The social contract of international politics

The purpose of this research paper is to examine the extent to which states engage in the proposed idea of a currently forming international social contract and what effect have institutions had on this development. More specifically, the paper will examine the extent to which the development of international institutions has catalyzed the evolution of an international social contract wherein states voluntarily participate in a contract that provides security but requires rights. Just as Rousseau described how individuals relinquished certain freedoms that they once had in the state of nature, in order to build a secure environment for themselves within the city-state, it will be shown that modern nation states are engaging in a very similar type of behavior. Through the use of international institutions states are beginning to minimize risk for themselves by forming a type of international social contract whereby they give up freedoms in order to provide security. The main reason for a state to engage in an international social contract is that they will eventually establish a legitimate political authority that can provide a system of hierarchy to counteract the anarchy that exists in the current international system. There are many factors and metrics that are referenced in order to prove that the international social contract is indeed being formed. The bulk of quantitative analytics shows a causal relationship between the steadily increasing number of international institutions and the states that participate in them, and the rapidly decreasing number of major conflicts between great powers. This shows that as states seek security, they do it by looking to a legitimate political authority and not by maximizing power as the realists would claim.