| Title | The runaway officials revisited: remaking the Mormon image in antebellum America |
| Publication Type | thesis |
| School or College | College of Humanities |
| Department | History |
| Author | Worthen, Bruce W. |
| Date | 2012-05 |
| Description | In September of 1851, four federal officials left Utah Territory after serving less than four months. Chief Justice Lemuel G. Brandebury, Associate Justice Perry E. Brocchus, Territorial Secretary Broughton D. Harris, and Indian Subagent Henry R. Day created a furor in Congress with their reports of Brigham Young‘s rebellion against federal authority. This came as a great surprise in Washington since over the previous five years, Mormon agents had created an image of the Latter-day Saints as mainstream Americans who were loyal to the United States and had a conventional form of republican government. Unfortunately, the Compromise of 1850 resulted in Congress imposing an unwanted territorial government on the Mormons. When nonresident officials arrived in 1851, the Latter-day Saints reacted with defiance and antagonism. As the situation worsened, these officers feared for their safety and left the territory. Members of Congress responded to their reports of a Mormon rebellion by threatening to send federal troops to Utah in 1852. Latter-day Saint agents in Washington realized this would almost certainly result in the kind of violence that led to the collapse of four previous Mormon settlements. Even though the report of the returning officials accurately described the words and actions of the Church leadership, Latter-day Saint agents in Washington discredited their charges by creating an image of them as -runaway officials‖ whose word could not be trusted. Unfortunately, the victory over the officials did not end the conflict with Washington. Brigham Young‘s insistence that the Mormons and not the federal government ruled Utah Territory put the Latter-day Saints on a collision course with Washington and became the first step on the road to the Utah War. |
| Type | Text |
| Publisher | University of Utah |
| Subject | Brigham Young; Mormon; Utah territory; Utah war |
| Dissertation Institution | University of Utah |
| Dissertation Name | Master of Arts |
| Language | eng |
| Rights Management | Copyright © Bruce W. Worthen 2012 |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Format Medium | application/pdf |
| Format Extent | 820,080 bytes |
| Identifier | etd3/id/3416 |
| ARK | ark:/87278/s6r5301n |
| DOI | https://doi.org/doi:10.26053/0H-D9M8-G7G0 |
| Setname | ir_etd |
| ID | 196980 |
| OCR Text | Show THE RUNAWAY OFFICIALS REVISITED: REMAKING THE MORMON IMAGE IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA by Bruce W. Worthen A thesis submitted to the faculty of The University of Utah in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of History The University of Utah May 2012Copyright © Bruce W. Worthen 2012 All Rights Reserved The University of Utah Graduate School STATEMENT OF THESIS APPROVAL The thesis of Bruce W. Worthen has been approved by the following supervisory committee members: W. Paul Reeve , Chair March 2, 2012 Date Approved Edward Davies, II , Member March 2, 2012 Date Approved L. Ray Gunn , Member March 2, 2012 Date Approved and by Isabel Moreira , Chair of the Department of History and by Charles A. Wight, Dean of The Graduate School. ABSTRACT In September of 1851, four federal officials left Utah Territory after serving less than four months. Chief Justice Lemuel G. Brandebury, Associate Justice Perry E. Brocchus, Territorial Secretary Broughton D. Harris, and Indian Subagent Henry R. Day created a furor in Congress with their reports of Brigham Young‘s rebellion against federal authority. This came as a great surprise in Washington since over the previous five years, Mormon agents had created an image of the Latter-day Saints as mainstream Americans who were loyal to the United States and had a conventional form of republican government. Unfortunately, the Compromise of 1850 resulted in Congress imposing an unwanted territorial government on the Mormons. When nonresident officials arrived in 1851, the Latter-day Saints reacted with defiance and antagonism. As the situation worsened, these officers feared for their safety and left the territory. Members of Congress responded to their reports of a Mormon rebellion by threatening to send federal troops to Utah in 1852. Latter-day Saint agents in Washington realized this would almost certainly result in the kind of violence that led to the collapse of four previous Mormon settlements. Even though the report of the returning officials accurately described the words and actions of the Church leadership, Latter-day Saint agents in Washington discredited their charges by creating an image of them as -runaway officials‖ whose word could not be trusted. Unfortunately, the victory over the officials did not end the conflict with Washington. Brigham Young‘s insistence that the Mormons and not the iv federal government ruled Utah Territory put the Latter-day Saints on a collision course with Washington and became the first step on the road to the Utah War.TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................. vii Chapters I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1 Literature Review................................................................................................................ 3 II. REMAKING THE MORMON IMAGE ................................................................... 11 Mormon Theo-democracy ................................................................................................ 12 Mormon Loyalists ............................................................................................................. 22 Mormon Culture................................................................................................................ 28 III. -IT IS ALL WE ASK AND IT IS ALL WE EXPECT‖ .......................................... 35 The Territorial System ...................................................................................................... 36 The Slavery Issue .............................................................................................................. 40 The Compromise of 1850 ................................................................................................. 44 IV. -I AM SICK AND TIRED OF THIS PLACE‖ ....................................................... 47 The Elections of 1851 ....................................................................................................... 52 Mormon Justice ................................................................................................................. 58 Mormon Polygamy ........................................................................................................... 63 Mormon Lawmaking ........................................................................................................ 65 Misappropriation of Federal Funds ................................................................................... 69 Antigovernment Sentiments.............................................................................................. 75 -So Much for Defending My Country‖ ............................................................................ 78 V. A VIOLENT STORM ............................................................................................... 85 Attacking Character vs. Answering Charges .................................................................... 90 -Routed Horse, Foot and Dragoons‖ .............................................................................. 100 vi VI. CONCLUSION....................................................................................................... 102 APPENDIX ..................................................................................................................... 105 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 113 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to thank Professors Reeve, Davies, and Gunn for their guidance in the preparation of this manuscript. I am also grateful to Lindsay Adams for the many hours he has spent sharing his enthusiasm for history with me, and for helping me to learn to be an historian. I am especially indebted to the many people who assisted me in my archival research over the years. Finally, I am grateful to my son Zaq for the many hours he spent reading this manuscript and listening to my tales of adventure in unearthing the past. 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION On November 13, 1847, Mormon leaders held a meeting at the home of Brigham Young. The purpose of the gathering was to discuss the form of government the Latter-day Saints would adopt for their settlements in the Great Basin of Mexico.1 While the Mormon communities were outside the borders of the United States, Church leaders were convinced that after the Mexican War, Washington would lay claim to their lands.2 Therefore, Brigham Young and the Apostles needed to develop a strategy for dealing with the federal government. Unfortunately, the course they decided to follow had unintended consequences. It led to a conflict with federal officials sent to the Great Basin 1 Minutes of Meetings, November 13, 1847, Church Historian‘s Office, General Church Minutes, 1839 -1877, (CR 100/318), LDSCA. See official transcript in Minutes of Meetings, November 13, 1847, Leonard Arrington Collection (LJAHA COL 1), Series 9, Box 12, Folder 3, USU. The Quorum of the Twelve Apostles collectively led the Church following the death of Mormon founder Joseph Smith on June 27, 1844. Brigham Young established a new settlement in the Great Basin on July 24, 1847, but returned to Iowa where the bulk of Church members lived. The Apostles held a series of meetings that winter to lay a course for the future of the Latter-day Saint movement. They made many important decisions including formally naming Brigham Young as President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. See also Leonard J. Arrington, Brigham Young : American Moses (University of Illinois Press, 1986), 155-156. 2 Journal of John D. Lee, August 7, 1846, Leonard Arrington Collection (LJAHA COL 1), Series 9, Box 15, Folder 6, USU. Almost a year before settling in the Great Basin, the leadership of the Church became concerned that the United States Congress would impose a government over their lands with non-Mormon leaders to rule over them. They decided to take the initiative by promising to claim the Great Basin in the name of the United States. They did this in hopes Washington would grant them self-government. Consequently, Brigham Young sent word to President James K. Polk saying, -We intend raising the American Flag and sustain[ing] the Government of the United States.‖ 2 in 1851 and put the Mormons on a collision course with Congress. It destroyed the reputation of the Latter-day Saints and became the first step on the road to the Utah War. The plan Brigham Young and the Apostles discussed that day was to petition Congress for a territorial form of government -as a blind.‖3 According to Webster‘s 1843 dictionary, -a blind‖ meant -Something to mislead the eye or the understanding; as, one thing serves as a blind for another.‖4 Mormon agents in Washington sought to create -blinds‖ for several aspects of Latter-day Saint society. This included their form of government, their anger toward the United States, as well as certain aspects of Mormon culture. Church leaders hoped that if Washington perceived the Mormons as mainstream Americans, Congress would allow the Latter-day Saints to run their own affairs in the Great Basin. Therefore, the Church leadership sought to create a reassuring picture of Mormons as a people who practiced a republican form of government, who were loyal to the United States, and whose culture was within the limits of American Protestant sensibilities. These attempts to create a positive public image had the opposite effect, however. Ultimately, Washington sent non-Mormon officials to the Great Basin. When these territorial officers encountered the real Latter-day Saint government, their bitterness toward the United States, and came face to face with some of their cultural practices, it created an explosion. The sharp contrast between the images created by Mormon representatives in Washington and the experience of 3 Minutes of Meetings, November 13, 1847, Church Historian‘s Office, General Church Minutes, 1839 -1877, (CR 100/318), LDSCA. The minutes of the meeting record that, -A conversation took place about petition to Congress for territory - (as a blind).‖ 4 Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language : Exhibiting the Origin, Orthography, Pronunciation, and Definition of Words, Rev. ed. with an appendix containing all the additional words in the last ed. of the larger work. (New York: Harper, 1844), 129. 3 federal officials in Utah Territory produced an outcry in the halls of Congress. It also raised suspicions that the Latter-day Saints might be hiding other things, including a desire to secede from the Union. Mormon agents in Washington felt they had to deny the reports of the returning officials or face the imposition of federal troops in 1852. Because of the fear of possible violence, they misled Congress by insisting the officers really left Utah for economic reasons and fabricated their charges in hopes the government would allow them to continue drawing their salaries. Since this was a common occurrence in other territories, Congress and the President gave Brigham Young the benefit of the doubt. However, these attempts to discredit the -runaway officials‖ of 1851 did not put an end to Washington‘s deep suspicions of the Latter-day Saints. They only became part of a cycle of conflict and deception that led to the Utah War of 1857. Literature Review Historians who write about the incidents leading up to the Utah War have largely neglected the period from 1847 through 1852. Most scholarly works move quickly past this crucial episode to other incidents, including the conflict with Judge William W. Drummond, the practice of polygamy, and the Mountain Meadows Massacre. A second problem that afflicts the historiography of this period is that the writing of Utah history in general tends to be myopic in nature. Local historians write for Mormon audiences and rarely fit their works into the larger context of United States history and the narrative of the American West. Utah historians rarely discuss the national controversy over the territorial system. They seldom attempt to put the Mormon experience within the context of antebellum politics. Nationally, even historians of the American West tend to overlook 4 Utah, or only deal with it in a cursory fashion. The result is that they usually ignore incidents such as that of the -runaway officials.‖ For over fifty years, the principal scholarly work on issues surrounding the Utah War has been The Mormon Conflict, 1850-1859 by Norman F. Furniss.5 Unfortunately, Furniss wrote his book during a time when the archives of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints were not as open as they are today. Furniss did not have letters, office journals, minutes of meetings, and other documents to help him understand the actual chain of events that led to armed conflict in Utah Territory. While the book is very valuable in its coverage of events from a Washington perspective, it does not effectively explain the motives for the actions of the Mormons. While Norman Furniss was clearly interested in understanding the Latter-day Saints, other non-Utah authors have not been. Holy Smoke: A Dissertation on the Utah War by Paul Baily is a relatively brief account of the Mormon conflict that made little effort to explain Latter-day Saint culture.6 Baily wrote the book primarily from an eastern perspective. While Baily also wrote at a time when materials in the LDS Archives were not as available as they are today, it is questionable if he would have put them to good use. The same is true of many other authors outside of Utah. Kenneth Stampp‘s book America in 1857: A Nation on the Brink only devotes one chapter to the Utah War with material drawn mostly from secondary sources.7 The rest of the book deals with the failings of the Buchanan Administration, the 5 Norman F. Furniss, The Mormon Conflict, 1850-1859 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960). 6 Paul Bailey, Holy Smoke : A Dissertation on the Utah War (Los Angeles: Westernlore Books, 1978). 7 Kenneth M. Stampp, America in 1857 : A Nation on the Brink (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 5 Dred Scott case, and other events that paint a picture of America before the Civil War. He clearly does not see Utah as being very important in a national context. Many Utah authors have written extensively on the topic of the Utah War. Unfortunately, those works have not given much attention to the 1851 conflict between the Mormons and Washington. Brigham Young University professor Richard Poll explored the causes of the Utah War with William P. MacKinnon in an article entitled -Causes of the Utah War Reconsidered.‖8 This article does a good job of covering the period just before federal troops came to Utah, but there is little coverage of the period between 1847 and 1852. Brigham Young University professor Eugene Campbell wrote an excellent volume on early Utah history. His book, Establishing Zion, was part of a project to produce a new official history of the Mormon Church.9 The LDS leadership abandoned the project in 1981 and Campbell sought an outside publisher for his manuscript.10 Unfortunately, Campbell died before completing his work and the published version is from a rough draft. The book as published has little material on the runaway officials of 1851. In addition, Campbell clearly wrote the book for a Latter-day Saint audience and made little effort to put the Mormon conflict into a broader context. Many books written by LDS Church historians have tended to avoid controversial issues, but Brigham Young : American Moses by Leonard Arrington was an exception.11 8 Richard D. Poll and William P. MacKinnon, -Causes of the Utah War Reconsidered,‖ Journal of Mormon History, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Fall 1994), 16-44. 9 Eugene E. Campbell, Establishing Zion : The Mormon Church in the American West, 1847-1869 (Salt Lake City, Utah: Signature Books, 1988). 10 Campbell, Establishing Zion, Publisher‘s Forward. 11 Arrington, Brigham Young. 6 Arrington had both the access to materials and the will to write Mormon history from a scholarly perspective. Unfortunately, it was impossible for him to give a great deal of attention to early territorial history in a single volume covering Brigham Young‘s entire life. Massacre at Mountain Meadows by Ronald W. Walker, Richard E. Turley, and Glen M. Leonard was another work that breaks away from the apologetic nature of histories produced by official LDS sources.12 They had the same problem as Arrington‘s work in that the focus of their book left little room for a thorough treatment of events in early territorial Utah. Other authors, with no official connection to the Mormon Church, have suffered from the same problems of the availability of primary sources and contextualizing events from national perspective. Juanita Brooks in The Mountain Meadows Massacre had difficulty gaining access to the materials she sought. She wrote at a time when Church leaders wished to avoid the topic of her book.13 In addition, the focus of Brooks‘ work was primarily the massacre of the Fancher Company in 1857, and she devoted little time to earlier conflicts or their national implications. Camp Floyd and the Mormons was a book written by Donald Moormon and Gene Sessions.14 Dr. Moormon spent over eighteen years researching his book but died before he was able to complete it. His colleague Dr. Gene Sessions finished it. Unfortunately, this work provides little coverage of the 1847-1852 years and concentrates on the Utah War and its aftermath. Dale Morgan 12 Ronald W. Walker, Richard E. Turley, and Glen M. Leonard, Massacre at Mountain Meadows (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 13 Juanita Brooks, The Mountain Meadows Massacre. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963). 14 Donald R. Moorman and Gene Allred Sessions, Camp Floyd and the Mormons : The Utah War (Salt Lake City, Utah: University of Utah Press, 1992). 7 explored Utah‘s early government in his groundbreaking work The State of Deseret.15 Morgan was an indefatigable researcher with keen insight into the culture of the Latter-day Saints. Regrettably, he ended his narrative before the start of the territorial period in 1851. David Bigler‘s work, Forgotten Kingdom, does the best job of covering territorial Utah.16 Unfortunately, Bigler‘s work covers the years 1851 to 1896 making it difficult to go into much detail about any particular period. In addition, Bigler wrote his book at a time when material from the LDS Archives was not as available as it is today and did not have many important documents. William P. MacKinnon has spent over half a century investigating the Utah War and has written a documentary work entitled At Sword‟s Point.17 MacKinnon planned to produce a two-volume work, but as of this writing, the second volume has not appeared. MacKinnon‘s contribution to discovering primary source materials for the Utah War is legendary, but he has yet to write the definitive work. Few of his writings deal with the territorial experience with federal officials in 1851. Other authors have written extensively on early Utah, but unfortunately, a polemical style mars their works. This is true of Will Bagley‘s recent books The Mormon Rebellion : America's First Civil War (coauthored with David Bigler)18 and Blood of the 15 Dale Morgan, The State of Deseret (Logan, Utah: Utah State University Press with the Utah State Historical Society, 1987). 16 David Bigler, Forgotten Kingdom : The Mormon Theocracy in the American West, 1847-1896, 1st ed. (Utah State University Press, 1998). 17 William P. MacKinnon, At Sword‟s Point (Norman, Okla.: Arthur H. Clark Co., 2008). 18 David L. Bigler and Will Bagley, The Mormon Rebellion : America‟s First Civil War, 1857-1858 (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2011). 8 Prophets.19 Bagley states his biases clearly in the introductions to his books and seems to be writing to challenge the Mormon faith more than to excavate history. Much the same is true of Sally Denton‘s book American Massacre : The Tragedy at Mountain Meadows, September 1857..20 The most glaring deficiency in books by Utah historians is their neglect of the territorial system and the controversy it created nationwide. The historiography of this period is quite rich and demonstrates that while Brigham Young‘s resistance to federal authority may have been unique in its intensity, it was not the only example of territorial rebellion. Those who have studied the territorial system view it as an inefficient and corrupt system that caused local settlers to rebel. Peter Onuf, in his book Statehood and Union : A History of the Northwest Ordinance, argues that the possibility of rebellion was foremost on the minds of those who framed the early territorial ordinances.21 Jack Eblen in his book, The First and Second United States Empires; Governors and Territorial Government, 1784-1912, makes a case that a desire by Washington to create an empire overrode concerns for the right of self-government to residents of the territories.22 Jay Amos Barrett in his book, Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787, examines 19 Will Bagley, Blood of the Prophets : Brigham Young and the Massacre at Mountain Meadows (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002). 20 Sally Denton, American Massacre : The Tragedy at Mountain Meadows, September 1857 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf : Distributed by Random House, 2003). 21 Peter Onuf, Statehood and Union : A History of the Northwest Ordinance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987). 22 Jack Eblen, The First and Second United States Empires : Governors and Territorial Government, 1784-1912. ([Pittsburgh]: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968). 9 the debates surrounding the Northwest Ordinance in detail.23 He agrees with Onuf and argues that the Founding Fathers originally wanted to give settlers self-government and a sure path to statehood to assure their loyalty. Unfortunately, other forces dictated a change in policy. What emerges from all these accounts of the early development of the territorial system is a story of a new nation that starts out intending to grant self-government to the territories but then has second thoughts. The result is a territorial form of government that sparks rebellion in all the territories, not just in Utah. Robert W. Larson in his book, New Mexico Populism : A Study of Radical Protest in a Western Territory, shows the frustration New Mexico endured over a period of more than sixty years.24 New Mexico applied repeatedly for statehood but filibusters, parliamentary tactics, and other maneuvers of one party or the other foiled their plans in order to keep a new state from disrupting the balance of power. Interestingly, these books only speak briefly of the Utah experience, although it clearly fits into the national pattern of dissatisfaction with the territorial system. Another important theme that runs through the historiography of this period is the generally poor job Washington did of running the territories. Since the people of the territories did not vote in national elections, Congress took little interest in providing financial support to their governments. The salaries of officials were so inadequate that most needed to have outside business interests just to survive. This led to a corrupt system of government. The lack of adequate salaries and reimbursement for expenses 23 Jay Amos Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787 : With an Account of the Earlier Plans for the Government of the Northwest Territory (New York: G.P. Putnam‘s Sons, 1891). 24 Robert W. Larson, New Mexico Populism : A Study of Radical Protest in a Western Territory (Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press, 1974). 10 also provided local settlers with leverage over unpopular officers. They would use -sagebrush districting‖ to create judicial circuits that were so large that judges would have to leave the territory or go bankrupt. In addition, territories often bypassed federal officials and assigned court cases to probate judges appointed by the legislature rather than the federally appointed judges. Therefore, the Utah experience is part of a larger story. Other territories often invented many of the methods Brigham Young used to rebel against federal authority. The Mormon revolt was more intense than that of other territories, but it was not unique. Historians have not told the story of the Mormon conflict within this larger context. 11 CHAPTER II REMAKING THE MORMON IMAGE For the first sixteen years of its existence, the image of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in the public mind was almost exclusively a negative one. Mobs drove the Mormons from Missouri and Illinois claiming the Latter-day Saints were lawbreakers who threatened the safety of their communities. Disgruntled former church members frequently inflamed the public mind by claiming the Mormons were planning violence against their neighbors. State governments arrested Church leaders numerous times on various charges. Newspapers across the country carried stories that portrayed the Latter-day Saints as robbers, murderers, counterfeiters, and dupes. The most common phrase applied to the Mormons defined them as -a deluded and fanatical people.‖25 After seeing their first four settlements collapse and their founding prophet Joseph Smith murdered, Church leaders decided to move the Latter-day Saints to the Great Basin of Mexico. Once there, Mormon Prophet Brigham Young intended to create -a nation, independent of all others on earth.‖26 The Mexican Cession complicated those plans, 25 Leonard J. Arrington and Davis Bitton, The Mormon Experience : A History of the Latter-day Saints, 2 Sub. (University of Illinois Press, 1992), 46-47. 26 James Arlington Bennet to Dr. Willard Richards, June 4, 1845, Leonard Arrington Collection (LJAHA COL 1), Series 9, Box 33, Folder 7, USU. In this letter, James Arlington Bennet, a New York aristocrat who wished to serve the Latter-day Saints as a military commander, advised the Mormons to form -a nation, independent of all others on earth.‖ He went on to say, -A government within a government cannot be sustained, therefore the Mormon People should be of themselves, an independent nation, governed by their own Laws.‖ Brigham Young replied to Bennet‘s letter saying, -Your views of 12 however. With the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mormon controlled lands fell under the authority of the federal government. In order to convince Congress to grant them political autonomy, the Latter-day Saints sought to portray themselves as a society that embraced republican principles of government, who had great affection for their country, and whose culture was consistent with American Protestant values. Church leaders hoped these positive images would convince Washington to let the Mormons govern themselves, rather than impose outside officials. Unfortunately, creating this image required some deception. This was particularly true when it came to the Mormon form of government. Mormon Theo-democracy Church leaders felt that Congress would be more likely to grant the Latter-day Saints political autonomy if they hid their theocracy behind a façade of republican forms. This was necessary because the Mormons had rejected American political practices. In their place, they had created a -theo-democracy‖ that was inextricably tied to their religion.27 Under this political model, power was concentrated in the hands of Church leaders. Brigham Young and the Apostles had the authority to create legislation and nominate candidates for public office. The citizens only had the right to accept or reject the ‗nation, independent of all others on Earth‘ are perfectly correct, and one thing is certain, that we shall remove ‗en masse‘ beyond the Rocky Mountains as early next Season as the forage will permit.‖ See Brigham Young to James Arlington Bennet, October 17, 1845, Brigham Young Office Files (CR 1234/1), Box 16, Folder 5, LDSCA. 27 Minutes of Meetings, November 16, 1847, Leonard Arrington Collection (LJAHA COL 1), Series 9, Box 12, Folder 3, USU. During the organizational meetings held in Iowa during the winter of 1847/48, Apostle Willard Richards defined the Mormon form of government. He stated that the United States had a republican model of government but that the Latter-day Saints had -a ‗Theo Democracy‘ - - the power of God untrammelled - -.‖ 13 their proposals.28 In four previous communities, state governments and other outsiders had violently objected to the Latter-day Saints‘ political system.29 Church leaders were afraid that if Washington sent non-Mormons to the Great Basin, bloodshed would inevitably occur.30 The Latter-day Saints felt their form of government was essential to their faith, however, and decided to avoid conflict by hiding it, rather than abandoning it. Theo-democracy was an integral part of the Mormon religious experience. The Latter-day Saints chose the Great Basin as a place to prepare for the Second Coming of Christ and his eventual rule over the entire earth.31 Brigham Young taught that one day, 28 On August 22, 1847, Brigham Young called the Mormon pioneers together in the Great Basin and stated, -It is the right of the Twelve to nominate the officers, and the people to receive them.‖ He then nominated the leaders for the Salt Lake Valley settlement and received a unanimous vote from the residents. See Howard Egan, Pioneering the West, 1846 to 1878 : Major Howard Egan‟s Diary (Richmond, Utah: H.R. Egan Estate, 1917), 127. 29 Brigham Young, Journal of Discourses (Liverpool: F.D. Richards, 1854), 2:310. In this discourse of July 8, 1855, Brigham Young declares, -Had even the letter of the law been honored, to say nothing of the spirit of it, of the spirit of right, it would have hung Governors, Judges, Generals, Magistrates, &c. for they violated the laws of their own States. Such has been the case with our enemies in every instance that this people have been persecuted.‖ 30 William Pickett explored the opportunities for creating a settlement in Mexico on behalf of Brigham Young and the Council of the Twelve. His report to the Church leadership reflects Mormon concerns about trusting the United States. He argues that if the Latter-day Saints were to move to Mexican land under the American flag, it would only be a matter of time before the persecutions of the past returned. He states, "Men such as Boggs (who has gone there) Ford and others would come on with commissions, lord it over the Saints and all as Governors, Judges, etc. and in a few years the old business of Mormon plundering would begin again; our safety is to leave this government!‖ William Pickett to the Council of the Twelve, July 16, 1846, Brigham Young Office Files (CR 1234/1), Box 47, Folder 11, LDSCA (emphasis in the original). 31 Young, Journal of Discourses, 1:189. In this discourse of June 19, 1853, Brigham Young tells Utah Congressional Delegate John Bernhisel not to fear the federal government because it would not be long until, -the kingdoms of this world become the kingdom of our Lord and His Christ; and no power can hinder it.‖ 14 Jesus would be -King of Nations as well as King of Saints.‖32 The Mormon Prophet planned to create a kingdom in the West and govern it the way he believed Christ would govern the entire world during the millennium.33 Young taught that at the Second Coming, Jesus would personally take charge of the kingdom.34 Then, during the millennial reign of Christ, the world would look to the Latter-day Saints to learn about -the ways of the Lord.‖35 Therefore, Brigham Young taught his followers that they had to become a -divine community‖ which would be governed by religious principles, rather than by secular ideologies.36 Unfortunately, four features of the Mormon theo-democracy were destined to create conflicts with the federal government. 1) The Latter-day Saints did not rely on a popular assembly to create legislation. In its place, Brigham Young 32 Brigham Young, The Complete Discourses of Brigham Young, ed. Richard S. Van Wagoner (Salt Lake City: Smith-Pettit Foundation ; Distributed by Signature Books, 2009), 1:207. Young made this statement at a general conference of the Church on April 6, 1847. 33 Young, Journal of Discourses, 2:309-310. In this discourse of July 8, 1855, Brigham Young discusses how the Kingdom of God will operate during the millennium. He tells his listeners, -That Kingdom is actually organized and the inhabitants do not know it. If this people know anything about it, all right; it is organized preparatory to taking effect in the due time of the Lord, and in the manner that shall please Him.‖ 34 Young, The Complete Discourses of Brigham Young, 1:207. During a church conference of April 6, 1847 Young declared, "I believe this kingdom will increase until Jesus takes the kingdom." 35 Young, The Complete Discourses of Brigham Young, 2:316. In this discourse of July 8, 1855, Brigham Young describes how life will be during the millennium and declares, -The kings and potentates of the nations will come up to Zion to inquire after the ways of the Lord, and to seek out the great knowledge, wisdom, and understanding manifested through the Saints of the Most High.‖ 36 Young, The Complete Discourses of Brigham Young, 1:474. Brigham Young addresses the legislature on January 29, 1852 saying, -I suppose, and believe that others take the same view of the matter that I do, that when we come to enact human laws to govern and control a divine community; we find it is a hard matter to enact human laws to govern a divine kingdom.‖ 15 appointed a -Council of Fifty‖ to enact laws based on religious principles.37 2) The Mormons held elections for their officers, but they did not allow for political competition. Instead, Church leaders nominated a single candidate for each position and then sought the approval of the electorate.38 3) The Latter-day Saint judicial system rejected lawyers, judicial precedence, and other trappings of American jurisprudence. Under the Mormon system of justice, religious tribunals rendered judgments using the scriptures and spiritual precepts.39 4) The Latter-day Saints based their economic system on religious values and not on the free market.40 In the Mormon kingdom, Church leaders required everyone to work together for the common good, rather than allowing citizens to seek their own fortunes.41 The goal of the Latter-day Saints was to be economically independent. 37 Klaus Hansen, Quest for Empire : The Political Kingdom of God and the Council of Fifty in Mormon History (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1974), 128. Hansen argues that the Council of Fifty -paid lip service to the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people and the democratic practices of a constitutional convention and free elections. Actually, the new government was formed through the highly centralized and autocratic control of its own organization.‖ 38 Brigham Young to -Dear Brethren,‖ July 21, 1851, Brigham Young Office Files (CR1234/1), Box 1, Page 96, LDSCA. In this letter to Church leaders, Young gives his instructions on elections saying, -always remember to keep your politics in subjection; let there be no division in Israel; but come to the polls with the voice of one man, let their not be a single dissenting vote.‖ 39 Minutes of Meetings, March 26, 1851, Leonard Arrington Collection (LJAHA COL 1), Series 9, Box 12, Folder 7, USU. This is a record of Young‘s instructions to a Mormon court. -Brigham Young instructed the High Council not to act as Gentile lawyers - but directed them to speak for righteousness and against inequity. Dig out the truth and get the facts. They will make the truth shine. Plead for righteousness & innocence of course, and put down iniquity. Never suffer anyone to come and make long pleas or smug testimony and judge law or no law. That is the way I want to see you.‖ 40 Leonard J. Arrington, Building the City of God : Community & Cooperation Among the Mormons (Deseret Book Co, 1976), 45-62. 41 Hosea Stout, On the Mormon Frontier : The Diary of Hosea Stout, 1844-1861 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1982), 334. In an entry of October 29, 1848, 16 Therefore, they created a virtually cashless society that was largely incompatible with the outside world. The Mormons felt strongly about these four features of their theo-democracy and believed they were all essential to preparing for Christ‘s Second Coming. The Church leadership was convinced that if Washington imposed outside officers over their settlements, it would lead to a power struggle that would inevitably result in violence.42 Therefore, Church leaders moved quickly to hide their theo-democracy behind a provisional government that followed conventional republican forms. Under the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the President appointed seven officials to each territory. These included a Governor, a Secretary, a Marshall, an Attorney General, a Chief Justice, and two Associate Justices. As early as December 9, 1848, the Council of Fifty began making plans to petition Congress for a territory -giving them to understand at the same Mormon settler Hosea Stout records in his diary a statement by Brigham Young condemning those who did not work within the communal nature of the settlement. -B. Young spoke against persons who scatter off from the main body & denounced those who were trying to locate a farm on the other side of Jordin. He said that all such were operating against the will of God & if they did not cease he would grant to them their desires & let them go to hell &c.‖ 42 Bernhisel served as a representative to Congress for the Mormon people in the Great Basin. He wrote to Apostle Wilford Woodruff expressing his fears that Washington would not allow the Latter-day Saints to select their own officers. He told Woodruff, -If some whippersnappers or broken down politicians should be sent out, who would not be acceptable to us, to tyrannize over us, we should certainly be brought into collision with the General Government.‖ He went on to say that if the Mormons refused to accept the officers, -it would be rebellion, and we should bring down upon us the indignation of the whole nation, and measures would be taken to enforce it, and it is superfluous for me to tell you what the consequences would be.‖ John Bernhisel to Wilford Woodruff, March 22, 1850, Wilford Woodruff Papers (MS 1352), Box 6, Folder 18, LDSCA (emphasis in the original). 17 time that we wanted officers of our own nomination.‖43 Church leaders did not wish to risk having the same type of non-Mormon officials that they had endured in Missouri and Illinois. The Council vowed that if Washington appointed such men to -send them Cross Lots to Hell, that dark & dreary Road where no traveler ever returns.‖44 They then created a provisional government with the same offices as a territorial government. The Council of Fifty planned to petition Congress to create the -Territory of Deseret‖ and insist the President appoint the officers of the provisional government to their equivalent territorial positions. The Council finalized the list of officials in a meeting of March 4, 1849.45 On March 12, 1849, Brigham Young presented the following candidates to the residents of the Great Basin for a vote:46 Brigham Young Governor Willard Richards Secretary Horace Eldredge Marshall Daniel H. Wells Attorney General Heber C. Kimball Chief Justice Newel K. Whitney Associate Justice John Taylor Associate Justice Joseph L. Heywood Supervisor of Roads Albert Carrington Assessor and Collector Newel K. Whitney Treasurer Bishop of each Ward Justice of the Peace The first seven offices were identical to those in a territorial government. The other candidates were for ordinary local positions. Giving the Bishops, who served as Mormon 43 John D. Lee, A Mormon Chronicle : The Diaries of John D. Lee, 1848-1876 (San Marino, Calif.: Huntington Library, 2003), 1:81. 44 Lee, A Mormon Chronicle, 1:80. 45 A Mormon Chronicle, 1:99. 46 Stout, On the Mormon Frontier, 348-349. 18 judges, the additional title of -Justice of the Peace,‖ was primarily for the benefit of emigrants and other outsiders. The Mormon theo-democracy was unaffected by the creation of this provisional government. Brigham Young and the Council of Fifty continued to oversee municipal affairs. Other religious councils, aided by the Bishops, continued to carry out the Mormon system of justice. When Brigham Young presented the names of the officers for a vote of approval, the only nominees were those chosen by the Council. The election had merely given the members of the Latter-day Saint religious government additional titles for the benefit of Washington and other outsiders.47 The Council then charged one of their members, Dr. John M. Bernhisel, with the task of convincing Washington to agree to appoint these same officers to their equivalent positions in a territorial government. To show Congress that the population of the Great Basin supported this action, the Council of Fifty circulated a petition for residents to sign.48 John Bernhisel left on May 4, 1849 with these documents in hand. On his way to Washington, he collected more signatures from Latter-day Saints in Iowa, Illinois, Ohio, and elsewhere, even though all the signatories were supposedly residents of the Great Basin.49 47 Lee, A Mormon Chronicle, 99. Lee states that the Council of Fifty chose the judicial titles to be compatible with those used by non-Mormons. This was a time when an increasing number of emigrants were passing through the territory. They sometimes had legal charges to prefer against fellow emigrants or Mormon settlers. See Morgan, The State of Deseret, 14. 48 Morgan, The State of Deseret, 26. 49 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, September 10, 1849, Brigham Young Office Files (CR1234/1), Box 60, Folder 9, LDSCA. Bernhisel reveals he has gathered additional signatures in Council Bluffs, Iowa, Kirtland, Ohio, Nauvoo, Illinois, and expects to gather many more as he visits Mormon communities in the East. 19 Before John Bernhisel arrived in Washington, an incident occurred that required a change of plans. The ranking Mormon official in the eastern United States had second thoughts about the wisdom of requesting a territorial form of government. Apostle Wilford Woodruff sent a letter to Brigham Young and the Church leadership in Salt Lake City in which he argued that it would be better for the Latter-day Saints to petition Congress for a state government.50 Woodruff based his recommendation on reports he received from Almon W. Babbitt, a Mormon lawyer residing in Washington, who was attempting to get postal service established in the Great Basin. Babbitt felt that unless the Latter-day Saints petitioned Congress to become a state, they ran the risk of having non-Mormon officials imposed upon them.51 Babbitt returned to Salt Lake City on July 1, 1849. He met with Church leaders the next day to discuss a change of strategy.52 As a result, the Council of Fifty hastily created the paperwork to apply to Congress to become a state. They sent the new documents to John Bernhisel in New York City where he was visiting Mormon congregations.53 Under the direction of Apostle Wilford Woodruff, Bernhisel rewrote the original petition changing the word -territory‖ to -state.‖54 50 Wilford Woodruff to Brigham Young, February 15, 1849, Brigham Young Office Files (CR1234/1), Box 43, Folder 26, LDSCA. 51 Wilford Woodruff, Wilford Woodruff‟s Journal, 1833-1898: Typescript (Midvale, Utah: Signature Books, 1983), January 22, 1849. 52 Franklin D. Richards, July 2, 1849, Franklin D. Richards Journal, 1844-1854 and 1866-1899 (MS 1215), Box 1, Volume 9, LDSCA. 53 John Bernhisel to Wilford Woodruff, October 18, 1849, Wilford Woodruff Papers (MS 1352), Box 6, Folder 17, LDSCA. 54 Wilford Woodruff to John Bernhisel, December 5, 1849, Wilford Woodruff Papers (MS 1352), Box 6, Folder 17, LDSCA. 20 John Bernhisel arrived in Washington on November 30, 1849 and circulated the request for statehood among members of Congress.55 The Senators and Representatives were impressed with the Latter-day Saint provisional government. Some even said the Mormons had created the best constitution in the country.56 Congress also praised the republican procedures the Latter-day Saints employed in creating their government. According to the records delivered by Dr. Bernhisel, organizers gave public notice of a convention to create a provisional government for the Great Basin on February 1, 1849. The minutes of the meetings stated that residents then met in Salt Lake City on March 8, 1849 and elected convention officers. Over the next several days, the assembled residents debated and adopted a constitution for a provisional government known as the -State of Deseret.‖ The convention then received nominations for Governor and other officers. Finally, they scheduled an election for May 7, 1849. On July 2, 1849, the provisional legislature, known as the Assembly of Deseret, met and certified the results of the election. Over the next three days, the provisional legislature created the documents necessary to request Congress to admit Deseret to the Union.57 The papers showed that the Latter-day Saints had done an exemplary job of creating their provisional government. The only flaw was that none of these events ever took place. The Council of Fifty created all of the paperwork during the first two weeks of July. They portrayed the vote of March 12, 1849 as a constitutional convention. They 55 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, March 21, 1850, Brigham Young Office Files (CR1234/1), Box 60, Folder 9, LDSCA. 56 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, October 2, 1850, Brigham Young Office Files (CR1234/1), Box 60, Folder 10, LDSCA. 57 Morgan, The State of Deseret, 30-34. 21 then invented the election of May 7, 1849 and all of the sessions of the Assembly of Deseret.58 One of the members of the Council of Fifty, Apostle Franklin D. Richards, described the creation of these documents as follows: Thursday, July 19, 1849. Attended council the two weeks past at which the Memorial - Constitution of the State of Deseret - Journal of its Legislature - Bill or Declaration of Rights & the election of A. W. Babbitt as Delegate to Congress was all accomplished.59 The documents had the desired effect. Congress spoke highly of the provisional State of Deseret, and the Mormon proposal to join the Union received praise in the nation‘s newspapers.60 The New York Daily Tribune described Deseret as a government modeled after the best constitutions in the country.61 The Saint Louis Republican marveled at the incredible job the Mormons had done in creating a government in just one week. Other 58 The actions taken by the Council of Fifty have caused considerable confusion among historians because of the many contradictions in the historical record. The journals of many of the participants make clear that they were not engaged in the activities described in the documents sent to Congress. Some were not even in Salt Lake City at the time they were supposedly attending the constitutional convention or attending the Assembly of Deseret. See Peter L. Crawley, -The Constitution of Deseret,‖ BYU Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Fall 1989). 59 Franklin D. Richards, July 19, 1849, Franklin D. Richards Journal, 1844-1854 and 1866-1899 (MS 1215), Box 1, Volume 9, LDSCA. Obviously, Richards‘ description of these events is at odds with the records sent to Washington. A convention supposedly created the Constitution of the State of Deseret the previous March, but Richards indicates that the Council of Fifty wrote it between July 2 and July 19. There are numerous other problems, including the fact that none of the participants in the July session of the Legislature made any note of it in their journals or letters. One of the lawmakers listed in the documents wrote in his journal that he was building a barn the entire time he was supposedly at the Legislature. See the entries for July 1, 1849 through July 7, 1849 in Stout, On the Mormon Frontier, 2:354. 60 -State of Deseret,‖ St. Louis Republican, October 1, 1849. -In one respect at least, the Convention which formed the Constitution for the new State, has set a good example. They were employed only one week in action upon it, and we do not see but what it is as good an one as some of our States have been able to form after months of deliberation.‖ 61 -State of Deseret,‖ New York Daily Tribune, December 29, 1849. 22 papers quoted extensively from the Constitution of Deseret or printed it in its entirety.62 Reports of the creation of a conventional republican government helped convince the public that the Latter-day Saints had abandoned their theocracy. On December 29, 1849, the New York Daily Tribune published a story commenting on how the Mormon petition before Congress was changing the Latter-day Saints‘ image in the nation‘s press: A recent article in the Dayton (Ohio) Transcript led to the conclusion that the government of this new State was based on a Theocracy, but an examination of the liberal Constitution formed by the inhabitants of Salt Lake Valley, compels the Transcript editor to retract the unfounded charge made against the Deseretlans.63 Mormon image-makers had convinced Washington the Latter-day Saints embraced a conventional form of republican government. They successfully hid their theo-democracy behind the provisional State of Deseret. Members of Congress and the nation‘s newspapers believed the Mormons selected their officials by holding competitive elections, that they held traditional jury trials, and that they used a popular assembly to create legislation. These institutions existed only on paper, however. It was a -blind‖ intended to convince Washington that the Latter-day Saints were fit to govern themselves. The next goal was to hide Mormon anger with the United States behind an image of Latter-day Saint love of country. Mormon Loyalists In order to convince Washington it could trust the Latter-day Saints to govern themselves, John Bernhisel had to reassure Congress that the Mormons were loyal 62 -The Constitution of the New State of Deseret,‖ New York Daily Tribune, December 13, 1849. 63 -State of Deseret,‖ New York Daily Tribune, December 29, 1849. 23 Americans with great affection for their country. The mission of creating this image of the Latter-day Saints found a powerful ally in the person of Colonel Thomas L. Kane. Colonel Kane was a Philadelphia aristocrat who had heard about the Mormon expulsion from Illinois and offered to help. He visited the temporary Latter-day Saint settlements in Iowa during the summer of 1846 and became close friends with the Mormons.64 Kane felt that he could do little to help them until he changed their image with the public.65 His message was a powerful one. He declared that the Latter-day Saints had such a love for their country that they had remained loyal to the government despite the violent persecution they endured in Missouri and Illinois. Kane lectured extensively on the Mormons, visited the editors of newspapers, and wrote articles about the Latter-day Saints.66 Kane told a moving story of a United States Army officer who visited the Mormon camps in Iowa to recruit a battalion of volunteers for the Mexican War. Kane stated that even though enrolling 500 men into the military was a terrible hardship, -the feeling of country triumphed.‖ He went on to say that the Latter-day Saints felt -the Union had never wronged them.‖ Kane then quoted Brigham Young as saying, -you shall have your battalion at once, if it has to be a class of our elders.‖ The starving Latter-day Saints then found an American flag from among the few possessions they salvaged from 64 Matthew Grow, "Liberty to the Downtrodden" : Thomas L. Kane, Romantic Reformer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 60-61. 65 Thomas L. Kane to -Dear Sir,‖ December 2, 1846, Research on Thomas L. Kane ca. 1947-1948 (MS 1251), Box 1, Folder 6, LDSCA. 66 Grow, Liberty to the Downtrodden, 72. 24 their homes before fleeing angry mobs. They raised the banner over the camp and -in three days, the force was reported, mustered, organized, and ready to march.‖67 The results of Kane‘s lecture and letter writing campaign were impressive. Horace Greely, the legendary editor of the New York Daily Tribune, published one of the Colonel‘s letters about the expulsion of the Latter-day Saints from Nauvoo. Greely then wrote an editorial calling for justice for the Mormons and -eternal shame to Illinois.‖68 Other influential individuals responded by organizing charity events to help the Latter-day Saints. The New York Herald reported that on October 28, 1847, Washington elites held a tea party in the nation‘s capital -for the relief of the 15,000 Mormons in the wilderness of the Far West.‖ The article states that, -the ladies of all denominations, all over the city, headed by the Mayor and the clergy went heart and hand into the work.‖ Those in attendance included Dolly Madison, the wife of former President James Madison, the current first lady Mrs. James K. Polk, and the wife of General Alexander Macomb.69 Newspapers in New York and Philadelphia reported similar fundraisers.70 67 Thomas Kane, The Mormons. A Discourse Delivered Before the Historical Society of Pennsylvania: March 26, 1850. (Philadelphia: King & Baird Printers, 1850), 28-29. Kane printed his lecture in pamphlet form and distributed it widely. 68 -The Mormons,‖ New York Daily Tribune, December 16, 1846. When a resident of Illinois objected to this editorial comment and insisted the Mormons were at fault, Greely replied, -We know the writer of the above as an upright, intelligent man, whose opportunities of observation have been good. He has not at all shaken our conviction, however, that the forcible expulsion of the Mormons, innocent and guilty, old and young, men and women, is an ‗eternal shame to Illinois.‘ [Ed. Tribune].‖ See -Eternal Shame to Illinois,‖ New York Daily Tribune, January 26, 1847 (emphasis in the original). 69 -The Ladies‘ Tea-party for the Benefit of the Mormons,‖ New York Herald, October 30, 1847. See also -Relief to the Suffering Mormons,‖ Daily National Intelligencer (Washington), October 27, 1847. 70 Some of the stories about Mormon suffering and the need for relief include -Suffering of the Mormons in California,‖ Dollar Weekly Sun (New York), June 5, 1847, -Aid for 25 Kane‘s efforts helped to recast the image of the Latter-day Saints in the public mind. Influential people increasingly viewed the Mormons as loyal Americans deserving of assistance, while they viewed those who opposed the Latter-day Saints as villains. Meanwhile, citizens in Illinois felt the sting of Kane‘s campaign. The Illinois Journal counseled mobs to cease evicting the few remaining Mormons from Nauvoo, lest it cause the reputation of the State to sink even lower.71 Kane‘s image of the Latter-day Saints hid a deep-seated mistrust the Mormons felt for the United States. The Latter-day Saints had not forgotten that Congress and the President consistently refused to intervene in the conflicts the Mormons endured in Missouri and Illinois. Senator John C. Calhoun insisted such intervention did not come -within the jurisdiction of the Federal Government, which is one of limited and specific powers.‖72 This created a feeling of intense anger in the Latter-day Saint people toward Washington. They continually pled for help, but the only financial assistance they received came from an agreement, brokered by Thomas Kane, to enroll 500 men into a the Mormons,‖ New York Commercial Advertiser, August 21, 1847, and -Relief of the Mormons,‖ Saturday Courier (Philadelphia), November 13, 1847. 71 -Mormon War,‖ Daily Argus (Albany, New York), September 23, 1848. This paper quotes the Illinois Journal as saying, -Two meetings have been lately held in Nauvoo for the purpose of making arrangements to drive the remaining Mormons out of Hancock County. We trust that no further attempts of this kind will be made. Our State has suffered enough in reputation already, and the anti-Mormons by such an act will not be sustained by the sympathies of the community." 72 Joseph Smith, History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book Co., 1946), 6:156. John C. Calhoun made this statement to Joseph Smith in a letter dated December 2, 1843. He wrote it in reply to the Mormons‘ repeated requests for federal assistance in reclaiming their property that had been lost when state militia forces expelled the Latter-day Saints from Missouri on orders of the Governor. See Lilburn W. Boggs to General John B. Clark, October 27, 1838, Mormon War Papers 1837 - 1841, MSA. 26 -Mormon Battalion‖ for a noncombat operation of the Mexican War. While Church leaders welcomed this offer, it soon turned into a disaster. Brigham Young convinced the battalion soldiers to turn over a portion of their pay to the Church on the promise that he would take care of their families and use the funds to move them to the Great Basin. Unfortunately, an influx of Latter-day Saint refugees, fleeing angry mobs in Illinois, overwhelmed the resources of the Iowa camps shortly after the battalion left. To prevent starvation, the Mormon Prophet used the money the soldiers sent to help their families move west to buy food for the entire population.73 Even with these additional funds, over 730 Latter-day Saints died between June 1, 1846 and May 31, 1847.74 Hunger and disease afflicted the entire camp. The suffering was particularly great among the families of the soldiers. When Young reached Salt Lake Valley, returning Mormon Battalion soldiers confronted him about the hardships their families endured. Possibly fearing violence from the angry men, Young created a story of how the federal government had drafted the soldiers as a cruel test of loyalty. He insisted he had no choice but to comply with the President‘s demands or the Army would have destroyed the Latter-day Saints. Young exclaimed, -Polk would be damned for this act,‖ and then went on to accuse the President of involvement in the murder of Joseph Smith. The Mormon Prophet concluded by promising that if 73 John D. Lee Journal 1846, August 16, 1846, Leonard Arrington Collection (LJAHA COL 1), Series 9, Box 15, Folder 6, USU. Lee records a heated argument between Brigham Young and some of the wives of the Mormon Battalion soldiers who feel that they are not getting enough of the money their husbands are sending to the Church. Young explained that -their Poor Bretheren who are needy as themselves,‖ required assistance. He also criticized the women for writing letters to the soldiers complaining of how the Twelve spent the money they sent. 74 Richard Edmond Bennett, Mormons at the Missouri : Winter Quarters, 1846-1852 (University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 137. 27 Washington, -ever sent men here to interfere with us they will have their throats cut and sent to Hell.‖75 While his hastily contrived explanation deflected the anger of the soldiers for the moment, it came at the expense of fueling the already high level of Latter-day Saint resentment toward the federal government. When other Church leaders retold the story, it added to the anger already felt by Mormons over the inaction of Congress in redressing the wrongs the Latter-day Saints had suffered.76 John Bernhisel and Colonel Thomas Kane effectively hid the Latter-day Saints‘ resentment toward the United States. Because of Kane‘s careful image making, Washington had no idea of the deep anger the Latter-day Saints felt for the federal government. National leaders and the nation‘s newspapers were convinced the Mormons had volunteered for the Mexican War because of their love of country, rather than for financial reasons. Colonel Kane and Dr. Bernhisel convinced Washington that the Latter-day Saints were loyal Americans with deep feelings of affection for their country. The 75 Woodruff, Wilford Woodruff‟s Journal, 1833-1898, July 28, 1847. Few Latter-day Saints were aware that Young had sent an emissary to Washington to ask for federal assistance and that the Mormon Battalion was the result. See Arrington, Brigham Young, 128. They were in no mood to serve in military after mobs had driven them from their homes. One Mormon refugee stated, -I confess that I was glad to learn of the war against the United States and was in hopes that it might never end until they were entirely destroyed for they had driven us into the wilderness & was now laughing at our calamities.‖ See Stout, On the Mormon Frontier, 163-164. Many felt the federal government was being unreasonable in asking to serve in the military. See John F. Yurtinus, -‗Here is One Man Who Will Not Go, Dam „Um‟: Recruiting the Mormon Battalion in Iowa Territory,‖ BYU Studies, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Fall 1981), pp. 475-87. Young may have taken advantage of these sentiments in creating his story. 76 See -Oration,‖ Deseret News (Salt Lake City), July 24, 1851. This speech was typical of Latter-day Saint thought of the period. The Mormons felt the country had abandoned them and rejected the Constitution of the United States. They felt that God would severely punish them. Wells most likely gave this speech for the benefit of federal officials whom Brigham Young invited and seated on the stand. For the complete text, see the Appendix. 28 next task for the Mormon image-makers was to convince Congress that Latter-day Saint culture was consistent with mainstream Protestant values. Mormon Culture The image-makers in Washington knew that most Americans found the Latter-day Saints to be a people with strange beliefs and practices. Early Mormon settlements operated on communal principles that gave the Latter-day Saint leadership tremendous power over the lives of the residents. Rumors ran rampant that the Mormons participated in strange rituals. There were also persistent reports that the Latter-day Saints practiced polygamy.77 In addition, the public often found the sermons of Church leaders to be offensive. They contained fiery rhetoric and warnings of God‘s impending judgments on the nation. Brigham Young, the Mormon Prophet, was frequently bombastic, angry, and defiant. He was intent on rebuking iniquity with sharpness. Unfortunately, Young did not confine his chastisements to the Latter-day Saints. The Mormon Prophet rebuked Congress, the President, and anybody else with whom he might interact. All of these factors combined to create an image of the Latter-days Saints as a people who were deluded, fanatical, angry, and potentially dangerous. In addition, from the founding of the Mormon Church, the nation‘s newspapers suggested that the religious claims of the Latter-day Saints were so outrageous that those who believed in them were necessarily superstitious dupes. On March 12, 1845, the Boston Investigator declared that Mormons had -uneducated, unscientific, ignorant 77 -Mormonism,‖ New York Weekly Tribune, October 8, 1842. This is the story of George W. Robinson who withdrew his membership from the Church as he, -cannot consent longer to remain a member of said church while polygamy, lasciviousness and adultery are practiced by some of its leading members.‖ 29 minds‖ that were taken in by faith healing, speaking in tongues, and other religious enthusiasms.78 The New York Daily Tribune of September 12, 1843 described the Latter-day Saints as -poor, deluded fanatics, who are deceived, robbed and oppressed by their corrupt and designing leaders, in a manner that is truly revolting to the Christian, Patriot, and Philanthropist.‖79 In addition, the often-unpolished sermons and letters of Church leaders created a poor image of the Latter-day Saints among the educated elite. The New York Spectator of December 9, 1843, criticized a letter written by Joseph Smith saying, -It is not cunning of Joe to lay himself out on paper; for surely a man of his divine pretensions should be able to spell and to write grammatically.‖80 As Church leaders prepared to petition Congress for statehood, they sought a representative in Washington who could create a positive image of the Mormons for the American public. For this important task, they turned to an aristocratic physician from Pennsylvania, whose striking appearance, scientific mind, and gentle manners made him the perfect antidote for the negative representations of the Latter-day Saint people in the nation‘s press. For more than a decade, Dr. John Milton Bernhisel served as the public face of Mormonism in Washington. Bernhisel was born on June 23, 1799, in Loysville, Perry County, Pennsylvania. He worked on the family farm and had an enjoyable childhood. Bernhisel attended the University of Pennsylvania where he studied medicine. Among his 78 -Mormonism - Miracles - Gift of Toungues,‖ Boston Investigator, March 26, 1845. -The cap-stone of Mormon delusion is its Miracles. Nothing binds the ignorant in adamantine chains, but their miracles. Thousands would discard that open and palpable humbugism, were it not that their uneducated, unscientific, ignorant minds can neither comprehend, explain, nor account for a common effect from a common cause.‖ 79 -The Mormons at the West,‖ New York Daily Tribune, September 12, 1843. 80 -Letter from Joe Smith,‖ New York Spectator, December 9, 1843. 30 classmates were future senators, congressmen, governors, judges, and other men of importance. Before joining the Mormon movement in 1837, Bernhisel became acquainted with such men as Andrew Jackson, Henry Clay, Thaddeus Stevens, and a variety of other powerful individuals.81 Colleagues referred to him as a -Gentleman of the Old School.‖82 He arrived in Washington with letters of introduction from the Governor of New York, the Governor of Pennsylvania, and other important individuals.83 His erudition, intelligent conversation, and quiet manners, stood in stark contrast to the negative image of Mormons in the newspapers of the East. He impressed some of the country‘s most influential people. Dr. Bernhisel replaced Almon W. Babbitt as the Mormon chief representative in Washington. Church leaders decided that Babbitt did not portray the proper image of a Latter-day Saint. While he was successful in getting legislation passed for the Church, he suffered from a poor personal reputation. Apostle Wilford Woodruff warned the Mormon leadership in Salt Lake City that Babbitt was using his position to benefit himself. In addition, Babbitt led members of Congress to believe that he was an outsider who worked for the Mormons, but did not share their faith.84 Babbitt felt this image would ingratiate 81 John Bernhisel to -Dear Sir,‖ December 1, 1825, Research Materials on John M. Bernhisel - Lucile Pratt (MS 5402), Box 1, Folder 2, LDSCA. 82 Reminiscences of John M. Bernhisel by Dr. Washington Franklin Anderson (MS 2426/3), LDSCA. 83 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, March 21, 1850, Brigham Young Office Files (CR 1234/1), Box 60, Folder 9, LDSCA. 84 Almon Babbitt to Wilford Woodruff, January 26, 1850, Wilford Woodruff Papers (MS 1352), Box 6, Folder 18, LDSCA. Babbitt states, ‖I am considered here an outside Mormon by the Members of Congress and cannot therefore say much as to the faith of the Mormon Church. I only represent their political organization when the attacks were made on our operations here by William Smith and others.‖ 31 him with people in Washington. Unfortunately, it had the opposite effect. Colonel Thomas Kane sent a confidential letter to Brigham Young warning him of the -improper conduct of Mr. A. W. Babbitt.‖ He told Young that any representative should -at least be of correct deportment, discreet, and of good report,‖ so that when people said -look there goes a Mormon‖ that it would reflect positively upon the Church.85 The Latter-day Saints needed somebody who could portray Mormon culture in a light acceptable to outsiders. Therefore, Brigham Young turned to John Bernhisel to take the lead in negotiations with Washington. Dr. Bernhisel quickly gained the praise of members of Congress and the confidence of Church leaders. He took to his new responsibilities with industry and enthusiasm. Bernhisel had aristocratic manners and a scientific mind. He was far from the typical Mormon portrayed in the nation‘s press. Bernhisel knew the fiery rhetoric of Church leaders would not play well in Washington. He felt the language of gentlemen would be far more effective than the bombast of Brigham Young. To help improve the reputation of Church leaders, Bernhisel took great care that any communications sent to the President or Congress on behalf of the Mormon people did not violate the sensibilities of the influential people in the nation‘s capital. At first, Brigham Young gave Bernhisel full authority to decide which communications from Salt Lake City he presented to government officials saying, -Do as you please, either to show a part, all, or none, as shall seem proper to you.‖86 Bernhisel responded by rewriting almost everything sent by 85 Thomas Kane to Brigham Young, September 24, 1850, Leonard Arrington Collection (LJAHA COL 1), Series 9, Box 11, Folder 4, USU. 86 Brigham Young, Heber C. Kimball, and Willard Richards to John Bernhisel, November 20, 1850, Brigham Young Office Files (CR 1234/1), Box 60, Folder 1, LDSCA. 32 Church leaders. In addition, he frequently wrote letters to Mormon officials warning them to exercise greater caution when speaking in public, lest their words make their way into the eastern press. The Latter-day Saint leadership soon began to chafe under John Bernhisel‘s desire to hide their religious rhetoric from Washington. Samuel Richards, a Mormon Elder who published a Latter-day Saint newspaper called the Millennial Star, became exasperated with Bernhisel‘s restrictions. He wrote the doctor protesting that people in Washington frequently denounced the Government and asked why the Mormons could not do the same. He reminded Bernhisel that South Carolina and several other southern States were holding secession conventions. -Any person or people can say and do what they please with perfect impunity except the Mormons,‖ Richards protested.87 Brigham Young was particularly upset with Bernhisel‘s insistence that he temper his language. He felt the doctor was interfering with the mandate of a Prophet to rebuke iniquity. In a sermon in Salt Lake City, Young complained of letters he received from the East saying, -Would not this or that course be better than for you to get up in the stand, and tell the Gentiles what they are?‖ In an unmistakable reference to John Bernhisel, Young thundered: Do you know how I feel when I get such communications? I will tell you, I feel just like rubbing their noses with them. If I am not to have the privilege of speaking of Saint and sinner when I please, tie up my mouth and let me go to the grave, for my work would be done. 88 Despite his annoyance, Young reluctantly deferred to Dr. Bernhisel‘s judgment. The Pennsylvania physician continued to edit the words of Church leaders and carefully 87 Samuel Richards to John Bernhisel, April 29, 1852, Richard D. Poll Collection (Ms674), Box 78, Folder 1, JWML. 88 Young, Journal of Discourses, 3:48-49. Brigham Young made these remarks in a discourse of October 6, 1855. 33 avoided any discussion of Mormon beliefs with members of Congress. This sometimes put the doctor in the position of misleading Washington about certain Latter-day Saint practices in which he personally participated. Everyone in Washington knew John Bernhisel as a scientist, a physician, and as a true gentleman - but not as a polygamist. Nobody suspected that the refined and proper John Bernhisel had been married to seven wives at one time and fathered children by two of them.89 Even Thomas Kane, the Latter-day Saints‘ most intimate political ally, was convinced that rumors of Mormon polygamy were false.90 Bernhisel knew that any revelation of the controversial practice would ignite outrage in Washington. For nearly ten years, Church leaders consistently denied that the Latter-day Saints sanctioned polygamous marriages. If federal officials came to Utah, such a widespread practice could no longer remain a secret. Therefore, Church leaders felt it was essential to keep outsiders away from Mormon settlements. They wanted the aristocratic image of Dr. John M. Bernhisel to be Washington‘s primary reference point for defining the Latter-day Saint character. John Bernhisel was the perfect individual behind whom to hide some of the more objectionable aspects of Mormon culture. His manners and personal habits reassured 89 Gwynn W. Barrett, -Dr. John M. Bernhisel: Mormon Elder in Congress,‖ Utah Historical Quarterly Vol. 36, No. 2, (Spring 1968), 152-157. Bernhisel became a monogamist by the summer of 1851, separating from his other wives. For a more detailed treatment of John Bernhisel see Barrett‘s doctoral dissertation at Brigham Young University in, Gwynn Barrett, -John M. Bernhisel, Mormon Elder in Congress,‖ (PhD Diss., Brigham Young University, 1968). 90 J. M. Grant to Brigham Young, December 30, 1851, Brigham Young Office Files (CR 1234/1), Box 38, Folder 12, LDSCA. 34 Washington that Latter-day Saint beliefs and practices were well within the limits of American Protestant sensibilities. His aristocratic language hid the bombastic rhetoric of Mormon leaders. His reputation as a gentleman convinced Washington he could never indulge in such practices as polygamy. Furthermore, Bernhisel‘s reputation made it possible for him to avoid the discussion of controversial religious issues altogether. Whenever political leaders tried to engage him on such topics, he simply declined to respond insisting it had no bearing on his business before Congress. The political elite in Washington respected his wishes.91 John Bernhisel knew all his efforts at creating a positive image of the Latter-day Saints would be for naught if Washington sent outsiders to the Great Basin. He was convinced the introduction of federal officials into Mormon settlements would lead to a power struggle that could result in a repeat of the violence the Latter-day Saints had experienced in Missouri and Illinois. Therefore, he concluded that it was essential to keep such officials from ever coming to the Great Basin and taking the reins of power. He directed all of his energies into seeing that the Mormons achieved statehood, fearing that if he failed, it would lead to bloodshed.92 91 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, February 5, 1850, Brigham Young Office Files (CR1234/1), Box 60, Folder 20, LDSCA. In this letter, John Bernhisel reports that Senator Truman Smith had stated that he disagreed with the Mormon religion. Bernhisel replied, -that is nothing to this purpose, and he said, it was not.‖ Bernhisel did the same thing with President Millard Fillmore when he asked about polygamy. Bernhisel answered that he did not feel -authorized, under any circumstances, to enter into, countenance, or admit an official discussion of either the religious faith or the moral habits of the people of Utah.‖ See House Exec. Doc. 25 (32-1), 1852, Serial 640, 27. 92 John Bernhisel to Wilford Woodruff, March 22, 1850, Wilford Woodruff Papers (MS 1352), Box 6, Folder 18, LDSCA. 35 CHAPTER III -IT IS ALL WE ASK AND IT IS ALL WE EXPECT‖ Dr. John M. Bernhisel began his work in Washington with a sense of urgency. He knew the Mormons would not accept outside officials to govern them. He also knew that the federal government did not recognize the right of the Latter-day Saints to have political autonomy over the lands they occupied. Meanwhile, hungry office seekers were lobbying Congress and the White House for appointments to any new territories Congress might create. Bernhisel was convinced that if Washington imposed non-Mormon officers on the Latter-day Saints, it would start a chain of events that would end in bloodshed. He sent a letter to his friend, Apostle Wilford Woodruff, confiding his concerns: If a common territorial government be given us, and we should not accept it, it would be rebellion, and we should bring down upon us the indignation of the whole nation, and measures would be taken to enforce it, and it is superfluous for me to tell you what the consequences would be.93 The Church leadership in Salt Lake City considered political autonomy a right guaranteed under the Constitution. Writing in the name of the Assembly of Deseret, Brigham Young explained clearly the expectations the Mormons had of Congress. He claimed the Latter-day Saints had the right to choose their own form of government, elect their own officers, pass their own laws, and even define their own borders. He asserted that the Mormons had chosen to become a state and that it was a decision that -must and 93 John Bernhisel to Wilford Woodruff, March 22, 1850, Wilford Woodruff Papers (MS 1352), Box 6, Folder 18, LDSCA. 36 will be acceded to on the part of Congress.‖ Young then issued a thinly veiled threat by advising Washington that it would be wise to grant the demands of the Latter-day Saints lest they -encourage the formation of Independent Sovereignties within her newly acquired Territories.‖ Young concluded by saying, -It is all we ask and, it is all we expect and this we consider we have a right to claim at the hand of Congress.‖94 Wisely, John Bernhisel did not deliver the letter. He knew that Washington did not recognize any of the rights that Brigham Young had so forcefully claimed. In fact, until Deseret became a state, the Mormons had virtually no rights at all in the eyes of Congress. This was because of the body of law that had developed since 1787 concerning United States territories. The Territorial System Over the course of sixty years, the territorial system of the United States evolved from a method of granting a sure path to statehood into a corrupt and inefficient form of governance. It drifted far from what the Confederation Congress intended when it passed the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. The original intent of the law was to give Washington the authority to run a territory only until it gained sufficient population to govern itself.95 In practice however, Congress frequently refused to grant statehood, even when the population reached the 60,000 threshold specified in the law. Political issues, such as the balance of power between free and slave states in the Senate, often kept territories from becoming states. In addition, Congress sometimes moved the boundaries of a territory 94 Brigham Young to John Bernhisel and Almon Babbitt, September 10, 1850, Brigham Young Office Files (CR 1234/1), Box 60, Folder 1, LDSCA. Young did not know that Congress had already created a territory for the Great Basin. 95 Onuf, Statehood and Union, 45-46. 37 when it was politically expedient to do so. Soon, residents became resentful of both the perpetual federal control over their lands and the poor job Washington did of providing basic services.96 They felt the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 was a compact with the territories that would provide a sure path to statehood based on population. However, in 1850, Chief Justice Roger Taney of the Supreme Court ruled in Strader v. Graham that there were no guarantees in the Northwest Ordinance that Congress was obligated to follow.97 This ruling assured that Washington could withhold statehood indefinitely. Meanwhile, the federal government controlled almost every aspect of territorial governance. Congress wrote the constitution of a territory without regard to the wishes of the settlers. The President appointed officials without the consent of the governed. Congress claimed the right to veto any laws passed by territorial legislatures. All this made residents feel that Washington was treating them like colonists. The territories soon became a dumping ground for patronage appointments. Two thirds of the officials sent by Washington were nonresidents of the communities they served.98 These outsiders had little knowledge of, or interest in, local issues. Settlers 96 Eblen, The First and Second United States Empires, 208-210. 97 Onuf, Statehood and Union, 139. The motivation behind this lawsuit was the prohibition in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 against slavery in the territories. 98 By the end of 1850, there were four organized territories in the United States. This included Oregon, Minnesota, New Mexico, and Utah. The President only appointed two of the seven officers from among residents in Oregon Territory when Congress first organized it. See Senate Journal. 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 August 1848, 483-484. The same was true of the Territory of Minnesota. See Senate Journal. 30th Cong., 2nd Sess., 15 March 1849, 84. The President only nominated one resident of New Mexico as a territorial officer. See Senate Journal. 31st Cong., 2nd Sess., 23 December 1850, 280, Senate Journal. 31st Cong., 2nd Sess., 14 February 1851, 288, Senate Journal. 31st Cong., 2nd Sess., 27 February 1851, 293. Only Utah Territory would receive four resident appointees, which was comparatively generous. See Senate Journal. 31st Cong., 2nd Sess., 26 September 1850, 252. While the records list Zerubbabel Snow as living in 38 complained that these political appointees treated them as royal subjects. Residents also complained of the chronic absenteeism of the outside officials. This fostered a spirit of rebellion among territorial inhabitants. Governor Arthur St. Clair of the Northwest Territory spent so much time on his estate in Pennsylvania that the territorial Secretary ran the government. Settlers refused to recognize his authority, however. When the Secretary attempted to call out the militia, the residents refused to muster. When police took prisoners on his orders, crowds freed them. Far from teaching the settlers of a territory how to live under the rule of law, the actions of the often-absent officers encouraged them to live by mob rule.99 Local citizens frequently created their own legislation. They often created their own system of justice because territorial residents considered the judges sent by Washington to be -political hacks‖ who were unsuited for their offices.100 Therefore, instead of creating order, the territorial system tended to encourage chaos.101 Ohio, he was a Mormon who had joined family members already living in Utah. Joseph Buffington declined the appointment and the President replaced him with Lemuel Brandebury, a non-Mormon from Pennsylvania. See Senate Journal. 31st Cong., 2nd Sess., 27 February 1851, 293. This pattern continued for decades. See Earl Pomeroy, The Territories and the United States, 1861-1890 : Studies in Colonial Administration, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), 73. 99 Eblen, The First and Second United States Empires, 75-82. 100 Kermit L. Hall, -Hacks and Derelicts Revisited: American Territorial Judiciary, 1789-1959,‖ Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 3. (July 1981), pp. 279-81. Hall argues that while residents despised the nonresident judges, their legal training was comparable to that of elected officials in the states. Earl Pomeroy studied the qualifications of all officials from 1861 to 1890 and argues that only one third had prior experience in office. See Pomeroy, The Territories and the United States, 9-10. 101 Eblen, The First and Second United States Empires, 128-129. 39 John Bernhisel knew the excesses of this form of government combined with the anger of the Latter-day Saints toward Washington would be a combustible mixture. The territorial system would deny the Mormons the political autonomy they had moved to the Great Basin to obtain. Bernhisel knew the Latter-day Saints would resist any attempt to dismantle their theo-democracy and replace it with a government controlled by Washington. If the United States attempted to enforce territorial rule, Bernhisel knew it would create the kind of violence that had led to the collapse of four previous Mormon settlements. He was convinced he had to avoid having nonresident officials come to the Great Basin at all costs.102 With the consequences of becoming a territory so dire, John Bernhisel went to work to make sure Deseret became a state. At first, things looked promising. When he introduced himself to the leaders of Congress, he was pleasantly surprised to find that many of them were eager to help the Latter-day Saints. Senator Truman Smith of Connecticut told Bernhisel that he felt the Mormons -have been badly and unjustly treated, and I want to do the handsome and generous thing for you.‖ Smith then used his influence to get appropriations and legislation passed on terms favorable to the Latter-day Saints.103 President Zachary Taylor also expressed his support for the Mormons. He sent 102 John Bernhisel to Wilford Woodruff, March 22, 1850, Wilford Woodruff Papers (MS 1352), Box 6, Folder 18, LDSCA. Bernhisel expressed his concerns about a territorial form of government to his friend Apostle Wilford Woodruff. He states in part, -There are already hungry office hunters here who are seeking for the offices in the event that we get a territorial government, and if some whippersnappers or broken down politicians should be sent out, who would not be acceptable to us, to tyrannize over us, we should certainly be brought into collision with the General Government.‖ 103 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, February 5, 1850, Brigham Young Office Files (CR1234/1), Box 60, Folder 20, LDSCA. Truman Smith had been instrumental in seeing that the Whig nomination for President fell to Zachary Taylor. This gave Smith tremendous influence with the Chief Executive. 40 a message to Brigham Young saying he felt the Latter-day Saints had been unfairly dealt with and that he was determined to do all the good in his power for them under the Constitution. He later expressed his support for accepting the State of Deseret into the Union.104 The Mormons were also popular on the social circuit. The wife of Supreme Court Justice John McLean declared that she could not conceive of why the Latter-day Saints -should be so grossly slandered, and cruelly persecuted.‖ She and several members of Congress invited John Bernhisel into their homes to learn more about the Mormon people.105 It seemed that having Deseret admitted to the Union was an attainable goal. Unfortunately, Bernhisel soon found that events outside of his control stood in the way of statehood. The Slavery Issue Not long after arriving in Washington, John Bernhisel became aware of the fact that while Senators and Congressmen got along quite well with him, they were having great difficulty getting along with each other. Congress spent three weeks in bitter debate 104 The First Presidency to Amasa Lyman, September 6, 1849, Leonard Arrington Collection (LJAHA COL 1), Series 9, Box 11, Folder 1, Page 44, USU. Zachary Taylor sent an emissary to the Mormons to propose a plan by which they could become an independent state by 1851. They would first join California as a single state. They would then become an independent state by 1851 without further action by Congress. Brigham Young was impressed by the offer and wrote to other Church leaders, -That the President and Council of the United States are friendly disposed towards us, and that he is commissioned by Gen Taylor to inform us that he fully appreciates our situation; that he considers that we have been unjustly dealt with; and that so far as his power constitutionally extends he will do us all the good that he can.‖ The President abandoned the plan when California refused to go along with it. 105 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, March 21, 1850, Brigham Young Office Files (CR 1234/1), Box 60, Folder 9, LDSCA. Bernhisel reports that he had received calling cards from Daniel Webster, Lewis Cass, several members of the President‘s Cabinet, and Vice President Millard Fillmore. 41 before finally electing a Speaker of the House of Representatives. The reason for the delay was slavery. Bernhisel observed that the sectional strife that preoccupied Washington was destroying the normal decorum of Congress. Fights sometimes broke out between elected officials. In December of 1849, Congressman William Duer of New York called Congressman Richard Meade of Virginia -a liar‖ in Bernhisel‘s presence. Mead then challenged Duer to -mortal combat.‖ Meade vowed to -attack him in the street or wherever he may meet him,‖ unless Duer agreed to a duel. Everywhere, there was talk of secession and the dissolution of the Union. Bernhisel wrote to Apostle Wilford Woodruff, -This will be an exciting and stormy session, and if there be not some duels fought I shall be disappointed - The Lord has indeed and in truth come out of his hiding place to vex the nation.‖106 When members finally elected Howell Cobb of Georgia as Speaker of the House, Bernhisel set about trying to get Congress to grant statehood to Deseret. He soon found that all the work he and Thomas Kane had done in creating a positive image of the Mormons in Washington was for naught. The longstanding conflict over slavery stood in the way. Adding a new state to the Union only threatened to tip the delicate balance of power in Congress. The Mormons tried to be neutral on the topic of slavery, but they found such a position only aroused the suspicions of both sides.107 Bernhisel wrote a 106 J. M. Bernhisel to Wilford Woodruff, Dec. 14, 1849, Wilford Woodruff Papers (MS 1352), Box 6, Folder 17, LDSCA. The Mormons felt that God‘s judgment was upon the United States for rejecting the Mormons and refusing to intervene when mobs drove the Latter-day Saints from their homes. 107 Brigham Young to Orson Hyde, July 19, 1849, Leonard Arrington Collection (LJAHA COL 1), Series 9, Box 11, Folder 1, Page 44, USU. This draft of a letter to Mormon Apostle Orson Hyde shows the thinking of the Church leadership in dealing with the controversial issue of slavery. Young suggests avoiding the topic and providing as little information as possible. -You might safely say (if it was of any particular use) that as a 42 statement for members of Congress that was vague and noncommittal. It suggested that the Mormons had not explored the issue enough to come to a final determination of whether to practice slavery or not.108 Members of Congress were not impressed. Bernhisel finally concluded that there was no chance Washington would admit Deseret to the Union until Congress resolved the slavery issue.109 Since a solution to such a contentious issue did not appear to be on the horizon, it meant the alternative was to have a territorial form of government that Brigham Young and the Mormons were sure to reject. Because of what was at stake, Bernhisel approached his friends in Congress to explore the remaining alternatives. Senators Truman Smith and Stephen Douglas were both aware of the violent history of the Latter-day Saints and wanted to avoid further problems. They knew a territorial government would not provide the Mormons with the autonomy they desired. people we are averse to slavery, but that we wish not to meddle with this subject, but leave things to take their natural course.‖ 108 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, March 21, 1850, Brigham Young Office Files (CR 1234/1), Box 60, Folder 9, LDSCA. Bernhisel stated, -Slave labor can never, in our opinion be profitably employed in Deseret, so far as it has been explored.‖ This allowed Bernhisel to avoid taking a firm stand on the issue. The Mormons continued to make ambiguous statements relative to slavery that created confusion that has lasted down to the present day. The central problem was Young‘s definition of slavery. He did not support chattel slavery or authorize it in Utah. Instead, he created a modified form of indentured servitude to accommodate slaveholders who brought their servants to the territory. See Christopher B. Rich, Jr., -The True Policy for Utah: Servitude, Slavery, and ‗An Act in Relation to Service‘,‖ Utah Historical Quarterly Vol. 80, No. 1 (Winter 2012), 54-74. For an alternative view of the Mormons and slavery see Nathaniel R. Ricks, -A Peculiar Place for the Peculiar Institution : Slavery and Sovereignty in Early Territorial Utah,‖ (MA Thesis, Brigham Young University, 2007). 109 J. M. Bernhisel to Wilford Woodruff, March 22, 1850, Wilford Woodruff Papers (MS 1352), Box 6, Folder 18, LDSCA. 43 Senator Douglas saw firsthand how disputes over Latter-day Saint self-government had turned violent in Illinois. The Illinois Senator tried to convince the Committee on Territories to recognize the provisional government of Deseret, and let the Mormons continue to govern themselves. The Committee refused to go along. Fortunately, Senator Truman Smith had an alternative approach. He offered to hide some language -about half as long as his little finger‖ in an omnibus spending bill that would authorize the President to pay the salaries of the officers of the provisional State of Deseret. This would have the effect of recognizing and legalizing the present Mormon government. Deseret would have the same autonomy as a state, but they would not have any senators or voting members in the House of Representatives. Senator Smith was confident that if he could get this legislation passed, President Zachary Taylor would implement it. He suggested waiting until the end of the session to introduce the bill when Congress would not have the time to read it or question the unusual provisions.110 Unfortunately, the divisions in Congress foiled the plans of Stephen Douglas, Truman Smith, and John Bernhisel. The conflict over slavery made it increasingly difficult to accomplish anything regarding the lands of the Mexican Cession. The debate inflamed the passions of Senators and violence continued to break out in the halls of Congress. On April 17, 1850, Senator Benton of Missouri and Senator Foote of Mississippi got into a heated debate about the status of California in John Bernhisel‘s presence. The doctor described how Senator Benton, -brimful of wrath and indignation, rose from his seat, threw his chair violently upon the floor, rapidly approached Mr. Foote, who retreated backward down the aisle to the area in front of the Vice President‘s chair, 110 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, March 27, 1850, Brigham Young Office Files (CR 1234/1), Box 60, Folder 9, LDSCA. 44 at the same time drawing a revolver from his bosom, and pointing it toward Col. Benton.‖ Benton then called Foote a -cowardly assassin,‖ and dared him to open fire. Panic gripped the chamber as Senators and others ran for cover. Bernhisel could barely hear the Vice President‘s calls for order -above the noise and din of the moment.‖ Once the excitement subsided, Henry Clay asked both men to refrain from shooting at each other while Congress was in session. Unfortunately, in spite of the Vice President‘s best efforts to maintain order, other similar disruptions occurred. John Bernhisel was surprised to see how the slavery question was destroying the normal decorum of both houses of Congress. He wrote Brigham Young saying there were -frequent threats of dissolution of the Union, and occasional threats of, and even attempts at, personal violence.‖111 Bernhisel feared Congress would ultimately force a territory on the Mormons. As a final fallback position, Senator Truman Smith indicated he had a great deal of influence with President Zachary Taylor, and promised John Bernhisel he would use it in case his plan to legalize the provisional government of Deseret failed. He felt confident he could get the President to appoint only Mormon approved officers to any territory Congress created. Unfortunately, unexpected events thwarted the efforts to give the Latter-day Saints self-government. The Compromise of 1850 President Zachary Taylor died on July 9, 1850, throwing all of the plans of John Bernhisel and his allies into disarray. Taylor had been a logjam in negotiations to solve the slavery issue. His successor, Millard Fillmore, proved more receptive to negotiation. A month after Taylor‘s death, thirteen senators emerged from a private meeting with 111 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, April 23, 1850, Brigham Young Office Files (CR 1234/1), Box 60, Folder 9, LDSCA. 45 what history would call the Compromise of 1850. The proposal was very controversial. The House and the Senate initially rejected almost all of it. Bernhisel wrote to Brigham Young saying, -Nothing survived the wreck, but the Bill providing for the establishment of a Territorial Government for Deseret.‖112 Therefore, on September 9, 1850, the worst-case scenario for the Mormons became law. Congress imposed a territorial form of government on the Latter-day Saints. The Mormons did not get all the land they claimed. Congress even refused to allow them to use the name -Deseret.‖ Instead, they became the -Territory of Utah.‖113 John Bernhisel felt there was still one chance to keep non-Mormon officials away from the theo-democracy of the Latter-day Saints. He hoped the new President, Millard Fillmore, would appoint only officers of the Mormons‘ choosing. It was a last ditch effort to avoid conflict. While President Fillmore was not agreeable to the proposition, he did suggest a compromise. The President promised to give the Latter-day Saints half of the patronage appointments while he would reserve the other half for himself. This was a higher percentage of local appointees than any other territory enjoyed.114 Bernhisel 112 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, August 9, 1850, Brigham Young Office Files (CR 1234/1), Box 60, Folder 10, LDSCA. The bill creating Utah Territory was the only part of the original legislation that survived the initial version of the Compromise of 1850. 113 Apparently, some members of Congress felt people would mistake -Deseret‖ for -desert‖ and wanted another name. See John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, March 21, 1850, Brigham Young Office Files (CR1234/1), Box 60, Folder 20, LDSCA. 114 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, August 9, 1850, Brigham Young Office Files (CR 1234/1), Box 60, Folder 10, LDSCA. Fillmore was relatively generous with the patronage. Washington had allocated Oregon & Minnesota two resident appointees while New Mexico received only one. See Senate Journal. 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 August 1848, 483-484, Senate Journal. 30th Cong., 2nd Sess., 15 March 1849, 84, Senate Journal. 31st Cong., 2nd Sess., 23 December 1850, 280, Senate Journal. 31st Cong., 2nd Sess., 14 February 1851, 288, Senate Journal. 31st Cong., 2nd Sess., 27 February 1851, 293. 46 continued to argue that all of the appointments needed to be of the Mormons‘ choosing and gave the President a list of acceptable candidates. The President still granted only half of the requests. The non-Mormon federal officials soon headed to Utah Territory not knowing the whirlwind of bitterness and anger their appointments would create. Because of the expert work the Mormon image-makers had done, the officials would be completely unprepared for the firestorm that lay ahead. 47 CHAPTER IV -I AM SICK AND TIRED OF THIS PLACE‖ Brigham Young was furious when he discovered that Congress had denied Deseret‘s petition for statehood. He was particularly upset that part of its failure might have been due to Zachary Taylor. In a letter dated July 7, 1850, Almon W. Babbitt told the Mormon Prophet that the President had opposed any kind of government for Deseret. Babbitt claimed he held a meeting with Taylor during which the President expressed his contempt for the Latter-day Saints. Babbitt stated Taylor -tried to reason with me of the absurdity of the Mormons trying for a government.‖115 He then quoted him as saying the Latter-day Saints were outlaws that Washington could not trust. Babbitt claimed the President threatened to veto any bill that gave Deseret either a territorial or a state government. Zachary Taylor died just two days after the date of Babbitt‘s letter. Brigham Young concluded that God had struck the President dead for his opposition to the Latter-day Saints and said so publicly and privately.116 Unfortunately, Almon Babbitt had ulterior motives for writing the letter and his accusations were not accurate. 115 Almon Babbitt to Brigham Young, July 7, 1850, Andrew Love Neff Collection (Ms0135), Box 10, Folder 1, JWML. 116 Minutes of Meetings, July 24, 1851, Church Historian‘s Office, General Church Minutes, 1839 -1877, (CR 100/318), LDSCA. See also Brigham Young to John Bernhisel, Brigham Young Office Files (CR 1234/1), Box 60, Folder 2, February 28, 1852, LDSCA. 48 Brigham Young never told Almon Babbit of his removal as Deseret‘s chief representative in Washington, but he suspected it nonetheless. He wrote an angry letter to Apostle Wilford Woodruff on January 16, 1850, complaining that he had not heard from the -leading men‖ of the Church for some time.117 He then asked Woodruff if Brigham Young had made John Bernhisel the de facto representative of Deseret. Babbitt‘s concern apparently arose over a disagreement between the two earlier in the week over how to handle rumors that Zachary Taylor would veto any legislation that benefitted the Mormons. Babbitt planned to confront Taylor, but Bernhisel -enjoined him not to say a word to the President on the subject.‖ When Babbitt spoke to Zachary Taylor anyway, the doctor -called at his room after he had retired, and entreated him to be silent on this subject.‖ Bernhisel felt he and his allies in Congress could overcome any objections Taylor had concerning the Latter-day Saints as long as Babbitt did not make a public issue of it. 118 Bernhisel knew that Taylor had previously voiced support for the Latter-day Saints, but in January of 1850 had a reason to be worried about their loyalty to the Union. William Smith, the younger brother of Mormon founder Joseph Smith, was probably the primary cause of Taylor‘s concerns about the Latter-day Saints. The younger Smith had written to Congress a few weeks earlier accusing the Mormons of disloyalty to the Union and of being robbers, murderers, and swindlers. While the charges were old ones, the fact that the brother of the Church‘s founder had made them caused a 117 Almon Babbitt to Wilford Woodruff, January 16, 1850, Wilford Woodruff Papers (MS 1352), Box 6, Folder 18, LDSCA. Much to Bernhisel‘s horror, Babbitt wanted to embarrass the President over the remark and make a partisan issue of it. 118 John Bernhisel to Thomas Kane, January 17, 1850, Thomas L. Kane and Elizabeth W. Kane Collection (VMSS 792) Series 3, Box 16, Folder 4, BYU. 49 great stir in the nation‘s capital.119 As time passed however, Washington came to discount William Smith‘s charges. This was due in no small part to a report from General John Wilson, whom Taylor had sent as an envoy to Brigham Young. Wilson‘s letter to the President of his visit to the Great Basin settlement spoke very highly of the Latter-day Saints and painted a picture of them that was very different from that of William Smith. Therefore, Bernhisel believed, -on what I regard as excellent authority,‖ that while the President may still have had reservations about the Mormon religion, he would not interfere with Bernhisel‘s legislative initiatives.120 The doctor was even able to secure an appointment for Brigham Young to take charge of the census for the Great Basin from the Taylor Administration.121 Meanwhile, Almon Babbitt continued to fume over his loss of status in the eyes of Church leaders. He expressed his resentment at getting information second hand from John Bernhisel.122 Babbitt argued that he had powerful friends and that he could help the Church a great deal, if the Mormon leadership gave him the chance.123 Nonetheless, 119 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, March 21, 1850, Brigham Young Office Files (CR 1234/1), Box 60, Folder 9, LDSCA. 120 John Bernhisel to Thomas Kane, January 17, 1850, Thomas L. Kane and Elizabeth W. Kane Collection (VMSS 792) Series 3, Box 16, Folder 4, BYU. See also -The Mormons,‖ January 21, 1850, Daily National Intelligencer for an excerpt of Wilson‘s report that described the Latter-day Saints as an -orderly, earnest, industrious, and civil people.‖ 121 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, July 3, 1850, Brigham Young Office Files (CR 1234/1), Box 60, Folder 9, LDSCA. 122 Almon Babbitt to Wilford Woodruff, January 26, 1850, Wilford Woodruff Papers (MS 1352), Box 6, Folder 18, LDSCA. 123 Almon Babbitt to Wilford Woodruff, January 16, 1850, Wilford Woodruff Papers (MS 1352), Box 6, Folder 18, LDSCA. 50 Woodruff gave him only vague assurances of his standing with Church leaders.124 Babbitt had most likely seen the death of Zachary Taylor as an opportunity to demonstrate his influence in Washington and his ability to gain inside information that would be helpful to the Latter-day Saints. Significantly, he dated his letter just two days before the death of the President even though the actual meeting occurred seven months earlier. While his report did not raise his standing in the eyes of Brigham Young, it did raise the anger of the Mormon Prophet. Young later made statements about the late Zachary Taylor that became a national scandal. Meanwhile, back in Washington, John Bernhisel met with some of the non-Mormon officials that Millard Fillmore appointed to Utah Territory. The President, true to his word, divided the patronage evenly. He gave four positions to the Latter-day Saints and reserved the rest for himself. The Mormons he appointed were Brigham Young as Governor, Seth M. Blair as U. S. Attorney, Joseph L. Heywood as U. S. Marshal, and Zerubbabel Snow as one of the two Associate Justices. The President then appointed three outsiders, including Broughton D. Harris of Vermont as Territorial Secretary, Lemuel G. Brandebury of Pennsylvania as Chief Justice, and Perry E. Brocchus of Alabama as the remaining Associate Justice.125 Washington then gave Brigham Young the additional title of Superintendent of Indian Affairs, but did not honor his request for 124 Wilford Woodruff to A. W. Babbitt, Jan. 21, 1850, Wilford Woodruff Papers (MS 1352), Box 6, Folder 5, LDSCA. 125 Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 2nd Sess. 252 (1850). Originally, the President nominated Joseph Buffington of Pennsylvania as Chief Justice but he declined the appointment. Fillmore replaced him with Brandebury. See Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 2nd Sess. 293 (1851). 51 Latter-day Saint Indian agents. Instead, non-Mormons Jacob H. Holeman, Henry R. Day, and Stephen B. Rose filled those three posts.126 When the nonresident officers began to arrive in the summer of 1851, they found that Utah Territory was not the place that Mormon agents in Washington had described. Despite John Bernhisel‘s representations to the contrary, the federal officials quickly discovered that the Latter-day Saint government was a theocracy. Notwithstanding the numerous Mormon denials over the years, they found the Latter-day Saints openly and unapologetically practiced polygamy. Finally, in spite of the reassuring images Thomas Kane had created of the Mormon‘s deep affection for their country, the federal officers encountered intense Latter-day Saints anger toward the United States. Over the next few months, the federal officials experienced serious conflicts with the Mormons over a variety of issues including elections, the judiciary, polygamy, lawmaking, misuse of federal appropriations, and antigovernment statements. Chief Justice Lemuel G. Brandebury received a hostile official reception from Brigham Young when he arrived in Salt Lake City on June 7, 1851. Brandebury sought to pay his respects to the Mormon Prophet, but the newly appointed Governor was not willing to meet with him. Brandebury wrote to President Millard Fillmore that Seth Blair, the Latter-day Saint U. S. Attorney, had tried several times to arrange an appointment with the Governor. Brigham Young refused, however, insisting that he -did not wish an introduction, for none but Mormons should have been appointed to the offices of the 126 -Proclamation,‖ Deseret News (Salt Lake City), July 26, 1851. Henry R. Day and Stephen B. Rose were Indian subagents who arrived in Utah in July. Jacob H. Holeman did not arrive until August 9, 1851. See Jacob. H. Holeman to Luke Lea, September 21, 1851, Letters received 1849 - 1880 Bureau of Indian Affairs Utah Superintendancy, USHS. 52 Territory, and none others but d-d rascals would have come among them.‖127 Young made his displeasure with Washington‘s actions known to the other officials as well.128 When these officers attempted to put the machinery of territorial government into operation, it created an explosion. The first conflict came over the Latter-day Saint method of electing public officials. The Elections of 1851 Territorial Secretary Broughton D. Harris and his wife arrived in Salt Lake City on July 19, 1851. Under the act establishing Utah Territory, Harris had the responsibility 127 House Exec. Doc. 25 (32-1), 1852, Serial 640, 9-10. The office journals of Brigham Young show he met with Seth Blair on June 9, 1851 and July 15, 1851 but they do not show any meetings with Judge Brandebury. The Judge did appear at a social event on July 9, 1851. See Church Historian‘s Office, Journal, 1844-1849 (CR 100/1) Box 2, Vol. 14, June 9, 1851, July 9, 1851, and July 15, 1851, LDSCA. The social occasion was apparently open to nonmembers including local merchants. See Church Historian's Office, Journal History of the Church, 1896-1923 (CR 100/137) Vol. 29, July 9, 1851, LDSCA. 128 Jacob H. Holeman, the non-Mormon Indian agent, felt Young was trying to see that the nonresident officials were -annoyed in every possible manner in order to force them to leave the Territory or succumb to his will.‖ See Jacob H. Holeman to Luke Lea, December 28, 1851, Letters received 1849 - 1880 Bureau of Indian Affairs Utah Superintendancy, USHS. Nonetheless, Young‘s hostility to the non-Mormon officials in their official capacity did not stop him from inviting them to social events. This caused a great deal of bewilderment for the federal officers. See House Exec. Doc. 25 (32-1), 1852, Serial 640, 10. Here the officials describe having dinner with Governor Young shortly after he and other speakers had denounced the government in very angry terms just a few hours earlier. In a similar vein, the wife of Secretary Broughton D. Harris described how Young was very contemptuous of her husband in his official capacity. Nonetheless, he showed up at the Harris resident with a fresh peach from his garden that he -wished Mrs. Harris to eat.‖ She also described her embarrassment at attending the Governor‘s dinner directly following a meeting where Young and other Church leaders had denounced the federal government with -sneers and contempt.‖ See Sarah Hollister Harris, An Unwritten Chapter of Salt Lake: 1851-1901 (New York: S.H. Harris - Privately Printed, 1901), 33-36. 53 of conducting a census and holding an election for the legislature.129 Much to his surprise, Harris found that Church leaders had already taken the census and that plans for the election were underway. The Secretary immediately objected to the way Young had taken the census. He also claimed Young was not following the election procedures specified in the Organic Act establishing Utah Territory. The Secretary felt he could not disburse any of the $24,000 he had brought from Washington for the operation of the legislature because of Young‘s violation of territorial law. 130 John Bernhisel and Almon Babbitt brought Harris to a meeting with Governor Young on July 23, 1851 to resolve the issue. Harris‘ previous experience with the Latter-day Saints had been primarily with the aristocratic John Bernhisel. Now, he had to deal directly with Brigham Young without having the doctor to filter the fiery rhetoric of the Latter-day Saint leader. The Secretary was shocked when he came face to face with the defiance and anger of the Mormon Prophet. Harris reported to President Fillmore that his meeting with Young -was made 129 -A Copy of the Act Passed by the Thirty-first Congress Establishing a Territorial Government in Utah,‖ Daily National Intelligencer (Washington), September 11, 1850. Section 4 outlined procedures for the census and the elections. 130 John Bernhisel arranged for Brigham Young to receive an appointment to conduct a census of the Great Basin in 1850 from the administration of President Zachary Taylor. This was before the formation of Utah Territory. See John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, July 3, 1850, Brigham Young Office Files (CR 1234/1), Box 60, Folder 1, LDSCA. Young‘s clerks took the census as of June 1, 1850. See Thomas Bullock to John Bernhisel, April 28, 1852, Brigham Young Office Files (CR 1234/1), Box 60, Folder 2. The Mormon Prophet later stated he made one copy for the U. S. census and a second for the territorial census, even though Congress had not determined Utah‘s boundaries. See Brigham Young to Millard Fillmore, September 29, 1851, Brigham Young Office Files (CR 1234/1), Box 51, Folder 1, LDSCA. Harris accused Young of not taking the census properly and insisted he wanted to conduct his own count independent of the Mormon Prophet. See House Exec. Doc. 25 (32-1), 1852, Serial 640, 25. 54 the occasion of a violent exhibition of his temper and abuse of Mr. Babbit, and of the government and officers.‖ 131 Church minutes of their meeting confirm that Brigham Young dealt harshly with Secretary Harris. Using coarse and abusive language, the Mormon Prophet demonstrated his contempt for the federal officers and an unwillingness to follow territorial law. The presence of Almon Babbitt only fueled his anger. He was particularly outraged when Babbitt sided with Secretary Harris on the need to follow the procedures outlined in the Organic Act creating Utah Territory. Brigham Young made clear the Latter-day Saints were not about to abandon their theo-democracy. -Any Governorship and everything else is to bow down to Mormonism,‖ he declared. When Almon Babbitt expressed his opinion that the election procedures used by the Church were illegal, Young exclaimed, -You say it is illegal. I say damn it, that is your foolery.‖ Babbitt suggested that the Governor postpone the elections for two weeks to sort out the difficulties. The Mormon Prophet angrily refused saying, -I won‘t have you here to dictate.‖ 132 Almon Babbitt‘s past behavior had put him on shaky ground with Church leaders and now the Mormon Prophet sharply rebuked him in the presence of Secretary Harris. If you interfere with any of my dictation in the elections, it will be the last. Now I don‘t want to hear you say this is not right and that is not right, you are nothing 131 House Exec. Doc. 25 (32-1), 1852, Serial 640, 24-27. Secretary Harris felt that Brigham Young had violated section four of the Organic Act establishing Utah Territory. He stated the Governor did not conduct a proper census, violated the law in the manner he conducted the election, and that he allowed noncitizens to run for office. He steadfastly refused to surrender any of the $24,000 until the Mormons held an election in accordance with federal law. 132 Minutes of Meetings, July 23, 1851, Church Historian‘s Office, General Church Minutes, 1839 -1877 (CR 100/318), LDSCA. The clerk, Thomas Bullock, attempted to make a verbatim transcript of the meeting. Young‘s tone is clearly angry, abusive, and sometimes vulgar. 55 but a stinking politician. I know more about sound questions and doctrine in law than you. I am not willing to suffer this people to be interrupted.133 Broughton Harris was shocked at Brigham Young‘s language. He wrote to the President saying Young later told him he wanted the Secretary to -know what kind of people he had to deal with.‖134 He then quoted the Governor as saying, -he had ruled that people for years, and could rule them again, and he would kick any man out of the Territory who attempted to dictate to, or advise him in his duty.‖135 Harris felt the federal officials -were looked upon as offensive intruders rather than co-ordinate branches of the government.‖136 He complained that Young went on to hold the elections without regard 133 Minutes of Meetings, July 23, 1851, Church Historian‘s Office, General Church Minutes, 1839 -1877 (CR 100/318), LDSCA. Brigham Young was also upset with Babbitt because he had not defended the Church‘s position to Chief Justice Lemuel Brandebury. He told Babbitt that because of his failure to do so, the elections would probably be overturned. 134 House Exec. Doc. 25 (32-1), 1852, Serial 640, 10. Apparently, Young wanted to make an impression on the Secretary. According to Church minutes of the meeting, when Young and Babbitt started to argue over financial issues, Harris tried to excuse himself saying, he had -no interest in it.‖ Young replied, -I know it but I want you to hear it.‖ See Minutes of Meetings, July 23, 1851, Church Historian‘s Office, General Church Minutes, 1839 -1877 (CR 100/318), LDSCA. 135 House Exec. Doc. 25 (32-1), 1852, Serial 640, 12. According to the minutes kept by Young‘s clerk Thomas Bullock, the Mormon Prophet made several comments that suggested he would expel anyone from the Territory who attempted to dictate to him. At one point during the meeting Young told Babbitt, -I don‘t want you to dictate. I feel like walking you out of these vallies.‖ Young later stated, -I will cut off any man in our community who will not walk straight.‖ See Minutes of Meetings, July 23, 1851, Church Historian‘s Office, General Church Minutes, 1839 -1877 (CR 100/318), LDSCA (emphasis in the original). 136 House Exec. Doc. 25 (32-1), 1852, Serial 640, 12. According to Church minutes of the meeting, Young made statements indicating he felt the federal officers were intruders. Young stated, -There is not a man in the Senate or House who is perfect to be told that I must do this and that I will just as soon cut their throat to say we have got to go all over the Mountains again. I won‘t bear it and won‘t bear the insults of any two-penny man. I will do my duty and no one shall put his nose in my dish. I would rather stand up and cut throats than suffer law suits and technicalities so help me the Gods, I will take my sword 56 to the law. Harris concluded that Young had done this to show -the determination of the Church to do as she pleased in such matters.‖137 Brigham Young unquestionably disregarded territorial law in the manner in which he conducted the elections.138 He wrote letters to local Church leaders throughout Utah instructing them to have only one candidate for each office. He specifically precluded competition for any of the elected posts. The Mormon Prophet admonished his followers to -always remember to keep your politics in subjection; let there be no division in Israel; but come to the polls with the voice of one man, let their not be a single dissenting vote.‖ He then informed local leaders that Dr. John Bernhisel was the Church‘s candidate for delegate to Congress and told them to support the choice. Young also provided the names of candidates for other offices saying, -These are our wishes in relation to the election and you will do right if you comply with them.‖ He then made clear he would allow no other candidate to be on the ballot.139 This was completely contrary to proper election and cut them down.‖ See Minutes of Meetings, July 23, 1851, Church Historian‘s Office, General Church Minutes, 1839 -1877 (CR 100/318), LDSCA. 137 House Exec. Doc. 25 (32-1), 1852, Serial 640, 13. 138 -A Copy of the Act Passed by the Thirty-first Congress Establishing a Territorial Government in Utah,‖ National Intelligencer (Washington), September 12, 1852. Section five of the Organic Act stated that only white males over the age of twenty-one years who were residents of the Territory could run for office. The law stated only those the federal government recognized as United States citizens could participate in the election. Harris complained that Young had ignored these provisions and allowed foreign nationals to officiate and stand for election. See House Exec. Doc. 25 (32-1), 1852, Serial 640, 12-13. 139 Brigham Young to -Dear Brethren,‖ July 21, 1851, Brigham Young Office Files (CR1234/1), Box 1, 96-97, LDSCA. Young anticipated that there might be differences of opinion over candidates. However, he wanted local Church leaders to resolve them privately saying, -If any of the brethren have preferences let their claims be canvassed prior to the Election day; in a convention; and then and there agree on whom you will run; and then all support the candidate that has been selected. Have but one candidate for 57 procedures. Young was not concerned with the fact that his actions violated territorial law, however. For the Mormon Prophet, elections served a religious purpose. The federal officials considered Young to be a dictator who ruled by decree. They assumed that the Latter-day Saints had no rights under the Mormon Prophet‘s form of government. What they did not realize was that in the Latter-day Saint system, everyone including Brigham Young could serve in office only after receiving the -common consent‖ of the electorate. Common consent was more than just an exercise in majority rule. Apostle George A. Smith described it as follows: Unless we can govern ourselves, we are unprepared to be governed in the way that the kingdom of God is to be ruled and directed, which is to be upon the principle of common consent. It is not that a majority shall rule, but that the people shall be agreed; and when all the people are agreed as touching any one thing in the kingdom of God, no power can resist it.140 Nonetheless, under the rules of common consent, the Latter-day Saints could and sometimes did reject the nominations of the Church. In such cases, the rules of common consent obligated the Mormon leadership to nominate another individual. The Latter-day Saints also had the right to remove office holders they found unsatisfactory with a vote of no confidence.141 Ironically, this was something denied them under territorial rule. The each office, when you come to the polls and let perfect union characterize all your works from this time henceforth and forever.‖ 140 Young, Journal of Discourses, 6:159. Smith went on to say, -This has astonished even republicans. It is astonishing to many men to think that a people can all be agreed; and I have read professedly learned illustrations of republicanism, which declare that it is attended with great danger for the people all to be united. There is danger of their being united, lest they oppress somebody-that is, themselves.‖ 141 Mormon journals are replete with examples of residents rejecting leaders or removing them during votes of confidence. See Edwin Harley (1819-1903) Diaries, 1846-1902 (MS 965), August 20, 1854, LDSCA. 58 federal officers found the support of the Latter-day Saints for their theo-democracy baffling, not recognizing that it actually provided the Mormons with a greater voice in their governance than the territorial system offered. They found the Latter-day Saints had similar feelings for their civil and criminal courts. Mormon Justice The nonresident federal officers soon discovered that the Latter-day Saint judiciary did not operate as Dr. Bernhisel represented to Congress. Bernhisel indicated that the Mormons had a three-man court that held conventional trials.142 The actual system of justice was far different. The federal officers observed as Mormon sheriffs pursued horse thieves and then brought them to trial before Latter-day Saint religious tribunals. -Some of them were arrested, tried, and fined a hundred dollars,‖ the officials noted. The Church took these actions without regard for territorial law or the jurisdiction of the United States Judges.143 The federal officials claimed that one Church member -purporting to be a judge‖ accused another man of a criminal offense. The Mormon then tried, convicted, and punished the offender without a jury. The officials complained that the Church claimed the sole right to decide whether to punish criminals or set them free. Their report states that in one case, a Mormon settler named Howard Egan gunned down a Mr. James Monroe of Utica, New York. Even though it was a clear-cut case of homicide, the Mormons buried Monroe without an inquest. The Church did not arrest 142 Morgan, The State of Deseret, 124-125. 143 -A Copy of the Act Passed by the Thirty-first Congress Establishing a Territorial Government in Utah,‖ Daily National Intelligencer (Washington), September 11, 1850. Section 9 clearly gave jurisdiction to the United States Judges for criminal cases and outlined the procedures for arresting, trying, and punishing lawbreakers. 59 Egan. In fact, the officials complained, they saw him -walking through the streets afterwards, under the eye of the Governor.‖ The federal officers also cited the case of Dr. John R. Vaughn of Indiana whom a Mormon settler named Madison D. Hambleton had killed. As in the Monroe homicide, the killer went free and the officials were helpless to intervene. Young, the officers complained, decreed that the -United States judges should never try a case if he could prevent it.‖144 Church records confirm that Brigham Young was not willing to recognize the authority of the non-Mormon judiciary. According to minutes of his meeting with Secretary Broughton D. Harris, the Mormon Prophet was adamant that the judges would not administer justice saying, -I will not have law and the devil.‖ He furthered declared, -They will have their courts and have nothing to do.‖ Young was content to let the judges stay in the territory and draw their salaries but said he would fight them if they attempted to hold any trials. Young felt the non-Mormon judges would only introduce quarreling into a community that was preparing for the Second Coming of Christ. He told Secretary Harris, -This people will never bring a suit before the Judges. I aim to promote peace and righteousness and prepar |
| Reference URL | https://collections.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6r5301n |



