of the treaty was to halt the spread of nuclear technology and weapons and to promote the international search for peaceful applications of nuclear energy.15 NPT held signers, which included the U.S., the U.K. and the then-USSR along with forty other countries, to a gradual nuclear disarmament and, eventually, total disarmament.16 The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) rose out of the NPT, as a mechanism to control the export of nuclear and nuclear-related materials.17 Like the NPT, the overall goal of the NSG and its guidelines regulating shipments, as implemented by the participating countries, were to halt nuclear proliferation. The U.S. specifically regulates the exports of radioactive isotopes— including plutonium-238, polonium-208, actinium-227, and radium-226—to governments not part of the NSG.18 These types of treaties and organizations, and the non-proliferation they sponsor, made nuclear weapons and materials more difficult for terrorists to access. Treaties like the NPT could only be as effective as the countries that upheld them, however. Accordingly, a New York Times article about the U.S. government’s prevention of the sale of “nuclear production equipment” to Brazil in December 1975 demonstrated its commitment to the NPT.19 The equipment an American                                                                                                                 15  UN,  “UNODA—Non-­‐Proliferation  of  Nuclear  Weapons  (NPT),”  UN  News  Center,   http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml  (accessed  February  16,  2014).     16  Ibid.     17  NSG,  “NSG,”  NSG,  http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/A_test/01-­‐eng/index.php  (accessed   February  16,  2014).   18  Michael  Levi,  On  Nuclear  Terrorism  (Cambridge,  Mass.:  Harvard  University  Press,  2007),  44.   19  David  Burnham,  “U.S.  Seems  to  Bar  a  Nuclear  Deal,”  New  York  Times  (1923-­‐Current  File),  Dec.  11,   1975,  http://search.proquest.com/docview/120524940?accountid=14677  (accessed  February  16,   2014).         8 company had tentative offered to Brazil could have potentially been “used to build atomic bombs.”20 By barring this deal, the U.S. acted to prevent any additional nuclear countries, thereby limiting the number of countries that required sufficient security to protect their nuclear arsenals from terrorists. The countries that did possess nuclear weapons and the knowledge to produce more of them, like the U.K. and the Soviet Union, needed to secure their arsenals and materials. As a method of protecting its interests and its allies’, the U.S. wanted to help those countries establish that security. One such program, the Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA), was created in 1983.21 This program offers training to police and other law enforcement officers of governments friendly with the United States, most frequently developing countries, responding to terrorist attacks. The ATA focuses on teaching skills to protect national borders, critical infrastructure, and national leadership and how to address terrorist incidents and their national or local implications.22 The establishment of the ATA embodies the policy voiced by a commission chaired by Vice President George H. W. Bush in 1985, wherein he announced that the U.S. considered counterterrorism a global effort and would act accordingly. The U.S. would not only work to halt and undermine “anti-American terrorism, but terrorism ‘in all its forms and wherever it takes place.’”23 The Clinton administration of the 1990s reaffirmed that policy, informing that                                                                                                                 20  Ibid.   21  U.S.  Department  of  State,  "Antiterrorism  Assistance  Program,"  U.S.  Department  of  State,   http://www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8583.htm  (accessed  February  16,  2014).   22  Ibid.   23  Richard  Falkenrath,  “Problems  of  Preparedness:  U.S.  Readiness  for  a  Domestic  Terrorist  Attack,”   International  Security  25,  no.  4  (2001):  154,  http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092136  (accessed   September  28,  2014).           9 any other countries fighting against terrorism could rely on the United States to provide training, financial and technical aid, as well as information if they needed it.24 Then, in 1991, the fall of the Soviet Union created a whole new international problem: what to do with the nuclear weapons stockpiled in countries no longer under USSR control? Even earlier, in 1986, the Department of Defense had worried that international standards over securing nuclear materials were not adequate.25 In the wake of the Soviet Union, however, these newly independent countries—such as Ukraine, Uzbek, Lithuania, Latvia, and Armenia—certainly did not have the money to spend securing the weapons of their former political and economic oppressor as they attempted to establish their own governments. And if these countries could not take charge of controlling these weapons, who would? The fear that these materials would fall into terrorist hands—or simply be appropriated, poorly guarded as they were—spurred the passage of the Soviet Threat Reduction Act in November 1991. This act created the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, or the NunnLugar Program, after the program’s two founders: Senator Sam Nunn, a Democrat from Georgia, and Senator Richard Lugar, a Republican from Indiana. The program focused on the following, previously Soviet, nations: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The U.S. pledged financial support and technical aid to these newly independent nations so that they could maintain their inherited nuclear weapons. The primary goals of the program were to dismantle the former Soviet Union nuclear weapons, gather and secure weapons and any technology or materials connected to the manufacture of nuclear                                                                                                                 24  Ibid.,  155.     25  U.S.  House  of  Representatives,  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  International  Physical  Security   Standards  for  Nuclear  Materials  Outside  the  United  States:  Reports  to  Congress  Pursuant  to  Section  604   of  the  Omnibus  Diplomatic  Security  and  Anti-­‐Terrorism  Act  of  1986  (P.L.  99-­‐399),  (Washington,  D.  C.:   U.S.  G.P.O.,  1988)  22-­‐23.       10 weapons, and support further efforts towards nonproliferation and greater transparency. It must be noted, however, as stated by a former scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Stephen Younger, that “regardless of what is reported in the news, all nuclear nations take the security of their weapons very seriously.”26 Even so, as of the year 2012, the CTR program’s efforts had deactivated over 7,500 warheads, destroyed over 900 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and upgraded twenty-four nuclear weapons storehouses.27 U.S. aid to various countries’ counterterrorism policies was seen by some critics as meddling, but the support helped to secure the nuclear weapon arsenals around the world. Programs that bolstered that security served U.S. interests, yes, but, in addition, furthered the self-interest of individual nations maintaining their weapons. The United States is not the sole power concerned with strict maintenance of nuclear materials, as demonstrated by this United Nations Security Council statement from January 31, 1992: “The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international security. The members of the Council commit themselves to working to prevent the spread of technology related to the research for or production of such weapons and to take appropriate action to that end.” 28 The U.S. was doing its part to establish                                                                                                                 26  Benjamin  H.  Friedman,  Jim  Harper  and  Christopher  A.  Preble,  eds,  Terrorizing  Ourselves:  Why  U.S.   Counterterrorism  Policy  is  Failing  and  How  to  Fix  It  (Washington,  D.C.:  Cato  Institute,  2010),  141,   quoting  Stephen  M.  Younger,  Endangered  Species  (New  York:  Ecco,  2007),  93.     27  Justin  Bresolin,  "Fact  Sheet:  The  Nunn-­‐Lugar  Cooperative  Threat  Reduction  Program,"  Center  for   Arms  Control,   http://armscontrolcenter.org/publications/factsheets/fact_sheet_the_cooperative_threat_reduction_ program/  (accessed  February  16,  2014).   28  United  Nations,  “Chapter  VIII:  Consideration  of  questions  under  the  responsibility  of  the  Security   Council  for  the  maintenance  of  international  peace  and  security,  28.  The  responsibility  of  the  Security   Council  in  the  maintenance  of  international  peace  and  security,”  In  Repertoire  of  the  practice  of  the   Security  Council:  Supplement  1989-­‐1992.,  821,  New  York:  United  Nations,  2007,   https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/89-­‐       11 international mechanisms supporting non-proliferation around the globe; its programs enable other countries to build better defenses, ensuring more control over nuclear weapons and materials. Efforts to Secure U.S. Ports The sheer amount of materials and goods housed in the massive shipping containers transported into U.S. ports made the detection of radiation a widely-recognized problem. Part of the problem is that highly enriched uranium and plutonium are far from the only materials that emit radioactivity; other naturally radioactive substances and products include bananas, brazil nuts, white potatoes, cat litter, aircraft parts, glass, and concrete.29 The ability to shield radiating materials—such as highly enriched uranium—with other substances, like lead and water, within shipping containers further decreases port security’s ability to reliably detect radiation.30 Port security faced enormous challenges, particularly because, in addition to monitoring the maritime access of goods and people to the country, it must also maintain and streamline the international trade that takes place there. Accordingly, author Michael Levi said that “port security may not be particularly useful on its own—and it is still likely to be ineffective against many threats—but when properly focused and combined with materials security, it can reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack.”31                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           92/Chapter%208/GENERAL%20ISSUES/Item%2028_SC%20respons%20in%20maint%20IPS.pdf   (accessed  March  23,  2014).   29  Thomas  B.  Cochran  and  Matthew  G.  McKinzie,  “Detecting  Nuclear  Smuggling,”    Scientific  American   298,  no.  4  (2008):  100,   http://www.nature.com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/scientificamerican/journal/v298/n4/pdf/scientificam erican0408-­‐98.pdf  (accessed  March  23,  2014).   30  Levi,  On  Nuclear  Terrorism,  56-­‐57.     31  Michael  Levi,  “Stopping Nuclear Terrorism: The Dangerous Allure of a Perfect Defense,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (2008): 137, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20020273 (accessed January 7, 2014).         12 Ports’ inherently multinational nature turns maritime security into an international problem, regardless of where the final destination port may be. The security vulnerabilities of one country’s ports become the vulnerabilities of the ports receiving goods from it. Accordingly, the necessities of port security are to “(a) control access to the port, its installations, and vessels, (b) control access to cargo or passengers while in the port, (c) prevent sabotage to vessels calling at the port, to port facility installations, and to the port’s business and trade information systems.”32 Transportation security cards, risk assessment tools, best practices assessments, training, and grants to purchase additional sensors are some of the available safeguards to achieve these necessities.33 The Single Port Identification Program (SPID), as recommended in a 1998 port security pamphlet, was meant to serve as such a safeguard. SPID cards would serve the dual purpose of restricting individuals’ access to specific areas of the port according to his/her authorization and ascertaining the identity of the cardholder.34 Simple processes, like SPID cards or their equivalent, require—at the very least—a serious time commitment from terrorists in order to infiltrate the port. Another of the pamphlet’s suggestions was to require port personnel to receive basic anti-terrorist training. Then, if faced with an attack, port personnel would be prepared to address the threat while waiting for security professionals to arrive. These techniques, when coordinated with the local and federal authorities who would respond to threats specifically terrorist in nature, would provide continuity in security goals and processes. Further, this type of training would allow port                                                                                                                 32  Federico  Peña,  Port  Security:  A  National  Planning  Guide  (Washington,  D.C.:  U.S.  Dept.  of   Transportation,  1997)  8.     33  Thomas  P.  Marian,  “Port  Security  from  the  Inside  Out:  A  Systems  Approach  to  Safeguarding  Our   Nation’s  Ports,”  Tulane  Law  Review  81  (2006-­‐2007):  1512-­‐13,   http://www.heinonline.org.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/HOL/Page?page=1  (accessed  March  4,  2014). 34  Kenneth  Gale  Hawkes  and  Anthony  Infante,  eds,  Port  Security:  Security  Force  Management   (Washington,  D.C.:  U.S.  Department  of  Transporation,  1998)  14-­‐15.         13 security personnel to focus on the task of detecting weapons or materials that could mature into an actual attack, without being unprepared in the face of one.35 The World Trade Center attacks in 2001 proved an important impetus for accelerations in port security developments, as they were for many aspects of national security. An example of this, the Megaports Initiative began in 2003 with the purpose of providing foreign ports with the facilities and technologies necessary to screen containers bound for the U.S. In accordance with the multinational nature of ports, the Megaports Initiative works to better port security from the start of a container’s journey to the finish, by increasing foreign capabilities to detect nuclear weapons and materials. Accordingly, the Initiative’s goal is to provide foreign seaports with the necessary detection equipment to prevent terrorists from smuggling nuclear materials into the country. To date, twentyseven ports have received Megaports equipment, including ports in the Bahamas, Belgium, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Greece, Israel, Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Panama, and Taiwan, just to name a few.36 As announced in January 2002, the Container Security Initiative (CSI), managed by Customs and Border Protection (CBP), is another specific attempt to increase the security of ports. CSI, using informed targeting tools, marks out suspicious containers for further inspection as they enter the United States. The data about containers and their port of origin enables port security to more thoroughly inspect imports—largely through prescreening processes—without drastically slowing down the commerce carried out there. Additionally, as a part of CSI, CBP officers work with foreign ports to “establish                                                                                                                 35  Ibid.,  16-­‐19.   36  NNSA,  “Megaports  Initiative  |  National  Nuclear  Security  Administration,”  NNSA,   http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/programoffices/internationalmate rialprotectionandcooperation/-­‐5  (accessed  February  16,  2014).         14 security criteria for identifying high-risk containers.”37 Containers suspected of hiding smuggled nuclear material, then, can be further inspected as they arrive in U.S. ports, having already been pointed out in collaboration with foreign port security.38 Securing ports evolved into a global effort, because a single safe port cannot make up for the vulnerabilities of all those that are in commercial contact with it. To their credit, all recent efforts to enhance port security incorporate that inherently international characteristic into their planning. Rather than attempting to secure solely U.S. ports, both the Megaports Initiative and CSI support increased security in ports around the world— helping to prevent the smuggling of nuclear materials from the source and the destination. Enhancing the Safety of Cargo and Passenger Flights The number of flights that have been deliberately brought down is uncomfortably high. In response to each of these incidents, however, further regulations were put in place to prevent similar incidents from occurring again. Pan Am Flight 103 will serve as an example of how a downed plane brought to light the safety gaps in existing security measures and the openings these gaps left for nuclear terrorism. On December 21, 1988, a conventional bomb disguised as a radio-cassette player, stowed inside an unregistered piece of luggage, exploded and brought down Pan Am Flight 103. Immediately following the crash, the ability to put luggage not registered to a passenger on a plane became a primary focus. Simply because, if at all possible, a                                                                                                                 37  U.S.  Department  of  Homeland  Security,  “CSI  in  Brief  –  CBP.gov,”  CBP.gov,   http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/csi_in_brief.xml  (accessed  February  16,   2014).   38  Ibid.         15 terrorist would certainly prefer to wreak his/her damage without being killed in the process. However, that preference would not, in the end, overcome a terrorist ideology, as the September 11th attacks demonstrated. Despite the general outrage about what was, in the wake of the crash of Pan Am 103, seen as lax security—inadequate bag matching procedures, the ability of screening equipment to detect explosive materials, and the ease of unauthorized individuals to enter restricted areas of airports—persisted in a FAA inspection of the Frankfurt airport mere months after the incident. This inspection exposed security gaps that left airlines and their passengers vulnerable not only to the threats of conventional explosives and hijacking, but also to nuclear terrorism.39 The Frankfurt airport had failed to pass an FAA inspection, but now the FAA had to enforce its jurisdiction, given under the Federal Aviation Act, over foreign airlines bringing passengers to the U.S.40 The FAA could require certain security measures at foreign airports which are points of origin for passengers flying to the U.S., but actually requiring that security was a delicate diplomatic issue. To aid the FAA in regulating the security requirements in foreign locations, foreign security liaison officers were sent to each category X airport—generally those airports with the highest traffic volume. Further, having personnel in foreign locations take part in security procedures— particularly in regards to the screening of baggage—would, in the words of New Jersey Senator Lautenberg, “help us know what is in baggage before it gets loaded on a plane and enters our country.”41 New air carrier standard security programs were implemented, requiring foreign airlines to provide a level of security on a par with that mandated by the                                                                                                                 39  President’s  Commission  on  Aviation  Security  and  Terrorism,  Report  of  the  President’s  Commission   on  Aviation  Security  and  Terrorism  (Washington,  D.C.:  The  Commission,  1990)  3,  15,  &  30.   40  Ibid.,  28-­‐30.     41  U.S.  Senate,  Subcommittee  on  Aviation,  Committee  on  Commerce,  Science,  and  Transportation,   Aviation  Security  (Washington,  D.C.:  U.S.  G.P.O.,  1989)  6.         16 United States government for domestic airlines. After their implementation on July 31, 1991, a review of compliance was to commence.42 By 1993, the FAA had developed a list of priorities to improve security on aircraft and in airports. These priorities included: “establish an explosive detection systems analysis and architecture group, demonstrate passenger/luggage correlation schemes, solicit and fund proposals for an aircraft hardening analysis, establish an operational testing facility[,]…solicit and fund proposals to demonstrate explosive tagging schemes [and] solicit and fund exploratory research proposals for new methods of explosive detection.”43 These goals would provide better protection from not only conventional threats, but also from terrorism. The ability for airline security personnel to more reliably detect explosives and radioactive material would deter and help prevent any such devices from being loaded onto a plane. A harder aircraft would decrease the efficiency of an explosive—nuclear or no—if it had made it onto the plane. Investigators into the Pan Am crash noted that, in the U.S., detection systems had already improved from an 80 percent successful detection rate in 1987, to 90 percent successful detection rate. Knowing how the extent of the efficiency of these screening systems would allow airport security to incorporate them where they could most reliably detect explosive material, such as, perhaps, in scanning carry-on bags.44 Accordingly, the Pan Am Flight proved to be the impetus for remarkable changes within airport security, within the U.S. and outside it,                                                                                                                 42  U.S.  House,  Subcommittee  on  Aviation,  Committee  on  Public  Works  and  Transportation,   Implementation  of  the  Aviation  Security  Improvement  Act  of  1990  (Washington,  D.C.:  U.S.  G.P.O.,  1991)   8-­‐9.   43  Committee  on  Commercial  Aviation  Security,  Detection  of  Explosives  for  Commercial  Aviation   Security  (Washington,  D.C.:  National  Academies  Press,  1993)  xi.   44  President’s  Commission,  Report  of  the  President’s  Commission,  48.           17 simply because of the FAA’s foreign responsibilities and the international nature of flying. One terrorist attack led to the prevention of others. SAFEGUARDING U.S. NUCLEAR MATERIALS As Graham Allison points out in his book, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, the U.S. government maintains complete control over the gold stored in Fort Knox45—so why should nuclear weapons and material be any different? After all, is the control of nuclear weapons equally as important as the nation’s monetary supply, if not more? Sadly, applying the absolute security of gold to nuclear weapons and material is not that simple. Unlike the gold at Fort Knox—only removed in minute amounts to test its purity, which makes the movement of larger amounts obvious as unauthorized— nuclear materials are frequently transported in varying amounts for a variety of purposes. There are both military and civilian professions that require access to nuclear materials, such that control over these materials means discerning legitimate and illegitimate users. Further, Fort Knox is a single location, with controllable exits and entrances. The U.S., any country, is not.46 The inability to provide nuclear weapons and material with “Fort Knox” protection makes internal security as significant as foreign security, a reality that did not escape the United States government. Accordingly, the AEC began to investigate the weakness of U.S. nuclear reactor facilities. The problem was where to begin. Even in the 1960s the awful—and awe-ful—power of nuclear weapons and the destruction they wrought was still new. Harold L. Price, in early discussions of nuclear security, explained                                                                                                                 45  Allison,  Nuclear  Terrorism,  15.     46  Levi,  On  Nuclear  Terrorism,  19-­‐20.           18 that the AEC did not need to establish extensive safeguards; the sheer monetary value of the materials would motivate sufficiently careful watch.47 However, the concern contrary to Price’s supposition proved valid when, in 1965, the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation in Apollo, Pennsylvania discovered that enough HEU to build six bombs was unaccounted for. Military sites were not the only vulnerabilities; civilian locations offered much the same materials and lower security. After a similar loss of low-enriched uranium in England a year later, the AEC mandated an improvement of security and control of nuclear materials. Despite these improvements, continued warnings about remaining weaknesses guaranteed continued government attention.48 Continuing government attention led to public attention. In response to increased public scrutiny, the AEC composed new security regulations and released them for public comment in 1973. The AEC suggested that nuclear power plants inventory their nuclear materials more frequently and narrowing access to those materials where possible. These recommendations also included requiring trucks transporting materials to have an armed escort in a separate vehicle, radioing in every two hours, and special markings to clearly identify vehicles. Trains carrying material would abide by adapted versions of these strategies as well. These suggestions, while displaying good intentions, would only serve to increase the vulnerability of nuclear material in transit. Specifically obvious markings and the conspicuous presence of armed escorts identified trucks not only to those keeping track of them for safety, but also to any terrorist groups attempting to acquire nuclear                                                                                                                 47  J.  Samuel  Walker,  “Regulating  against  Nuclear  Terrorism:  The  Domestic  Safeguards  Issue,  1970-­‐ 1979”  (Technology  and  Culture  42,  no.  1  (2001))  108-­‐109,   http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/tech/summary/v042/42.1walker.html  (accessed  September  28,   2013).   48  Micah  Zenko,  “Intelligence  Estimates  of  Nuclear  Terrorism,”  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of   Political  and  Social  Science  607  (Sept.  2006):  94,  http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097841  (accessed   January  7,  2014).           19 material. Requiring call-ins every two hours for drivers to report their locations increased the travel time and, therefore, opportunities for the truck to be attacked and the materials seized. Despite these criticisms from the nuclear industry, the AEC’s edits were minor— such as extending the call-in time from two hours to five.49 Continued public anxiety, particularly with India’s successful detonation of its own nuclear bomb in May 1974,50 meant that the AEC continued to suffer scrutiny about its safeguards and that amendments of regulations only became more exacting. One expectation was the ability to maintain constant communication while traveling, and if a particular road or route made that impossible, further safeguards were to be observed to compensate: the truck would be accompanied by two armed guards and an escort with two additional guards. Guards would also be required for transportation of nuclear materials via air or nautical travel, and five guards for train transportation.51 The AEC, and the organization that replaced it, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),52 consistently updated the regulations that governed the access, handling, and transportation of nuclear materials throughout the U.S. In the shadow of the Nuclear Age and new countries admitted to the “Nuclear Club,” the idea that a rogue individual—or worse, terrorists—could create or acquire a nuclear bomb deeply concerned the American public. Adam Adelson’s article, “Please Don’t Steal the Atomic Bomb,” published in the journal Theory into Practice in 1969 clearly demonstrates this fear and the resulting commentary on the safeguards of nuclear material. Adelson begins by discussing the possibility that Israel had acquired “the Bomb,” and establishes the two                                                                                                                 49  Walker,  “Regulating  against  Nuclear  Terrorism,”  115-­‐117.     50  Ibid.,  119.     51  Ibid.,  121-­‐122.   52  Ibid.,  122.           20 methods to do so: the conventional way and the “cheapest, quickest shortcut,”53 or stealing nuclear material rather than attempting to create it.54 The conventional method means recreating the extensive and expensive process the U.S. underwent during World War II as it sought to create the first atomic bomb, then still theoretical. More importantly in the world where an atomic bomb is no longer theoretical, the conventional process is a lengthy one and difficult to conceal. Thus, the international community can be made aware and prepare for the admission of another nuclear country, just as Adelson demonstrates with his introduction of the issue of nuclear materials through Israel’s progress through that method. Israel’s acquisition of an atomic weapon segues to the issue Adelson truly wants to address: the security of nuclear materials. He qualifies early on within his article that “the United States has, of course, kept all of its actual bombs under the strictest protection.”55 It is not the U.S. protection of nuclear bombs that concerns him, but the protection of nuclear materials. Adelson does not worry about the adequacy of U.S. safeguards, because he wants to extend the protection offered by those very safeguards to nuclear materials. The perception of the overall laxity in maintaining control over nuclear materials leads to the speculation divulged to Adelson by one Dr. Taylor, who has “worried about how easy it is to build A-bombs ever since I first helped design them.”56 Once an individual acquired the appropriate nuclear material, “the whole job could be done in                                                                                                                 53  Alan  M.  Adelson,  “Please  Don’t  Steal  the  Atomic  Bomb,”  Theory  into  Practice  8,  no.  2  (1969):  62,   http://www.jstor.org/stable/1475250  (accessed  March  4,  2014).     54  Ibid.   55  Ibid.   56  Ibid.         21 someone’s basement, with materials purchasable anywhere.”57 The paragraphs following these confidences discuss the ease, the simplicity, of assembling a nuclear bomb, not for the diplomatic aims of countries, but for the ideological goals of individuals or terrorists. Already, in 1969, Adelson, and many Americans along with him, recognized the fatal flaw in guaranteed retaliation to a nuclear attack: what if such an attack was launched by a group not tied to a nation?58 Adelson, sounding very much like author Graham Allison, says that the answer to deterrence’s flaw is “foolproof” accounting of nuclear materials.59 The AEC must enact the regulations to make that exacting accounting of nuclear materials not only possible, but required of private companies using them. Adelson does not question the government’s ability to successfully manage nuclear materials—just as he did not question the government’s ability to safeguard its nuclear weapons—but he is worried about the relatively lax standards it allowed the nuclear industry to operate under. The AEC had authority over the nuclear industry, and the probable emergence of a nuclear material black market convinced the American public that it needed to exert that authority. The potential for terrorism, and the ways that loose control of nuclear materials within the U.S. enabled that potential, concerned a sufficient number of people that regulation of the nuclear industry’s handling of those materials continued to be a prominent issue.60 While every revision of these regulations was conditioned by the belief that “additional measures might be necessary,”61 prevention became only one aspect of the overall reaction to the threat of terrorism. That desire to have some way to                                                                                                                 57  Ibid.   58  Ibid.,  65.     59  Ibid.,  63.     60  Walker,  “Regulating  against  Nuclear  Terrorism,”  122-­‐130.   61Ibid.,  115.         22 respond to an actual terrorist and/or extortionist nuclear attack led to the creation of NEST, an amalgamated group of nuclear professionals. NEST: REACTING TO NUCLEAR THREATS The Department of Energy (DOE) organized NEST—renamed the Nuclear Emergency Support Team in 200262—in 197563, providing the United States with a specialized response team, whose training prepared them to deal with nuclear attacks and their inherently catastrophic nature. As Jeffrey Richelson calls the members of NEST in the subtitle of his book, Defusing Armageddon, they are “America’s Secret Nuclear Bomb Squad,”64 ready to respond when preventive measures fail. Boston and the Creation of NEST By the time the FBI received, in May 1974, a nuclear extortion threat, wherein the perpetrator demanded $200,000 or else a nuclear bomb would detonate in Boston, there had already been five preceding threats.65 The first, in October 1970, targeted Orlando, Florida with a Hydrogen Bomb. The threat, delivered in a letter to the Orlando Police Department, demanded passage out of the country with $1 million—or else the bomb would be detonated. Understandably skeptical of the validity of this threat, the Orlando police, using the communication method described within the threat, asked for some demonstration that the extortionist actually possessed a viable hydrogen bomb. The response included a schematic drawing of a bomb, which an armament officer, stationed                                                                                                                 62  Richelson,  Defusing  Armageddon,  184.     63  Ibid.,  22.     64  Ibid.     65  Ibid.,  237.           23 in a nearby Air Force Base, said appeared workable. The Orlando police, in response to the apparent validity of the threat, left the money at a vacant house, but the investigative trail eventually led to the arrest a fourteen-year-old high school student, who confessed. Interestingly, rather than being sent to jail, the judge placed him under the supervision of two scientists in the hopes of halting his criminal tendencies and giving his intellectual talents a more beneficial direction.66 The other four threats—spanning from 1971 to 1974—ranged from very specific targets, like the Borough of Manhattan in New York, or to a general threat towards the entire United States with seven atom bombs.67 The threat to Boston in May 1974 appeared more serious than its predecessors, however, and was addressed accordingly. William H. Chambers, a scientist in the weapons division of the Los Alamos Laboratory, heard about the most recent nuclear threat, aimed at Boston. Chambers had experience with searching for a nuclear weapon because he had been part of the team sent to Palomares, Spain in 1966 to locate and retrieve a missing nuclear missile. Just as his presence had been specifically requested for his expertise for Spain, he called in others, including another scientist from Los Alamos, Carl Henry. While the assembled scientific team made their way towards Boston, the FBI left the requisite $200,000—in counterfeit bills—at the specified location. Strangely, no one ever appeared to collect the ransom. Even before the scientists arrived and could begin the search for the alleged bomb, the threat and its author had disappeared.68 Following the incident in Boston, which could have easily ended quite differently, Mahlon Gates, the manager of the Nevada Operations Office, received a memo entitled                                                                                                                 66  Ibid.,  17-­‐18.   67  Ibid.,  237.   68  Ibid.,  8-­‐9  &  19-­‐20.         24 “Responsibility for Search and Detection Operations.” In this memo, Major General Ernest Graves gave Gates the responsibility of using the AEC’s radiation detection systems for “search and identification of lost or stolen nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials, nuclear bomb threats, and radiation dispersal threats.”69 Locating missing nuclear material was no longer Gates’ only responsibility. In addition to everything else, Graves expected Gates to organize the deployment capabilities of the AEC’s radiation systems and teams to utilize those systems effectively. Since the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 defined the FBI as the lead agency in any instances of theft of or extortion by nuclear material, the Bureau would direct whatever teams Gates created in the field. NEST emerged from these tentative beginnings.70 NEST Deployment and Procedure As stated above, NEST operates under the command of the FBI—an organization within the Department of Justice (DOJ)—despite its being an agency within the DOE. Uniquely, the members of NEST retain full-time jobs elsewhere, leaving those jobs whenever deployed within NEST teams. NEST members are employed as atmosphere physicists, chemists, data analysts, engineers, infrared physicists, nuclear physicists, etc. As specifically skilled professionals, NEST members were employed around the country, in the DOE, the Department of Defense, the Los Alamos Laboratory, the Sandia National Laboratory, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Raytheon Services Nevada (RSN), and more. These individuals’ involvement in NEST requires them to immediately                                                                                                                 69  Ernest  Graves,  Major  General,  Assistant  General  Manager  for  Military  Application,  Atomic  Energy   Commission,  Letter  to  M.E.  Gates,  Manager,  Nevada  Operations,  “Responsibility  for  Search  and   Detection  Operations,”  November  18,  1974,  Secret,   http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb267/06.pdf  (accessed  April  4,  2013).   70  Richelson,  Defusing  Armageddon,  20-­‐21.         25 travel to the site of the latest incident when needed and apply their specialized skills to the situation. One of NEST’s primary purposes is to provide various experts with mobile versions of the unique tools of their profession to aid the FBI in resolving necessarily complicated situations involving nuclear material.71 Threats involving nuclear weapons, particularly extortion attempts, were not uncommon; the appendix of Defusing Armageddon lists 103 extortion threats documented from 1970 to 1993.72 The vast majority of these threats, however, have been revealed as hoaxes. The probability that an individual or a group of individuals could successfully assemble or acquire a nuclear weapon and then deploy it was (and is) extremely low. Their success would require a combination of the knowledge to construct a nuclear weapon and the ability to get the highly enriched uranium necessary to do so. Still, the FBI evaluated each threat as potentially credible. If the FBI believed a threat serious enough to proceed, an FBI specialist would often examine it to find what clues s/he could in the extortion note. One example of information such a specialist can glean has to do with the degree of technical knowledge displayed by the subject.73 The personal details present in the extortion note provide valuable knowledge not only to the FBI in its attempt to apprehend the individual, but for NEST as it searches for the bomb or radioactive material. The extent of a subject’s technical knowledge and where provides clues as to what type of nuclear material s/he had access to and would have used in constructing a nuclear weapon—if, in fact, s/he did so.                                                                                                                 71  U.S.  Department  of  Energy,  Nevada  Operations  Office,  Nuclear  Emergency  Search  Team:  A  Response   to  Nuclear  Terrorism,  May  29,  1983,  Unclassified,   http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb267/19a.pdf  (accessed  April  4,  2013).     72  Richelson,  Defusing  Armageddon,  237-­‐240.     73  F.  W.  Jessen,  Lawrence  Livermore  Laboratory,  “Nuclear  Extortion:  Psycholinguistic  Preliminary   Report,”  February  1,  1979,  Unclassified,   http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb267/12b.pdf  (accessed  April  4,  2013).           26 If a threat appears serious enough, the FBI and NEST, as well as other involved agencies, are deployed to the location. NEST’s equipment is particularly important, as team members use a variety of technologies to locate and evaluate nuclear weapons or material. This equipment includes “airborne/vehicle radiation detectors, handheld radiation detectors, helicopter and fixed wing aircraft, diagnostics systems, disablement systems, damage limitation systems, assessment systems, and technical/scientific support.”74 Although certainly long outdated, in 1978, one radiation detector NEST might have used was the “Neutron Detector Suitcase.” Despite its name, the suitcase was designed to be transported by vehicle, likely because it weighed 32 kilograms, or approximately 70.4 pounds.75 Other radiation detectors were designed to be attached to aircraft, enabling a wider search area. Accordingly, NEST frequently used aircraft, because they enabled the team to cover a lot more ground in the search for the radiation indicating nuclear devices or materials. NEST’s primary planes were the helicopter MBB BO-105 and the fixed wing planes King Air B-200, Convair 580T, and Citation II.76 Each threat poses different issues and, thus, each NEST group is deployed with equipment tailored to best aid the FBI with the situation at hand. As explained above, a threat must be seen as credible to initiate the deployment of NEST. Credible threats are, thankfully, a rarity. As Stephen Ronshaugen’s Standard NEST Briefing (circa 1995) explains, “to date, there have been in excess of 100 nuclear extortion threats and incidents in the United States. Only approximately a dozen of these resulted in deployment of NEST assets. All others were clearly determined to be hoaxes,                                                                                                                 74  U.S.  Department  of  Energy,  Nuclear  Emergency  Search  Team.   75  E.  J.  Dowdy,  C.N.  Henry,  R.D.  Hastings,  S.W.  France,  Los  Alamos  Scientific  Laboratory,  Neutron   Detector  Suitcase  for  the  Nuclear  Emergency  Search  Team,  February  1978,  Unclassified,   http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb267/09.pdf  (accessed  April  4,  2013).     76  U.S.  Department  of  Energy,  Nuclear  Emergency  Search  Team.         27 not requiring further action.”77 Not all threats initiating NEST deployment proved to be credible, however. An example of one such threat was the one delivered to Mr. Fred L. Hartley, then the chairman and president of the Union Oil Company of California, on November 4, 1975, claiming that there was a “Nuclear Devise [sic] with A [sic] potential of 20 Kilotons [sic] concealed on one of your valuable properties.”78 The letter continued by demanding $1,000,000 in small bills with specific instructions on how and where to deliver the money. The FBI and forty members of NEST traveled to Los Angeles to locate the device. At one point NEST members believed they had found something dangerous, but the radioactivity was eventually determined to be from a natural source. When the suspect picked up his ransom, the FBI trailed the vehicle. This surveillance quickly located the driver and identified him as Frank James, who was later tried and convicted for his attempted extortion.79 Most threats exposed a figure similar to Frank James and the unnamed Orlando teenager, an individual seeking money and believing that a threatened nuclear attack would give it to him. NEST’s skills had yet to be put to an actual test. The untried nature of NEST was comforting—the effects of any actual nuclear threats could be devastating—but how could the U.S. government be sure that NEST would be able to handle the real thing, if or when it finally arrived? For better or for worse, a true nuclear threat occurred in late 1977 in the form of a faltering Soviet satellite, Cosmos 954. Free Falling: Cosmos 954 and Cosmos 1402                                                                                                                 77Stephen  Ronshaugen,  “Standard  NEST  Briefing,”  n.d.  (but  circa  1995),  2,   http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb267/19b.pdf  (accessed  April  4,  2013).     78  Fision,  Letter  to  Fred  L.  Hartley,  Union  Oil  of  California,  November  3,  1975,  Unclassified,   http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb267/07.pdf  (accessed  April  4,  2013).     79  Richelson,  Defusing  Armageddon,  28-­‐32.           28 Cosmos 954 was a Soviet reconnaissance satellite powered by a nuclear reactor, launched into orbit on September 18, 1977. By November, Cosmos 954 had begun to malfunction and had slowed down significantly. Getting exact information from the Soviets on what exactly Cosmos 954 should be doing, if the deceleration was planned, was difficult at best. The American intelligence community received the Soviets’ eventual response to queries about the satellite on January 14th with hesitant relief. The Soviets claimed that the reactor was “explosive-proof because the accumulation of a critical mass is ruled out.”80 But, “in view of the accident aboard the satellite [depressurization], it cannot be ruled out that some destroyed parts of the plants still would reach the surface of the earth.”81 The Soviets’ explanation left the exact meaning of “explosive-proof” unclear, but the reply brought considerable, if uneasy, relief to the U.S. intelligence community. Still, they kept track of satellite’s position, just as a precaution. Scientists used collected tracking data to predict where the “destroyed parts” of Cosmos 954 might land, determining that North America was the most likely spot. After that conclusion, United States officials shared the unfortunate news with their continental neighbor, the Canadian government.82 In its final days in space, Cosmos 954 dropped over fifty miles in altitude. Cosmos 954’s hurtle towards Earth threw off calculations of where the satellite would land, changing from Canada to the Pacific and then to southwest Africa. But on January 24, 1978, Cosmos 954’s remains landed in Canada. Now the focus became the safe recovery of the debris of Cosmos 954, because “its reactor (of whatever type) was alive                                                                                                                 80  Gus  W.  Weiss,  “The  Life  and  Death  of  Cosmos  954,”  Studies  in  Intelligence  22,  no.  1  (Spring  1974),  3,   Secret,  http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb267/10.pdf  (accessed  April  4,  2013).   81  Ibid.   82  Richelson,  Defusing  Armageddon,  47  &  50-­‐53.         29 and hot,”83 posing a potential health hazard to any who came in contact with it. Immediately after President Jimmy Carter received the location of Cosmos 954’s demise, he offered U.S. assistance to the Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau, who accepted.84 At that point, two C-141 planes of NEST personnel and equipment headed directly north, one from Las Vegas and the other from Andrews Air Force base in Washington, D.C. Then the United States and Canada began their coordinated efforts in what came to be known as Operation Morning Light, the first real test of NEST’s ability to manage actual nuclear material and its consequences.85 One of Operation Morning Light’s first obstacles was determining if Cosmos 954 had left a cloud of radiation in the atmosphere in its wake. If Cosmos 954 had indeed done so, how much radiation was there? Where was it headed? There would be eleven U2 high altitude air sampling flights during 1978, but, thankfully, all eleven results were negative. The lack of radiation drifting through the atmosphere eased the initial worry of both the Canadian and United States governments. Now, personnel of the two countries could focus on locating the remnants of Cosmos 954 and preventing whatever radiation the debris emitted from having immediate or long-term consequences.86 Upon arrival, the DOE radiation detection equipment was installed into waiting Canadian aircraft. The first aircraft search proceeded along the mostly straight line between Yellowknife and Baker Lake,87 a distance of more than 500 miles. The search area of more than 15,000 square miles was initially divided into eight sectors, though                                                                                                                 83  Weiss,  “The  Life  and  Death  of  Cosmos  954,”  1.   84  Nevada  Operations  Office,  Department  of  Energy,  Operation  Morning  Light,  Canadian  Northwest   Territories/1978:  A  Non-­‐Technical  Summary  of  United  States  Participation,  September  1978,  8,   Unclassified,  http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb267/11.pdf  (accessed  April  4,  2013).   85  Richelson,  Defusing  Armageddon,  54  &  57.   86  Ibid.,  55-­‐56.   87  Nevada  Operations  Office,  Operation  Morning  Light,  8.         30 another six would be later added to make a total of fourteen. No fewer than twelve different aircraft were involved in the search, flying over sectors, carefully watching their equipment for a “hit.” In addition to the debris eventually discovered, radiation detection equipment also found natural sources of radioactivity, which could be documented so that in the future, searchers would already know which “hits” needed to be investigated further.88 While NEST and Canadian personnel cooperated in the airborne search for Cosmos 954, two Canadian campers, Mike Mobley and John Mordhorst, discovered a fragment on a hike from their camp. Upon finding the debris, the two men assumed that it was merely a piece of a downed aircraft and one of them, Mobley, actually touched it. When they returned to their camp, the radio announced the nation’s search for Cosmos 954 and, belatedly realizing what they had really found, they contacted the nearby Fort Reliance. Far too late, they were warned not to get any closer to the fragment than 1,000 feet. After being transported to a nearby cancer institute in Edmonton for tests,89 Mobley’s negative results meant that he appeared to have suffered no damage from his close contact with the Soviet satellite.90 One week after Cosmos 954 crashed to Earth, the entire search area had been covered by at least one aircraft flyover. Determining the exact location of “hits” was difficult, as aircraft flew over a relatively large area; Operation Morning Light provided the opportunity and necessity to solve this problem. By the time Operation Morning Light ended with the recovery of all of the debris of Cosmos 954, a “search technique                                                                                                                 88  Richelson,  Defusing  Armageddon,  61.     89  Nevada  Operations  Office,  Operation  Morning  Light,  33   90  Ibid.,  65-­‐66.         31 developed using a formation of three C130 aircraft equipped with sensors.”91 However, it was the Microwave Ranging System that allowed for the precise location of radiation “hits.” As the search continued through February 1978, any detected particulates emitting more than 100µ roentgens per hour at one meter were removed, while particles of any size were removed if near an established community. With the successful retrieval and removal of any detectable amounts of Cosmos 954, U.S. personnel were gradually phased out as the month of March began.92 At the end of Operation Morning Light, both Canada and the U.S.—and NEST— had gained valuable experience on how to locate and retrieve objects emitting nuclear radiation. Despite the fact that the U.S. efforts were not reimbursed by the USSR as Canada’s were, NEST and other U.S. actors gleaned valuable information from Cosmos 954’s wreckage about Soviet satellite fuel and design technology. That newly acquired intelligence and practice enabled NEST to adjust its standard protocol, making the team better prepared for future nuclear events.93 Cosmos 954 was not the last crashed Soviet satellite, however. In late 1982, NEST was once again placed on alert because another Soviet nuclear-powered satellite appeared to be malfunctioning. The Soviet Union launched Cosmos 1402 in August 1982, but by December it began to act strangely. By early January 1983, U.S. intelligence was tracking the satellite, its reactor, and a separate fragment. The U.S. did not attempt to keep the information on Cosmos 1402 to itself and made a general announcement about the satellite’s troubles, which the USSR initially denied. On January 24, 1983—amost exactly five years after the downfall of Cosmos 954—Cosmos 1402 fell into the Indian                                                                                                                 91  Ibid.,  46.   92  Ibid.,  46  &  56.     93  Richelson,  Defusing  Armageddon,  69.           32 Ocean. Like in Operation Morning Light, atmospheric samples were taken, but, again, the tests’ results were negative. The last fragment landed in the South Atlantic Ocean days later on February 8th. Although prepared, NEST’s services were not needed for this particular satellite.94 Presidents’ Preparation for Nuclear Incidents Presidents, using the NIE, produced by a consensus of the U.S. intelligence community and other resources, determined several of the policies towards the increasingly relevant threats of nuclear terrorism. Following Gerald Ford’s presidency and the inception of NEST, each of his Presidential successors addressed the growing dangers of nuclear weapons to the U.S. Prior to Cosmos 1402’s return to Earth, on April 10, 1982, President Ronald Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 30, titled “Managing Terrorist Incidents.” NSDD 30’s significance, particularly in relation to NEST, lay in its designation of different lead agencies for different instances. The Department of Justice—in other words, the FBI—retained its status as the lead on any domestic nuclear threats or thefts, while the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) became lead in the case of any “hijackings within the special jurisdiction of the United States.”95 In cases of foreign or international terrorist threats, the State Department took on the lead role. This directive, by defining a U.S. role in foreign or international threats, made NEST more than simply a national resource; NEST personnel and their equipment could henceforth find themselves using their nuclear expertise to aid foreign governments                                                                                                                 94  Ibid.,  79-­‐82.     95  Ronald  Reagan,  National  Security  Decision  Directive  30,  “Managing  Terrorist  Incidents,”  April  10,   1982,  Secret,  http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB55/nsdd30.pdf  (accessed  April  4,   2013).         33 and agencies address their terrorist threats, much as they done during the recovery of Cosmos 954.96 A later directive on January 20, 1986, NSDD 207, reiterated the lead agencies for the different categories of nuclear threats and, further, led to the creation of the Foreign Emergency Search Team (FEST), or the framework through which NEST is deployed to foreign locales.97 NEST functions the same way in FEST, formed of specialists specifically adapted to a particular threat who respond as quickly as possible, but simply operates in a foreign location.98 In his Executive Order 12656, Reagan clearly defined each agency’s or department’s responsibilities, to better coordinate their efforts to work together. DOE, which included NEST, was in charge of managing the “energy resource requirements for national defense and essential civilian needs,” as well as enhancing “capabilities for identification, analysis, damage assessment, and mitigation of hazards form nuclear weapons, materials, and devices.”99 NEST, then, was primarily to focus on bringing its technical skills to bear in addressing a threat. By specifically defining NEST’s role and expanding its field of operation to include beyond the United States, Reagan implemented several of the suggestions of the International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, whether or not that was his specific goal.100 For                                                                                                                 96  Ibid.   97  Ronald  Reagan,  National  Security  Decision  Directive  207,  “National  Program  for  Combatting   Terrorism,”  January  20,  1986,  Top  Secret,   http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB55/nsdd207.pdf  (accessed  April  14,  2013).   98  Richelson,  Defusing  Armageddon,  205.   99  Ronald  Reagan,  Executive  Order  12656,  “Assignment  of  Emergency  Preparedness   Responsibilities,”  November  18,  1988,  Sec.  701,  1b  and  6,  http://www.archives.gov/federal-­‐ register/codification/executive-­‐order/12656.html  (accessed  on  April  14,  2013).   100  Paul  Leventhal  and  Yonah  Alexander,  Preventing  nuclear  terrorism:  the  report  and  papers  of  the   International  Task  Force  on  Prevention  of  Nuclear  Terrorism  (Lexington,  Mass.:  Lexington  Books,   1987),  16.         34 Reagan, in the increasing tensions of the Cold War, being equipped—technologically and bureaucratically—to help important allies played an important role strategically. The threat of terrorism became particularly apparent to President Clinton, having witnessed an attack on the World Trade Center and the Oklahoma City Federal Building in 1993. At that point, if NEST had not already existed, President Clinton likely would have created it, because he was “convinced that we must…have the ability to limit the damage and manage the consequences should such a [terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction] occur.”101 Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 62, signed on May 22, 1998, obliquely recognized NEST as a participant in the “professionally trained interagency cadre,”102 but made terrorism a specific challenge that that cadre needed to prepare itself for. Before Clinton’s presidency terrorism had indeed been a threat, but the numerous attack attempts in a short span of years made it clear that terrorist attacks were no longer simply a threat, but a reality. President George W. Bush, like Clinton, was forced to face the reality of terrorist attacks and their consequences. One of Bush’s first responses after al Qaeda’s September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and attempts on the Pentagon was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DOH). Even agencies within the DOE were mandated to work with or, at times, under DOH.103 Just as Clinton had before him, Bush emphasized in his September 2002 National Security Presidential Direction (NSPD) 17 that it was “critical that the U.S. military and appropriate civilian agencies [like NEST]                                                                                                                 101  William  Clinton,  Presidential  Decision  Directive  62  Fact  Sheet,  “Combatting  Terrorism,”  May  22,   1998,  http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pdd/pdd62-­‐factsheet.htm  (accessed  April  14,  2013).   102  Ibid.   103  Alan  L.  Remick,  John  L.  Crapo,  and  Charles  R.  Woodruff,  “U.S.  National  Response  Assets  for   Radiological  Incidents,”  Healthy  Physics  89,  no.  5  (2005),  471,   http://ovidsp.ovid.com/ovidweb.cgi?T=JS&CSC=Y&NEWS=N&PAGE=fulltext&D=&AN=00004032-­‐ 200511000-­‐00007&PDF=y  (accessed  April  4,  2013).         35 be prepared to deter and defend against the full range of possible WMD employment scenarios.”104 As the gravity of nuclear threats posed by terrorists continued to grow, so did the significance of agencies like NEST. The Presidents of the United States recognized that importance and enacted policies to utilize those resources. Mighty Derringer and Mile Shakedown: Successes and Failures The actual value of NEST and its cooperating agencies largely depends on their ability to react and handle a real situation involving a viable nuclear threat as a whole. NEST’s deployments for credible threats were very few and far between, meaning that the agencies as a functioning whole needed a way to hone their skills, so that when the real thing finally did occur, they would know how to respond quickly and efficiently. Accordingly, the agencies hosted simulated exercises to test the responses of each agency and their overall ability to work together. The first exercise, codenamed Mighty Derringer, was scheduled to take place December 3-12, 1986 in Indianapolis, Indiana.105 The scenario comprised the reception of an intelligence report of an improvised nuclear device (IND) smuggled into the area, potentially by terrorists. The various personnel—including NEST—were able to recover and disable the device found in the fictitious foreign country incorporated into the exercise, but there was another nuclear device in Indianapolis, which exploded and took                                                                                                                 104  George  W.  Bush,  National  Security  Presidential  Directive  17,  “National  Strategy  to  Combat   Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction,”  September  17,  2002,  2,   http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/wmd19.pdf  (accessed  April  14,  2013).     105  Peter  Borg,  State  Department  Counter-­‐Terrorism  Center,  to  Richard  Kennedy  et  al.,  “Exercise   MIGHTY  DERRINGER,”  October  6,  1986,  Secret,   https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/359473-­‐8-­‐10-­‐6-­‐86-­‐state-­‐dept-­‐document.html   (accessed  April  4,  2013).           36 twenty blocks of the city with it.106 The exercise pointed out the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. government agencies as they cooperated with each other and local law enforcement. Mighty Derringer, as an exercise, gave each agency an opportunity to practice protocol and address its weaknesses outside an actual nuclear threat, where any mistakes could have a terrible cost. After Mighty Derringer, another series of exercise was planned during the summer of 1992, known as “Mile Shakedown,” and consisted of four exercises: Mica Dig, Emergency Deployment Readiness Evaluation (EDRE), Mild Cover, and Mirage Gold. Mirage Gold, because of the extensive after-action report on the exercise’s progression, is the one discussed here. Mirage Gold took place in New Orleans, Louisiana during the fall of 1994, with about 850 total participants.107 The basic scenario for Mirage Gold involved the FBI receiving a tip about a nuclear device in New Orleans from an informant. When surveillance overheard instructions to kill the informant, the FBI rescued the informant and the evidence at the scene confirmed attempts to assemble nuclear devices. The next day NEST and its equipment arrived and quickly set up. While scanning an area for radiation, a NEST team got a “hit,” and the FBI began planning for an emergency assault on the complex. When two men left the complex, radiation detectors reacted and the FBI subsequently followed them to a house. After the two men departed, the FBI entered and discovered an armed IND, set to detonate. After acquiring                                                                                                                 106  The  National  Security  Archive,  “U.S.  Nuclear  Terrorism  Exercise  Leaves  Indianapolis  in  ‘Ruins’,”   George  Washington  University,  http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb380/  (accessed   April  14,  2013).     107  Richelson,  Defusing  Armageddon,  91.           37 authority to do so on the morning of October 20th, the IND was disabled108 and not long after, the terrorists and their leader were apprehended.109 Simply based on the length of the report, it is clear that Mirage Gold exposed a number of problems in the procedure. Three major and persistent problems pointed out in the report will be discussed here. The first was the minimal inclusion of local authorities in the exercise. “State and local entities have significant and independent responsibilities for the populace in any major crisis and must operate with adequate knowledge,”110 which they cannot do without cooperation from the federal authorities. As a coalition of forces, the participating agencies needed to recognize and implement the place of local law enforcement in their efforts. The failure of the Joint Operations Center (JOC) slowed the flow of important intelligence—particularly concerning the IND—and left some players without the information they needed to move forward with their respective responsibilities. The FBI’s eagerness to acquire evidence to “identify and capture the terrorists,”111 before considering the construction or impending danger of the device, was particularly concerning. Overall, the problems seemed rooted in the agencies’ difficulty in cooperating while maintaining their distinctive responsibilities. One of the primary recommendations within the report was to plan similar exercises more frequently so that those involved would have more chances to hone their skills and remedy their mistakes.112                                                                                                                 108Ibid.,  95.   109  Nevada  Operations  Office,  Department  of  Energy,  The  Mile  Shakedown  Series  of  Exercises:  A   Compilation  of  Comments  and  Critiques,  February  18,  1995,  Unclassified  Controlled  Nuclear   Information,  1,  11,  &  25-­‐26,  http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb267/16.pdf  (accessed   April  4,  2013).     110  Ibid.,  38.     111  Ibid.,  53.     112Ibid.,  44,  53,  &  60.           38 TOPOFF: A New Generation of Exercises Top Officials (TOPOFF) exercises were the immediate successors to Mile Shakedown and the frequency of the scenarios show that the recommendations of Mirage Gold’s after-action report were taken seriously. Unsurprisingly, the primary focus of the TOPOFF exercises was to get the various agencies involved to work together fluidly as they act to identify and apprehend suspects and dismantle any nuclear devices the suspects possess. TOPOFF 1 was held in Denver, Colorado and Portsmouth, New Hampshire in May 2000. The agencies involved had to avert the chemical attack in Denver and the simultaneous biological attack taking place in Portsmouth. Three years later, May 2003, Seattle, Washington and Chicago, Illinois hosted TOPOFF 2—an exercise that cost around $16 million.113 In addition to the expected participating, Canadian government agencies and organizations also took part. TOPOFF 2’s scenario consisted of what was realized too late, due to the radiation, to be a dirty bomb in Seattle and Chicago’s attack with a biological agent. As with TOPOFF 1, the second exercise tested agencies’ ability not only to coordinate efforts, but to do so in two locations at the same time.114 TOPOFF 3 followed in April 2005 in both New Jersey and Connecticut. This exercise involved over 20,000 participants when all was said and done. Canada continued to participate and the United Kingdom took part for the first time, which added a transatlantic component to the exercise. Some attribute the United Kingdom’s efficient response to the July 2005 London subway bombing to its participation in TOPOFF 3. Whether or not that is true, the United Kingdom participated again in TOPOFF 4, which                                                                                                                 113  Richelson,  Defusing  Armageddon,  191.     114  U.S.  Department  of  State,  “Top  Officials  (TOPOFF),”  U.S.  Department  of  State  –  Home  Page,   http://2001-­‐2009.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16661.htm  (accessed  April  15,  2013).         39 took place during October 2007. Canada, once again, took part, and Australia became the latest international participant. TOPOFF 4 expanded the scenarios, involving not only multiple locations—the two domestic cities, Phoenix, Arizona and Portland, Oregon—but an international component in the Territory of Guam.115 The regularity of these exercises was no doubt extremely useful to NEST and all the other agencies that participated, domestic and foreign, practicing the management of various dire situations.116 NEST and Recent Preventative Measures NEST’s involvement is not limited to threats and planned exercises, particularly not since the al Qaeda attacks on September 11th. But even prior to the attacks NEST became involved in protective measures, a local example being the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics. In April 2001, NEST and several other agencies were in Salt Lake City, participating in an exercise called “Wasatch Rings,” having recognized the event’s vulnerability because the inherently international target made it attractive to terrorists. A variety of scenarios—several including different types of nuclear materials—were played out and dealt with, in preparation for what could happen during the actual Olympics. 117 Later, after 9/11, NEST began to survey the radiation levels around Washington, D.C. in an attempt to protect the capital. The data collected on natural radiation sources would allow for differentiation between the catalogued natural sources and those that could be hidden nuclear weapons. The preventative measure of grid-by-grid measurement of radiation was known as the “Ring Around Washington.” The tests of the operation’s ability to tell non-threatening radiation from that of a nuclear weapon proved that the                                                                                                                 115  Ibid.,  231.     116  U.S.  Department  of  State,  “TOPOFF.”   117  Richelson,  Defusing  Armageddon,  173.           40 system probably had not been ready to implement, but September 11th had provided the urgency to get the project going regardless. Then, as the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City began, NEST and “advanced detection sensors” were deployed to increase the security of the international sporting event.118 CONCLUSION This paper, while certainly not exhaustive in discussing the United States government’s responses and precautions taken to prevent and prepare for the potential of nuclear terrorism, demonstrates the efforts that have been developing in the U.S. for decades. Since the conception of the atomic bomb there could be no denying of the threats posed by nuclear materials, and governments have acted accordingly. The rise of terrorism across the globe during the end of the twentieth century enhanced the awareness of those dangers. Between the growing threats of terrorist groups and the fall of the Soviet Union, the strategy of deterrence was largely invalidated. Without deterrence, states had to rely on security measures to protect their citizens. The existence of numerous books, articles, pamphlets, etc. detailing the weakness of a variety of defenses of the U.S. homeland illustrate that, despite the dramatic increase in the counterterrorism budget since the 1990s, it doesn’t seem like quite enough. Or has that point already been reached? The fact that the possibility of a terrorist attack utilizing a weapon of mass destruction exists does not comprise a “clear assessment of the likelihood of the possibility occurring, particularly when compared to the likelihood of other future threats.”119 Further, in the name of more successfully capturing and prosecuting terrorists, several acts                                                                                                                 118  Ibid.,  183.     119  Wolfendale,  ”Terrorism,  Security,  and  the  Threat  of  Counterterrorism,”  757.         41 circumscribing the liberties of citizens along with the sought-after terrorists have been implemented, the U.S.A. P.A.T.R.I.O.T. Act being the most infamous. Since the “War on Terror” is one that will likely never end—simply because the modern world seems as though it will always have terrorists of one form or another—the so-called emergency legislation passed in response with that war will never be revoked.120 But, is it true that the “one key reality of homeland defense is that one lives with what one must”?121 Are the restrictions of liberty, privacy, and mobility worth the attempt-at-absolute protection against a very minute possibility? In the recent past and at present, it appears that the majority believe so. To assuage the prevalent fears of terrorism in all its forms, the U.S. government has done its best to both prevent and prepare. Wanted or not, the defenses are out there and will continue, if not grow, as the threat of terrorism maintain its monopoly of the international stage.                                                                                                                 120Ibid.,  762.     121  Anthony  H.  Cordesman,  Terrorism,  Asymmetric  Warfare,  and  Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction:   Defending  the  U.S.  Homeland  (Westport,  CT:  Praeger,  2002)  243.       42 BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources Adelson, Alan M.. “Please Don’t Steal the Atomic Bomb.” Theory into Practice  8,  no.  2   (1969):  62-­‐66.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/1475250  (accessed  March  4,   2014).       Aloise, Gene, Director of Natural Resources and Environment. “Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Key Emergency Response Facilities Could Be Strengthened.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.A.O, 2007. http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/118637.pdf (accessed September 28, 2013). “Antinuclear Group Holds Session on Strategy.” New York Times (1923-Current File), Dec. 19, 1982. http://search.proquest.com/docview/122011320?accountid=14677 (accessed February 16, 2014). 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