Philip II and the construction of Macedonian state

The accomplishments of Philip II of Macedonia have long been overshadowed by those of his son, Alexander the Great, due to the spectacular nature of Alexander's achievements and to the survival of ancient sources, though written later, that have documented Alexander's reign. Little remains of the histories or writings of Philip's contemporaries, and those that do remain are hostile to Philip and almost exclusively pro-Athenian. Ancient sources focus on Philip's diplomacy, imperialism, and character flaws-all from the view of outsiders watching Philip's actions against their Greek states. These ancient literary sources have necessarily focused the modern discussion of Greece in the 4th century BC on those same subjects and away from a survey of Philip's policies, systems, and successes within Macedonia. This thesis reviews the ancient literary, epigraphic, numismatic, and archaeological evidence in an effort to investigate Philip's initiatives and actions within Macedonia and to suggest the ideology related to these plans and strategies. Based on a review of this evidence, this thesis argues that Philip created a Macedonian state based on traditional Macedonian institutions, as well as new practices, that served Philip's purpose of uniting his disparate territories and peoples into one nation; and that Philip's reformed army provided the mechanism for Philip's achievement of his political, economic, and social goals, and importantly, for defining a national culture.

PHILIP II AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MACEDONIAN STATE by Cynthia Kimball Phillips A thesis submitted to the faculty of The University of Utah in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of History The University of Utah August 2012 Copyright © Cynthia Kimball Phillips 2012 All Rights Reserved The U n i v e r s i t y o f Utah Graduate School STATEMENT OF THESIS APPROVAL The thesis of has been approved by the following supervisory committee members: , Chair Date Approved , Member Date Approved , Member Date Approved and by , Chair of the Department of and by Charles A. Wight, Dean of The Graduate School. Cynthia Kimball Phillips W. Lindsay Adams May 9, 2012 Isabel Moreira May 9, 2012 Margaret Toscano May 9, 2012 Isabel Moreira History ABSTRACT The accomplishments of Philip II of Macedonia have long been overshadowed by those of his son, Alexander the Great, due to the spectacular nature of Alexander's achievements and to the survival of ancient sources, though written later, that have documented Alexander's reign. Little remains of the histories or writings of Philip's contemporaries, and those that do remain are hostile to Philip and almost exclusively pro- Athenian. Ancient sources focus on Philip's diplomacy, imperialism, and character flaws-all from the view of outsiders watching Philip's actions against their Greek states. These ancient literary sources have necessarily focused the modern discussion of Greece in the 4th century BC on those same subjects and away from a survey of Philip's policies, systems, and successes within Macedonia. This thesis reviews the ancient literary, epigraphic, numismatic, and archaeological evidence in an effort to investigate Philip's initiatives and actions within Macedonia and to suggest the ideology related to these plans and strategies. Based on a review of this evidence, this thesis argues that Philip created a Macedonian state based on traditional Macedonian institutions, as well as new practices, that served Philip's purpose of uniting his disparate territories and peoples into one nation; and that Philip's reformed army provided the mechanism for Philip's achievement of his political, economic, and social goals, and importantly, for defining a national culture. CONTENTS ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………...iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………………...vi INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………...1 CHAPTERS I. FOUNDATIONS OF TRADITIONAL MACEDONIAN INSTITUTIONS OF STATE………………………………………………………………………6 Part I. The Monarchy……………………………………………………….6 Part II. The King and His People……………………………………………12 Part III. The King and the Law……………………………………………..17 Part IV. The Concept of the Macedonian State…………………………….19 Part V. The Army…………………………………………………………...22 II. THE MACEDONIAN STATE BEFORE PHILIP………………………27 Part I. The Precedents of Alexander and Archelaus………………………...27 Part II. Obstacles to a Strong Macedonian State at Philip's Accession…….39 III. THE ARMY AS AN INSTITUTION OF STATE CONSTRUCTION...44 Part I. The Phalanx………………………………………………………….44 Part II. The Cavalry…………………………………………………………55 Part III. The Army as an Institution of Unification…………………………61 Part IV. The School of Royal Pages………………………………………...64 Part V. Logistics, Siege Warfare, and the Navy…………………………….66 IV. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MACEDONIAN STATE………….75 Part I. The Army as a Catalyst of State Construction..……………….…….75 Part II. The Practice of Decantation………………………………………...79 Part III. Development of Economy and Natural Resources………………...85 Part IV. Administration of the Cities……………………………………….89 Part V. The Ideology of State……………………………………………….92 CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………..97 BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………….102 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to thank Professors Moreira and Toscano for their review of my manuscript and their helpful suggestions for revision. I have had the privilege of studying ancient history under the guidance of Professor W. Lindsay Adams for the better part of three decades. He has encouraged my continuing education through the years of my young adulthood and into middle age-all the while validating Aristotle's assertion that to learn gives the liveliest pleasure. I thank Lindsay, in particular, for his kindness, his honesty, and his unbounded support and irresistible good nature that have enabled generations of students to feel capable of substantive accomplishment. Finally, I thank my husband and children for their patience and their belief that I would, one day, finish. INTRODUCTION The remarkable reign of Philip II saw Macedonia burst into Greek affairs as the premier European military and political power of the 4th century BC. Most modern studies of Philip's life and rule concentrate on Philip's reform of the military, his foreign policy, his relationship with and attitude toward Athens and other Greek states, his establishment of a Panhellenic league, and his planned invasion of Asia.1 These investigations reflect the nature of ancient, literary sources that focus on the strength of Philip's army, his diplomacy, his propensity toward political marriages, and his possible long-term goals in the larger Greek and Mediterranean world. Contemporary, literary Macedonian sources survive only in fragments that fail to provide an internal view of Macedonia or to act as a counterbalance to what are often hostile or biased Greek sources during this dynamic internal period in ancient Macedonian history. Marsyas of Pella wrote a history of Macedonia that focused on Philip II, Makedonia, of which only small fragments remain. Theopompos of Chios wrote a voluminous, contemporary history on 1 The foundational work on Ancient Macedonian history that studies all topics in depth is the multivolume work of N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, A History of Macedonia, (Oxford: 1972-1988); The second volume (Oxford: 1979) covers the period from 550- 336 BC and will be referenced throughout this thesis. See also N.G.L. Hammond, The Macedonian State: The Origins, Institutions, and History (Oxford: 1989; reprint 2001) and R. Malcolm Errington, A History of Macedonia (Oxford: 1990). Eugene N. Borza, In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon (Princeton: 1990; reprint 1992), in which Borza presents a narrative history of Macedonia that includes evidence from recent archaeological excavations. A summary of the literary, archaeological, and epigraphic sources for the study of Philip II can be found in Eugene N. Borza, Before Alexander: Constructing Early Macedonia, Publications of the Association of Ancient Historians, no. 6 (Claremont: 1999), 9-26. 2 Philip's reign, Philippica, whose numerous fragments criticize Philip's character and attribute his successes primarily to luck.2 The main surviving Greek histories of the period, including Herodotus' Histories, Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, and Xenophon's Hellenica, present only scant details on Macedonian history whenever Macedonian events affect the history of other Greek states. The only continuous historical narratives of Philip's reign are those of Diodorus Siculus' Universal History, written in the 1st century BC, dealing with events from earliest times to Diodorus' own time; and Justin's Epitome of Pompeius Trogus' Historiae Philippicae, a work from the 2nd or 3rd centuries AD based on a 1st century work, and derived from traditions hostile to Philip. Plutarch, a biographer living in the 2nd century AD and primarily interested in character, offers some information about Philip in his lives of Demosthenes and Alexander. Similarly, the historians Polybius, Arrian, and Quintus Curtius Rufus, all living in the 1st and 2nd centuries AD, provide some useful information related to Philip's reign-particulary Arrian and Curtius who wrote narrative histories on Alexander the Great based on earlier, contemporary sources now lost to us. The only abundant contemporary sources for Philip's reign come from the Athenian orators, Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Isocrates, all of whom have their specific political, philosophical, and moral reasons for maligning or supporting Philip, and whose speeches follow a rhetorical rather than historical tradition. This thesis attempts to provide a re-examination of the ancient sources and a survey of other relevant evidence to discover Philip's initiatives and achievements within Macedonia itself during the dynamic period of his reign. When Philip succeeded to the 2 Ian Worthington, Philip II of Macedonia (New Haven: 2008), 212. Worthington provides a succinct and informative summary of the ancient sources related to Philip's reign-both those extant and those now lost. 3 throne in 359 BCE after his brother's death in battle with the Illyrians, Macedonia had a weak central government, few urban centers, and underutilized manpower and natural resources.3 The external and internal crises that immediately beset Philip may call into question whether or not Macedonia could strictly be called a state at all: its territories were in dispute; its army, one of the few national institutions besides the monarchy, demoralized and diminished; and its kingship contested.4 And yet, in the space of only two decades, Philip transformed Macedonia into a state capable of defending and administering an expansive territory, commanding a large and skilled army, and unified in its laws, economy, and recognition of central authority.5 The archaeological, numismatic, epigraphic, and literary evidence supports the conclusion that Philip planned and implemented programs within his own country-initiatives that certainly predated any grand schemes outside Macedonia-to achieve this remarkable transformation. J.R. Ellis has specifically addressed the ways in which Philip employed traditional 3 N.G.L. Hammond points out that the forty years preceding Philip's accession demonstrated the "weaknesses" of the Macedonian state without any realization of its potentialities in Philip of Macedon (Baltimore: 1994), 7. Also, Errington, History of Macedonia, 18, states that the sources demonstrate the territorial and monarchical weakness of the Macedonian kingdom even earlier. Perdiccas' actions of shifting alliances during the Peloponnesian War suggest his fear for his weak state's survival. See also J. R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976; rpt. 1986), 44. 4 Richard A. Billows, Kings and Colonists: Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism (New York: 1995), 1. Also, Ernst Badian lists in the context of disproving that Philip invaded Thrace at that time (or planned to) the various political and military problems that beset Philip in "Philip II and Thrace," Pulpudeva: Semaines Philippopolitaines de L'Histoire et del La Culture Thrace (Sofia: 1983), 53. Also, see Diod. 16.2.4-5. Any references in Greek or English to Diodorus come from the Loeb Classical Library text, Charles L. Sherman, Diodorus of Sicily, vol. VII (Cambridge: 1952; rpt. 1980), and vol. VIII (Cambridge: 1963; rpt. 1983). 5 Diod. 16.1.3: "For Philip was king over the Macedonians for twenty-four years, and having started from the most insignificant beginnings built up his kingdom to be the greatest of the dominions in Europe . . . " 4 Macedonian institutions, especially the army and the monarchy, to unify his state.6 Building on this and other studies, this thesis argues that Philip constructed his state on the foundation of traditional Macedonian institutions and on the practices of his two most successful predecessors, Alexander I and Archelaus. This thesis further argues that Philip undertook a number of related measures to change the social, political, economic, and cultural structure of his state. Such measures included the enlargement and reorganization of the army, the foundation of cities, the redistricting of territory by the movement and mixing of populations into established settlements and newly founded cities, the acquisition and exploitation of natural resources, the imposition of an administrative and monetary structure, and the conscious strengthening of the monarchy.7 This thesis asserts that the army provided the mechanism for Philip's achievement of his political, economic, and social goals, allowing Philip to combine force and diplomacy to achieve his internal goals, and a means for defining a national culture.8 Finally, this thesis contends that Philip systematically neutralized the disparate, and often hostile, peoples whom he conquered, incorporated them into both traditional and new systems, 6 Ellis, Philip II, focuses throughout on the Macedonian army and monarchy under Philip. 7 A number of articles provide unique support on these subjects and will be referenced throughout. These include the following from earliest to most recent: J.R. Ellis, "Population Transplants by Philip II," Makedonia 9 (1969): 9-17; J.R. Ellis, "The Dynamics of Fourth-Century Macedonian Imperialism," Ancient Macedonia 2 (Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki: 1977): 103-114; W.L Adams, "Philip II and the Thracian Frontier," Thrace Ancienne 1 (Actes 2e Symposium International Des Etudes, Komotini: 1997): 81-88; W.L. Adams, "The Frontier Policy of Philip II," Ancient Macedonia 7 (Papers Read at the Seventh International Symposium, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki: 2002): 283-291; W.L. Adams, "Symmiktous Katoikisas and the City Foundations of the Thracian Frontier, Thrace in the Greco-Roman World (Proceedings of the 10th International Congress of Thracology, Komotini- Alexandroupolis: 2005): 3-12. 8 See especially J. R. Ellis, Philip II, chapter 2 and passim, and "The Dynamics of Fourth-Century Macedonian Imperialism." See also Richard A. Gabriel, Philip II of Macedonia: Greater than Alexander (Washington, D.C.: 2010), 167. 5 and thereby established a national consciousness. Philip's successful efforts at unification enabled him to establish the first territorial, national state in Europe and, arguably, the first Hellenistic monarchy.9 9 Hammond, The Macedonian State, 49-53, in which Hammond explains that Macedonia had always been a "territorial" designation in that the lands over which the king had control defined the state; however, this "state" had been confined to "Macedonia proper" and not the Upper Cantons or wider territories on a consistent basis until Philip II. For the assessment of Philip as the founder of the first territorial state of Europe and as a visionary who founded the Hellenistic Age see Gabriel, Philip II, 2-3. Gabriel also points out that, even from the first battle against Greeks at Lavahdi Ridge in which the Macedonian phalanx won the day (without the cavalry as an attacking force as would become the norm) Philip changed Greek warfare permanently by his army's weapons and training. See also R. Lane Fox, "Philip of Macedon: Accession, Ambitions, and Self- Preservation, in Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC-300 AD (Leiden: 2011), 335 and 337. And R. Lane Fox, "Philip's and Alexander's Macedon," in Brill's Companion, 377, in which Fox calls Philip's military innovations the "blueprint of Hellenistic warfare." CHAPTER I FOUNDATIONS OF TRADITIONAL MACEDONIAN INSTITUTIONS OF STATE Part I: The Monarchy In their foundational work on ancient Macedonia, Hammond and Griffith recognized Macedonia as a polity in which "there was simply no government apart from the king."10 The hereditary monarch of the Argeadae constituted the foundation of the Macedones, or those who "inhabited the homeland of Pieria and spread out from there" during the Archaic and Classical periods of ancient history.11 From the foundation of their first city, Aegae, the Argeadae produced all Macedonia's kings until the death of Alexander IV, the last Argead male-from the 7th century to 310/09 BCE.12 After the death of Alexander, briefly the dynasty of Cassander, and then later the Antigonids in their turn, tried to legitimize their rule by a claim of kinship with the Argeadae.13 This 10 N.G. L. Hammond, and G.T. Griffith, A History of Macedonia, vol. 2 (Oxford: 1979), Hammond and Griffith, 384 (see also 152). 11 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 151. 12 Edward M. Anson, "Macedonia's Alleged Constitutionalism," CJ 80, no. 4 (Apr.-May 1985): 306, and note 6. Elizabeth Donnelly Carney, Women and Monarchy in Macedonia (Norman: 2000), 3 and 6. Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 152. 13 Anson, "Alleged Constitutionalism," 306. Anson points out that there were not always clear rules to succession, no rule of primogeniture, and often disputes over the control of the kingdom among legitimate Argead claimants. For the Antigonids "claimed kinship to the Argeads," see p. 306, note 26. As further support for the strong tradition of the Argeadae, Anson points out that "it is the lack of a powerful Argead claimant to the 7 monopoly on power was, in part, the Argeads' assertion of divine descent from Heracles, the son of Zeus, by way of Temenus of Argos.14 The Argeadae also maintained their divine descent from Argeas, son of Macedon, who was a son of Zeus.15 Such a lineage gave a king and his ethnos better access to the "favor of the gods" and its attendant prosperity.16 Since it was the king's prerogative and duty to intercede with the gods on behalf of his people by the handling of sacrifices and festivals, his lineage and functions worked together to strengthen his position by imbuing it with a "sacral nature."17 throne and the division of the ‘principes' which made possible the chaos at Babylon," after Alexander III's death (311). See also W.L. Adams, "Alexander's Successors to 221 BC," in A Companion to Ancient Macedonia, ed. Joseph Roisman and Ian Worthington (Oxford: 2010), 209-222 in which Adams details the efforts of Alexander's successors to establish connections with his line and his mystique in order to legitimize their rule. 14 Anson, "Constitutionalism," 306, note 26. Hammond, and Griffith, History Macedonia, 383. Herodotus gives the lineage in 8.138-140 while establishing the line of Alexandros, son of Amyntas: "The brothers then went to another region of Macedon, and settled down near the gardens which are called the gardens of Midas son of Gordias . . ." Any translations of Herodotus are from The Histories: The Landmark Herodotus, trans. Andrea L. Purvis, ed. Robert B. Strassler (New York: 2007). 15 N.G. L. Hammond, The Macedonian State: Origins, Institutions, and History (Oxford: 1989), 16. Hammond also points out that the veracity of the Argead's claim to divinity may be interesting research for modern scholars, but is irrelevant in understanding the influence of such a claim in ancient Macedonia since "no one in antiquity doubted the truth of the claim." (19) 16 Hammond, Macedonian State, 16-17. Hammond has always argued the basic accuracy of the Argead foundation legend that traces the founders of the dynasty back to Argos and places their arrival in traditional Macedonia in the middle of the 7th c. BC. In his most recent restatement of his arguments, Hammond emphasizes the general credibility of genealogical calculations of Hecataeus, Herodotus, and Thucydides as vindicated by archaeological discoveries; he also argues that, at the very least, the literary tradition and the "archaeological evidence at the Cemetery of Tumuli places the arrival of that dynasty firmly in 650," as he asserts in "The Early History of Macedonia," AW 27, no. 1 (1996): 70, and 69-71. W. Greenwalt has questioned the validity of the legend by attributing the efforts of Argead kings to participate in the Greek only games at Olympia as politically expedient, but notes the religious importance to the monarchy of this "special religious status" in "Herodotus and the Foundation of Argead Macedonia," AW 13, nos. 3-4 (1986): 121-122, and 118-120. 17 Anson, "Constitutionalism," 306-307. Anson explains that this "religious aura" even "carried over into the ceremonies performed for a dead king." Curtius also indicated that the Macedonian people had a deep reverence for their kings (3.6.17). References to 8 In fact, the strength of the Argeadae over their centuries of rule likely resulted from a practical "track record" of success in producing heirs and "carrying out military and religious functions."18 The practice of polygamy among the Argead kings tended to produce more heirs than does monogamy, and was, therefore "desirable but not statutory."19 Sometimes too many heirs led to competition among legitimate claimants to the throne.20 Perhaps because of the availability of heirs or simply the need for militarily successful kings to fend off surrounding, hostile peoples, a pattern of succession emerges within Macedonia pointing to the importance of the Argead clan rather than to any particular Argead individual or his line.21 While the age, natural capacity, and experience of an heir played a definite role in describing him as fit for rule, any potential heir, it seems, could succeed to the throne depending on his influence from within the dynasty, his support from foreign states, and especially his "perceived personal competence" Quintus Curtius Rufus may be found in Curtius' History of Alexander, trans. John Yardley (New York: 1984; reprint 2004). R.M. Errington, History of Macedonia, 218, reports that the monarchic system "was so deeply rooted in the Macedonian way of life" that, even during Roman times, numerous pretenders to the throne gained popular support and "had to be suppressed by the legions." Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, also point out (152) that the "royal family were unique in being Greek." Whether or not this "Greekness" was, in fact, unique to the family is irrelevant if their subjects thought their position to be unique and desirable. M.B. Hatzopoulos, in "Macedonians and Other Greeks," states that the belief in the "essential Greekness of the Macedonians . . . was not limited to a literary coterie, but was the communis opinio" during the 5th century BC, found in Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC-300 AD (Leiden: 2011), 57. 18 R. Lane Fox, "399-369 BC," Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC-300 AD (Leiden: 2011), 219. Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 153 emphasize the importance of the king's producing heirs since, in Macedonia, "princes were foremost in the hunt and in battle, and casualties among them were frequent." 19 Carney, Women and Monarchy, 24-25. Quote is from Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 153. Although their kings were polygamous, the Macedonians, like the Greeks, were monogamous. 20 Carney, Women and Monarchy, 24-25. 21 Carney, Women and Monarchy, 6-7. 9 among the Macedonian men in arms.22 Not surprisingly then, the death of an Argead king almost always created a contest among the many potential heirs of the dynasty.23 The traditional Macedonian king was, in some respects, a "Homeric" king in that he was foremost a warrior and the Commander-in-Chief of his army.24 Such a position required the king's physical presence in the forefront of battle and assumes the development of close relationships between him and those who fought alongside him and protected him.25 The royal family served the king as did his hetairoi or companions, including selected advisors, administrators, and appointed generals.26 These hetairoi comprised a group of aristocratic cavalrymen who served as the king's bodyguard and 22 Carney, Women and Monarchy, 24. More will be said below about the importance of a king's personal competence as perceived by the Macedonian Assembly, who often, it seems, chose among potential heirs by its support or withdrawal of support. 23 Carney, Women and Monarchy, 6. 24 Errington, History of Macedonia, 221. Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 156, explain that the king's "command was absolute," that his "orders were obeyed to the letter," and that the "king led the foremost troops" in battle. The nature of his "absolute rule" seems clearly to have been an outgrowth of his role of Commander-in-Chief whose military orders, which were most orders in a military state, could not be disobeyed. This does not prevent Griffith from arguing that the king's rights were not absolute (158). Note the views of Charles Edson, in "Early Macedonia," in Philip of Macedon, ed. Miltiades B. Hatzopoulos and Louisa D. Hatzopoulos (Athens: 2006), 11, who believes that "the fighting men chose the new king from the available males of the royal family, usually the oldest son of the former king, and could express the desires and attitudes of the folk." See also M. Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," in Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC-300 AD (Leiden: 2011), 79, where Mari states: "In Macedonia, as opposed to most other parts of the Greek world, the government was still exercised by a king long after the Heroic Age, and the aristocracy surrounding and counseling him was a reminder of the Homeric world." 25 See Gabriel, Philip II, 37. Gabriel thinks that the traditional relationships among leaders and people grew out of a pastoralist society in which land was owned in common and a powerful chief led a companion of warriors "to protect the group." He calls these relationships the "seeds of the constitutional monarchy that was the mark of the later Macedonian state." 26 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 153-154. More will be said below about a king's companions. 10 closest associates, and whose number grew over time with the growth of Macedonian territory and prosperity, and especially as Philip included them through patronage in this institution.27 What seems rather certain from literary and epigraphic sources is that the Macedonian king had absolute power over traditional, monarchical spheres of authority. He alone received foreign embassies and formed alliances and treaties.28 He owned the mines, the timber stands, hunting parks, and landed estates, and consequently, the king used or distributed the profit from these enterprises as he saw fit.29 All the land was termed the "king's land." Such actions would be confirmed or not by subsequent kings.30 It is telling that the Macedonian king, "not the people or the state," gained seats on the Amphictyonic Council at Delphi in 346 BC.31 The king ruled the cities of Macedonia, whether they were Greek poleis or native towns; and unlike cities in other parts of Greece that acted as independent states, Macedonian poleis did not control the state's politics or determine foreign policy.32 In his own name, the king sent official letters into the cities and country districts addressed from himself to administrators (epistatai) who were called by their first names "as though personal servants of the king."33 The strength of the monarchy has been characterized by R.M. Errington as "the total supremacy of the king in all recorded aspects of public life," especially in consideration of Alexander's actions among Macedonians in Asia, and of the actions of 27 Errington, History of Macedonia, 243. 28 Anson, "Constitutionalism," 304. Errington, History of Macedonia, 220-221. Also, Borza, Shadow of Olympus, 56: "all surviving treaties regulating commerce in timber between foreign states and Macedon were made with the king personally." 29 Errington, History of Macedonia, 222-223. 30 Hammond, Macedonian State, 54-55. 31 Errington, History of Macedonia, 221-222. 32 Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 79. Mari explains: "the cities and the Makedones were nearly invisible to a foreign observer" because other Greeks so closely identified the Macedonian king with the Macedonian state rather than any other entities. 33 Errington, History of Macedonia, 222. 11 his successors.34 Hammond has argued for a strong Macedonian monarch in relation to his hetairoi: a king who "associated with his Companions as primus inter pares," but who was in fact "in complete control of them" since he had promoted them to their position and posts, and had bestowed upon them their wealth.35 Errington attributes the nearly absolute power of a Macedonian king precisely to this close relationship between the king and his hetairoi who, in a less dependent relationship, may have effectively challenged the king's authority.36 Hammond has called the institution of Macedonian kingship a constitutional monarchy, in spite of its autocratic nature, because the king exercised his power as "commander and judge" in accordance with traditional law.37 Drawing on Thucydides' description of "hereditary monarchies with stated rights," Griffith describes Macedonia as a state in which the king had "wide but not absolute rights," that were, in fact, measured by the Macedonian Assembly.38 He asserts that the Assembly chose the king, and that once chosen, he governed by consent, but could also be deposed "by the body 34 Errington, "Macedonian ‘Royal Style' and its Historical Significance," JHS 94 (1974): 37. 35 Hammond, Macedonian State, 57. 36 Errington, History of Macedonia, 219. W.L. Adams presents a summary of the historiography on the debate surrounding the Macedonian Staatsrecht in "Macedonian Kingship and the Right of Petition," in Ancient Macedonia 4: Papers Read at the Fourth International Symposium Held in Thessaloniki, September 21-25, by the Institute for Balkan Studies (Thessaloniki, 1986), 42-46 and throughout the article. F. Granier has argued that the Macedonian monarchy evolved from a Homeric war monarchy into a constitutional monarchy; A. Aymard has argued that the Macedonian right of isēgoria supports the idea of a monarch with defined authority and limited powers. 37 Hammond, Macedonian State, 21. See also Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 385 where Griffith argues that, although an autocrat after assuming power, the king was chosen by the Macedonian army assembled for the purpose and continued to be limited in his jurisdiction of capital crimes. 38 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 158, where Griffith refers to Thuc. 1.13.1and Arr. An. 4.11.6 to substantiate his arguments. See also 386. My references to Arrian's Campaigns of Alexander (Anabasis) are from the translation of Aubrey de Selincourt, ed. J.R. Hamilton (New York: 1958; reprint 1971). 12 which had created him king."39 Unless deposed by this body, however, "the king was a free agent, conducting all affairs as he thought fit and not subject to approval by an organ of what we might call ‘government.'"40 Perhaps the king's traditional roles as a military commander and judge, and how a Macedonian king typically fulfilled those roles, gave the Macedonian monarchy a certain familiar quality that could be called constitutional in that it was deep-rooted, hereditary, and habitual.41 As Errington recognized, in spite of his autocratic power, a Macedonian king "behaved in a way that kept him in close contact with his people" and probably prevented the development of royal accoutrements.42 Part II: The King and His People While the king may theoretically have held absolute power should he have chosen to exercise it, several institutions among the Macedonians point toward a practical limitation of the king's power by traditional customs that required his attention and compliance. The institution of the hetairoi possessed a privileged status based on their personal relationship with the king. C. Edson describes this relationship as one of "mutual benefit and obligation" that functioned as part of Macedonian government.43 The king granted to his hetairoi land, gifts, position, and influence, and in turn, they 39 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 158. Griffith also suggests that a restored version of Curtius, 6.8.25, may read "de capitalibus rebus vetusto Macedonum modo inquirebat (rex, iudicabat) exercitus," and lend credence to a significant political role of the Macedonian Assembly. At 160, Griffith references the example of Amyntas III who was, in fact, "expelled by the Macedonians." 40 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 158. Griffith cites Arr. An. 4.11.6 in support. 41 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 152: "the kings drank, hunted, and fought alongside their contemporaries." 42 Errington, History of Macedonia, 219. 43 Edson, "Early Macedonia," 11. 13 supported him politically, militarily, and personally.44 In fact, Griffith asserts that the hetairoi had earned their positions based not just on the king's original patronage, but on their "personal merit" and the king's subsequent acknowledgement and reward of merit.45 The festival of the Hetairideia, in honor of Zeus and with the king presiding, affirmed this reciprocal rather than unilateral relationship.46 Certainly the hetairoi had a say in who would become king among the available heirs of the Argeadae.47 These hetairoi seemed to have comprised a king's council whenever the king needed advice on a particular issue.48 A king could have formed such a council ad hoc and invited whichever hetairoi he wanted at any given time-rather than a predetermined council of high army officers who would have, in any case, been hetairoi as well.49 In a description that also calls into question the autocratic nature of the Macedonian monarchy, Justin records that Philip was "constrained by the people to take the throne," thereby offering some evidence, at least in the case of Philip, that the Macedonian "people" influenced the selection of their king from among contenders.50 Justin's phrase, compulsus a populo regnum suscepit, suggests that, after Philip had been urged or obliged by the people's expressed wish, he accepted royal power and brought 44 Edson, Early Macedonia, 11. 45 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 162-163. 46 Edson, Early Macedonia, 11. Edson references Athenaeus 13.572d. 47 Errington, History of Macedonia, 220. 48 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 398. 49 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 398. Griffith argues that "to write of the king's council in constitutional terms seems impossible, and to separate its functions into the political, the diplomatic, the military, the judicial, and so on, seems academic." 50 Justin records that Philip "was constrained by the people to take the throne." Justin 7.5.10. All translations of Justin, unless otherwise indicated, are those of J.C. Yardley, Justin: Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus (The American Philological Association: 1994). 14 the kingdom under his protection.51 One assumes that the populus is the Macedonian Assembly or the men in arms who might gather to shout "yay" or "nay" in response to decisions significantly affecting the kingdom and their lives and in response to direction from the hetairoi or aristocracy; but "populus," may in fact mean "the people" as the word is used in this way by Justin in other contexts.52 Certainly the events following the death of Philip describe a system in which powerful nobles or hetairoi could immediately lend their support to a member of the Argead family, who was then confirmed by an Assembly of Macedonian soldiers; these soldiers were either ratifying the hetairoi's selected candidate for king as a genuine demonstration of some actual political role, or acting pro forma, depending on whether and how the institution of the Assembly evolved from earliest Macedonian times into the Hellenistic period.53 At the very least, the Macedonian monarchy had a "personal nature" that afforded Macedonians certain traditional privileges in their relationship with their king, limited only in power by the strength and popularity of the king in relation to his nobility.54 A discussion of the nature of institutions in Macedonia must take into full account the ancient sources' description of the right of Macedonians to speak to and to be heard by 51 Justin, 7.5.10. Abrege des Histoire Philippiques de Trogue Pompee, in Corpus Scriptorum Latinorum: A Digital Library of Latin Literature, edited by Marie-Pierre Arnaud-Lindet, ED maintained by David Camden, 2009. 52 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 390 and note 5, and 391. The suggestion is that soldiers and noncombatants may have been part of an assembly, but again, one assumes that these are former soldiers, or soldiers who may be called up for duty. 53 Anson, "Constitutionalism," 305-308. The soldiers clashed their spears as "part of a ritual surrounding the creation of a new king," but the choice of king had already been made by the "powerful elements in Macedonian society." Curt. 10.7.1-14. Ian Worthington argues that the Macedonian Assembly or men in arms could have had much say in the selection of a new king and particularly when the succession was disputed. Philip II of Macedonia (London: 2008), 12. At the very least, it would seem that the assembly had the role to affirm the selection of king. 54 Anson, "Constitutionalism," 315. 15 their king, whether or not the king had absolute power or was limited by the influence or role of other groups within the realm-and regardless of the class or status of an individual Macedonian.55 W. L. Adams has argued persuasively that ancient literary sources preserve a custom of isegoria, or the right of the Macedonian people to speak freely to their king.56 He cites three examples, each from a different period in Macedonian history and each unique from the others in circumstances. The first example concerns a peltast commander speaking freely to Philip V regarding the arrest of and imposition of a fine on a fellow peltast, and in turn, other peltasts speaking to the king on behalf of the commander when Philip charged the commander with crimes.57 Two additional examples show an old woman, whose petition was repeatedly rebuffed by Philip II, responding to his excuse that he had no time to listen to her petition with the words, "then don't be king," and a defendant criticizing Philip for falling asleep during his trial where Philip was apparently presiding.58 Philip's reported response in the former instance was to right his wrongs by listening to petitions, and in the latter by paying the defendant's fine himself. Another time, Philip's soldiers demanded their back pay when 55 The best summary of the scholarship and arguments for the traditional rights of Macedonians to speak to and be heard by their king are found in Adams, "Right of Petition," 43-52. Hammond and Griffith , History of Macedonia, 153, also suggest that instances of the Macedonian soldiers "speaking frankly to their king are typical of the independent spirit of a people, which, as Curtius remarked ‘was accustomed to the rule of a king but lived with a greater sense of freedom than any others subject to a monarchy.'" Curt. 4.7.31. 56 Here, Adams is following the suggestion of A. Aymard as indicated in "Right of Petition." Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 392. Griffith defines isēgoria in the case of Macedonia as "the habit of answering back, and letting it be known to the king, if they disliked something, that they did dislike it." 57 Polybius records this instance in Polyb. 5 as referenced by Adams, "Right of Petition," 46-47. Adams notes that A. Amyard discussed this example in his 1950 study, "Sur l'assemblee macedonienne," in REA 52 (1950). 58 W.L. Adams, "Right of Petition," 47-48, in which he uses these examples recorded in Plut. Moralia 179 and Plut. Moralia 178, respectively. These references are made in another context above-related to laws and justice. 16 Philip was broke.59 Philip good-naturedly received the criticism, even though he could not meet the demand.60 Demetrius Poliorcetes' reign provides numerous examples of a king who would give no hearings, was inaccessible to his subjects, was therefore compared unfavorably to Philip, and was even approached and denounced by the hetairoi for his lavish lifestyle.61 These examples consistently represent that, regardless of the king's traditional authority, the limits to his powers in any given era, or the status or size of the groups involved, the Macedonian people expected to be able to approach their king and freely express their opinions to him.62 And they expected the king to listen-even when he could not or would not grant their requests.63 An understanding of this relationship between the king and his people necessary defines the Macedonian king as constrained by custom to meet with and respond to his people, and to distribute justice. These examples also suggest that the people expected a king to provide for his people what they considered their due, although he may not have been formally required to do so. Perhaps Curtius had in mind this traditional relationship when he explained that, even 59 Polyaen. Strat. 4.2.6, as cited in Adams, "Right of Petition," 48. 60 Adams, "Right of Petition," 48. Adams emphasizes the fact that Philip took the abuse from the soldiers because the soldiers had the right to complain, and Philip had the obligation to listen. 61 Adams, "Right of Petition," 48-49, where he references Plut. Demetr. 41-44. 62 Anson, "Constitutionalism," 314-315, where he references Plut. Demetr. 42. 2-4; Mor. 179C; Polyb. 5. 27. 6-8 and Arr. An. 5.27. 2-9. Adams also demonstrates in "Right to Petition," 50-52 that a petition to the king could come from an individual, a small group, or from a large group as a "mass representation." Nor does Adams think that it matters whether these groups employing their right to free speech constituted a "council of war, an informal meeting, or an assembly which had the right to vote," as it is the institution of isēgoria itself that matters most in understanding the Macedonian state. 63 Adams, "Right of Petition." Throughout this article, Adams suggests that the ancient literary examples provide evidence that the Macedonians could approach their king with concerns related to or unrelated to legal cases, whether or not the king wanted to hear what they had to say, but with no specific expectation that the king would grant their requests. 17 though "the Macedonians were accustomed to monarchy, they lived in the shadow of liberty more than other races . . ."64 Part III: The King and the Law While the judicial system of Macedonia is uncertain, the king held the power to summon, to judge, and to condemn or acquit someone accused of serious or even capital crimes. Nevertheless, the king seems constrained in his exercise of this power by a traditional or customary law requiring him to sound the opinions of his hetairoi, or some select council, that had adjudicated such cases, unless he wanted to be seen as a tyrant.65 The king may only have acted as a prosecutor in capital cases while the Assembly judged such cases and carried out any necessary executions.66 Griffith suggests that the king could even be tried for treason in the Assembly and sentenced by the Assembly, if found guilty.67 That Macedonia had laws before Philip is quite certain, even if we do not have much evidence of a specific written code of laws before or during Philip's reign.68 The law, or nomos, of the Macedonians was not written or given by a traditional council or a democratic assembly, but the Macedonians had law, nevertheless, and the law bound the 64 Curtius 4.7.31. 65 Anson, "Constitutionalism," 304-305, 309-310, referring to the conspiracy described in Curt. 8.6.28, 8.8.20; he also refers to R.M. Errington's comments in "The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy," 89-90, that, prior to the condemnation of Philotas and Permenion, Alexander needed to "test his ‘auctoritas' before exercising his ‘potestas.'" Hammond and Griffith believe that the king had limited authority in the sphere of jurisdiction. See History of Macedonia, 385-386. 66 Adams describes the argument for a constitutional nature of the Macedonian state as consisting of two important "pillars:" that the Assembly elected the king and that he only prosecuted in trials "de capitalibus rebus," in "Right of Petition," 43. See also Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 158 and 385. 67 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 68 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 385-386. 18 various groups in the state to act their part in the state's governance.69 Numerous instances recorded by Plutarch reveal Philip sitting as a judge, hearing cases, considering throwing a man out of his court, as though laws and judicial procedures had been well established by Philip's reign.70 Polybius recorded incidents in which Philip's officers inspected allegations, heard witnesses, and made a report to the king; and in response to their information, Philip asked for securities for payment of fines, or arrested specific individuals based on his understanding of the evidence.71 Plutarch also records that Philip appointed as a judge one of Antipater's friends, whom he later dismissed because he did not trust his judgment.72 In a rare glimpse of the Macedonian legal system, references to a dispute between Philip and the Athenians over the island of Halonnesus suggest that, until the relationship between Athens and Philip had become highly adversarial, no formal treaties had been necessary between the two states to ensure that both Athenians and Macedonians received justice in Macedonian courts.73 Arrian reported two speeches that suggest that Philip continued a tradition of the rule of law within Macedonia and then extended it to conquered territories and peoples who were unaccustomed to rule by law. In the first report, Callisthenes reminds 69 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 386-387, and 393. 70 Plut. Moralia (Regum et Imperatorum Apophthegmata, 177-178). See especially those sayings numbered 5, 24, 25, and 31. References are to Plutarch's Moralia, vol. 3, trans. Frank Cole Babbitt (London: 1931; reprint 1949), 41-53. See also Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 386-387, and 393. 71 Polyb. 5.15 and 5.27. W.L. Adams references these incidents from Polybius when describing the Macedonians' right to address and be heard by their kings throughout his article, "Right of Petition." These recorded incidents may refer to Philip V, but demonstrate the nature and persistence of isēgoria among the Macedonians. 72 Plut. Moralia (Regum et Imperatorum Apophthegmata 178), saying number 23. Philip's appointment of one of Antipater's friends demonstrates the patronage that a king distributed to his loyal hetairoi. 73 The Demosthenic corpus (7) includes this information according to Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 393 and 511. 19 Alexander that he is "Philip's son, a man with the blood of Heracles and Aeacus in his veins, a man whose forefathers came from Argos to Macedonia, where they long ruled not by force, but by law."74 In the second, Alexander reminds his soldiers that Philip brought them law, made them city-dwellers, and civilized them.75 What emerges from these records is a tradition of a Macedonian king who is expected to rule justly and to govern according to customary laws-extending justice to his own people, to foreigners within his realm, to conquered peoples, and to conquered territories. Part IV: The Concept of the Macedonia State The concept of the Macedonian state, as compared to other Greek states, suggests a model of rule more akin to ancient Sparta in that the king and state's raison d'etre was "conquest and war."76 In such a state, categories of constitutionalism or absolutism may be inapplicable.77 A Macedonian king established his legitimacy by his success in battle and his winning of land, resources, and security for his people. His state was a "military state," and his position would be better compared to other monarchies in the Balkans, 74 Arr. An. 4.11. 75 Arr. An. 7.9. 76 Hammond, Macedonian State, at 63 suggests that Macedonia can be described in exactly the same way that Aristotle described Sparta as a state designed entirely for "conquest and war" (note 48). 77 Alan E. Samuel, "Philip and Alexander as Kings: Macedonian Monarchy and Merovingian Parallels," AHR 93, no. 5 (December 1988): 1270; Samuel acknowledges: "there are wide variances in views, from Macedonian kingship as almost a constitutional monarchy to the opposite extreme of representing it as an unrestrained autocracy." I will refer later to Alan Samuel's comparison of the monarchy to Merovingian chieftains in contrast to the formal analysis influenced by Hellenistic and Roman models often applied anachronistically to the Macedonian monarchy. Adams argues, in "Right of Petition," 44-45, that scholars lack definitive evidence for absolutism or constitutionalism in Macedonia and that such evidence as exists is from limited periods; most importantly, that theories of the nature of the Macedonian state are "entirely too legalistic" and force the evidence into "preconceived and entirely modern notions of a constitution." 20 including those of the Dardanians, Paeonians, and Thracians.78 The Macedonian state also had affinities to early Thessalian models of rule.79 Hammond has pointed out that, unlike other Greek states in the south as they expanded, the Macedonians applied the name, "Macedonia," to newly conquered territories.80 They defined their kingdom as "the territory over which the king as the executive agent of the state exercised a direct authority" rather than a state defined by strict ethnicity or locale.81 This definition implies that the king, his territory, and his people could be constantly redefined as "Macedonia." Any "constitutional" systems in such an ancient state would have to be simple, malleable, and based more on personal relationships and general customs than on a strict adherence to law or formalities.82 W. L. Adams has aptly described the Macedonian constitution as "fluid" with a king's success based largely on his auctoritas and his attention to his customary duties within his historical context.83 Aristotle delineated several "expansionist tribal states (ethne) which rated military prowess and 78 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 166. Griffith argues that "the same pattern of tribal life and of intertribal warfare, practiced often for plunder" characterizes these monarchies. Griffith also describes these Balkan monarchies as having "elite troops . . . formed around the king, as in the state of Macedonia." Griffith also makes the connection among these ethne as to their king's role (156): "As elsewhere in the Balkans the kings of Macedon were primarily warrior kings." 79 Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 79-80, where Mari points out the "regular trade relations" that existed between Macedonia and Thessaly throughout the Bronze Age and the Macedonian affinity with other people's of the Balkan region. 80 Hammond, The Macedonian State, 49 ff. 81 Hammond, Macedonian State, 49. 82 Adams, "Right of Petition," 45, argues persuasively that the Macedonian state contained aspects of legal, customary, and personal relationships in the patterns of interaction between groups---a description consistent with a developing society that defies categorization by "current legal or social theory." 83 Adams, "Right of Petition," 45-46. 21 power most highly" in his Politics.84 Among these listed states, Aristotle gives examples from the Scythians, Thracians, and the Macedonians-all in the Balkans. Aristotle also supports this interpretation of the Macedonian state in his Politics in which he describes the benefit of Macedonian kingship to have been the "settling or gaining control of territory," although he may just as easily have ascribed to it the benefits of other types of kingship from his list, such as elected kingship or absolute power.85 Aristotle's classification also suggests the primacy of the king's military role in defining the state. While the army or nobles had to "ratify or accept" the new king as their leader, "once on the throne, a king was not necessarily secure" but had to continue to seek or earn support.86 The six years following Archelaus' murder and the accession of Amyntas III in which five or six kings came to power, as well as the "murderous campaign" against his opponents that secured the throne for Amyntas III, would suggest that a king's security and authority depended on something besides his Argead lineage and absolute power.87 Samuel sees the Macedonian king as analogous to the kings of the Germanic nations of the Western Roman Empire "whose power fluctuated with the abilities and 84 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 166, where Griffith cites Aristotle (1324b), to make the argument that the Macedonia state was primarily a military state and recognized as such in ancient times. 85 Aristotle, Politics 5.88.5 (1310b 38) as cited by Alan E. Samuel, "Philip and Alexander as Kings: Macedonian Monarchy and Merovingian Parallels," AHR 93, no. 5 (December 1988): 1272 and note 7. Samuel points out that no one was in a better position to have "known the kingship of Macedon" than Aristotle (1272). Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 517-519, in which Griffith delineates Aristotle's "special connection" with Macedonia since Aristotle's father had been a court physician to Philip's father so Aristotle had been raised at the Macedonian court with Philip, and it is likely that Philip and Aristotle had kept in touch during the latter's absence-hence the appointment of Aristotle as Alexander's tutor in 342 B.C. 86 Samuel, "Philip and Alexander," 1274. 87 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 168-172. For revised dates of the reigns of the kings of this period, see R. Lane Fox, "399-369," in Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedonia, 650 BC-300 AD, ed. R. Lane Fox (Leiden: 2011), 210-219. See also Worthington, Philip II, 223. 22 accomplishments of those who held it" and was "for the most part measured in military terms."88 In addition, he judges that the forty-year combined reigns of Philip II and Alexander allowed the office of king to "accumulate prestige and power in quantities sufficient to overawe or overwhelm the body of soldiers," and to constitute a real shift in the power of the monarch against the will of his nobles and generals.89 Part V: The Army Thucydides describes the Macedonian army of Perdiccas, in 429/8 when Sitalces and his Odrysians invaded Macedonia, as unable to take the field against so numerous an invader," and so "shut themselves up in such strong places and fortresses as the country possessed."90 According to Thucydides, the Macedonians "never even thought of meeting him with infantry," but attacked the Odrysians "by handfuls of their horse, which had been reinforced from their allies in the interior." These cavalrymen were "armed with breastplates, excellent horsemen," and "wherever these charged they overthrew all before them." They were simply too few, however, to put Sitalces' forces of combined infantry and cavalry to flight. Only low provisions, bad weather, and the potential of 88 Samuel, in "Philip and Alexander," 1272 and 1276, sees the Germanic and Macedonian nations in the same stage of development and postulates his view based on the large amount of evidence available for the Germanic kingdoms as compared to evidence for the Macedonian kingdom at this stage of development. Ellis supports a similar view in Philip II, 24. Ellis suggests that the king was essentially an "elected military commander whose authority in peacetime was initially a function more of his personal standing and strength than of his office," but that his office had "solidified into something more formal but with residual traces of its beginnings" by historical times. 89 Samuel, "Philip and Alexander," 1276 and 1279. 90 Thuc. 2.100. 1-2. Translations of Thucydides are those of Richard Crawley, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, ed. Robert B. Strassler (New York: 1996). 23 numerous enemies allying against him forced Sitalces out of Macedonia.91 The implication from Thucydides' description is that the Macedonian army in the 5th century B.C. included an excellent cavalry and a negligible infantry. While skilled and well armed, the Macedonian cavalry was hardly a match against the numbers of combined infantry and cavalry that its enemies could muster. Diodorus describes the Macedones, in a governmental sense, as "the men serving in the King's Forces, hai basilikai dynameis, and those who had so served."92 He also suggests that these men had been specifically "chosen by the king to serve in his forces." To the extent that Macedonia had a state or civil administration, the army, in local militias, oversaw and executed such administration.93 There is no evidence of any "administrative class or of state officials other than the military-officer element" in ancient Macedonia.94 For that matter, the only national institution beyond the monarchy for which an argument can be made is the "army organization when not actually under arms," however weak or strong it may have been at any given period.95 Griffith makes the important point that a consideration of the Macedonian army in any period is also a discussion of Macedonia's social history since the army or parts of the army constituted the Assembly and possibly an advisory council of hetairoi, while the king served as the highest officer in the army.96 91 Thuc. 2.101. 92 Hammond, Macedonian State, 63. See Diod. 18.16.1 for the designation, hai basilikai dynameis. 93 Hammond, Macedonian State, 63. 94 Ellis, Philip II, 28. 95 Ellis, Philip II, 26. 96 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 407. Since the evidence is more abundant from Philip II's reign on, and especially during the reign of Alexander III, I will elaborate on the army's social significance in the sections below that discuss Philip's reign. 24 The groups constituting the Macedonian army were several before the time of Philip II. The hetairoi appear to have existed ab initio in Macedonia and to have made up the core of the cavalry, the King's Companions, distinguished for their excellence and rewarded by their inclusion in a social and economic class of large landowners.97 This same socio-economic class seems to have produced the heavy cavalry force, the top generals and administrators, and the king's close retainers-including an inner group of advisors.98 The cavalry also constituted the main corps of the Macedonian army before Philip II.99 The rest of the Macedonian men whose land holdings may have been smaller served as some type of infantry or light cavalry, but we have little information about the infantry as an effective fighting force prior to the reign of Philip II.100 Diodorus records that Macedonia lost more than 4,000 men in battle at the hands of the Illyrians in the military disaster that killed Philip's brother and brought Philip into contention for the throne.101 The Macedonian king must have, therefore, levied some 97 Ellis, Philip II, 26. 98 The hetairoi were also mentioned above in the section on monarchy as holding a special position vis a vis the king. See also Ellis, Philip II, 26-27. Ellis compares the inner circle to the hetairoi of Homer or the comitatus described in Tacitus' Germania. 99 So Thucydides would suggest above, as does G.T. Griffith, "Philip as a General and the Macedonian Army," in Philip of Macedon, ed. Miltiades B. Hatzopoulos and Louisa D. Loukopoulos (Athens: 2006), 58-59. 100 Thucydides attributes a significant strengthening of a Macedonian infantry to Archelaus in Thuc. 2.100. 1-2. As mentioned above, Thucydides' descriptions have generally been substantiated by archaeological discoveries over time, so it is safe to say, I think, that the Macedonians had some infantry prior to Philip that Archelaus had improved. Perhaps the reason Thucydides did not mention the infantry when the Odrysians invaded Macedonia is because its size and effectiveness at that time was no match for the Odrysians, and the infantry was not sent into pitched battle. See also Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, especially 405ff. to understand the dearth of sources from before Philip and the helpful details related to the army during the reign of Alexander from ancient literary sources. 101 Diod. 16.2.5 : "For the Macedonians had lost more than four thousand men in battle, and the remainder, panic-stricken, had become exceedingly afraid of the Illyrian armies and had lost heart for continuing the war." 25 infantry troops from across the ever-changing boundaries of his kingdom to serve as soldiers before Philip's time. Griffith questions the nature of this group as a "phalanx" prior to Philip, as both the sources and "the logic of events themselves point to Philip" as the creator of the Macedonian phalanx.102 Nor does the term pezhetairoi appear before Philip's reforms of the army.103 We know that Philip established a group of Foot Companions called pezhetairoi that functioned as an elite group of soldiers, or a Royal Guard not unlike his cavalry companions, and that he probably used this designation to extend privileged status and to generate loyalty among the group of leaders in a newly expanded infantry.104 The act of establishing an elite group of Foot Companions suggests that a traditional group of foot soldiers existed before Philip from whom Philip could choose an elite group. Alexander III designated his elite group of foot soldiers as hypaspistai (or long-shield bearers), although Philip may have established this designation toward the end of his reign-but not before.105 A group of servants and 102 Griffith, "Philip as General," 58. See also Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 406. 103 Griffith, "Philip as General," 58-59. Griffith asserts that Philip "gave Macedonia for the first time a real army and a great one." 104 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 405-406. Griffith argues that a fragment from Anaximenes (FGrH no. 72 F 4) probably describes the pezhetairoi during the reign of Alexander III. If the "Alexander" of the fragment refers to Alexander I or Alexander II, it may be that one of these kings began to establish an infantry by a general levy. Such an interpretation, however, seems anachronistic in light of Thucydides' remarks and Diodorus' description of Philip's reforms that will be discussed below. See also Griffith, "Philip as General," 58 where Griffith asserts that the designation, pezhetairoi, appears firmly in the 340s to describe Philip's royal footguards-and not before Philip. Andrew Erskine makes the point that the fragment of Anaximenes that seems to contradict Theopompus lacks a context in which to understand it, and may be referring to a particular rather than a general description, "The Pezhetairoi of Philip II and Alexander III," Historia 38, no. 4 (1989): 385-394. 105 Griffith, "Philip as General," 58-59. 26 laborers, who worked on the land of wealthier citizens, may have served as camp supporters of the army.106 The king as general, a competent but small cavalry, and a somewhat inconsequential infantry constituted the Macedonian army before Philip II.107 Not surprisingly, the same groups constituting the army units of Macedonia corresponded precisely to those groups functioning as organs of the Macedonian state in the period prior to Philip II. 106 Ellis, Philip II, 27 and 41. Ellis cites Beloch on this point and states that Beloch believes that this lowest class outnumbered Macedonian citizens; he also references Arrian 4.4.1 and Curtius 6.8.23. The point does not seem conclusive to me from this evidence. Curtius mentions 6,000 soldiers appearing before Alexander III in a call for a "general assembly in arms," accompanied by "camp-followers and servants." Such folk typically accompanied an ancient army, and the context is Asia and not Macedonia. It is more likely that most Macedonian citizens were shepherds or farmers with small landholdings. 107 Griffith, "Philip as General," 59. CHAPTER II THE MACEDONIAN STATE BEFORE PHILIP Part I: The Precedents of Alexander and Archelaus Among the number of kings whom we know prior to Philip II, only two successfully implemented systems designed to centralize, unify, and strengthen Macedonia. These are Alexander I and Archelaus. Herodotus and Thucydides give the best literary information for the infrastructure of the Macedonian state during the 5th century BC, and much of Griffith's analysis of Macedonia from the reigns of Alexander I to Archelaus is based on their reports.108 Both historians identify the ancient homeland of Macedonia in Pieria between the Thermaic gulf, the Haliacmon River, Mount Olympus, and the Pierian Mountains.109 Thucydides explains that Macedonia did not control most of the areas outside this Macedonian heartland, even where the residents were culturally or ethnically Macedonian: "for the Lyncestae, Elimiots, and other tribes more inland, though Macedonians by blood and allies and dependents of their kindred, still have their own separate governments."110 108 Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 80-81. Mari supports the view that the digressions found in both Herod. 8137-9 and Thuc. 2.99-2.100.2 constitute the best "surviving narratives of the origins and early expansion of the Macedonian kingdom" (81). See Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 98-104 and 115-141. 109 Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 81. 110 Thuc. 2.99. 2. 28 With the exception of the foundation legends, neither Herodotus nor Thucydides says much about Macedonia before the Persian invasion, when Macedonia would have become more interesting to the general Greek reader; and the first kings mentioned are Amyntas I and his son Alexander I, who ruled for nearly the first half of the 5th century BC.111 The Macedonian homeland expanded greatly as a result of Persia's early 5th century intrusions into Macedonian lands. Beginning in 512 BC, the Persians required the Macedonians to become their vassal state, and this situation continued until Xerxes' defeat at the hand of the Greeks and his withdrawal in 479 BC.112 Darius had destroyed Paeonian power to the northwest of Macedonia in the 490s and had opened up trade between Persia and Macedonia.113 Amyntas took advantage of his alliance with Persia and Paeonia's weakness to expand the kingdom north beyond the Axius River.114 Though Thucydides acknowledges that eight Macedonian kings preceded the reign of Archelaus (413-399 BC), he mentions only Alexander I, son of Amyntas, whose "role in the enlargement of the ‘Old Kingdom' had been decisive."115 When Persia invaded Greece a second time, Xerxes supported Alexander I in his efforts to bring the cantons of Upper Macedonia under his control.116 The bonanza for Alexander I came as the Persians withdrew from Greece leaving weakened polities behind them, and enabling Alexander to conquer Crestonia, Bisaltia, Mygdonia, the Strymon basin, the Nine Ways, 111 Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 85. 112 Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 85. 113 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 99-100. 114 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 99. 115 Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 83. The information on the Macedonian kings is found in the digression on Sitalces in Thuc. 2.95-101. 116 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 99-100. 29 and significantly, the Bisaltic gold and silver mines.117 Thucydides lists those areas considered as "Macedonian territory" that had been hard won, and presumably, hard kept during the time of Alexander I, as requiring "the expulsion of peoples" from their lands in the process of conquest.118 Thucydides is the first to document the Macedonian practice of expelling the original inhabitants from conquered territories, as apparently happened in Pieria, Bottia, Eordaea, and Almopia over the course of the 5th century B.C., and re-populating the regions with Macedonians.119 The Macedonian practice of depopulating and repopulating conquered territories probably began with Alexander I. In the process of expansion, he may have established this system of resettlement in order to locate more Macedonians on land, thus qualifying them for his military levy. Throughout Persia's hegemony over Macedon, Alexander had been playing a "double game" with the Persians, courting their favor while continuing to trade with and to seek the approval of Greek cities in the south, and particularly Athens.120 Among other things, Alexander had cultivated xenia with Greek elites, served Persia as a 117 Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 84. See also Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 99-100. Hammond and Griffith also explain, 102, that the group that gained most from the Persian withdrawal was the Chalcidians who gained Olynthus at this time. There is also some question as to whether or not Macedonia occupied the Nine Ways at this early date. For a consideration of the arguments, see Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 86. Regardless, the Macedonians would soon lose control of the Nine Ways over which the Athenians and Thracians would fight for control of Strymon basin (as noted in Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 102-103). 118 Thuc. 2.99. 3-6. 119 Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Greece," 83. Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, note that Alexander also offered refuge and settlement to the people of Mycenae in 468 BC (103). 120 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 99 and note 3. Alexander was called the "Philhellene" in ancient times, although this epithet was probably a late attachment to distinguish Alexander I from Alexander III. Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Greece," 86-87, explains that Herodotus consistently refers to Alexander as a "friend of the Greeks," in spite of Alexander's loyalty to the Persians. His diplomacy between Athens and Persia is a direct result of his status as a proxenos of the Athenians. See Herod. 7.173, 8.131.1, 8.136-144, and Just. 7.4.2. 30 diplomat to Athens based on his historically good relations with the Athenians, participated in the Olympic games, and patronized Panhellenic sanctuaries.121 As a result of Alexander's successful relations with both the Persians and the Greeks, Macedonia's trade had increased, the Persians had begun to expand their royal road system, the "King's Road," into northern Greece as well as secondary routes, and had even built a bridge at the Nine Ways, thus opening up land routes for the movement of soldiers and trade.122 After Persia's retreat and Alexander's subsequent conquests, Alexander had the resources to mint Macedonian coins in the name of the king for the first time in Macedonian history.123 While Alexander temporarily controlled silver mines in the Dysoron Mountains that the Thracians had controlled, he created coins that borrowed greatly from neighboring peoples such as the Thracians and the nearby Greek poleis so that Macedonia could trade with these local peoples.124 Significantly, Kremydi explains that the varieties of Macedonia coinage of Alexander I and his immediate successors, 121 Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 87. Significantly, W.L. Adams sees these Greek games in which Alexander I, Archelaus, and later, Philip II participated as "rooted in religious practice," defining of "Greek culture," and "seen by the Greeks themselves and by those around them as an iconic representation of Greek civilization," and as such served as a "benchmark for Hellenic identity, both in Greece and outside it." Adams' arguments are found in "Sport and Ethnicity in Ancient Macedonia," in Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in Honor of Eugene N. Borza (Claremont: 2008): 57; Adams also points out that Alexander I, Archelaus, and Philip II employed their participation or alleged association with Greek games to strengthen their positions and enhance their prestige, 58-62. 122 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 100. The Persian troops built the roads using local trees, with a third of what was left of Xerxes' entire invasion army employed in the tree felling on one stretch of road over "the shoulder of the Pierian range." See also Herod. 7.131. 123 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 100. Hammond and Griffith, 110, also explain that the emblems on Alexander's coins were mostly of "religious significance." 124 S. Kremydi, "Coinage and Finance," in Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedonia, 650 BC-300 AD, ed. R. Lane Fox (Leiden: 2011), 161-162. 31 designed to match the varieties of standards used by Thracians, Athenians, and northern colonies, "reflects, on a monetary level, the complex environment in which this ethnos was destined to survive and develop."125 As a result of his resources in precious metals and his subsequent prosperity, Alexander was also able to dedicate two gold statues of himself to Apollo and Zeus; and according to Herodotus, Alexander's Bisaltic mines were providing an "income of a talent of silver a day."126 Alexander's borders extended west to within Lyncestis and east to the Strymon; and he had solidified his relationship with Elimeia by a royal marriage.127 Even though Alexander had established his state as "the strongest state on the Thraco-Macedonian mainland," his economy remained largely underdeveloped, most of his people continued to lead a pastoral life, and Macedonia lacked a "heavy-armed infantry."128 By the end of his reign, the Edones had captured the Bisaltic mines, and Athens had stirred up disunity among the Balkan tribes and disrupted Macedonian routes for accessing timber and mines.129 Thucydides also describes the efforts of Archelaus (413-399 BC) to build a national infrastructure in Macedonia. These efforts were clearly military in nature and included the construction or improvement of fortresses and roads: 125 Kremydi, Coinage and Finance, 162. 126 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 104-105. Herod. 5.17.2. See also Borza, In the Shadow of Olympus, 164, where Borza explains how the production of these silver mines "provided the funds needed for Archelaus' program of military and cultural reform." 127 Worthington, Philip II, 221. W.S. Greenwalt, "The Production of Coinage from Archelaus to Perdiccas III and the Evolution of Argead Macedonia," in Ian Worthington (ed.), Ventures into Greek History: Essays in Honor of N.G.L. Hammond (Oxford: 1994): 105-106. 128 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 114-115. At 114, Griffith makes this judgment of Alexander: "a strong and enterprising leader of his people, the creator of an enlarged kingdom, a man of Greek outlook and Panhellenic spirit . . . he was a worthy forerunner . . . of Philip and Alexander." 129 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 114. 32 Of these there was no great number . . . having been erected . . . by Archelaus son of Perdiccas on his accession, who also cut straight roads, and otherwise put the kingdom on a better footing as regards horses, heavy infantry, and other war material than had been done by all the eight kings that preceded him.130 Thucydides' suggests that Archelaus paid particular attention to building up his military, and to the supporting logistical preparations and strategic sites that such an enterprise would entail. Thucydides words, "cut straight roads," suggest an opening up of new routes "through forested country," such as that toward and through the cantons of Upper Macedonia where life was still largely pastoral, as well as the strategically important route through the Demir Kapu en route to the Paeonians.131 Archaeological findings near Demir Kapu on a rocky hilltop across from the ancient settlement describe a fortified structure with a tower dated to the end of the 5th century, and suggest the likelihood that Archelaus established this and other such fortresses.132 His fortifying of strongholds and improving the means of moving men and information through his kingdom complemented Archelaus' efforts to increase and improve both the Macedonian cavalry and infantry along with their weapons and supplies.133 Thucydides' reference to heavy infantry undoubtedly refers to Archelaus' hoplite levy, or the levying of a soldier who 130 Thuc. 2.100. 1-2. W. Greenwalt, "Why Pella?" Historia 48, no. 2 (1999): 166-167. Greenwalt includes in these fortifications "the Zoodokos, Kara Burun, and Demir Kapu passes (providing access to the lower Macedonian plain from Elimaea, Eordaea, and Paeonia respectively)," although only the Demir Kapu Pass has yielded supportive archaeological evidence so far. See Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 140 and 146. Griffith indicates his belief that Thucydides was writing from personal knowledge of Macedonia and of Archelaus (137). 131 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 140. Griffith, 140, goes as far as to suggest that Archelaus was the creator of the "viae regiae" or "viae militares" referred to by Livy 44.43.1, (odoi basilikai) that "ran through the Pierian forest from Aegeae direct to Pydna . . .from Beroea through the Zoodokos Pege into Elimea and from Edessa via Kara Burun into Eordaea." 132 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 146. 133 Worthington, Philip II, Appendix 3, 221-222. 33 would have been a landowner connected with divisions of Macedonian poleis or ethne.134 Greenwalt suggests that Archelaus had the ability to raise more troops than his predecessors because he had "tapped the manpower of nearby and once independent Greek poleis" and had "fostered the development of Macedonian poleis on the Greek model-without, of course, granting them political autonomy."135 Archelaus' founding of the cities of Pella and Dion, while long considered strategic and cultural, should also be considered military and social. Archelaus extended a Hellenic institution, the polis, within Macedonia in order to "expand the social class from which he could draft hoplites."136 Hatzopoulos sees in Archelaus' policies a king who fostered urbanization, built fortifications to protect urban centers, levied troops from the "middle class" of these cities, and then identified his people by these polities.137 Archelaus had begun a practice that Philip would implement on a large scale: the defining of Macedonian citizenship through the king's granting of land in return for military service, and the defining of the Macedonian state through that relationship. When Thucydides speaks about Archelaus' preparation of "war material," he is likely referring to improvements in bronze body armor, iron weaponry, cavalry gear, and 134 Greenwalt, "Why Pella," 172. 135 Greenwalt, "Why Pella," 172. Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 148. Griffith explains that Archelaus drew men from Pella and other developing urban centers. 136 Greenwalt, "Why Pella," 172. See also Ellis, Philip II, 41 where Ellis explains that Archelaus' new centers served "as agencies for recruitment." 137 M.B. Hatzopoulos, "The Cities," in Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC-300 AD (Leiden: 2011), 238. Hatzopoulos perceives a trend during the fifth century BC in Macedonia towards "the entrenchment and diffusion of civic values and institutions" that Archelaus attempted "to control rather than to suppress." Ellis, Philip II, 41 and note 87. Ellis thinks that Archelaus is the king who reorganized Lower Macedonia "into a series of cantons dominated by and perhaps administered from central towns . . . " Such a reorganization did occur at some point, and Ellis believes Arrian who attributes this reorganization to Archelaus (Arrian, Ind. 18). 34 missile weapons.138 Archaeological evidence from the Balkans indicates that infantrymen from before the time of Archelaus wore the ‘Illyrian helmet' and a light shield, and wielded two spears and a short sword. These infantrymen were "second rate" compared to the typical Greek hoplite fighting in a tight phalanx formation because they fought in a loose formation or individually. Macedonian infantry numbers were small compared to their own cavalry numbers, their enemies' cavalry, and even the numbers of infantrymen that their neighbors could muster.139 Archelaus' intervention in Thessalian affairs and his subsequent control of strategic territory between Macedonia and Thessaly give proof of Archelaus' success in implementing his military reforms.140 And yet, Archelaus was still a weak king in some ways, especially against the kingdom's cities in the Chalcidice that were pushing for autonomy.141 He was not always strong enough to settle his own domestic problems, as when he required the support of a small contingent of the Athenian fleet in order to retake the city of Pydna in 410 after it had revolted. After Archelaus had reconquered Pydna with Athens' help, he tellingly moved the city to a site that he could better manage. 138 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 140-147. What follows is largely Griffith's analysis of the archaeological evidence. 139 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 147. Griffith points out that the cavalry of the Upper cantons of Macedonia were the only fighting corps before Archelaus that could have given anybody a good fight. He also explains that the Odrysians could put 50,000 cavalry into the field and 100,000 infantrymen as under Sitalces. Such a superior number of enemy troops explains why "the population of Macedonia took to the hills and any defeated infantrymen did likewise" during an invasion. See Thuc. 4.124.3. See also Ellis, Philip II, 41. Ellis argues that Thucydides' information supports a view that "the cavalry was excellent (though perhaps not numerous) but the infantry was totally inadequate." 140 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 141. 141 Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 91-92. See also Diod. 13.49.1. What follows is Mari's analysis of the weakness of Archelaus relative to the strong cities of the Chalcidice. 35 During Archelaus' reign, the Athenian disaster at Syracuse relaxed Athenian naval activity and increased the demand for Macedonian timber from Athens and from Athens' enemies.142 Numismatic evidence indicates that Archelaus had regained control of the Bisaltic mines and was mining copper within Orestis and Tymphaea, suggesting his control over these areas.143 Archelaus minted coins, including a "varied series of denominations" of silver staters of significant weight and of new weights that would facilitate trade with his neighbors and the larger Aegean community.144 He even began to mint bronze coins for internal exchange that would replace, over time, the "expensive and impractical silver fractions."145 W. Greenwalt notes the significant increase in Archelaus' output of coinage compared to his predecessors and attributes this increase to his "attempt to generate a more complex economy driven by cash exchange."146 The debasing of his coinage, even his best silver, and his choice of coin weights indicate Archelaus' efforts to maintain a closed and profitable system within Macedonia, to increase his access to tax revenues, and to facilitate trade with Athens. Greenwalt sees such measures as evidence of a "major domestic reorganization and a significant commercial initiative aimed at Athenian trade." 142 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 137-139, 141. 143 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 138-139. Griffith, 139, also points out that Archelaus' interference in Thessalian affairs demonstrates his control over "Elimea, Tymphaea, and Orestis." 144 Greenwalt, "Coinage," 106-107. Greenwalt, "Why Pella?," 173. See also Kremydi, "Coinage and Finance," 164. 145 Kremydi, "Coinage and Finance," 164. Kremydi also points out that these bronze issues remained scarce during Archelaus' reign, but continued to increase in abundance "under the reigns of Amyntas III and Perdiccas III" just prior to Philip's reign; and they begin to "dominate everyday transactions within the Macedonian kingdom" (164). Clearly, Archelaus started something that proved, over time, its effectiveness as an economic measure. 146 Greenwalt, "Why Pella," 173. Greenwalt's suggestions follow. 36 Kremydi argues that, sometime in the 5th century BC, the Macedonians invented the double standard of coinage: a system whereby the state produced coins of lesser value for internal circulation while coins of greater value were used for export-and that this economically effective invention spread from Macedonia "to the rest of the Greek world during the Hellenistic period."147 If Archelaus is not the inventor of the double standard, he certainly capitalized on it. Archelaus' coins, like the coins of Alexander I, suggest that Archelaus aimed at "political and/or religious legitimacy" as much as profit.148 Significantly, Archelaus minted staters much like Alexander's but with the introduction of "a divine head . . . placed on the obverse" likely representing Heracles Patroos, the mythical progenitor of the kingdom.149 Archelaus also established a new capital at Pella by at least 399.150 While this site had originally been "associated with pastureland," Archelaus must have drained the surrounding marshlands, put the newly created land under cultivation, and distributed this land to Macedonians.151 Located at the head of the Thermaic Gulf on water that was either an inland part of the gulf or an inland lake created by the River Loudias on its way 147 Kremydi, "Coinage and Finance," 163. 148 Greenwalt, "Coinage," 107. He apparently used expensive obverse dies and minted the coins in large numbers over the period of his entire reign. 149 Kremydi, "Coinage and Finance," 163-164. 150 I.M. Akamatis, "Pella," in Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC-300 AD (Leiden: 2011), 393-94 explains that archaeological evidence demonstrates that Pella became the capital toward the end of the 5th century BC, even though this relocation "is not mentioned in any written source" (394); and that, from its foundation on, Pella "rapidly developed into the largest city in the realm and one of the most important political, economic and artistic centres of the Hellenistic age" (393). See also Worthington, Philip II, 13 offers the date of 399, but Greenwalt suggests an earlier date of 406 based on the unique advantages that Archelaus would gain from the beginning of his reign and for the needs it could serve before and after the Athenians had requested special treatment, in "Why Pella?" 177. 151 Greenwalt, "Why Pella?" 172. 37 to the gulf, Pella offered easy access to the sea but protection from naval attacks.152 Pella offered a number of advantages to Archelaus: a strategic military site along the natural east-west passage that would later become the Egnatian corridor; enough arable land to support a substantial city; and enormous commercial potential as a center and as an end point along Archelaus' military roads for the transport of timber from Mt. Bermion through the Kara Burun to its north and the Zoodokos Pass to its south.153 Timber could also travel to Pella by means of various streams and rivers, including the Haliacmon and Loudias rivers.154 Pella may have also been the site where Archelaus allowed the Athenians to build 110 new triremes and supplied them with oars (although this probably happened at Methone).155 Archelaus moved the "seat of court and government to Pella" and elevated the status of Dion by reorganizing its festival of Olympia.156 The general picture of Archelaus' reign that emerges from Thucydides' observations, numismatic and archaeological evidence, and the establishment of the capital at Pella, suggests a "king with a keen sense of the importance of monopolizing and centralizing his control over his kingdom's most marketable assets."157 We can view 152 Ellis, Philip II, 40. Ellis points out that "naval approaches from the gulf must have lain either up the river or through narrow and shifting channels in flat, marshy land . . ." See also A. B. Bosworth, "Philip II and Upper Macedonia," CQ, n.s. 21, no. 1 (May 1971): 99. 153 Greenwalt, "Why Pella?" 174. 154 Greenwalt, "Why Pella?" 174. 155 Greenwalt, "Why Pella?" 175-176, where Greenwalt makes a good argument that Pella, if established by 406, would have been the best place to receive timber while simultaneously defending the ships before they were built. He suggests that such an enterprise would have provided Archelaus with much needed cash for implementing his reforms. Also, Eugene N. Borza, "Timber and Politics in the Ancient World," PAPS 131, no. 1 (March 1987): 45. 156 Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 92. 157 Greenwalt, "Why Pella?" 172 and 175. Also, In Shadow of Olympus, Borza mentions the quality of the epigraphic material and artifacts recovered from Dion, though still unpublished, that commenced with the reign of Archelaus (174-175). 38 several of Archelaus' actions as designed to unify his state culturally and to strengthen his ties with Greece: Archelaus' philhellenism, as exemplified by his establishment of a dramatic competition to Zeus and the Muses at Dion; his support of Greek artists and poets such as Zeuxis, Agathon, and Euripides; and his artistic support of the Temenid and Argive legends linking the Macedonian Argeadae with Greece in his patronization of a play entitled Archelaus and performed at court for the king.158 While his philhellenism had economic and cultural aims, Archelaus also used Hellenic culture and ideas to try to create a national identity that could neutralize or prevail over local identities.159 He introduced Attic Greek as the "official court and legal language of Macedonia," an action aimed at facilitating trade in the Aegean and imposing a common language.160 Archelaus' economic, social, and political reforms also combined to strengthen his state: the increase of the hoplites in the army and their supplies; the building and maintenance of roads and strongholds; the minting of coins and the manipulation of their value; and the strengthening and legitimizing of the monarchy through allusions to religion and lineage. These were expensive but potentially profitable initiatives for strengthening Archelaus' position and that of the Macedonians.161 Griffith judges Archelaus as a king who had a "plan for growth, which resembled in some ways the plan actualized by his great successor Philip II."162 158 Mari, "Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia," 92. 159 Ellis, Philip II, 42. Ellis sees Archelaus' efforts to promote Hellenic culture as an effort to establish "the beginnings of a national identity . . ." 160 Adams, "Sport and Ethnicity," 60. Adams argues that Archelaus utilizes athletics to "project himself into the Greek Oikumene as a Greek . . . and to establish a Greek identity at home." 161 Greenwalt, Coinage: 108. Also, Worthington, Philip II, 13. 162 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 141. 39 Part II: Obstacles to a Strong Macedonian State at Philip's Accession163 Macedonia's southeastern border or its Aegean coastline contained many Greek colonies either controlled or influenced by Athens or the Chalcidian League that posed a constant threat to Macedonia and prevented it from fully utilizing its own resources.164 To make matters worse, the Athenians and Chalcidians vied against each other for control of ports and of the interior, and alternately made alliances with or against Macedonia to suit their own purposes.165 If this eastern region, full of mines and forest products, could be controlled and exploited by a strong monarch, it had the potential to produce enormous wealth for the Macedonian state.166 To exploit this wealth in natural resources and trade, however, Macedonia would need seaports and the control of maritime trade in the region, the acquisition of which would mean war with autonomous or allied Greek states and their ultimate absorption into the Macedonian state.167 To the extent that the Greek colonies controlled this rich area and maritime trade, they would continue to pose a serious threat to Macedonian stability.168 Any strategy for Macedonia's long-term cohesion would require the extension of Macedonian power into the upper Axios basin and in the area between the Axios and the Strymon, and control of the key city of Amphipolis; territorial unity would also require 163 Billows, Kings and Colonists, 2ff., provides the bulk of information for this section. Similar information can be found in Hammond, Philip of Macedon, 7-9, and in Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 22-31, 115-136, and 189-200. 164 Billows lists Pydna, Methone, Therme, Potidaia, Argilos, and Amphipolis as the most important in Kings and Colonists, 2. See also Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 176 and 180. 165 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 184-186 and 196-to cite a few instances. 166 Borza, Shadow of Olympus, 56-57. 167 Billows, Kings and Colonists, 2. 168 Billows, Kings and Colonists, 2-3. Also Borza, Shadow of Olympus, 50ff. where Borza discusses the natural resources of this area. What follows is Borza's description and analysis. 40 the seizure of land beyond the Strymon as a buffer from the Thracians. In contrast, Macedonia's southern border with Thessaly was quiet and safe, but would remain so only by diplomacy and alliance that specifically aimed to hinder southern Greek armies from using Thessaly as a passage into Macedonia.169 Macedonia's western border contained the cantons of Upper Macedonia, Eordaia, Elimea, Tymphaia, Orestis, Lynkos, and Pelagonia, areas that, by this time, generally operated almost independently of Lower Macedonia. These cantons contained significant "non-Macedonian elements" in their populations, including peoples of Molossian and Illyrian descent, and also royal Macedonian families that competed with the Argeads for dynastic control.170 Historically, Upper Macedonia had struggled to maintain its independence and had often allied itself with peoples to the north and west in order to do so.171 At the time of Philip's accession, the Illyrians controlled much of Upper Macedonia, a region that the Argead kings' had not ever fully controlled.172 In order to unify Macedonia, a strong monarch would have to defeat or win over the royal families of Upper Macedonia, and consciously weaken local loyalties and replace them with a loyalty to the state.173 As part of any full incorporation of Upper Macedonia, a monarch would have to deal with the continual problem posed by the unsettled borders with the 169 Billows, Kings and Colonists, 3. Billows mentions a potential threat from the south such as Jason of Pherai was able to pose in the 370s B.C. 170 Thucydides lists these families and their independent rule in a number of places, including 2.80, 99, 4.79, and 124-125. Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 185. Griffith notes the tendency for some of these Upper Macedonian cantons to join the Molossian state as it suited them-especially as the Orestae, in particular, had ethnic ties to the Molossians. See also Billows, Kings and Colonists, 3, and note 10. 171 ABosworth, "Philip II and Upper Macedonia," 100. 172 J.R. Ellis, "The Unification of Macedonia," in Philip of Macedon, ed. Miltiades B. Hatzopoulos and Louisa D. Loukopoulos (Athens: 2006), 37-38. 173 Billows, Kings and Colonists, 3-4. Archelaus had taken some successful steps toward the incorporation of Upper Macedonia as described above. 41 powerful Illyrians whose invasion and subsequent destruction of the Macedonian army and of Philip's brother brought Philip to power. The Illyrians and Thracians resurged as a significant threat to Macedonia prior to Philip's accession and during the reign of his brother, Perdiccas III. The Illyrians drove Amyntas III out of Macedonia twice, as recorded by Diodorus, and only the help of the Thessalians restored Amyntas after two years of exile (he was able to restore himself to the throne the second time).174 Bardylis, an Illyrian king who lived into the reign of Philip II, even required Amyntas to pay tribute to the Illyrians after a defeat in battle.175 Bardylis' power extended, at this time, from the borders of Molossis all the way to the borders of Macedonia, and these resources allowed him to put a large force into the field.176 Bardylis was the Illyrian king who in 359 B.C. killed 4,000 Macedonians out of a force of 6,000, including Philip's brother, Perdiccas, "exposing the kingdom to attack by all its neighbors-Illyrians, Paeonians, Thracians, Chalcidians, and the Athenians alike."177 The Odrysian kingdom had been established as early as the 440s.178 Their king, Cotys, controlled all of inland Thrace and had become powerful enough to interfere in Macedonian affairs. Cotys often allied with Macedonia and Athens against pretenders to the throne or against the Chalcidian League, but he just as often turned against the 174 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 174. Griffith argues for the acceptance of two Illyrian invasions rather than viewing the report as a "doublet" from Diodorus. See Diod. 14.92.3-4 and 15.19.2. 175 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 180. 176 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 188. The evidence is from a fragment of Callisthenes. 177 I have mentioned this battle above and its source: Diod. 16.2.4-5. The quote is from Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 188. 178 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 115. 42 Athenians or Macedonians when it suited him.179 He strengthened his realm by uniting it with parts of Sitalces' old Odrysian Empire and then began to threaten Athens' holdings in the area of the Bosporus and the Hellespont.180 Although he was assassinated just prior to Philip's accession, Cotys had demonstrated how politically dangerous a strong Thracian polity could be to the Macedonian kingdom, and how economically dangerous, if it controlled the resources near the Strymon and along the inland trade routes. The strength of the Argead family to provide legitimate heirs continued to prove its persistent weakness as well, since various claimants to the throne could muster the loyalty necessary to try to take power.181 With so many hostile peoples surrounding and competing with Macedonia, a claimant to the Macedonian throne had ample potential supporters. The external threats to the Macedonian state served to complicate and worsen its internal disunity.182 Philip II had to overcome a number of claimants, including his cousins, Pausanias and Argaeus, and his half-brother, Archelaus, in order to secure his position, a situation not at all unusual in Macedonia, and especially during the preceding decades.183 Since the Macedonian monarchy constituted the source of Macedonian unity, any problems within this institution left Macedonia virtually without a state.184 Philip 179 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 177, 184, and 195. Cotys worked against Athens' recapture of Amphipolis, for instance. 180 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 195-196. 181 Billows, Kings and Colonists, 4. See the arguments above related to the strengths and weaknesses of the Argead monarchy. 182 Ellis, "The Unification of Macedonia," 38. 183 Billows, Kings and Colonists, 4. These challenges are also described in Diod. 16.2. 6 to 16. 3.6. 184 Billows, Kings and Colonists, 4. 43 thus inherited an extremely "fragile kingdom," small, divided, poorer than it had been for decades, surrounded by enemies, and without a real fighting force.185 185 Fox, "The 360's" 268-269. Fox points out that the poor quality of Perdiccas' coinage and its metal content is evidence that he lacked any access to the mines in the north or east. Fox emphasizes that Philip inherited a very poor and weak kingdom (269): "On point after point, closer study of the scattered evidence" has sharpened the impression that Philip was bequeathed "a Macedon even weaker than many historians . . . have outlined. His achievement, therefore, is even more remarkable." CHAPTER III THE ARMY AS AN INSTITUTION OF STATE CONSTRUCTION Part I: The Phalanx Diodorus Siculus describes the Macedonia that Philip took over in 360/59 as a kingdom in a "sorry state" with its king dead along with 4,000 Macedonians, the Illyrians planning to invade Macedonia after their stunning victory, the Paeonians ravaging Macedonian lands out of contempt for its army, and two different claimants to the throne, one supported by the Thracians and another by the Athenians.186 During this inaugural crisis, Diodorus records that Philip stayed calm and took an initial action that may not have been given the attention it deserves in relation to the strengthening of Philip's immediate position as a legitimate king worthy of his subjects' trust and loyalty.187 Philip assembled the Macedonian men in arms, "in a series of assemblies, and exhorting them with eloquent speeches to be men, he built up their morale."188 As discussed above, Philip had inherited a monarchical position that required of its kings a certain intimacy with the troops. Philip's training, under philosophers while a hostage in Thebes, had undoubtedly prepared him to give calm, eloquent, and artful speeches under virtually any 186 Diod. 16. 2.1. 4. 187 Diod. 16. 3.1. 188 Diod. 16. 3. 1. 45 circumstance.189 Diodorus reported that Philip was known for his diplomacy and was said to have been prouder of his "grasp of strategy and of his diplomatic successes than of his valor in actual battle."190 If Diodorus has accurately represented Philip's judgment of his own his successes, then Philip must have realized the importance of strengthening his monarchical position immediately by an appeal to his soldiers, and over time, by frequent and intimate discussions with them. After quickly positioning himself as a legitimate and invested Macedonian king, Philip set about strengthening traditional institutions of state. His first step involved the strengthening of the Macedonian army and the likely creation, training, and equipping of a heavily armed infantry. Philip's experience as a hostage in Thebes, the greatest military city of Greece at the time, his assignment as the king's brother to a garrison in a strategic area of Macedonia, and his upbringing as a Macedonian hunter and warrior combined to give him solid military training for a young man in his twenties.191 Griffith suggests that 189 Diod. 16. 2.2-3. Justin 6.9.7. Justin explains that, while Philip was a hostage in Thebes, "he was trained in those qualities possessed by Epaminondas and Pelopidas," and that it was his time in Thebes that, most of all, "served to develop Philip's exceptional genius" (Justin 7.5.2-3). Philip would have received unparalleled military training under the tutelage of Pelopidas. 190 Diod. 16. 95. Polyaen. 4.2.9 offers an explanation of Philip's pride in his diplomatic successes: that he could take more credit for these but had to share the credit for military successes with his soldiers. He had to share his diplomatic successes with his troops as well, as I argue below. References to Polyaenus are from his Stratagems, vols. 1-2 edited and translated by Peter Krentz and Everett L. Wheeler (Chicago: 1994). See T.T.B. Ryder, "The Diplomatic Skills of Philip II," in Ian Worthington (ed.), Ventures into Greek History: Essays in Honor of N.G.L. Hammond (Oxford: 1994): 229 for an alternative view of the success of Philip's diplomacy. 191 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 206-208. Griffith notes that Perdiccas, Philip's brother, may have assigned him to Pelagonia, where there was some move toward independence. Griffith also notes that Perdiccas may simply have assigned Philip to an area and given him a few troops to lead in order to marginalize him so that he was not a threat to the throne. On the other hand, given Philip's quick military response and methods upon his accession, he may very well have been the drill master of whatever troops Perdicass possessed, since Philip's return from Thebes. 46 Philip's experience in Thebes may have been quite influential in his subsequent actions with the Macedonian army since Philip would have observed first hand the training of the Theban infantry, "the final strength of Greek citizen armies."192 Certainly Philip had never seen such infantry in Macedonia or among the surrounding peoples.193 Philip was probably present and fighting in the battle that killed his brother and 4,000 Macedonians, as Philip's brother, Perdiccas, had issued him a contingent of troops (presumably cavalry troops or lightly armed infantry), Philip had been brought up to be an Argead warrior, and Macedonia was in grave danger.194 Philip's successful rebuilding and renovation of the Macedonian army would become the sine qua non for the building of the Macedonian state since it would provide the establishment of Philip as a successful king and provide the security that allowed for the establishment of internal unity; economic exploitation, the enfranchisement of old and new Macedonian citizens, and expansion would follow security and unity.195 The strength of Philip's army would also provide his diplomatic initiatives with unusual force, since Philip's army would eventually have the ability to destroy completely "entire Greek peoples, societies, and states," unlike the traditional Greek armies of the Greek poleis.196 192 Griffith, "Philip as a General," 59. See also Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 425 193 Gabriel, Philip II, 61: "Macedonia had no tradition of infantry combat." See also my descriptions above. 194 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 208. 195 Adams, "Frontier Policy," 284. Adams explains that the "nature of what he was trying to achieve with his kingdom would not have been possible without that security." 196 Gabriel, Philip II, 59. Gabriel points out that Philip's war machine, in its developed form, had the capacity to effect wholesale destruction on a state. See also Adcock, Art of War, 5-7. Adcock indicates that ancient Greek hoplite warfare was fought on open, flat plains, with a relatively modest number of soldiers, with traditional and expected tactics, and at a certain season of the year; and its potential destruction to any one city-state was limited by the campaign season and other factors. 47 Ancient authors recognized Philip's military innovations as one of his first acts as king. Diodorus specifically states that Philip was "the first to organize the Macedonian phalanx."197 His description of Philip's military reforms suggests that Philip implemented them quickly-maybe within his first year of rule-when, in fact, these reforms may more accurately represent Philip's changes over the course of many years.198 Diodorus lists Philip's reforms of the army as several: provisioning the troops with appropriate weapons; changing the military formation; and constant training under arms through maneuvers and competitive exercises.199 Polyaenus describes the type of vigorous training and conditioning, or the forced marches, that Philip imposed upon his troops before battles as "making them take their arms and march for 300 stades, carrying their helmets, shields, greaves, sarissas, plus-in addition to their arms-a stock of provisions and all the utensils necessary for daily life."200 Justin adds that Philip "amalgamated the cavalry and the infantry to create an invincible army."201 Greeks had, of course, employed infantry and cavalry together since the beginning of hoplite warfare, so Justin's statement, "unumque corpus equitum pedestriumque copiarum inuicti exercitus fecit," must mean that Philip created a new unity in the way in which the cavalry and infantry fought together-and on a scale not seen before in Greek warfare. 197 Diod. 16.3.2. 198 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 211 and 407. Griffith argues that the process of developing Philip's army to the numbers and training bequeathed to Alexander III probably took Philip's whole lifetime. 199 Diod. 16. 3.1.1-2. 200 Polyaen. 4.2.10. These training marches would have been 35 miles long (if we assume approximately 8 stades to a mile). 201 Justin 7.6.9. Philip's use of a combined infantry and cavalry is modeled on that of Pelopidas and Epaminondas of Thebes. More will be said of Philip's debt to these great generals below. 48 Philip first revolutionized Macedonian warfare by creating a distinctive Macedonian phalanx-which means that he decided its "structure, weapons, and tactics."202 Who were these Macedonians who might become heavily armed infantrymen amidst the crises besetting Philip from the outset of his reign? Certainly no cavalryman would have exchanged his elite position to start fighting on the ground. An aristocracy of landowners atop a group of small farmers, some landless workers, and craftsmen-along with slaves-had characterized Greek societies since the end of the Bronze Age.203 While such a societal structure had changed significantly in the city-states of southern and central Greece, Macedonia probably continued to have something resembling this archaic societal structure. Traditional hoplite warfare in Greece required a social class that could afford the armor of a hoplite soldier-and this class had emerged in Greece proper as early as the 8th century BCE because of the economic prosperity that had created a class of people distinct from the aristocracy who could afford to equip themselves.204 Macedonia did not yet have a large and prosperous middle class of 202 Minor M. Markle has written two foundational articles on Philip's organization of the Macedonian phalanx, both of which will be referenced throughout this section: "The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear, and Related Armor," American Journal of Archaeology, 81, no. 3 (1977): 323-339 and "Use of the Sarissa by Philip and Alexander of Macedon," American Journal of Archaeology, 82, no. 4 (1978): 483-497. See also Gabriel, Philip II, 61. 203 W.G. Forrest, The Emergence of Greek Democracy: 800-400 BC (New York: 1966; reprint 1979), 46. Note that there is no direct reference to slavery in ancient Macedonia although there would certainly have been slaves in the Greek city-states of the Chalcidice. See Gabriel, Philip II, 37-38. 204 Forrest, Emergence of Greek Democracy, 88-90. See also Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 423-424. Griffith explains that Macedonia had few cities so that its political organization was still mostly based on the ethnos rather than the polis. The attendant soldiers were light-armed and not wealthy enough to arm themselves as hoplites. 49 citizens who had the means to provide themselves with the armor of a hoplite, and Philip would have had to establish such a group if he wanted to build a Greek phalanx.205 As Philip determined to develop a phalanx in Macedonia, he invested the Macedonian lightly armed infantrymen, who did not have heavy armor and, presumably could not have afforded it, fully into the Macedonian military structure.206 By investing men who had previously been peripheral to or nonexistent in the Macedonian military, Philip enfranchised large numbers of Macedonian men economically, socially, and politically into the Macedonian state.207 These were the troops who had wisely rushed away from any invaders attacking their countryside, had hidden themselves in the mountains and hills, and had preserved their lives in the only way that insufficiently armed, poorly trained, and small numbers of soldiers on foot could have.208 While Philip may not have had the time or the resources at the beginning of his reign to equip soldiers as hoplites or to train them in the Greek fashion, as much as he may have wished to do so, he initially used the soldiers and equipment that he had available, and he eventually had the means through conquest to give his soldiers the means to equip themselves in land, resources, and pay.209 Griffith has argued that Macedonia's vulnerable position 205 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 423-424. 206 While it is possible that Alexander I had attempted to create pezhetairoi, this is unlikely (see my discussion above). In addition, any specially trained foot soldiers would have been a small group of soldiers associated with the king and would likely have died in the attempt to repulse the Illyrians. See Gabriel, Philip II, 62. 207 I will discuss the economic and social significance of Philip's military reforms below. 208 Gabriel, Philip II, 61, suggests that such soldiers "were little more than untrained peasants hastily assembled for the occasion and armed mostly with farm implements and work tools." 209 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 421-426. While initially stating that Philip is not likely to have armed his phalanx himself, Griffith states (424) that "the making and issue of the right kind of pike (sarissa) and the right kind of shield to go with it, must have been organized by the government in some way, and it will have taken a little time." See also Gabriel, Philip II, 62-63. 50 forced Philip to levy as many soldiers as he possibly could at the beginning of his reign, "even if many of the citizens called up, probably most of them, could not equip themselves fully as hoplites."210 The levying of new soldiers and the formation of soldiers from the lightly armed infantry into a phalanx suggest that Philip may have organized the issuing of pikes and shields in those cases where a soldier could not afford it. Since Philip needed troops quickly and cheaply who could effectively fight against traditional Macedonian enemies and even Greek hoplites, as the Athenians were supporting an alternative claimant to the throne, he conceived a new formation of soldiers who would be simply armed and equipped and would have the capacity to defend and hold enemy soldiers in position, while the traditionally strong and already trained and equipped Macedonian cavalry cut the enemy down.211 Hammond believes that Philip "revolutionized ancient warfare" by freeing the hands of the infantryman from carrying his shield, now reduced in size and attached to his left shoulder and neck more like a cuirass, so that his hands could wield a sarissa.212 This Macedonian type of shield, worn from the neck and protecting a soldier's chest, proved to be lighter and cheaper than a 210 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 424. 211 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 424-426. Griffith argues that Philip was able to use what he found "freely in Macedonia" (one assumes an abundance of men, timber, long hunting spears, and eventually, land) "to produce an infantry arm both bigger and better than anything that had been seen before." See also Gabriel, Philip II, 64-65. 212 Hammond, Macedonian State, 100-102. See also Billows, Kings and Colonists, 12- 14. Markle, "Use of the Sarissa," 483 and throughout the article disputes that Philip armed his heavy infantry with a sarissa until the battle of Chaeronea in 338 B.C., and maintains instead that Philip created a traditional Greek phalanx armed with traditional Greek weapons. Markle argues that Philip would eventually employ a phalanx armed with sarissai but that he would continue to utilize traditionally armed hoplites even after the introduction of the sarissa to protect the flanks of the clunky Macedonian phalanx. Markle sees Philip's significant innovations as related to the cavalry, of which more will be said below. 51 hoplon, the standard hoplite's shield.213 Philip's sarissa was a long pike made of indigenous wood and traditionally used in the Macedonian boar hunt.214 Macedonian cornelwood provided the material for the sarissa because of its strength and lightness.215 And since the metals and wood of the realm belonged to Philip as king, he could have immediately had the means "to equip his men with pikes and light shields at his own expense."216 One wonders if many of the Macedonians, even the smallest landholders and pastoralists, would not have already had their own pike for the traditional boar hunts. Polyaenus clearly described the list of equipment carried by Philip's troops in training as including the sarissa, although he may be writing anachronistically or preserving a description of the army that Philip had developed in time for Chaeronea.217 Philip's initial poor and desperate circumstances, however, argue for his early introduction of the 213 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 424. Griffith explains that the lightly armed hoplite of the Macedonian phalanx had armor like that of Thracian peltasts, and that Philip was understandably more concerned about winning battles against Illyrians, Thracians, and other ethne than against Greeks. See also Gabriel, Philip II, 64-65. Gabriel points out that the initial armor worn across the chest of a Macedonian phalangite was probably just leather. He also indicates that the Macedonian type of shield seems to have been described in Homer's Iliad and may have its origins in the Bronze Age-like so much else in Philip's Macedonia (64). 214 Gabriel, Philip II, 64-65. Gabriel demonstrates that this Macedonian pike probably originated in Homeric times and is related to the Homeric battle spear: "a miniature fresco from Akrotiri dating from 1450 BCE depicts Mycenaean warriors using long spears of the sarissa's length in battle" . . . "while later tomb paintings show men hunting wild boars with long spears." Diodorus 16.3.2 also indicates that both the shields and the "close order fighting" that characterized Philip's phalangites were in imitation of the "warriors at Troy." While it is unlikely that the phalanx formation has origins in the Bronze Age, the shield might. 215 Hammond, Macedonian State, 102. See also M. Markle, "The Macedonian Sarissa," 324. 216 Hammond, Macedonian State, 104. Billows, Kings and Colonists, 14. Billows points out that Philip's provisions would have helped to ensure the loyalty of the phalanx to himself "as well as easing the financial burden of military service." Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 421. Griffith disagrees that Philip provided the soldiers with equipment, but he accepts that Diodorus' description of Philip's arming of the soldiers is an indication of Philip's "innovation in the armament of the infantry." 217 See Polyaen. 4.2.10. 52 sarissa, and may explain his army's swift and substantial success by comparison with any predecessor.218 The advantages of a sarissa to a Macedonian phalangite in battle were the same as those provided to the hunter in a boar hunt: it kept the enemy at a distance in a charge, and it could kill when driven with sufficient penetration and force.219 Similarly, the sarissa allowed the Macedonian phalanx to assume a defensive position, probably without an inordinate amount of training, and with time and training, a threatening and lethal, offensive position. Philip may have initially conceived of the role of his sarissa-wielding phalanx as defensive so that his relatively untrained foot soldiers only had the role of holding an enemy force, infantry or cavalry, in an area that would allow his highly trained cavalry to make decisive attacks.220 Eventually, the Macedonian phalanx became a formidable offensive weapon. Plutarch described this sarissa-wielding phalanx at the battle of Pydna between Romans and Macedonians in 168 B.C.: 218 Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 421. Griffith argues that Philip introduced the sarissa into the Macedonian phalanx earlier rather than later because we do not hear about the existence of a phalanx before Philip; and "the arming of the infantry with it . . . represented the one material innovation which helped to make of the phalanx the formidable force which it became." For an alternative but somewhat unconvincing view, see Minor M. Markle, III, "The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear," 331; and Minor M. Markle, III, "The Use of the Sarissa," 483 and passim. Markle argues that there is no evidence of the use of the sarissa as an infantry weapon until after Chaeronea-either explicitly in the ancient sources or by inference in the descriptions of fighting. 219 Gabriel, Philip II, 65. Gabriel suggests that Philip got the idea to use the long spear from his experience of the Macedonian boar hunt. Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia, 421. Griffith thinks that the sarissa is the most important change that Philip made to the army: "the introduction of the sarissa and the arming of the infantry with it . . . represented the one material innovation which helped to make of the phalanx the formidable force which it became." 220 Gabriel, Philip II, 65-66 and 81. 53 Impregnable and unapproachable, with its close array of long spears everywhere meeting the assailant . . . and piercing those that came in their way quite through their armor, no shield or corslet being able to resist the force of that weapon.221 Peter Manti argues convincingly from archaeological evidence, both pictorial evidence and artifacts from the mounds of Vergina, for specific length and types of sarissai.222 The sarissa of the infantryman ranged from 15 ¾ to 18 feet long-the relative length of the mature trunk of the cornelwood tree.223 The sarissa of the infantryman differed from the sarissa used by a cavalryman or a peltast in that it was longer, had a "sharp bladed weapon head of iron affixed to the forehead, and a spike on the butt to implant the pike" in the event of an enemy's charge, and to act as a "counterweight to its great length" when carried by the soldier.224 The sarissa also had cording that allowed a soldier to grip tightly around the shaft of the pike, but also marked 221 Plutarch, "Aemilius Paulus," in Plutarch's Lives, vol. 1, ed. Arthur Hugh Clough, trans. John Dryden (New York: 2001), 369. See also Gabriel, Philip II, 65-66 and note 18. Gabriel asserts that "as long as the Macedonian infantry held their fear in check, the phalanx was impenetrable by hoplite infantry" (66). 222 Peter A. Manti, "The Sarissa of the Macedonian Infantry," AW 23, no. 2 (1992): 30-42 and "The Macedonian Sarissa, Again," AW 25, no. 1 (1994): 77-91. Manti convincingly challenges the views of Minor Markle by establishing the length of a Macedonian cubit as 13.5 inches (making the Macedonian sarissa from 15¾ ft. to 18 ft. in length), and by establishing the differences based on archaeological evidence between the cavalry and infantry pike. Markle seems to have mistaken the various units by which particular polities designated lengths as being equal, and so suggested erroneous lengths and types of pikes for infantrymen and cavalrymen in Macedonia. Markle also interprets general terms such as soteris to suggest that the end of a cavalry pike would be in nature, size, and weight the same as the end of an infantry pike, although archaeological evidence suggests otherwise-as does common sense. 223 Manti, "Sarissa of the Macedonian Infantry," 32 and 41. Manti points out that the trunk of a tree is "the only portion of a tree suitable for straight shafted weapons" (41). 224 Manti, "Sarissa of the Macedonian Infantry," 32. 54 the spot that allowed a soldier to wield the weapon with balance and with an appropriate length jutting forward in relation to the position of other soldiers.225 Philip's phalanx arranged the soldiers in a simple box formati