Camp Floyd in retrospect

Camp Floyd in retrospect

CAMP FLOYD IN RETROSPECT by Don Richard Mathis A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of Utah in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science Department of History University of Utah June 1959 This Thesis for the Master's Degree by Don Richard Mathis has been approved by Ch&frman, Supervisory Committee Reader, Supervisory Committee Head} Major Department Dean, Gradua/te Sc#6ol ~J~ PREFACE During the period of United States History typified by the westward movement, military posts were established along the main routes of travel for the principal purpose of providing protection to those hardy souls who looked to the setting sun for a better way of life. There was at least one exception to this practice, however, and it is the topic of this thesis. \he author has an abiding interest in military move­ments in the West and a desire to learn more of the contribu­tion made to America by dusty cavalrymen and footsore infantry men. This study of Camp Floyd, Utah Territory, grew out of this interest, which bordered at times on obsession. Though Camp Floyd was typical of western outposts in many respects, it was still unique in the purpose of its establishment- to quell the reported rebellion of subjects of the United States. An attempt has been made in this work to capture the excitement and romance experienced by the frontier soldiers stationed at Camp Floyd, as well as to discuss their several contributions to the development of the West. Appreciation is expressed to the many people and insti tutions who aided the author in preparing this work; to Dr. Leland H. Creer, Head of the Department of History at the University of Utah, for his guidance and encouragement in su­pervising this thesis, to Dr. David E. Miller, Professor of History at the University, for his detailed reading of this work and for his helpful suggestions on style and phraseology, to the University of Utah Library, Utah State Historical Society, the Bancroft Library, and the L.D.S. Church Historian*s Office for making available the primary material used in this thesis, and to the author's grandfather, Henry George Mathis, a pioneer of Utah, who was directly influenced by the topic of this paper. Especial appreciation is due the author*s wife, Sara-Beth, for her untiring efforts in typing this thesis and for the patience, understanding, and encouragement she has expressed to him in the preparation of this work. Don Richard Mathis iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page PREFACE...................................... H i TABLE OF CONTENTS............................ V LIST OF MAPS.................................. vi I BUCHANAN'S BLUNDER............................ 1 II JUST WHERE WE WANT TO GO...................... 26 III POSSE COMITATUS . ............................ 61+ IV MILITARY PATHFINDERS.......................... 8l V EMIGRANTS AND INDIANS........................ lOij. VI CIVILIANS AND SOLDIERS.......... „ ............lij.3 VII RETURN TO DUST............................... 162 APPENDIXES.................................... 169 BIBLIOGRAPHY. . , .............................l8£ ▼ LIST OP MAPS Figure Page 1 ARMY ROUTE FROM FORT BRIDGER TO CAMP FLOYD, 1858 ........................ 31 2 MILITARY RESERVE AT CAMP FLOYD, U.T., 1859 . . 35 3 CAMP FLOYD, U.T., 1859 ...................... Ul l\. TERRITORY AND MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF UTAH, i860............................ 98 i vi CHAPTER I BUCHANAN*S BLUNDER With the creation of the Territory of Utah, the Mormon people were subjected to "Carpet Bag" government- placed again under the domination of officials who had very little in common with the saintso In essence, it was a result of this territori­al government and the political manipulations of President Buchanan that the "Utah War" occurred. The evolution of con­flict between government and citizen, or church if you will, and the subsequent formation and march of United States Army units to the Great Basin is a lengthy and involved study. Only the highlights of the smoldering coals of distrust, fear, and hatred will be examined here. The citizens of "Mormondom" made petition to the govern­ment in Washington, D.C., for admission to the Union as a state, with the name of "Deseret," soon after realizing that the ter­ritory they occupied had come under the control of the United States. A constitutional convention met in Salt Lake City early in March, I8I4.9, to form a provisional government pending Con­gressional action to establish a civil organization for the territory annexed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. A con­stitution was adopted and the officers provided under it were 1 2 •lected on March 12, I8I49• With this, the provisional govern­ment of the State of Deseret began to function. In effect, the organization of this government gave legal recognition to the "Theo-democracy" and tended to place "gentiles" under* the authority of the L.D.S. Church. , On July 6, I8I4.9, the last day of the week appointed for the first session of the Legislature of the State of Des­eret, a memorial to Congress was drafted whieh asked that Deseret, with the political organization then in operation, be admitted to the Union. Congressional action of l8£0 denied the memorial for statehood and ereated instead the Territory of Utah, on Sep­tember 7o This received presidential approval by Millard Filmore on September 9. As a consequence of this action the Legislature for the State of Deseret voted its own disolution, to take effect on April 5» 1851* By the end of the summer newly appointed officers, half of whom were Mormons, had assumed their duties in the territory. As the years passed, changes in the appointed officers took place* Some of the gentile appointees had difficulty recognizing where the true authority for government was, i.e., in the church. Severe collisions occurred between themselves and their constituents as a result of their desire to exercise the office to whieh they had been appointed. This gave President James Buchanan an excuse to use the Mormon issue in an attempt to popularize his party and lay the groundwork for his re-election. 3 One of the early areas of conflict was embraced in the unique relationship that the Mormons claimed with their red brethren- the Indians. Missionaries were sent among them to provide instruction on the history of their forebears as told in the Book of Mormon,, The saints had long recognized that a brotherly attitude toward the red men- expressed in terms of food, clothing, recognition, and kindness- bore sweeter fruit than a hostile one0 In consequence of these friendly expres­sions toward them, the Indians distinguished between Mormons and other white men. To people out of the church, this appeared to be a conspiracy between two evil factions, and one which would eventually result in trouble for the American who held the conventional opinion about Indians. Gentile Indian agents in Utah repeatedly warned the government in Washington of the dangers of Mormon meddling in their affairso Agent J.H. Holeman reported as early as Novem­ber l85l, that "it seems to me that no Mormon should, officially, have anything to do with the I n d i a n s . G a r l a n d Hurt wrote in May 1855, that he feared Mormon missionaries would ''teach those wretched savages that they are the rightful owners of the Ameri­can soil, and that it has been wrongfully taken from them by tha whites, and that the Great Spirit had sent the Mormons among them to help them recover their rights.M He further suggested ^House Executive Document, Number 71» 35th Congress, 1st Session, Serial N o . 956 > 129. 2Ibid., 176. k that active measures be taken to regulate intercourse between the saints and the Indians* Fuel was added t© the growing fire of suspician against the Mormon relations with the Indians by Thomas S. Twiss, agent of the Upper Platte. He reported in April l857» that the saints were inciting the Indians of his district to violence by estab­lishing settlements on their land under the pretence of facili­tating the execution of a contract to carry mail from Independence, Missouri, to Salt Lake City.'*' The Indian agents, under the territorial government, were joined in expressions of lawlessness and treason on the part of the Utahans. David E. Burr, surveyor general of Utah corresponded with the General Land Office in 1856, indicating that he and his deputy surveyors were subject to assault, insult, and the possibility of losing their lives through action by the Mormons. On March 28, l857» he wrote that "the fact is, these people £kormons| repudiate the authority of the United States in this country, and are in open rebellion against the general p government." Gentile officials in the territory were supported by gentile civilians in their charges. W.M.F. Magraw Mfelt that it was incumbent on him as a 'personal and political friend,* to advise the President relative to the 'present political and 1Ibid«, 192o ^Ibid., 119. Italics in the original. social conditions * of the Territory of Utah. In a letter of October 3» 1856, he wrote: . There is no disguising the fact, that there is left no ▼estige of law and order, no protection for life or pro­perty; the civil laws of the Territory are overshaddowed and neutralized by a so-styled ecclesiastical organization, as despotic, dangerous and damnable, as has ever been known to exist in any country, and which is ruining not only those who do not subscribe to their religious code, but is driving the moderate and more orderly of the Mormon community to desperation.2 The judicial branch of territorial government also added its weight to the complaints. The two justices prominent in the immediate conflict were George P« Stiles and ¥.¥. Drummond, The territorial legislature had made a peculiar distribution of ju­dicial power which Justices Drummond and Stiles refused to ac­knowledge o Shortly after assuming their offices in 18SU- and 1855> they began to set aside the territorial laws respecting this unusual distribution of power. Their refusal to recognize the territorial law caused considerable difficulty with the Mor­mons* In consequence of this difficulty Justice Stiles* office was broken into, the court records maintained by him removed, and several of his personal papers scattered and burned. Shortly after this, Stiles fled the territory and reported to his su­periors in Washington, that his court records had been destroyed and that the saints were in open rebellion against the laws of the United States. Justice Drummond resigned his office and left "^Andrew L. Neff, History of Utah, ed. Lei and H„ Creer (Salt Lake City, the Deseret News Press, 19^0), if)\?. 2 House Executive Document, Number 71, 35th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 95 b , T, 6 the territory on the heels of Stiles. When he arrived in Wash­ington, he corroborated the story of Stiles by leveling the fol­lowing charges against the people of Utahs lo The Mormon people of Utah look only to the president of the church as being the supreme lawgiver. 2. There is a secret organization among the males of Utah to acknowledge only the law of the priesthood„ 3. There are men in Utah set apart by the church to destroy the lives and property of those who reject its authority, l^-o The records "of the supreme court in Utah have been destroyed by order of the Church." 5. Federal officials "are constantly insulted, harassed, and annoyed by the Mormons." 6. The Mormons openly speak against the United States government and its chief executives, living and dead. 7. Favoritism and injustice are being shown in the courts and executive pardons of the territory. 80 The murder of Captain John W. Gunnison, and party, was performed by Indians- ordered, advised, and directed by the Mormons. The deaths of Leonidas Shaw and A.W. Babbitt were both directed by the church.^- These charges brought to a head the claims of federal officers, in years past in Utah Territory, that the United States was looked upon with contempt by the Mormons. Needless to say, these various complaints against the people of Utah were answered, but the emotion of the situation had hold of the reins after Judge Drummond*s letter of resigna­tion was made public. He had recommended in his resignation that a non-Mormon governor be appointed to the territory and that the authority of that governor be enforced by a large military force. He stated that his reason for "making this communication thus public is, that the democratic party, with which I have alway* House Executive Document, Number 71* 35th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 956* 212-211]-. V 7 strictly acted, is the party now in power, and, therefore, is the party that should now be held responsible for the treasonable and disgraceful state of affairs that now exists in Utah Terri­tory."^- This statement led Neff to write: Political expediency, party responsibility and the strong likelihood that his program would redound to the advantage and glory of the Democratic Party were cleverly drawn poli­tical motives for the writing of his vindictive document.^ Drummond1s resignation suggested a political stratagem to the president- gain support of both the North and the South by taking active measures against the Mormon polygamists,, The newly formed Republican party had made equal issue of slavery and polygamy as part of its program to discredit the "popular sovereignty" idea as voiced in the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The Democrats were being pressed to take a stand on polygamy before the view gained credence that they supported it. Stephen A. Douglas formally stated the policy of his party on this issue as a means of gaining widespread support for the party and him­self in the forthcoming presidential election. He condemned the "peculiar" institution and advocated that measures be taken to cor­rect the situation in Utah. "Undoubtedly it was believed to be good party strategy as well as sound political tactics to rob the Republican party of its thunder"^ by sending an army to Utah to quell rebellion and establish law and order, as sug- Iderrio 2Neff, op. cit., l+lj-9. 3Ibid., k59c 8 gested by Drummond0 It is very possible that Buchanan wanted to steal thunder not only from the Republicans but also from Douglas. If the Utah War had not backfired, he may well have done just that I At any rate, the president issued an order t© the general In chief, Winfield Scott, to move the United States Army against the rebellious Mormons. General Scott directed the adjutant general, quarter­master general, and chief of ordnance to put all of their fa­cilities at the disposal of the Army for Utah. In a circular dated May 28, 1857* Scott stated that the Utah force would be composed of units from the 2nd Dragoons, 5th and 10th Infantry, and Ifth Artillery- to total not less than 2,500 men."*' These various units were then located at a number ©f western outposts and would have to be gathered at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Terri­tory, under a central commander. By May 28, General W.S. Harney, then in command of the Department of the West with headquarters at Fort Leavenworth, had been appointed the commander for the 2 army to be sent to Utah. The gigantic task of assembling, •quipping, and getting the force on the move had already begun by this time. The 5th Infantry had been ordered to assemble and wait at Jefferson "SeLou se Executive Document, Number 71* 35th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 956» 2 It was the success that General Harney experienced in rebellious Kansas which influenced his appointment to perform a similar mission among the Mormons as commander of the Army for Utah. See House Executive Document, Number 71» 35th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No* 956, 1 . L 9 Barracks, Missouri. On June 29, 1857, this regiment was directed to march on to Port Leavenworth,1 and there be joined with the main body of the 10th Infantry,^ which was already in Kansas assist­ing General Harney perform his duties controlling the whites in 3 their election squabbles. The two companies of the 10th In­fantry at Port Snelling, Minnesota, were ordered to Port Leaven­worth, on July 30, to join their regiment4 which had already left for Utah,, During the month of July, the 5th and 10th Infantry Regiments, Phelps* six pounder battery, and Reno's twelve pounder battery marched from Fort Leavenworth with the senior officer, Colonel E.B. Alexander, in command. General Harney remained in the vicinity of Leavenworth directing the campaign against Indians and insurgent whites„ Because of the unsettled nature of political affairs In Kansas Territory, Governor Walker secured retention of the Kansas command for General Harney.^ On August 28, 1857, Colonel Albert Sidney Johnston was ordered 6 to Fort Leavenworth, to take command of the A m y for Utah. He ^House Executive Document, Number 71, 35th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 956, ^ 2Ibid0, 5. ^Oliver L. Spaulding, The United States Army in War and Peace, (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1937)» 236. ^House Executive Document, Number 71, 35th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 956, 12. ^William P. Johnston, The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston (New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1^79}, 208o House Executive Document, Number 71, 35th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 95&»' 13. 10 was directed to comply with all of the orders and instructions that had been issued to General Harney- pertaining to the Utah forceso The basic letter of instructions- dated June 29, 1057, applicable to the conduct of the army in Utah- contained the following significant items: lo The people of Utah Territory are in rebellion against the United States. 20 The military are to insure the success of the new civil officials in discharging their duty, namely, "the establishment and maintenance of law and order." 3. The military force is placed at the disposal of.the civil authorities, i.e., the governor, judges, and marshals, to act as a posse oomitatus on the requisi­tion of the civil authorities. Ij.. The army is to actively engage in warfare against the citizenry only as a means of self defense. 5. The supreme authority of the territory is to rest with the civil authorities, nonetheless, the military is not to be subject to that authority; it is encouraged to support the authority however. 6. The United States government will spare no expense in supporting the military force. 7. A small body of men is to be detached to guard the movement of beef cattle. A significant amendment to the above letter was made on July 1: In addition to the instruction, already given, it is further directed that all requisitions which the commander of the expedition for Utah may, in his discretion, address to the departments of supply, be promptly complied with, without reference to higher authority.2 It appears that every facility at the armyfs disposal was geared to support the force going to Utah. The stores at Forts Leavenworth and Kearney, were opened to the westward moving regiments. Contracts for goods were let in the East for the 1Ibid., 7-9. 2Ibid., 9. 11 specific purpose of providing for the Utah Array. Several of these contracts were given without advertisement, which later led to Congressional investigation of corruption and favoritism in the conduct of the Utah Expedition and resulted in the name '‘Contractors War" being attached to it. General Harney had started the mobilization of the force for Utah, sent the vanguard of two regiments and supporting ar­tillery on their way, and dispatched a special agent, Captain Stewart Van Vliet, to investigate the logistical support avail­able in Utah and suggest a location for a camp. When Colonel Johnston assumed command in August, all that remained to be done was to finish the preliminary plans and execute the movements on the battlefield. It was expected that the army would be in the Salt Lake Valley for the winter, despite the lata start for that place. Resistance from the Mormons was not anticipated. Several unforseen Incidents occurred which prevented the realization of the expecta­tion. No sooner had the supplies started for Utah than the Indians in the vicinity of Port Kearny began raiding the herds of cat­tle. Several hundred head of beef were driven off on August 2. The infantry guards were not the least bit effective against mounted Indians. To correct this situation Colonel Johnson re­quested, on September 12, that twenty infantrymen be mounted at Fort Kearny to keep the Indians in check. This request was granted and the move was effective in stopping Indian depredations. How- ^•Por a list of these contracts see Appendix C. It ever, the Mormon raiders were soon to present another problem in the guarding of beef cattle. On September 16, six companies of the 2nd Dragoons were detached from Port Leavenworth, to march as escort to the newly appointed civil authorities and as reinforcement, in place of the 1st Cavalry, for the Utah Army. Lieutenant Colonel Philip St. George Cooke was selected as commander of the dragoons. He was provided with a half ration of corn for his horses as far as Fort Kearny, where his supply of grain cauld be replenished to Fort Laramie, and from there to the Salt Lake Valley, where it was estimated that he would arrive by November 20, 1857.1 Un­fortunately, the supply of c o m at Fort Laramie was inadequate to satisfy the needs of the dragoons. This, coupled with the burning of suitable forage west of that post, by the Mormons, resulted in a significant slow down of the whole Utah Expedi­tion. The herds of cattle couldnH move without food. The horses of the dragoons suffered from hunger and lost strength, and the mules of the supply trains were in the same condition. Colonel Johnston left Fort Leavenworth the day follow­ing Colonel Cooke*s departure, in company of a fast moving es­cort of forty dragoons. He arrived at Fort Kearny on September 214., and reported that the march was detained due to bad roads.3 1House Executive Document. Number 71, 35th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 95^, 21-22. 2Ibid., 28.95. 3Ibid., 22-23. 13 By this time the civil authorities and their escort were several days behind him. His desire was to join the Infantry units in advance of his position as quickly as possible. He left Port Kearny, and arrived at Port Laramie, on October Ij.. In his re­port from Laramie, Colonel Johnston expressed some concern over the bad roads; lack of supplies, grains, and forage; and sug­gested that possibly his soldiers would not be able to gain the shelter of Salt Lake Valley before winter.^ He was some­what disturbed by the report of Captain Van Vliet that the 2 Mormons would not sell supplies to the army, and may have questioned the advisability of crossing the mountains, which would place his men at the mercy of the saints for the winter® As Colonel Johnston hastened westward to join his van­guard, he was met with reports describing increased resistance to the army intrusion. On October 16? he received a communica­tion from Colonel Alexander, dated October 8, wherin it was reported that "the Mormons [were] committing acts of hostility and depredation, fandj had already burnt three trains contain­ing supplies."3 Alexander was at a great disadvantage in at­tempting to punish the perpetrators of these raids since they were on horseback and he did not have a mounted unit with him. Colonel Alexander had not received communication of the 1Ibid., 28-29. 2Ibid., 21+-26o 3Ibid., 39. I k fact of Colonel Johnston*s assumption of command. In fact, he had not received any commuhication from the expedition head­quarters up to this time (August 8, 1857).1 Consequently, he was unaware of certain strategic changes in the order and dis­position of the troops at his rear. He was well aware of the enemies at his front, however, and was concerned over his lack of instructions from higher headquarters. It is apparent that in its haste to get the Army for Utah into Utah, the military had violated almost every rule of combat effectiveness. Infantry units had been sent out without adequate sup­port to enable them to even effectively defend themselves. The trains were at the mercy of the enemy because of insuffi­ciently equipped guards. The resistance of the Mormons had not been anticipated. Lines of communication had not been maintained between the commander and his command. Poor plan­ning was evidenced in almost every phase of the mobilization. Once the movement had begun, it was impossible to rectify the mistakes. Colonel Alexander desperately needed dragoon support, but they were some 200 miles behind him, unable to advance until supplies of grain were brought from the rear. The crown­ing problem of the whole expedition was the rapid approach of bad weather and the need to find a winter camp, since it was apparent that the campaign could not be ended before the moun­tains were choked with snow. Colonel Alexander was halting in his assumption of re- 1Ibid0, 38. 15 sponsibllity for the units near him, nonetheless, when he finally realized that the responsibility was his whether he assumed it or not, he took decisive action* He determined to move the troops under his command up Ham*s Fork to "Sublette *s Cut-Off, along that road to Bear river and Soda Spring," whore a winter camp could be established. He recommended that the units to his rear follow his course of action, so that a uni­fication of the army could be accomplished before winter set in, and preparations made for an early spring campaign against the Mormons down the Bear River Valley. He further recommended to the headquarters of the army, that a force of soldiers be sent east from Oregon and California, since the roads from those territories to the Utah communities were open longer in the year„^ As these recommendations moved eastward, they were taken under advisement by Colonel Johnston, east of South Pass. He decided on October 16, to stop the proposed movement of Colonel Alexanders force to Soda Springs and instead concen-p trate the troops at Fontenelle Creek, just north of present day Kemmerer, Wyoming. The suggestion that a force move east from Oregon and California was forwarded to New York City, where it was accepted and plans laid for* its execution under the per­sonal supervision of the general in chief.3 However, on 1Ibid., 30-32, 38-14.0* 2Ibid., 1+0. 3Ibid*, 15-16. 16 February if, 1858, these plans were countermanded and the pro­posed support from the western departments failed to materialize.^ In a communique dated October 18, at South Pass, Colonel Johnston indicated that the concentration of soldiers at Fon-tenelle Creek was only a temporary measure of deception to keep the Mormon raiders from burning the grass near Henry's Fork, east of Fort Bridger, where the permanent winter camp was to be established, after sufficient snow had fallen to make forage burning impossible. He also made a painful admis­sion when he wrote in this letter: I greatly regret that the impossibility of concentrating the troops destined for this service, and their supplies, will prevent a forward movement before spring. It is now manifest that before the force can be united that the autumn will be too far advanced to move with a probability of success, though not opposed by the Mormons. On this same day (October 18) Colonel Alexander inde­pendently concluded that his plan of moving to Soda Springs 3 was not feasible. He determined to reverse his march and go down Ham's Fork toward Fort Bridger, and then over to Henry's Fork where he planned to put his men into winter camp.^ At this time Colonel Alexander had not yet received Colonel Johnston's instructions to move on to Fontenelle Creek, nor did he know of the commander's decision to make Henry's Fork 1Ibid0, 16. 2Ibid., 65. % h e night of October 17-18 marked the debut of winter in the mountains with snow falling to a depth of three to four inches. ^House Executive Document, Number 71, 35th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 66-67° 17 the permanent winter camp. When Colonel Alexander did receive the order to proceed to Fontenelle Creek, on October 22, he was well on his way back to Henry*s Fork. Consequently he brought his force to a halt on Ham*s Fork to await further instructions.'*' On October 2 Colonel Johnston issued orders to Colonel Alexander to "march and camp at some suitable point p below the crossing on Black's Fork." This order was complied with and the vanguard settled about three miles from Fort Bridger on November 20 October 18 was a day of decision for the Array of Utah. The snow and cold of the proceeding days had turned Colonel Alexander back and impressed on all of the field commanders the necessity of securing a concentrated winter encampment. In view of the turn in the weather, Johnston sent a letter of encouragement to Lieutenant Colonel Cooke, then at Chimney Rock, urging him to make haste in joining the body of the force near Fort Bridger. Detachments of soldiers were then sent out from the main body to assist the wagons in getting 3 into camp. Two civilian trains destined for Salt Lake were requisitioned by the aimy to bolster their supply of goods. Livestock began to suffer from the cold and lack of food, and Ji . many head perished0 On November 6} Colonel Johnston and the 1 Ibid., 67-68. 2Ibid., 6 7. ^Trains of Livingston and Kincade, and Garrish and Radford. ^House Executive Document, Number 71, 35th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 956, 99, 101-102. Army for Utah occupied Fort Bridger and established Camp Scott, their permanent winter camps0 The troops were assembled, with the exception of Lieutenant Colonel Cooke*s column, which ar­rived at Fort Bridger within a fortnight„ By November 20, 1857, the Army for Utah, composed of units from the 5th and 10th Infantry, 2nd Dragoons, and ifth Artillery was encamped along Black*s Fork near Fort Bridger, The hard­ships experienced by them during the months of October and No­vember were only a preview of the difficulties that would be encountered before the winter was through,. The faulty planning of higher headquarters was very apparent to the force on Black*s Fork. Ample supplies of good warm clothing were needed, but not available. Livestock and men were hungry because of the lack of sufficient food, A basic ingredient to life, salt, was in great demand since none had been sent with the army. In spite of these inconveniences the men survived the winter in their tents at Camp Scott and Fort Bridger. During the cold winter months, plans were laid for the move to Salt Lake in the spring. On November if, l857» the commander issued an order to Lieutenant Colonel William Hoffman at Fort Laramie, to prepare his two companies of 6th Infantry for an early spring march to join the Utah Army0 The force already in Utah Territory was strengthened by the enlistment of four companies of volunteers from the teamsters, and em­ployees of the South Pass Wagon Road Company trapped with the 19 army by the snow* Captain B.E. Bee was elected to command these volunteers and was commissioned a Lieutenant Colonel of Utah Militia by Governor Gumming, who was also at Port Bridger.1 The livestock that survived the last month of the march were moved to Henry*s Pork where some grass was available* Lieutenant Colonel Cooke reported on November 21, 1857> that 13lj. of his original 278 horses had died of starvation after 2 his farce went through South Pass on November 11. Captain John H. Dickerson wrote on November 2\±, 1857, that ''about 588 mules of this command jXrmy for Utahj have died since leaving Port Leavenworth. Over nine-tenths of this loss has occurred within the last month* About half the horses of the two bat- 3 teries are dead, and two thirds of the dragoons are dismounted." This left the army with only lljif horses, 522 mules, and about 2,000 beef cattle to be wintered on Henry*s Pork* The Mormon strategy of burning the grass and supply trains along the route, and driving off the herds of cattle was extremely effec­tive* . To correct the deficiency in draught animals, and as part of the preparations for the spring offensive, General^" Johnston ordered Captain R.B. Marcy and a force of forty 1Ibid., 113. 2Ibid., 99* 3Ibid., 101-102. ^Colonel Johnston was promoted to the rank of brevet brigadier general on November 18, 1857? "for meritorious conduct in the ability, zeal, energy, and prudence displayed by him in command of the army in Utah." 20 soldiers and twenty-two civilians, to inarch overland to New Mexico Territory and purchase 1+00 horses and 800 mules0 General Johnston exercised faith in the assurance of his su­periors that no expense would be spared in support of his army, and authorized Captain Marcy to spend $120,500 for the animals*2 3 Captain Marcy and company left Camp Scott on November 27, 1857 They arrived at Port Massachusetts after almost eight weeks of extremely difficult travel. On March 23, 1858, the detachment, reinforced by units under the command of Colonel W.W. Loring, left New Mexico to rejoin the army in Utah. This force arrived back at Camp Scott on June 10, with 960 mules and 160 horses in herds.^- In the meantime, General Johnston continued to prepare his command for an early march. The herds of mules, horses, and cattle were occasionally moved to better grazing grounds0 As the snow began to melt, a force of ninety dragoons, mounted on mules, was sent back to Port Laramie to patrol the road and act as guides for the columns of reinforcement. Other small detachments were sent toward Salt Lake City to spy out the route and ascertain the activity of the Mormon resistance. 1House Executive Document, Number 71, 35th Congress, 1st Session, Serial Ho. 956, 10^* 2T , Idem. ^Senate Executive Document, Number 1, 35th Congress, 2nd Session, Serial No. 975, 221. ^Ibid.. 187-201. 21 The War Department in the East was also a hive of activity in preparing for the spring offensive. On January 8, 1858, General Scott ordered columns of reinforcement from the 6th and 7th Infantry Regiments, 1st Cavalry, 2nd Artillery, and the rest of the 2nd Dragoons to prepare for an early march to Utah. This would have made the total strength of the Army for Utah (if all units were at their maximum strength) 5,606 1 officers and men. Later adjustments in these columns resulted in less than half of them reaching their Utah destination. Supply trains were organized to accompany the reinforcements and provide the force with food, clothing, arras and ammunition, tents, and other equipment. A resolution was presented in Congress to increase 2 the size of the military establishment, not. expressly because of the Utah Expedition, but with that expedition as one of the 3 motivating factors. Another measure proposed to Congress, arising out of the difficulties in Utah, was construction of if a telegraph line to the army there. The Utah situation be­came the avowed reason for the acceptance of many proposals made to Congress at this time of supposed emergency. Senator John P. Hale^ from New Hampshire, indicated the absurdity of the 1Ibid., 31. p The Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 1st Session, ip6. 3Ibid., U29-14.35. W , 1559-15614-. 22 situation when he said: I did not suppose that I should ever get out of patience with the Senate, but I confess this Utah war comes very nearly doing it. I thought it had answered its purpose when we had got the additional volunteers ^Increase in the armyj, . . . but it has got here now to help this telegraph along. . . o Now Brigham Young is coming in to be another scarecrow to build this telegraph, and Heaven only knows what next. . . . There is a proposition to vote twelve additional sloops-of-war, and I will bet you that Brigham Young will be tacked on to that. We shall be told . . <, there is a necessity for additional sloops, with which to storm Salt Lake, or something of that sort. I do not believe there is any sort of necessity for lugging Brigham Young in here. If it is to be continued, I shall ask for an amendment . . . that the name of Brigham Young shall not be brought into every measure, but that it shall be limited to. a certain number of days, or a certain number of measures. Evidently the Utah emergency was not considered to be too serious by some of the members of the national government. By the time that the snow had cleared from the passes separating the army and the saints, the crisis was in fact over, having been mediated through the efforts of the peace commissioners and Colonel Thomas L. Kane. The preparations made by the War Department and the various proposals made to Congress had indicated a full fledged battle. Such a battle may have occurred had not a level headed Senator from Massachu­setts, Henry Wilson, introduced and promoted the acceptance of a resolution to have a commission appointed to investigate and 2 find a peaceable settlement to the Utah rebellion. As an out­growth of this resolution, L.W. Powell and Ben McCulloch were 1Ibid., 1^63. 2Ibid., i+28. 23 sent to the territory with a presidential pardon for the citi­zens of Utah, on condition that they stop their rebellion and pledge their faith and allegiance to the United States. On June 12, 1858, they reported that their mission had been suc­cessful'*' and that peace was restored in the Mormon communities <, By the time that the commissioners got to Utah, Governor Alfred Cumming had been accepted by the people, largely through the efforts of Colonel Kane, who had arrived in February after having travelled around the Horn and overland from California. The army still had its orders to march into Salt Lake, so as soon as Captain Marcy returned with the draught animals (June 10) and Colonel Hoffman, his command, and the advance trains arrived at Camp Scott (by June 10), the Utah force began its move out of winter quarters. An assembly point on Bear River was designated by the commanding general and on June 13, 1858, the advance to that place began* By June 16, all of the units had gathered from their winter encampments, and an order of march was issued to govern the anticipated five day journey to the Salt Lake Valleys GENERAL ORDERS NO. 30 HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH Camp on Bear river, U.T., June 16, 1858. The army will commence the march to-morrow, and daily hereafter till arrival in Salt Lake Valley, in the follow­ing order, each command being followed immediately by its train and a proportion of the supply train. ^Senate Executive Document, Number 1, Part 2, 35th Congress, 2nd Session, Serial No. 975, 110-120. 2k Brevet Colonel C0F. Smith's battalion, constituting the advanced guard, at 5 a.m. 10th infantry and Phelp»3 battery at 5<»l5 a.m. 5th infantry and Reno*3 battery at S»kS a.m. Colonel Loring*a battalion of mounted riflemen, 1st cavalry. 3d, 6th, and 7th infantry at 6.15 a.m. Volunteers at 6*30 a.m. 2nd Dragoons, constituting the rear guard, at 7 a.m. Commanders of regiments and battalions will order the guard for their respective trains. The headquarters will be with the advance. By order of Brevet Brigadier General A.S. Johnston. F.J» PORTER x Assistant Adjutant General The next morning, the Army for Utah marched from Bear River somewhat behind schedule. The troops and trains encoun­tered considerable mud and rain for the next few days; conse­quently it took longer than the anticipated period of time to reach the valley. The Mormons presented no obstacle to the movement; indeed, they began to come into camp to sell country produce to the soldiers. As the men proceeded over the moun­tains and down through the canyons they observed with mixed feeling the defenses prepared by the saints. By June 21, the soldiers had left toe mud and were experiencing discomfort due to dust as they wound their way through Echo Canyon. June 25 marked their first view of the seat of Mormondom, the destina­tion of their year*s long march. Captain Albert Tracy wrote; 'We . . . reach at last the bald and rocky crest of JBig Mountain* * The view from this point is little less than mag­nificent-- opening out between rocky and snow-clad peaks and 1Ibid., 119 ridges, t© the veritable valley of Salt Lake in the distance." The Army for Utah camped that night in the dell at the eastern foot of Little Mountain. If one could imagine the sight from the hills surrounding the force that night- could have seen the fires sparkling- could have heard the out­bursts of laughter and loud talk--could have reflected on the handiwork of President Buchanan, he may have uttered the pro­phetic words, "There lies a miscarriage- a great mistake, to 2 be known in future years as 1 Buchanan*s Blunder* ." ^Albert Tracy, The Utah War, Utah Historical Quarterly, ed. J. Cecil Alter (Salt Lake City, Utah State Historical Society, 19h$) , XIII, 25. Orson P. Whitney, History of Utah (Salt Lake City, George Q. Cannon and Sons Co., 1592T7 I, 568. 2 CHAPTER II JUST WHERE WE WANT TO GO The Army for Utah camped on the flat at th© eastern base of Little Mountain on June 25, 1858. The next day *s task was to move over the last obstacle and pass through Salt Lake City. The Peace Commissioners, Powell and McCulloch, had requested General Johnston to assure the people of Utah that their property would be respected during the army*s sojourn among them. This assurance had been given in the form of a proclamation on June lij., wherein he stated ". . . that no per­son whatever will be in anywise interfered with or molested in his person or rights, or in the peaceful pursuit of his avoca­tions o11 To insure that his troops would not have opportunity to violate this proclaimed assurance of peace, the commander determined early in the march to pass, in one day, through Great Salt Lake City, and camp a sufficient distance away from the community to discourage any acts of violence or hostility by his 2 men. With this goal in mind; the army utilized the full moon of the morning, June 26, to get an early start, so that the entire force would be clear of the city and encamped on the west side ^Senate Executive Document, Number 1, Part 2, 35th Congress, 2nd Session, Serial No. 975* 121. 2Ibid., 117. 26 of the Jordan River by nightfall.^ At three o'clock in the morning^ the men were awakened and the wagons loaded and strung out in preparation for the crossing of Little Mountain. Break­fast was prepared and eagerly consumed, then the movement be- 2 gan. Over the hill and down through the narrow defile known as Emigration Canyon went the men led by General Johnston. They soon passed the last bend of the stream and eagerly marched out onto the bench overlooking the modern Zion. What a sur­prise! Rather than a city of desolation, akin to the country they had recently passed over, they saw a neat, orderly, well planned community spread out before them. Houses built of adobe and looking very much like cut gray stone stood in even rows along the wide streets. Green shrubbery and spreading trees surrounded each home, and in the distance the green banks of the Jordan River shone in the morning sun. Amazement clouded the faces of some, others felt yearnings for home which the scene before them brought to remembrance. The regimental banners fluttered in the breeze as the army moved down off the bench toward the city. To the tune of nOne-Eyed Riley" they entered the town, and as they marched 1Ibid., 121. 2 The basic material for the description of the army*s entrance into Salt Lake Valley, and its subsequent passage to Cedar Valley was obtained from Jesse A. Gove, The Utah Expedition l8f?7-58» ed. Otis G. Hammond (Cleveland, Arthur H. Clark Co., 1928), 177-181+; and Tracy, op. cit., 26, 30. 27 they fell into step, something they had not done for a long time. Again they were brought up short by surprise. Instead of a mass of people to observe the triumphal entry, they sav only a few men occupying pre-assigned posts. The soldiers thought that the occupants of the city were a well disciplined people to remain in their homes while such a parade was within their view. Not until later in the military occupation did the soldiers learn of the evacuation and planned destruction of this oasis in the desert.^ The army marched west through the city, across the Jordan River at North Temple Street, then south for about three miles* For two days they remained in camp on the west bank of the Jordan, near what is known today as Twenty-First South and Redwood Road. On June 28, the wagons and the men turned westward for a march of sixteen miles to the vicinity of 2 Copperton, Utah, on Bingham Creek, WSst and south of Salt Lake City. The mules and horses ate the grass faster than it could be found, consequently, the mounted units moved almost daily thereafter in search of water and forage for the animals. This was done to the disgust of many soldiers, but to the amusement ■'■Edward W. Tullidge, The History of Salt Lake City and Its Founders (Salt Lake City, Edward W. Tullidge, l886), 22l±0 2 Official military correspondence called this camp "West Creek," which should not be confused with the West Creek now flowing into the north end of Cedar Valley. The John Bennion, Journal (unpublished manuscript), entry for July 2, 1858, identifies the "West Creek" camp as being on present day Bingham Creek. . . 29 of the Mormons, for here was a well organized group of intel­ligent men wandering about as though they were dumb, not knowing where to go. Captain Tracy tells us of this paradox in his journal entry for July 6, l858j We read of Calebs in search of a wife, and of various people in search of many things. Our search is for a camp. . . . Why not have camped by the city, and have march at once in a direct line to the ground selected for a permanent occupation? Such, however, is life, and particularly the life of a soldier.* His entry of July 9 shows the humor evidenced by the Mormons-as they observed this seemingly confused situation: The Mormons grin to see us marching out again today* Your Mormon is of a practical turn and by no means en­dorses the habit of beating about, to the loss of valu-p able time, together with the strain of personal muscle. To outward appearances these men did not know where to go, but the War Department leaders had already decided the general location of the military post. They had begun their search for a camp in Mormondom as early as July 28, 1857, when Captain Van Vliet was specifically directed to look for, and secure, a suitable location for the array in Utah. His orders even went so far as to suggest Skull Valley or "any place some twenty or thirty miles from the city [Salt Lake City] . He reconnoitered Skull Valley, and those valleys connected with it, but reported under date of September 16, 1857, that Tooele ^Tracy, op. cit., 29 2Ibid., 30. 3 -^Senate Executive Document, Number 11, 35th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 920, 28* was the only location suitable for a camp.1 Undoubtedly the army wanted to camp in the area of the Rush Military Preserve, which had been set apart in 1855, on the advice of Lieutenant Colonel EoJ. Steptoe. This was primarily due to the need for livestock forage, which Colonel Steptoe had reported an abun­dance of in that spot. Scouts were sent out as soon as the army arrived on the banks of the Jordan, and by July 1, Cedar Valley was selected, and received its final confirmation by the commanders, as the future home of the Army for Utah. Captain Jesse A. Gove recorded this confirmation in a letter to his wife, dated July 2, l8£8: Gen0 Johnston returned yesterday from a reconnaissance for a post. He took with him a board of officers and the Commissioners0 He has decided to go south to Cedar ^ Valley, near Lake Utah and Provo. Just where we want to go. Little did Captain Gove realize how often and vehemently the place selected for the permanent location of the army would be cursed and referred to as Mthis God forsaken spot.* Captain John W. Phelps expressed his sentiments toward the location of Camp Floyd in the following words: The object in choosing this place as a military site must have been to accustom us to all kinds of unseasonableness in order to reconcile us to the greatest of all possible unseasonablenesses, viz., that of slavery.3 On July 6, a week after the decision had been made, the array began its movement into Cedar Valley. It took two days to 1Ibid., 26-27o ^Gove, op, cit., 178. ^John Wo Phelps, Diary (unpublished manuscript), April 23, 1859. . , 3© A m y route from Port Bridger oNe?it> to Camp Floyd, 1858. £c« le o s ic oj> g o t i__i_____i_____> Milks AftMY Rout£ Map 1. gather the mass of humanity, animals, and supplies into the shadow of the Oquirrhs, along a small stream flowing into the north end of the valley--known today as West Creeko Tents were put up, the area divided among the various commands, and the first enemy of Camp Floyd encountered. Captain Gove described the enemy in the following wordsi There is so much alkali in the soil that it is like ashes. It becomes powdered as the wagons pass over it on our mareh, so that, with perspiration on the face, we get as black as though we were painted. Dust so thick ^ that you cannot see a foot before you for most of the way. The dust was so fine that It penetrated the pages of a closed 2 book packed away in a box, so evident that each footfall raised a cloud to encircle the head and hinder the breathing of the person that walked. This enemy was to be a plague on the army during its entire stay in Cedar Valley. General Johnston thought the dust problem was serious enough to prevent the drilling of the men. In his communication of July 22,to Army Headquarters at West Point, he wrote: The soil everywhere, except in small moist localities, is exceedingly pulverulent, and by the occupancy of any position for a few days only it becomes beaten into a fine dust, which rises in clouds by the slightest disturb­ance o With every desire to exercise all the different arms in the evolutions of the line, I find it impossible without great danger to the lungs of men and animals. I do not believe we can find any.position for a camp or post free from this objection.-' ^-Gove, op. clt., 18l+o 2Tracy, op. clt a, 36. 3 Senate Executive Document, Number 1, Part 2, 35th Congress, 2nd Session, Serial No. 975, 125. 33 General Johnston and Captain Gove are only two of the many writers that have left vivid descriptions of encounters with the dust. It is no wonder that the temporary camp in the mouth of West Canyon was constantly enshrouded in a cloud. Official records indicate that there were thirty-nine company-size units, not including the various headquarters and bands, making a total of 2,i|10 soldiers caraped there on July 10.^ In addi­tion to this may be added the livestock for the mounted units (consisting of 586 horses) and the trains (reported as a mini­. , 2 mum of 500 wagons and 3,000 mules), and the civilian employees and camp followers of which there is no accurate count. The unit camped at the head of the stream was indeed fortunate. The water was so muddy that it was thought unfit for even the livestock to use. General Johnston directed that four metal wagon bodies be set in the ground to be used as settling basins For the significant figures on names and strengths of units at Cemp Floyd from June 1858 to July l86l? see abstracts of Returns for the Department of Utah, in Appendix A, taken from U.S. National Archives, Records of the War Department, Office of the Adjutant General, Returns of the Utah Expedition 1857-1861. 2 George Laub, Diary (unpublished manuscript), June 26, 1858. The quartermaster general reported the following figures relative to trains equipment provided to the Army for Utah. There is some question as to whether all of the equipment con­tinued to Utah after some of the columns were directed to other areas. "Besides the vast supplies provided for the service, the operating columns were furnished with nine travelling forges, twenty-two ambulances, twenty-nine light wagons, nine hundred and eighty-two baggage wagons, six thousand four hundred and forty-seven mules, and two hundred and fifty-four horses, in addition to the horses furnished for the mounted corps," House Executive Document, Number 2, Part 3, 35th Congress, 2nd Session, Serial No. 999, 797. 3k so that the horses could drink. The small stresin flowing out of West Canyon proved insufficient to supply the needs of the force encamped on its banks„ More men were expected to arrive any day, which, with their animals, would increase the need for- water. It was de­cided that the permanent location for the post would have to be in the center of the valley where more water was available. This decision was made with some reluctance on the part of the general* He wrotes In selecting a site for our winter camp, I was de- 1 sirous, if possible, to avoid proximity to the dense settlements, or any settlements, if possible; but this was not practicable, for every suitable position where there is water is occupied,, In this valley there are two small settlements, the one close by the place selected for the camp,3 where there is a spring of water, and contains perhaps ten families; we shall occupy opposite sides of the stream, . and I will see that they suffer no inconvenience from us The major portion of the army remained at West Canyon, while a party under Lieutenant Colonel D, Buggies went south to survey and lay out the permanent post. The disposition of the men*s quarters was to be, facing north and from left to right; Headquarters; 10th, 7th, and 5th Infantry Regiments; % National Archives, Records of the War Department, . .. . e Utah, Iifiik&ES Sfiai 1,911-19,61 (letter no. 317, July 2i+, 1858), I, 360-361. ^Cedar Port and Fairfield. 3Pairfield. ^Senate Executive Document, Number 1, Part 2, 35th Congress, 2nd Session, Serial No. 975j 125. r f Six Pounder Battery; Twelve Pounder Battery; and the 2nd Dragoons,1 When the survey was completed, large numbers of Moircon laborers and artisans were hired to assist in the work of construction. Carpenters and mechanics received $3«00 per 2 day and board. This labor force, directed and assisted by the soldiers, immediately began building storehouses in which to place the goods arriving almost daily by mule and ox trains. The army had been ordered west to Utah Territory in the spring of 1857, shortly after the return of Justices Stiles and Drummond to Washington, D.C, The quartermaster general and the commissary general of subsistence had made arrangements for supplies to support a force of 5,606 men to be put on the road west. Thousands of pounds of foodstuffs, arms, ammuni­tion, and equipment had been prepared at Fort Laramie for 3 shipment to Utah. Contracts were let to suppliers in the East to provide additional goods specifically for the army in k 5 Utah. Russell, Majors and Waddell were given the contract to ^John Wo Phelps, Letters (unpublished manuscript), Letter to "General," September 7, 1858, II, li}2. 2Laub, Diary, August 11, 1858. •^Senate Executive Document, Number 1, 35th Congress, 2nd Session, Serial No. 975» 50-5l. For a list of this equipment see Appendix B. ^House Executive Document, Number 99, 35th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No, 95^, 2-5'. See Appendix C for a list of these contracts. £^ This contract was awarded on January 16, 1858 at Wash­ington, D.C. and provided for rates of from $1.35 to $i|o5:0 per hundred pounds of freight, per hundred miles, depending on the type of freight, the post of pickup and delivery, and the time of year. A table of these rates is found in House Executive Docu­ment, Number 99, 35th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 958, 36 37 transport these goods to the western outpost. Alexander Majors wrote of the gigantic task of moving millions of pounds of goods-to Utah: That spring (l858] our firm, under the name of Russell, Majors and Waddell, obtained a new contract from the United States Government to carry freight to Utah for the years 1858-59. That year the Government ordered an immense lot of freight, aggregating 16,000,000 pounds, itfost of whieh had to be taken to Utah. We had to increase the transportation . . . to 3,500 wagons and teams, and it required more than forty thousand oxen to draw the supplies; we also employed over four thousand men and about one thousand mules. Thousands of pounds of flour, sugar, beans, rice, \ coffee, and other dry goods required dry weatherproof storage facilities to prevent total loss by spoilage. Dried fruit, hams, bacon, and other perishable type products needed cool warehouses for their preservation. Hundreds of pounds of ammunition and explosives had to have dry storage buildings that would afford these goods maximum security. Clothing, saddles, harnesses, and livestock feed in the form of grains also required undercover storage, away from the blasts of wind, snow, and rain. The immense amount of goods shipped to Utah made building great warehouses one of the most important re­quirements of the men at Camp Floyd. Many of the storage buildings departed from the standard material of adobe and were made entirely of wood or stone. The quartermaster's barns on the eastern edge of camp were an example ''"Alexander Majors, Seventy Years on the Frontier, ed„ Prentiss Ingrahm (Chicago and New York, Rand, McNally and Co., 1893), 11*3. of the wooden structures. Stone was used to construct the magazine. The arms and ammunition were stored in this building, which was enclosed by a fifty-five by seventy-five foot stone 2 wall. All the stone used in building Camp Floyd was obtained from open quarries in the hills about two miles northwest of 3 the camp, and was mined by the stockade prisoners. Stone was also used to build a four foot high wall around the cemetary, twenty rods long by thirteen rods wide and in on© other small building twenty by forty feet, possibly a guardhouse, seventy-five yards due west of the magazine. By September 7, most of the storehouses were complete^ and many of them were already filled. Beginning on September Ij., and continuing for about a week, the soldiers at West Canyon moved south through Cedar Fort to Fairfield and the permanent Camp Floyd, The name "Floyd" had been given to the entire valley on July 10, 1858, so in order to distinguish between the two camps the location at West Ganyon was referred to as the "Upper Camp," The sol­diers began building their quarters as soon as they arrived ■''Many of these buildings were made completely of wood. Contemporary accounts tell of the burning of the bams that could not be sold at the abandonment of the post0 One commissary build­ing remains standing today (1959) and is wholly a wooden structure o Journal History of the Church , September 2, X86l. 1, 3Tracy, op, cit., 69<> ^Phelps, Letters. Letter to "General," September 7, 1858 II, llj.2, . . . 39 on the ground set aside for them. Large pits were dug in the sloughs of the creek to extract clay for the 1,600,000 adobes1 required for construction of the buildings, Civilians from the neighboring communities found ready employment making dobies, which were fashioned by pressing a gruel of clay, water, and straw into molds eleven by eight by four inches. The filled molds were placed in the sun to dry, after which the bricks were removed and given to the soldiers who did the actual con­struction. 3 They were required to work with makeshift tools as a consequence of the destruction of their trains the pro­ceeding fall. Brick by brick the walls rose until they were eight feet high.^" As the walls grew, space was left for doors and windows, the sills and frames of which were fashioned from pine sawed by the army in the canyons of the Oquirrhs. Each squad room and officer*s quarters had four windows. The floors were made @f hard pounded clay and straw, except for the head- •*~Senate Executive Document, No. 52, 36th Congress, 1st Session, Serial Number 1035, 299. 2 Idem indicates that these laborers were Mormons. Greeley, op. cito, 2U6, says that the laborers were Mexicans0 There is little evidence to suggest that a large labor force of Mexicans was with the army. Some may have been travelling with Colonel Loring*s command from New Mexico, but not enough to contribute appreciably to the construction. ^Richard F. Burton, The City of the Saints and Across the Rocky Mountains to California (London, Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, lB6TJ, lj-06; estimates that the adobe bricks cost one cent apiece. Using this estimate and the number of adobes re­ported by Assistant Surgeon Aquila T. Ridgely, a figure of $16,000 for adobes is arrived at. ^Johnston, op. clt., 23k° quarters and staff structures which had wooden ones. The roofs were sawed planks from Brigham Young*s mill^ in Mill Creek Canyon. These were laid against the ridge beams, the seams stripped, and the whole covered with three to four inches 2 of adobe mud. The quarters, and some of the other buildings in which men worked, had fireplaces. Many of the adobe struc­tures were finished off with a wash of white, or sometimes colored, clay. When the post was at its largest, it comprised some 3 300 to lj.00 buildings i- the quarters, warehouses, messes, guard houses, administration buildings, stables, and so forth. Most of the troops were kept busy throughout the fall months raising these structures. There were interruptions arising from Indian difficulties, of which more will be mentioned later, but as a whole the army devoted its entire time and energy to complete the post. Some changes in the strength of the Army for Utah, which naturally affected construction, were made during the first three months at Camp Floyd. No sooner had this great array arrived in the valleys of the Wasatch Mountains than Horace Greeley, An Overland Journey from New York to San Francisco in the Summer of lti59~~(New York.C'.M. Saxton. Barker and Co., i860), 21+7> estimates that of the total cost of $200,000 for Camp Floyd, Brigham Young received in excess of $50,000 for the lumber that he supplied for its construction. 2Tracy, op. cit., 35. plans were laid to reduce its size. On June 29, 1858, the Department of the Army issued General Order Number 17. This order affected a reorganization of the Utah forces and gave complete command of them to General Johnston, According to Headquarters of the Array General Order Number 1, dated January 8, 2 1858, a force to aggregate 5,606 men was to be sent to Utah, At that time there were less than 2,000 soldiers in the terri­tory, This would mean a reinforcement of some 3,000 men in the spring of 1858. By the time the army had decided on their location for a camp in Cedar Valley this re inf ore ement was already on the march. General Order Number 17 halted most of the reinforcement and detailed it to other posts and territories than those associated with the Department of Utah* Three columns were to continue to Camp Floyd, where they arrived on September 16, 2lf, and 25 respectively, providing an increase 3 of 967 men and 168 horses to General Johnston's command. Not only did General Order 17 provide for the disposi­tion of the columns enroute for Utah Territory, it also re­organized the force already there. The 6th Infantry Regiment, located east of Fort Bridger (building a road through Bridger*s Pass) and at Camp Floyd (two companies), was ordered to Walla •^Senate Executive Document, Number 1, Part 2, 35th Congress, 2nd Session, Serial No. 975, 131. 2Ibid., 31. . 3 U.S. National Archives, Records of the War Department, Office of the Adjutant General, Efi.turaa ja£ ±iu Utah Expedition. 1857-1361, Field Returns of the ij.th, 5th, and 6th Columns, Utah Forces, September 1858. Wall9, Washington. Territory, to assist in the control of in­surgent Indians. An engineer company that had been directing the road work of the 6th Regiment was sent back to West Point by this same order. While the array was encamped at the Upper Camp in the north end of Cedar Valley, General Johnston was faced with the problem pf what to do with the battalion of volunteers who were shortly due for discharge. He decided to send them back to Fort Leavenworth to be paid off and disbanded0 His main consideration was to prevent the possibility of a large body of men being released to cause damage and ill will with the Mormons. On July 197 this group of volunteers, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Bee, left Camp Floyd. On this same day, the escort provided for Captain Marcy, under the command of Colonel Loring of the Department of New Mexico, began 2 their return journey. This reduced the number at Camp Floyd by 603 men. These readjustments in strength and disposition left the Army for Utah with 2,791 officers and men3 (exclusive of the 371 men at Fort Bridger) to participate in the dedi­cation ceremonies at Camp Floyd on November 9, 1858. This is the largest number of military men at Camp Floyd than can be •'•Senate Executive Document, No. 1, Part 2, 35th Con­gress, 2nd Session, Serial Number 975, 137. 2 Ibid., 121+.. 3^U.S. National Archives, Records of the War Department, Office of the Adjutant General, Returns of the Utah Expedition 1857-1861, Return for Department of Utah, October 1858. * 4-3 documented. By November 8, 1858, the quarters were nearly finished. On this date an order was issued by camp headquarters for a grand review and dedication ceremony to be culminated by the first raising of the national standard in Cedar Valley, to b® accompanied by the national salute to be fired by Light Company B, I|.th Artillery6 CIRCULAR Tuesday, 9th Nov, 1858, having been designated as the day on which the National Flag be hoisted for the first time in this valley, the following is the order for the ceremony, viz: The troops of this command will be formed under arms at 11^ o'clock A.M. and the columns formed on the ground as hereinafter indicated at % before 12:00 o'clock A.M. A National Salute will be fired by Light Company B, l4.th Artillery at 12 o*clock M., precisely. At the first gun the flag will be run up to the masthead. The three Regiments of Infantry formed in columns closed in mass- division front--7th and 10th on the North side of the Staff facing South; Ipth-on the West side facing East; Light Company B 5th Artillery and 2nd Dragoons on the East side facing west; (Artillery on the right)- Light company B ij.th Artillery to be posted in the S.W. angle, between the 5th infantry and the Depot Guard House. As soon as the Flag is saluted the Regiments and Corps will o be marched to their respective parades and then dismissed0 The next day, November 9, 1858, the troops gathered in obeyance to the parade order. By eleven-thirty in the morning, Various sources estimate the strength of the force at Camp Floyd as ranging upwards to 7,000 men. Leonard J. Arrington in his Great Basin Kingdom (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1<558), 196, conservatively used the figure of i^.,000 soldiers. 2 This is obviously a misprint. The other artillery unit at Camp Floyd at this time was Light Company, C, 3rd Artillery. •^Valley Tan, I (November 12, 1858), 2. the various units had assumed their assigned positions and waited patiently the ceremony looked forward to since their first day in Cedar Valley just two months before. The post was almost complete and had the appearance of a city laid on the flat of the valley. The flag staff had been completed on Saturday, November 6, and stood nakedly stabbing the sky. It was a magnificent pole standing a straight ninety feet out of the ground; four feet and four inches in circumference at the base'. A few minutes before noon the general and his staff rode up, taking position on the south facing the flagstaff to the north. At precisely twelve o'clock noon, Lieutenant Colonel Pitcairn Morrison, the Post Commander, signalled with his sword and the salute began. As the first gun barked its homage, the flag was raised by Lieutenants Nathan A.M. Dudley and Alexander Murry, of the 10th Infantry, and the bands began playing "Hail Columbia," finishing as the cadence of the seventeenth explosion echoed back from the hills. The guns continued their salute and at the twenty-second shot were again joined by the bands as they struck up the "Star Spangled Banner." After the last note of music the guns were still speaking their tribute, finally end­ing with the thirty-second blast, one for each state in the Union, Colonel Morrison proposed three cheers for the flag. This was executed and the soldiers were marched back to their quarters to the tune of "Yankee Doodle." The giant banner hung limp at the masthead awaiting the omnipresent wind of Cedar Valley. At about one o'clock in the afternoon, the breeze freshened and the forty by twenty-eight foot flag unfurled and shook itself against the desert sky. 1 Upon arriving back at their respective quarters the men were dismissed and served a whiskey ration, while the officers gathered at the headquarters for punch and lunch* The day was a festive occasion for the men. That night the theater, primarily the work of the 5th Regiment, opened to a full house. The theater at Camp Floyd was an integral part of the entertainment of the post, and consequently deserves consider­able mention here. The soldiers, as in the case of all large groups of men, craved entertainment. General Johnston realized the danger to the morale of his force if they could only find entertainment across the stream in Fairfield. It is believed that he encouraged the soldiers to seek satisfaction in their own camp. As a consequence of this encouragement, and with the cooperation of the $th Infantry Regiment, a theater was built within the confines of the post. The theater organization was called "The Military Dramatic Association," and was composed of the theatrically minded men and women of the camp and its environs. The organizers went as far afield as Salt Lake City in order to obtain female talent. A Mrs. Tuckett, one of the principal Mormon actresses of the "Social Hall," was "stolen" 1Ibid.. I (November 12, 1858), 2. Also see Deseret News. VIII (November 10, 1858), iSk. '"Valley Tan, I (November 12, 1858}, 2. by Sergeant Dick White for the Camp Floyd theater. Other Mormon actresses may also have been employed by the soldiers. The first presentation of the theater was a great success and opened the way for almost continuous twice weekly performances until the 5th Regiment was ordered to New Mexico in April i860. Scenery and costumes were difficult to obtain, but this did not prevent the theater from becoming a tremendous success. The inventive American soldiers solved these problems with ease. For example, the initial scenery was prepared using yellow mustard, red pepper, and ox blood for pigments, be- 3 cause paints were not available." An evening*s entertainment usually consisted of two or three selections with an interlude of some sort. The actors and actresses seemed to favor the comedy and farce, but did not lack the ability to present legitimate drama. On at least one occasion they favored the troops with a Shakespearian tragedy.^" The program for November 9, was composed of a prologue by Mr. Willis, of the 5th Infantry, a farce in two acts entitled "Used Up," and an afterpiece, "The Dead Shot." A band under "John S. Lindsay, The Mormons and the Theatre (Salt Lake City, Century Printing, 1965), l5-I8. p Phelps, Letters. Letter to "Eunice," November 3» 1858, III, 182. Also see letter to "Helen," November if, 1858, III, 185. 3 ^Lindsay, op. cit., 16. Also see Valley Tan, I (Novem­ber 12, 1858), 2. ^Valley Tan, I (October 5, 1859), 3, indicates that Othello was presented on September 2i+, 1859. U-7 1 2 the direction of the 7th Infantry provided musical support to the evening1 s entertainment.^* The theater was typical of frontier theaters. Among the plays presented were found such old time favorites as "Sweethearts and Wives," "Serious Family," "The Day After the Wedding," "The Secret, or the Hole in the Wall," and many 2 many others. Intermission selections were played by the band, whieh was almost always present, with the leading vocalists of the various rogimenfcs singing bsllads typical of soldiers„ One such ballad, "Root Hog or Die," almost broke the association up on January 15, 1859.^ It was so offensive in nature that two of the leading ladies, Mrs. Tuckett and Mrs. Lougee, left the ranks of actresses in the organization until an apology k was tendered by the offender. The pages of the Valley Tan are full of praise for the work of the theater. In the issue of January 25, 1859, the critic said this in regard to "The Lady of Lyons": "There are so many affecting passages, and were so well recited as to bring down thunders of applause. However, the various performances 1Ibld., I (November 16,1858}, 3. 2 See Appendix D for a list of some of the prominent plays and principals of the "Military Dramatic Association." 3Valley Tan, I (January 25, 1859}, 3. . k Ibid., I ( February 1, 1859), 2. ^Ibid., I (January 25, 1859), 3 , 48 were not always praised. It seems that the camp claimed a number of critics. All received space in the Valley Tan. While one was praising, another was condemning, and the reader today can't help but believe that these critics were engaging in just another form of recreation at Camp Floyd, Throughout the winter the theater continued to perform. With the approach of spring, and the scarcity of m o m y among the troops, it was found necessary to close down. Many of the sol- 1 diers had not received pay for six to ten months and could not attend the plays, not having enough money to purchase a ticket, which cost fifty cents for enlisted men and one dollar for officers.- The theater closed the latter part of March, 1859, and remained closed tintII June 1|, when it reopened and continued 3 to operate with few interruptions until it was disposed of in April i860. The Dramatic Association was the frequent sponsor ii of dancesT in addition to the dramatic presentations. The Military Dramatic Association was only one of the many organizations at Camp Floyd designed to provide entertain­ment or other than military activity for the soldiers. Shortly after the completion of the post a group of officers petitioned •^Ibid., IfFebruary 1, 1859), 2. Also see U.S. National Archives, Records of the War Department, Department of Utah, Letters Sent 1857-1861 (Letter No. 1+5, February 6, l8j?9), II, 120-121. 2Phelps, Diary. ' November 12, 1858, ^These interruptions were for new scenery or redecoration of the theater, ^Valley Tan, I (January 18, 1859), 2. 49 5o the Grand Lodge of Missouri for permission to begin a Masonic Lodge in Utah,^ A charter was issued on March 6, 1859, and probably reached the petitioners at Camp Floyd sometime in April. The grant provided the name "Rocky Mountain Lodge" for the Masonic group there, and stipulated that it must be returned p to the Grand Lodge in May i860." Upon receipt of the charter the members of the Masonic Order immediately began construction of a temple. They built the walls with adobe bricks and hand sawed all of the lumber needed for the roof, sills, and door frames. The building was sixty feet long by thirty feet wide, 3 with high windows on the north and south sides. Meetings be­gan as soon as it was completed,, In the first year 162 degrees l|. were conferred, more than any other lodge in Utah up to 19314-. Most of the degrees were conferred on soldiers; however, there is evidence that at least one initiate at Camp Floyd was a civilian. The Rocky Mountain Lodge returned its first charter, according to previous arrangement, to the Grand Lodge at St. Louis, ^Sam Henry Goodwin, Freemasonry in Utah, Rocky Mountain Lodge Number 205 (Salt Lake City, Grand Lodge of Utah, 193I4J , 1 7. 2Idem. 3Ibid., 19o ^Ibid», 21. 5 Richard Thomas Ackley, "Across the Plains in 1858," Utah Historical Quarterly, ed. J. Cecil Alter (Salt Lake City, Utah State Historical Society, 192+1), IX, 227; states that he was the first civilian "taken in." In May i860. A second charter was granted in May. i860, with the numbers "205" added to the title of Rocky Mountain Lodge," and the Masonic labors continued until Camp Floyd was abandoned. During its two years of existence, the Rocky Mountain Lodge gave humanitarian service to many destitute emigrants passing west through Utah Territory. Food and clothing, or funds with which to purchase supplies, were often provided for those who 2 had not made proper preparations for their journey w st. Tn addition to this service, the Rocky Mountain Lodge contributed $250 to the construction of the Washington Monument, in Wash- 3 ' ington, D.C. It is not definately known when the second char­ter for the lodge was returned to the Grand Lodge of Missouri. The last recorded communication between the Grand Lodge and the Rocky Mountain Lodge was dated March 27, l86l, just four months to the day before Camp Floyd was officially abandoned and the first Masonic Lodge of Utah ceased its labor.^ The Military Dramatic Association and the Rocky Mountain Lodge were two of the many organizations which absorbed the interest of off duty soldiers. A few more activities of camp life deserve mention here. The latter part of June, 1859, Bartholomew^ Great Pioneer Circus presented a series of shows ^"Goodwin, op0 ait., 17. 2Ibid., 21. 3Idem. 51 ^Ibid., 33. at the camp.* This was a civilian organization which travelled through the communities of central Utah. After the group moved from Camp Floyd, the soldiers determined to organize their own circus. On August 20, 1859, the "Soldiers Circus" opened at the camp. It was composed entirely of residents of the post 2 and was well received by the men. The acts included the usual buffoonery of clowns and several outstanding acrobatic groups. Of course the clowns made successful burlesque of the Mormon way of life. The Valley Tan reported: Crawford and Willis possess a peculiar faculty in hitting off the Mormons, and this is the thing to please the soldiers. We all hate these degenerate scoundrels, and anything produced in the way of burlesquing them will always take well.^ The success of the circus prompted performances two and three times a week. The show got better, so an enlargement and im­provement of the pavillion was soon required and accomplished„^ "Observer" reported on September 7> that the Soldiers Circus " is the only place of amusement in Camp Floyd worth going to."^ This was primarily because of the buffoonery of Crawford and Willis: ■''Valley Tan, I (July 6, 1859), 2. Also see Phelps, Di arv. June 22, 1559. 2Valley Tan, I (September 7, 1859), 2. 3Ibid., I (September 28, 1859), 1. ^Ibid., I (September H+,1859), 2. -Ibid., I (September 7, 1859), 2. 52 The fountain-head from which all the amusement was drawn was the inimitable comicality of Willis and Crawford. Their tricks and witticisms invariably brought down the audience in roars of applause; but the capping of the climax was in the burlesque on Mormon emigration. 0 o . Willis* personification of the Mormon Bishop was ren­dered so well that it afforded material for laughter for days afterward. 1 About the same time that the Soldiers Circus was being organized, another society to occupy the soldier's attention was created. Sunday, August 21, marked the debut of the lfGer-manic Singing Club." This group of men had spent considerable time in constructing and decorating a social hall on the 7th Infantry's ground, in which to hold their meetings. The Singing Club was unique in that It was a private organization. Only members and guests could attend the activities of the society. The purpose of the organization was to promote "dramatic repre- 2 sentations and chorus singing." Meetings were held each night to sing and rehearse dramatic and operatic presentations for the club. The first performance before the group was executed in German and included three farces with choral interludes be­tween each one. In subsequent weeks the society performed selections from grand opera, sponsored classical orchestral numbers, and presented other music and drama of a very high caliber. A critic of one of their meetings reported in the October 5, issue of the Valley Tan: ~*~Idem. 53 2Idem. We may state that the music performed at this elegant little establishment is characterized no less by its chaste­ness of style than by the brilliance of its execution^, The selections are made with taste and judgement, and is deci­dedly superior £0 anything which can be heard elsewhere in this territory.~ The intellectual life of the camp received considerable support from-a number of schools that operated in the various unitso Captain John W. Phelps was a frequent lecturer at one of these schools and recorded a report that when his school ended 2 on April 2, 1859, four soldiers had learned to write. It has been shown that there were many and varied acti­vities and entertainments organized within the camp to occupy the spare time of the men. Before elaborating on the entertain­ments available across the stream, in Fairfield, mention should be made of some of the duties and amusements common in the camp to a lesser degree than those already described. Life at Camp Floyd was at times far from glamorous. There were the routine duties associated with the maintenance of a military establishment. The post was in need of constant maintenance and improvement. During the winter of 1858-59> the quartermaster built a conduit, which provided for the distri- 3 bution of water throughout the camp* in addition to this, Richard Ackley wrote of other improvements accomplished by the 1Ibid., I (October 5, 1859), 3. 2Phelps, Diary. April 2, 1859. 3 Valley Tan, I (January 18, 1859), 2. 54 55 quartermaster: As Spring opened, the men were busy building and rearranging the garrison. Capt. Turnley, the Quartermaster of the post, was very efficient in his duties. A very large spring of water started close by, and the Captain had it nicely cleaned out and walled up. About on^ mile below, he damiaad it up and built a mill for the purpose of grinding grain, for either flour or feed for the horses. Also a large lot of bath-houses were fixed for the purpose of the men bathing. The little lake formed by the dam, he filled with fish, which he had brought from Lake Utah, Besides working at improvements, the soldiers in camp had the official responsibility associated with the ceremonies of parades, guard duties, funerals, entertaining Indian digni­taries, and policing across the creek in Fairfield. Excerpts from accounts of these various duties reveal that Camp Floyd life was not always the exciting one generally expected at frontier army posts. A parade was held on every significant holiday regard­less of the weather of obstacles of terrain. Captain Tracy described the review in honor of Washington1s birthday, 1859, as being one of extreme hardship due to both weather and ter­, 2 rain. There was a biting wind blowing the falling snow into a blizzard, but the parade continued with the men slipping and tripping over the sagebrush. In subsequent parades the dust was the element which blinded them. With the tramping of feet in the parade, great clouds arose to add to the discomfort of the troops. Not being able to see through the dust made it ^Ackley, op. cit., 22I4.0 2 Tracy, op. cite, 51|-560 56 extremely difficult for the soldiers to maintain their lines, or even keep their feet due to stumbling over clumps of sage. Even with these problems to contend with, the reviews must have been something to see. Imagine the largest force to be assembled in one place since the Mexican War parading "upon the plateau, and forming a line of brave and well disciplined soldiers 0 . . across the valley almost from one mountain to the other. Closely allied with the duties of parading were those associated with providing security for the quarters, warehouses, prisons, and arsenal. Guard duty at Camp Floyd was always drudgery, though a necessary concern of all the men. The sever­al guard stations were occupied twenty-four hours a day then, just as similar stations in the army today are maintained* Documents relate that the officer of the day had a real and sometimes hazardous task to perform in checking his guards* One of the sentries was occasionally located at the quarry, about two miles from camp. The officer on duty was required to visit this sentoy during the night. Captain Tracy wrote of his experi­ence in performing this assignment: Northwesterly and between camp and the point where the guard is stationed lies the usual stretch of sage. . . . Over this ground . . . the wolves are wont at night to traverse in packs. * . . These animals appeared parti­cularly on the alert tonight, and, with my orderly- both of us on foot- I had proceeded perhaps nearly half way Valley Tan, I (January 1+, 1859), 2 57 . * . when at the front and somewhat to right, there arose the longdrawn deep howl. . . . Presently from the neigh­borhood of the lower camp, there came the answer, then another, deeper and wilder of note, and finally the chorus of a troop under full head, in one direction. I did not linger for the advance, and if I did not run, I imitated the Kentuckian in some very rapid walking. Nearer and nearer the pack came on, till I almost, fancied I could hear the sagebrush crash beneath them. At this point the captain and his orderly reached the protecting fire of the sentry. They later returned to camp, accompanied by an armed escort. Upon arriving in camp, Captain Tracy re­lieved his orderly who reported to his fellows that "there wasn't an officer in this camp could beat Captain Tracy walking." The wolf packs were attracted to the camp by the slaugh­tering pens on its outskirts. Many an off duty hour was spent in hunting these i^olves, using dogs to chase them up for shoot- 3 ing. This amusement, and the camp billiard room were generally 1+ reserved for officers. While some men occupied their spare time hunting wolves in the valley, other men were hunting for precious metals. The search for riches was met with some success. Captain Phelps reported in his diary of silver, lead, and gold being discovered by the soldiers in the vicinity of the camp. ^Tracy, op. cit., 69-70. p Idem. ^Valley Tan, I (February 1, 1859), 2. ^Ackley, op. cit., 225. 5 Phelps, Diary, November 10, 1858; January 31, 1859, April 27, 1859. ' 58 At the same time that the mineral riches of the land were being discovered, the agriculturalists of the military establishment were exploiting the earth by way of farming. On April 27> 1858, ground was surveyed for a large garden and on May 2, plowing and planting began. By the end of the spring of 1859> there had been forty acres of soil seeded in the valley by the soldiers. Each regiment had the responsibility for tending and irrigating the garden one day a week. The crop was to be equally distributed among the men when the harvest was brought in. The garden flourished and was a great success." When the activities in camp became too dull, there were 2 always available the amusements of Fairfield, across the stream It was a gamble to venture over for an evening. Permission was required, in writing, before the luxuries of "camp follower civilization" could be sampled. All the vices known to man 3 were present in the town of "Frog." Knifings and shootings I4. ' ' were common occurrences, so much so that two provost sergeants were appointed by the commander to police the town and attempt 1Ibid., April 27, 1859; May 2, 1859; June 1, 1859; July 3, lWH July 30, 1859. 2 Fairfield wa3 often referred to as "Frogtown" or "Dobie town." 3 See Appendix E for a contemporary description of a Saturday night in Fairfield. ^Deseret News, X (April 2, i860), 61j also Valley Tan, I (March 1, --- Tracy, Ackley, Greeley, Burton and the newspapers are all agreed that Fairfield was the breeding place of the lawless­ness of the territory. to maintain order between soldiers and civilians. The princi­pal entertainments were gambling-in every conceivable form (cards, horseracing, pistol shooting, ten pins, roulette, bil­liards, etc,}- figating, women, and drinking. Among the bever­ages obtainable was a whiskey composed of alcohol and tobacco. This brew was responsible for frequent illnesses and receives mention in the department medical reports as being the cause of 2 at least one death. The two principal streets of town were lined with establishments designed to dispense liquors and excitement. There is evidence to suggest that women were readily 3 obtainable to contribute to the entertainments across the stream." General (then Lieutenant) B.M. Thomas recorded his impression of "Frogtown," an accurate summary in view of evidence obtainable today: Fairfield, or Frogtown, as we called it, was on the oppo­site side of the stream. Here were assembled a motley gang of horse thieves, murderers and desperadoes. . . 0 Every house was a gambling deji, with barroom attachment. Crime ran high carnival here.*+ Many of the men buried in the post cemetary were victims of drunken brawls or foul play in Fairfield- that "hell of gamblers 1Vallej Tan, I (March 1, 1859), 2„ 2 Senate Executive Document, Number 52, 36th Congress, 2nd Session, Serial No. 103p, 307• ■5 ^Ackley, op. cit., 219-220. Also see Phelps. Diary. June 15, 1859. ^Proceedings of the M a¥. Grand Lodge Free and Accepted Masons of Utah, Fifty-fourth Annual Communication (Salt Lake City. T725TT 95." - ^ -------- ----- ------ - - ' 59 1 liquor venders, " 1 However, the life of "Dobiatown" did not appeal to all of the soldiers. Indeed, it was to combat the licentious exis­tence of Fairfield that several hundred men banded together into p the "Military Order of the Sons of Temperance," If a man found life at Camp Floyd too unbearable and couldn*t compensate for it at Frogtown, he had two alternatives, both of which were utilized at one time or another0 He could commit suicide,-' or desert the post. As a matter of fact, desertions were fairly common, moreso than suicides! The di­aries of Phelps and Ackley, and the pages of the Deseret News all report punishment being meted out to deserters that were caught and returned to camp,'*' The prescribed method of correc­tion for this crime was a public whipping and a tour of duty at the stone quarry. If the routine activity at Camp Floyd was difficult, it was at least healthy. The sterility of the soil made breeding •^Phelps , Letters. Letter to "Helen," February 2, 1859, III, 220, 2Valley Tan, II (December 7, 1859), 2, ^Deseret News, X (April 2, i860), 61; reports the suicide of a clerk in the 7th Infantry Regiment, This Is confirmed by the medical reports of the camp: Senate Executive Document, Number 52, 36th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No, 1035, 319, Captain Phelps Diary reports that there were two additional suicides in the first.year at Camp Floyd; May 13 and August 6, 1859, 60 ^Ackley, o£, cit., 225. Also see Deseret News, X (April 25, i860), 61; and Phelps, Diary February 5, 1^59; February 19, 1859; July 16, 1859, places for micro-organisms few and far between. There was plenty of clear fresh water, and good wholesome food. The dry air was a boon to the sufferers of respiratory disease. Though the dust is often mentioned as being inconvenient to breathing, the military health records show no serious respiratory illnesses resulting from it. The most prevalent disease at the post was mountain fever, a disease which completely baffled the doctors of the territory. Some attributed it to drinking snow water,1 while others blamed the night mountain air02 With the cause of the fevers not being known, they led the list of mortality with a ra­tio of one death for every eighty-six cases, compounded over a period of three years. This placed the Department of Utah eighth in severity out of the twenty-three regions of the United States listed in the health records.3 There was some scurvy among the men, but the ample supply of fresh fruits and vegetables procured from the Mormon gardens decreased the severity and duration of the disease in individual instances. Cases contracted at camp were caused principally by "drunkeness, filth, despondency, ennui, and an unvaried diet from which vegetables"^ were absent. It is interesting to note that despondency was recognized as a contributing factor in producing scurvy. Undoubtedly, despondency ^Senate Executive Document, Number 52, 36th Congress, 1st Session, Serial wo. l03>» 3l3» 2Idem. ■ 3Ibid., 325. 61 1+ Ibid., 309. 62 was a common condition for soldiers in the Department of Utah, and had some influence in the prevalence of other illnesses. The following maladies are ordered according to the aggregate mortality for each, compounded over a three year period in the Department of Utah: fevers, digestive disfunctions, respiratory diseases, wounds and injuries, brain and nervous system, muscular disorders, venereal diseases, and miscellaneous. When compared with the national military mortality rate for the same period, the Department of Utah was lower in proportion to mean strength than any other region except the Military Academy and Army Headquarters at West Point, with an aggregate annual 2 ratio of 8.2 deaths for every 1,000 men in the department. Utah may not have been the most lively department of the army but it was certainly the most healthy. Camp Floyd had humble beginnings, but before its abandon­ment it ranked with the largest and most prominent military establishments in the United States. Certainly, the experiences of the soldiers at the post were conducive to dissatisfaction and boredom, but fortunately there were opportunities for adven­ture and excitement in the duties away from camp--military duties that the Army for Utah was frequently called upon to discharge. As a consequence of these tasks the men were given the chance to revitalize their attitudes. Some, who were never 1Ibid., 318-321. 63 called upon to participate in military ventures away from Cedar Valley, resigned and left Utah feeling that their time had been completely wasted,. Captain Phelps was one of these men, and as he left, he breathed a sentiment it is believed was expressive of the thoughts and desires of many of the men that served in the Army for Utah; On arriving at the rim of Cedar Valley I turned to look at the small region of the globe where an entire year and more of ray life had been spent,like a blank, and which I hoped I might never see again. What adventures away from camp had Captain Phelps missed? One concerned itself with a conflict between civil and military authorities- the "Provo Incident"--an examination of which will be presented next. "^Phelps, Diary. September 8, 1859 CHAPTER III POSSE COMITATUS1 The instructions which governed the conduct of the army in Utah Territory specified that soldiers were to be used at the discretion of the civil authorities to aid them in estab- 2 lishing and maintaining law and order among the Mormon people. It will be remembered that law and order had been established through the mediations of Colonel Kane and the peace commis­sioners at least two months before the Army for Utah reached Great Salt Lake City. At least the commissioners and newly appointed governor were satisfied that the reported rebellion was over, before the army left its winter camp at Fort Bridger and Camp Scott. However, some of the recently appointed civil authorities refused to recognize that the Mormons had estab­lished peace with the United States. These men were bound and determin ed to extract what they termed "justice" from the saints, and before they were through they had almost fanned the -Posse Comitatus is literally the power of the county. The term denotes a body of citizens who are summoned to assist an officer of the law "in suppressing a riot or in executing any legal precept which is forcibly opposed. The word comitatus is often omitted and posse alone used." (Webster1s Unabridged Dictionary.) 2 House Executive Document, Number 71» 35th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 7^', 7» 65 coals of conflict into open flame again. Governor Cumming had sensed that trouble was brewing as early as November 5, 1858. The men at Camp Floyd daily uttered oaths of hatred and threats of violence against the residents of Zion. General Johnston could control the soldiers, but he had no authority when it came to dealing with the civili­ans. The governor attempted to salve the situation when he wrote a letter of explanation and appeal to Secretary of State, Lewis CassJ It is a subject of regret that certain persons who believe that the Mormons ought to be cured of their errors of opinion by violent remedies have Inflamed the passions of the ignorant against the inhabitants, and several mur­ders have been the result of this unwise and wicked prac­tice. If the administration desire to preserve the present peaceable condition of society here, I cannot too strongly urge the necessity of avoiding the appointment to office in this Territory of men who believe it to be proper to wage a war of extermination against men who entertain i errors of opinion on the subjects of religion and politics. In spite of the efforts of the territorial chief execu­tive to prevent his subordinate officers from waging a war of retribution, such a conflagration broke out in March, 1859, at the session of the second district court in Provo. On March 7, 1859, John Cradlebaugh, associate justice of the United States Supreme Court and one of the recently appointed gentile officers charged with the establishment of law and order in Utah, left his quarters in the security of 2 Camp Floyd, and journeyed to Provo to preside over the second 2Phelps, Di&.ry. March 7, 1859. ^House Executive Document, Number 78, 36th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 1056, l|o district court which was to meet there on March 8. Judge Cradlebaugh was one of the men alluded to by Governor Gumming in his report to the secretary of state, on November 5• To insure success in his plans of bringing justice to the terri­tory, Judge Cradlebaugh had made requisition to the army on March 6, for a force of men to accompany him to court„ He based his request on the authority granted to the army to aid the civil officers upon their request. It seems that several violators of various laws had been arrested and imprisoned at the camp. Once the court had begun to meet, it was believed that other persons guilty of crimes would be apprehended and brought to trial. Undoubtedly many of these ''criminals" were of the predominant religious faith. The judge may have anti­cipated resistance to his form of justice, just as the governor had, and this may have been the primary motivation behind his asking for military assistance. He formally stated his reasons for having soldiers at the court in the following words: Certainty of punishment being the surest preventive of crime, and having no prison within my district in which to secure . „ . offenders that they may be brought to justice, the public interest, as well as my duty requires that the prisoners . . . be transmitted to the place of trial, and there be kept under military guard until their cases are disposed of. I feel confident that without such aid the court will be unable to bring said persons before the court, and secure their answering to the crimes alleged against them.^ 66 1 Senate Executive Document, Number 2, 36th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 1021}-, llj-O. ^Idem. 67 General Johnston responded to the judge's request by ordering a company of 10th Infantry, commanded by Captain Henry Heth, to escort the prisoners and the judge to Provo. The gen­eral had no desire to give cause for dispute between his men and the citizens of Provo. He was very specific in his instructions to Captain Heth. He ordered that the soldiers were not to assist in arrests or otherwise follow directives from the judge or marshal except to guard and deliver the prisoners turned over to them by authorized civilian law enforcement officers. Any requests for assistance were to be directed to the command­ing general and not to be complied with unless ordered by him. In addition to securing the prisoners, Captain Heth's men were directed to afford protection to witnesses seeking it in their camp, which was to be established outside of the city limits. To further avoid friction with the civilians, the soldiers were encouraged to stay out of town, even to the extent of requiring the marshal and court bailiffs to come to their camp 1 to get the prisoners. Upon arriving in Provo, the soldiers were persuaded by Judge Cradlebaugh that to camp outside the extended limits of the city would make the discharge of their orders impractical and almost impossible. Consequently, Captain Heth secured permission from the town marshal to occupy the ground around the seminary (where court was being held), with the officers taking up residence in one of the rooms on the ground floor, 1Ibid., ll+0-l|l. 68 adjoining and under the one occupied by the grand jur^ and the 1 designated meeting place for the court* These arrangements touched off a series of protests, which for a time threatened to result in violence* On March 10, 1859, fifty-six of the citizens of Provo drafted and presented a petition to the mayor and city council stating their views and feelings respecting the ^invasion" of the court by the army. They wrote that the alleged need for soldiers to act as guards because of the absence of security for the prisoners was unfounded: "The civil officers both of the city and county hold themselves in readiness at all times to secure and take 2 care of prisoners." They further protested: The judge says the troops were sent . . . at his request. We can only look upon it that he is either afraid of his own personal safety or that they are here to intimidate private citizens, witnesses, jurors, and so prevent jus­tice.-'" The next day, Mayor B*K. Bullock and the city council wrote to Governor Curaming, expressing, by way of consolidated protest, their objections to this "high-handed outrage:" Dear Sir: The mayor and city council of Provo beg leave to respectfully represent, that whereas the city council have received petitions from the various wards of this city against the military occupations of the seminary and vicinity by United States troops, to the annoyance of the citizens of this city and intimidation of those persons House Executive Document, Number 78, 36th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 10^6, 7-9. 2Ibid*, 7* Idem* 69 having business with the district court, in session in the seminary, and also rendering it exceedingly difficult for the civil officers, and expensive, to preserve the peace between the unruly portion of the citizens and sol­diers, some unpleasant circumstances having already occurred, and that they regard it as a direct interference with the municipal regulations of American citizens. Under These circumstances you will see the impropriety of their longer continuing in their present positions, and we respect­fully request your honor to cause that they be removed beyond the limits of this city. A letter similar in context to the above was also sent to Judge Cradlebaugh* This prompted a series of heated communi­cations between the judge and the city officials. The judge reiterated his belief that there were no means or facilities for tending prisoners at Provo. He challenged the council to show where the soldiers had interfered with or annoyed citizens, and closed his first rebuttal with these words: "As to your remark about intimidation, allow me to say that good American citizens have no cause to fear American troops o This attack on the loyalty of the pardoned Mormons was almost more than they could peaceably bear. The council shot back an acid reply to the judge, again stating that prison facilities were available, listing several "incidents" between the troops and the civilians, and explaining again the impro­priety of having the civil courts virtually controlled by the steel of the military. Senate Executive Document, Number 2, 36th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 102i{., l42<> ^Ibid,, 1^3 70 By the middle of March, the whole territory had entered into the dispute. The community of Spanish Pork added its pro­test to that from the people of Provo„ On March 22, a petition from citizens throughout the territory was presented to the governor, who forwarded it to the secretary of state at Wash­ington, D.C. The Valley Tan and the Deseret News devoted con­siderable space to editorials, charges, and counter-charges^ which tended to excite the men at Camp Floyd and the Mormon readers throughout the valleys of the Wasatch Mountains. However, all of the citizens did not rebel at having troops in and around the halls of justice. On March lij., eight men, claiming citizenship in Provo, complicated the protests from Provo, Spanish Fork, and the territory by requesting that the troops not be removed from the city. They further certi­fied that they had neither seen nor heard anything which could be interpreted as intimidation by the army, and that the con- 1 duct of the soldiers was exemplary. In the meantime, Governor Cumming determined to get to the bottom of the problem through a personal investigation,, On March llj., he arrived at Provo and found the disposition of the military force to be precisely as described to him in the petitions from the citizens of the area, The governor was virtually ignored by Captain Heth, an action which resulted in open conflict between the chief executive and the military com­mander of the department,, Judge Cradlebaugh chose this most 1Ibid„, 1UJ+ 71 inopportune time to add insult to injury by securing the arrest of Mayor Bull.ock and threatening to arrest Bishop Johnson of Springville. This action caused an increase in the size of the police force and touched off frequent rows between soldiers and civilians, which resulted in Captain Heth*s men being dri- 1 ven from their posts by stoning, "When the mayor of Provo was arrested „ „ . every ablebodied man in town immediately became a member of the police force, and the judge found him­self confronted with a civilian army of his own indirect cre­ation."^ Captain Heth became greatly alarmed with the appear­ance of such a large police force about his position. He pre­pared for a battle and sent a messenger back to Cemp Floyd, on March 18, with a description of the now openly hostile situa­tion. This report prompted General Johnston to muster a force 3 of some 500 men to march to Battle Creek and be in readiness to support Captain Heth in case fighting began. Major Gabriel R. Paul was directed to assume command of the entire Provo expedition, which numbered 6I4.7 men. Again, the general em­phasized the need for maintaining peaceful relations with the ■^Tracy, 0£. cit., 59 0 Also see Ackley, o£. cit., 22i|.« 2 Nels Anderson, Desert Saints (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 191+2), 199» 3 Pleasant Grove. 4 Returns of the Utah Expedition. March, 1859. 72 citizenry when he instructed the major: You will be careful not to permit your command to inter­fere with the rights of the citizens, and, on no pretence whatever, will you make an attack upon any body of citi­zens except in sheer self-defense. On March 21, the force, under Major Paul, marched from Camp Ployd. Just as Captain Heth had exercised independence of action by not camping .outside the city, so also did the major move considerably closer to the seat of action then he was specifically directed. On March 22, his men marched through 2 Battle Creek and on to the Timpanogos River, where they camped 3 within sight of the court house. Governor Cumming had observed these movements of the military. Indeed, he had attempted to quiet the condition by writing to the general on March 20, requesting that Captain Heth's command be removed to a "position outside of the wall of the village," and that the men under Major Paul "assume such position as will relieve the inhabitants from the influence of a military encampment in their v i c i n i t y . H e continued his letter by writing: It is with pleasure that I announce to you, that after careful observation I am satisfied that the presence of the military force in this vicinity is? unnecessary, and for this and other reasons I desire to impress upon you the propriety of the immediate disposition of the troops as above indicated.5 ^Senate Executive Document, Number 2, 36th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 10£i+, 11+9. ^Provo River. ^Tracy, op. cit., 60-61. fy-House Executive Document, Number 73, 36th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No„ l6j?6, 19. £ •^Idertio 73 Accompanying this letter was a copy of instructions frora Secretary of State Cass to the governor, indicating that troops could be called on for assistance *and while thus em­ployed they will be under the direction of the proper civil officer, and act in conformity with the Instructions you may give as the chief executive magistrate of the Territory. This last phrase brought forth a strong and heated reply from the general on March 22, the day Major Paul camped on Timpano-gos River. General Johnston briefly reviewed the events which made the use of troops at Provo necessary. Then he launched into an analysis of the military position in respect to the civil one. He defended Captain Heth for not reporting to the governor, for "such an act would be an acknowledgement of raili- • 2 tary supremacy on your part which does not exist." He further stated: To prevent any misunderstanding hereafter, I desire to say to your excellency that I am under no obligation what­ever to conform to your suggestions, with regard to the military disposition of the troops of this department, except only when it may be expedient to employ them in their civil capacity as a posse, . . . I have also to say to you that, to secure the military convicts who were re­quired as witnesses by the United States district attorney, it would have been necessary to»send a force to Provo with them, whether asked for or not.^ Since the troops were asked for, and by Judge Cradlebaugh, the ^Idem. Italics in the original. 2Ibifl., 21. 'Idem. general indicated that he could not remove them without first obtaining their release from the requesting official. It was apparent to the governor that he could make no peace with the military commander until a clarification of orders was obtained from the secretary of state and the general in chief. The soldiers at Camp Floyd had believed for some time that the governor was on the verge of falling into the pit of Mormondom. His taking sides with the saints in the Provo con­flict confirmed their suspicions and the gulf between the civil and military authority continued to widen throughout the summer of 1859, until a stand was taken on the issue by the government at Washington as a result of a plea from the territorial execu­tive. Governor Gumming asked Secretary Cass, in a letter of March 25, "that the discrepancy which exists between the instruc­tion given to the civil and military departments in this terri­tory o . . be removed by some further action on the part of the government, To make his position in the Provo incident absolutely clear, pending action from Washington, the governor issued a proclamation on March 27, reviewing the military movements, their effect on the civilian element of the population, and the general*s refusal to comply with the executive request for withdrawal. He concluded with the following declaration: Now therefore I, Alfred Cumming, governor of the Territory of Utah, do hereby publish this my solemn protest against the present military movement, and also 74 1Ibid,, 23 75 against all movements of troops incompatible with the letter and spirit of , , . the instructions received by me from the government fop my guidance while governor of the Territory of Utah.1 On May 2, 1859, Secretary of State Cass wrote to Gover­nor Gumming that the secretary of war had issued orders to General Johnston clarifying when the military were to be subject to call and direction from the civil officers. Four days later Secretary of War John B. Floyd wrote to the department commander: Peace being now restored to the Territory, the judicial administration of the laws will require no help from the army under your command. If the service of the United States troops should be needed under any circumstances, it could only be to assist the executive authority in executing the sentence of law or the judicial decrees of the court; and that necessity could only arise when the services of a civil posse were found to be insufficiento You will, therefore, only order the troops under your command to assist as a posse comitatus in the execution of the laws, upon written application of the governor of the Territory, and not otherwise. This communique made it clear that soldiers were to be used only as a posse comitatus and upon a request from the governor. It was also a rebuke to General Johnston for allowing his men 3 to be used by the judge„ However, he was to have sweet revenge before too long. 1Ibid., 23-21+, p Senate Executive Document, Number 2, 36th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No, lOT1,., 15?. 3 Anderson, op. clt., 200; reports on documentation not readily available, which sheds additional light on o the secretary of state1s statement of clarification: "On May 17, 1859, Attorney General Jeremiah S, Black wrote to the federal judges in Utah that they had exceeded their authority to become public accusers. Concerning the Provo epi­sode he wrote the following opinion, concurred in by the 76 Before the summer of 1859 was through, Governor Cumming had cause to regret his pressing for such a narrow interpreta­tion of orders. In August, an Indian uprising occurred on the 1 California road near the Goose Creek Mountains. The governor asked the general to "detach a suitable command with instruc- 2 tions to communicate with Superintendent Forney, at Brigham City, with a view of arresting the murderers, and furnishing 3 protection on the road," General Johnston replied that he would comply with the request: And I will, in consequence of the information contained in your letter, but not in compliance with your requisi­tion, despatch a force, as I would do should the like information come from any source entitled to credit,'"* This was sufficient answer, but he continued to rub salt into president: 1. That the governor of the territory alone has power to issue a requisition upon the commanding general for the whole or a part of the army0 2. That there was no apparent occasion for the presence of the troops at Provo. 3. That if the rescue of the prisoners in custody had been attempted, it was the duty of the marshal and not of the judge to summon the force that might be necessary to prevent it. That the troops ought not to have been sent to Provo with­out the concurrence of the governor, nor kept there against his remonstrance. 5* That the disregard of these principles and rules of action has been In many ways extremely unfortunate," ^In southwestern Idaho and northwestern Utah, p Jacob Forney was appointed Indian agent for Utah, to fill the office vacated by Garland Hurt on September 27, l857<> Mr. Forney came into Utah in the spring of 1858, after having wintered with the array at Fort Bridger. ^Tdem. ^House Executive Document, Number 78, 36th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 1056, 30. 77 the wound by writing: In view of the very specific orders of the Secretary of War of recent date, limiting my authority to comply with your requisitions for the aid of the United States troops to cases which in a single contingency may occur, I shall feel it my duty to refuse a compliance with your requisi­tions for Jroops in any other case whatever than those specified. With this, the conflict, which had seemingly been settled in May, was touched off again. The chief executive of the terri­tory had learned that he could not deal directly with the mili­tary commander, so he wrote again to Secretary Cass: "There seems to be an obvious descrepancy between the orders of the honorable Secretary of War to General A.S. Johnston and your 2 instructions to me. 11 The secretary replied in such a way as to give support to General Johnston's stand: In supposing that there is any conflict between your instructions and those issued by the War Department in May last, I think you labor under some misapprehension. The troops in Utah were not intended to be placed at your disposal, so that you might employ them for any purpose connected with the welfare of the Territory which you might deem expedient, but were only intended as posse comitatus in aid of the civil power, whenever resistance was manifested to the execution of legal process.-' This communique evened the score between the general and the governor. The orders were clarified, so that no misunder­standing as to the relationship between civil and military officers would be possible in the future. Feelings had been 1 Ibid., 31. 2Ibid., 29. 3Ibid., 32. 78 aroused between the two as a result of the Provo Incident, so hostile that they were never resolved,, General Johnston and Governor Cumming avoided contact with each other as though one or the other were possessed of a plague. Their future communi­cations were perfunctory in nature, never cordial nor personal. Fortunately, the successors to command at Camp Floyd, after General Johnston left in March i860, did not inherit his con­tempt for the governor. The affair at Provo, which had touched off this contro­versy, ended just a few days after the governor's formal re­quest, in March, for clarification of instructions. Undoubtedly, the pressure exercised on the army by the chief executive and the citizenry prompted orders for withdrawal of the military force on April I4.. The judge, sensing his perilous position without guns to back him up, brought the session of court to a speedy conclusion and joined the retreating army. Prisoners, whose cases had not been heard at Provo, were marched back to Camp Floyd with the soldiers. Considerable excitement was evidenced among the residents of Dobietown^ as the criminals were marched through. An indication of the high feelings evolving from the Provo incident is shown by the treatment accorded to the Mormon prisoners upon arriving back at camp. Ackley wrote: There was great excitement in camp when they were brought up. One of those placed in the guard house of the 7th Infantry came very near to losing his life. There "''Known today as Fairfield. 79 were always a good many soldiers who were confined in the guard houses for some misdemeanor or other, and this one particularly, had ten who had attached to tham a ball and chain0 . . . This night particularly they were walking into the cells single file with their ball and chain attached, holding the ball in the right hand as they walked in. The Provo prisoners were lying in the hall of the guard house tired after a long march from Provo. One of these fellows let his iron ball drop, which weighed about 10 pounds, in­tending for it to strike the Mormon in the head, and would have killed him had it not been that he threw up his arm to save himself, but broke his arm. Of course, Judge Cradlebaugh was heralded as the hero of American justice and received many callers and congratulations on the evening of arrival back in camp. He was so well thought of that the bands of the 7th and 10th Regiments serenaded his 2 honor late into the night. The Provo incident gave rise to other situations similar in nature, all of which revolved around the relationship be­tween military and civil officers. It will be remembered that the bishop of Springville had been threatened with arrest during the conflict at Provo. To avoid this he and some of his follow­ers had fled into the mountains. On March 21+, while the troops were at Provo, Marshal Peter K. Dotson made requisition on General Johnston for a force of two hundred men to assist him, as a posse, in searching out and capturing the bishop and his followers who were hiding in Hobble Creek Canyon. Judge Cradle­baugh favorably endorsed the marshal*s request, which was "Ackley, op0 cit., 221+-225. p Tracy, 0£. cit., 67. approved on the same day. Two hundred men were detailed from Major Paul * s command, at Timpanogos River, the next day, "to be 2 • ready for . . . movement at an hour's notice." At two o'clock in the morning-of March 26, after special preparations for a quiet movement, the posse began their march to Springville to capture Bishop Johnson. Fortunately, he had not returned home that night and the entire object of the mobilization was thwarted. When morning came, the soldiers marched back to their camp, after first scaring the bishop's nine wives with an Indian war dance. Thus ended the only posse activity concurrent with the Provo affair. The military force was frequently called upon to aid in the control of Indians and provide protection to emigrants along the various routes west, many of which had been explored and established by the army during its sojourn in Utah Terri­tory. An examination of these activities reveals a significant contribution of the Army for Utah, to Utah and the West. s© 1 Tracy, op. cit., 62. xSenate Executive Document, Number 2, 36th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 102Ij., l£?. 2 CHAPTER IV MILITARY PATHFINDERS Many roads were explored and established by the army, or as a direct result of military activity, in connection with the Utah Expedition. These roads were later utilized by civilians in their business and settlement, and consequently deserve recog­nition as one of the lasting contributions of the soldiers to. the West. In the course of movement to Utah, in 1857, the army had followed generally well established roads. It was not until winter camp had been made at Fort Bridger and Camp Scott, on Black's Fork, that significant strides were made in the line of discovering or publicizing practicable new routes of travel. The first venture in this regard arose out of the neces­sity of obtaining a remount from New Mexico to replace the horses and mules that had died since the soldiers had left the East. On November 27, 1857, Captain Randolph B. Marcy and a party of sixty-four men left Camp Scott and blazed a trail south and east to Forts Massachusetts and Garland in the De­partment of New Mexico. Their route was from Camp Scott to Green River, by way of Henry's Fork, generally along Green River, following Indian trails, to Box Elder Creek,1 along the north ^Willow Creek. 8 1 bank of that stream for nineteen miles then southeast over the Roan Cliffs to the Colorado River Valley near Westwater. The trail skirted the hills on the north side of the valley to near Grand Junction, Colorado. From this point, Marcy and his men followed Gunnison*s road along the Gunnison and Uncompahgre Rivers, over the mountains to the head of the Rio Grande and down that river into Fort Massachusetts on January 18, 1858. From here the party proceeded down the Rio Grande into New Mexico to purchase livestock. On March 17, 1858, after having completed their pur­chases, the soldiers started their return journey. They went 1 north and east from Rayado, along the Fort Leavenworth road, over the Raton Mountains to Purgatoire Creeko They left the Leavenvrorth road here and travelled northwest to Pueblo, Colo- 2 rado, then up Fontaine qui Bouille Creek for about thirty miles where they went into camp to awjait the reinforcement of Colonel W.W. Loring and command. Colonel Loring arrived on April 28, and the march con­tinued the next day across the high ground to Cherry Creek, then down to the South Platte, along this river to Cache la Poudre Creek. From here they went over the ridge to the Laramie River, then to Medicine Bow; along Bryan's trail for about thirty miles, and west, north of Bridger*3 Pass generally along present day ■^Cimarron, Colorado. 2 Fountain Creek. U.S. highway thirty to Camp Scott, where they arrived on 2 June 10. This trek was accomplished under the unfavorable con­ditions of winter weather and partially unknown terrain. To­day most of Captain Marcy's route is followed by good, hard surfaced highway. Concurrent with the Marcy expedition, and for the same purpose, was one sent north into the Flathead country under the direction of F.B. Ficklin. He was directed to negotiate with traders and Indians for cattle and horses. His party left Camp Scott on December 9, l857« They followed the California road to Soda Springs, then north to the Snake River, north and east of Fort Hall. From here they went along the Snake to where 3 its direction shifts to the east and west. At this point they took an Indian trail north across the mountains to the Beaver­head River, along that river to the Jefferson, then northwest k to Deer Lodge, Hell»s Gate, and north to St. Ignatius. Ficklin and his party were unsuccessful in securing livestock, so on March 3» 1858, they began their return journey to Camp Scott by the same route used on the outward trip. They arrived back ^"The route from Medicine Bow Butte to Fort 3ridger had been mapped and described by Captain Howard Stansbury on his return to the States in 1850. 2 Senate Executive Document, Number 1, Part 2, 35th Con­gress, 2nd Session, Serial No. 9?£> 187-201. 3 ^About Roberts, Idaho. ^Mis soula, Montana, 83 1 84 at the