Publication Type |
Journal Article |
School or College |
College of Humanities |
Department |
Philosophy |
Creator |
Benham, Bryan |
Title |
Ryle and the para-mechanical |
Date |
2000 |
Description |
The thesis of this paper is the unconventional claim that Gilbert Ryle is not a logical behaviorist. The popular account of Ryle clearly places his work in The Concept of Mind (1949) in the camp of logical behaviorist.1 The object of this paper, however, will be to illustrate how the conventional interpretation of Ryle is misleading. My argument is not an exhaustive account of Ryle, but serves as a starting point for understanding Ryle outside of the behaviorist label that is usually attached to his work. |
Type |
Text |
Publisher |
New Mexico West Texas Philosophical Society |
Volume |
22 |
First Page |
10 |
Last Page |
16 |
Subject |
Behaviorist; Logical behaviorism |
Language |
eng |
Bibliographic Citation |
Benham, B. (2000). Ryle and the para-mechanical. Southwest Philosophical Studies, 22, 10-6. |
Rights Management |
(c)New Mexico West Texas Philosophical Society |
Format Medium |
application/pdf |
Format Extent |
501,708 bytes |
Identifier |
ir-main,2215 |
ARK |
ark:/87278/s6fn1qdj |
Setname |
ir_uspace |
ID |
703090 |
Reference URL |
https://collections.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6fn1qdj |