| Description |
The Tiananmen Square Massacre presents an interesting puzzle to political scientists, as it contradicts traditional strategic theory that attacking one's own civilians erodes a government's base of power. The massacre defies these expectations through the ensuing decades of iron control the Communist Party has held over its people. This paper explores why the Communist Party made the decision to conduct the massacres, as well as how that decision was effectively implemented on June 3rd. It posits that three factors - organizational culture, a weak and inflexible state, and a desire to control the domestic and international narrative of events - led to the government's decision to crack down on the protests instead of engaging in negotiations. The paper then goes on to explore how the principal-agent model is an effect way to analyze why prior attempts at troop mobilization failed, and what processes were undertaken by the Communist Party to ensure the success of the June 3rd mobilization. Throughout the paper, these theoretical arguments are reinforced through a comparison between the '89 Democracy Movement and the 2014 Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong. It explores how holding other variables constant, the change in organizational culture, strength of the state, and exposure to international normal allowed the Chinese government to achieve the same outcome through drastically different measures. |
