Muslim brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan: history of modern Islamic fundamentalism

The Muslim Brotherhood has played a significant role in the history of the Middle East in the twentieth century. The organization was founded on religious fundamentalist principals striving to ensure that Islam would remain the cornerstone of Middle Eastern society. Yet the social and political events of the twentieth century ensured that the Muslim Brotherhood had very different experiences in different countries. In Egypt they faced repression, imprisonment and often violent confrontation with the government. This situation in turn led to an escalation of the Brotherhood's tactics and a radicalization of the organization. In Jordan the Brotherhood achieved a symbiotic relationship with the monarchy, exchanging support for legitimacy. This situation led to stability, continued moderation in the organization's platform and an increased influence over Jordanian society. A lesson that can be learned from comparing the Muslim Brotherhoods' experiences in Egypt and Jordan is that allowing moderate fundamentalist organizations a limited role in society with access to the public is a more effective means of ensuring peace and stability than attempting to suppress the fundamentalist organizations

FUNDAMENTALISM in THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN EGYPT AND JORDAN: A HISTORY OF MODERN ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM by Jason Wessel A thesis submitted to the faculty of The University of Utah in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Middle East Studies/History Department of Languages and Literature The University of Utah May 2009 Copyright © Jason Wessel 2009 All Rights Reserved .. T H E U N I V E R S I TY OF U T A H G R A D U A T E S C H O OL SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE APPROVAL of a thesis submitted by Jason Wessel This thesis has been read by each member of the following supervisory committee and by majority vote has been found to be satisfactory. 1 7 AcuLj ZG&<T Chair: Peter Sluelett " 1 M ^ J ^ g ^k^^^^ Ibrahim Karawan Peter von Si vers THE UNIVERSITY UTAH GRADUATE SCHOOL subm itted Chair~ ~ :-:ett~ Sivers T H E U N I V E R S I T Y G R A D U A T E SCHOOL F I N A L R E A D I N G A P P R O V AL To the Graduate Council of the University of Utah: I have read the thesis of Jason Wessel jn \ x s f m a \ fo rm submission to The Graduate School. Date vJ Chair: Supervisory Committee Fernando Rubio Chair/Dean David S. Chapman Dean of The Graduate School THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH GRADUATE SCHOOL FINAL READING APPROVAL in its final form and have found that (1) its format, citations, and bibliographic style are consistent and acceptable; (2) its illustrative materials including figures, tables, and charts are in place; and (3) the final manuscript is satisfactory to the supervisory committee and is ready for Peter Sluglett Comm ittee Approved for the Major Department Approved for the Graduate Council ABSTRACT fundamentalist turn limited role in society with access to the public is a more effective means of ensuring peace and stability than attempting to suppress the fundamentalist organizations. The Muslim Brotherhood has played a significant role in the history of the Middle East in the twentieth century. The organization was founded on religious fundamentalist principals striving to ensure that Islam would remain the cornerstone of Middle Eastern society. Yet the social and political events of the twentieth century ensured that the Muslim Brotherhood had very different experiences in different countries. In Egypt they faced repression, imprisonment and often violent confrontation with the government. This situation in tum led to an escalation of the Brotherhood's tactics and a radicalization of the organization. In Jordan the Brotherhood achieved a symbiotic relationship with the monarchy, exchanging support for legitimacy. This situation led to stability, continued moderation in the organization's platform and an increased influence over Jordanian society. A lesson that can be learned from comparing the Muslim Brotherhoods' experiences in Egypt and Jordan is that allowing moderate fundamentalist organizations a TABLE OF CONTENTS 'Abd al-Wahhab 15 Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh 19 Muhammed 'Abduh & Rashid Rida 27 Conclusion 30 III. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN EGYPT 34 The Early History of the Brotherhood 36 Militancy and World War II 40 Postwar 43 The 1952 Egyptian Revolution 50 The Nasser Years 54 The Sadat Years 58 The Mubarak Years 67 Conclusion 74 76 78 82 83 1964-85 and September 87 Liberalization 92 T ABLE ABSTRACT ... . ........................... . ................................... . .. ... . .. .............. iv PREFACE ................... . .. . ... . ........... .. . . ... .. .. .... ... .. ... ... . ............... .. ...... .. . vii Chapter I. INTRODUCTION .... . ..... . .... . ....... .. .... . ........ . .......... ......... . . .. .. .. .... 1 Overview of the Muslim Brotherhood .... ... . ... .. ................... .. ... ... ... 3 II. THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM ..... 5 Ibn Taymiyya ...... . ...... . ... .. ... ... ... ... ... ... . . .. ....................... . ....... 6 'Abd al-Wahhab .. .. .... . . .... .. . .. . .. ... . .. . ... .. . .. . . .. . ...... . ............. . .... 15 Jamal ai-Din ai-Afghani and Muhammad ' Abduh ... . .................. . .. .. 19 Muhammed ' Abduh & Rashid Rida . .. ... . ...... . ... .. . .. . .. . .. ..... . . ........ 27 Conclusion . .................... . ... ... ... ... .. .... . .. . . . .. . .................. . .. . .. 30 III. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN EGyPT .. .. .. .................... .. ... ... 34 The Early History of the Brotherhood . .... . .... . ................ . ...... .. .. . ... 36 Militancy and World War II .......... . ..... . .... . ....... .. .. .. .. ... .... ........ AO Postwar. ............ . ........ . . . ... .. . ... .. . ... ... . ......... .. .. .. . ............. . .. .. 43 The 1952 Egyptian Revolution ............... . ........ . .... . ... . ... . ... .. . .. . ... 50 The Nasser years ..... .... . .. .... . .................. . . . .. . .. . .. ... .... . . ... ........ 54 The Sadat years ............. . .. ...... ... . .. . .... . ...................... . ..... . .. .. 58 The Mubarak years ................................................ .... . . .. .. . . .. . 67 Conclusion .......... . .......... . ..... . .. . ... .................................... . .. 74 IV. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN JORDAN .. . ... .. .. . .. .. .. .. ..... ........ 76 The Early History of Jordan .................................. . .. . .. . . .... . .. .... 78 Independence and Statehood: The Palestinian Question .. . .. .. ........... . .. 82 The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan .. . .......... . ..................... .. ....... 83 1964-1967 .... .. .. .......................................... .. ... ... ....... .. . ..... 85 The PLO and Black September. .. ...... .. . . ... ... . . . ............ . .............. 87 Liberalization .. . ............................................ . .. .. ... .... .. . .. .. .... 92 The 1989 Election 94 The 1993 Election 97 The 1997 Election 98 Liberalization Under King Abdullah 101 Rollback of Democratic Liberalization 103 Liberalization During The Democratic Crisis 106 2007 Elections 110 V. CONCLUSION 113 BIBLIOGRAPHY The 1989 Election .............. .. .. ...... . .. .. .. .. . ... ..... ...... . ...... . .. .. . .... 94 The 1993 Election .. . .... . ............ . ......... .................... .. ... .... .. . ... 97 The 1997 Election ............. . ...... .. ... ..... .. . . .......... .............. . .. . ... 98 Liberalization Under King Abdullah . ......... ............ . .. . .... . ..... .. .. ... 1 0 1 Rollback of Democratic Liberalization ....... . ... .. .......... .. .. ............ 1 03 Liberalization During The Democratic Crisis .................... . .. ......... 2007 Elections .. ......... . ........................................... .. . ... ... .... 11 0 v. CONCLUSION .. . .. .. ... . .. ... ... .. . .................................... . .......... .113 BIBLIOGRAPHy ......................... . ................. ............ . ..... . ..... 118 PREFACE 1 salqfi fundamentalism. Therefore, in the face of definition and translation problems it is necessary to define a number of the terms that will be used throughout. Salaflyya al-salaf al-saliti) 1 Since the first appearance of 'political Islam' on the world stage in the late 1960s and 1970s, journalists and others have described the phenomenon using terms such as 'fundamentalist', 'radical' and 'extremist' more or less interchangeably. To complicate matters further, Muslim scholars use a different vocabulary to describe the same thing. For example, an Arab scholar would describe the Muslim Brotherhood as a radical organization or an extremist religious group but not a fundamentalist organization since fundamentalism is a Western concept.I An Arab scholar might refer to the original Muslim Brotherhood as a salafi movement, thus giving a very clear and nuanced definition in Arabic, which a Western scholar may translate as extreme fundamentalism. For the purposes of this thesis, 'fundamentalism' will be defined as a wide-ranging movement or tendency which aims to purge Islam of the various modifications it has endured over the centuries and return it to what it considers to be the original principles of early Islam. This can include the Salafiyya movement, which seeks to return to the ways and teachings of the Prophet and his companions (the 'pious generation', sala! salih) avoiding the accumulations of later generations, and I Abdel Azim Ramadan, "Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt," in Martin E. Marty and Scott Appleby (eds.), Fundamentalism and the State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993, p. 152. modern 'Radicalization' will be used in the sense of embracing violent revolutionary tactics. 'Extremism' will refer to those who radicalize and adopt violent revolution as the policy of their organization. Other less frequently used words will be defined in the body of the text. modern employ in their relations with Islamic fundamentalist organizations. Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic fundamentalism. I am in no way justifying or excusing the violence occasionally employed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, I am not outlining a path that could lead to fundamentalists eventually gaining control of the viii purportedly not deviating from the Qur'an and the Sunna. However, it can also refer to those who wish to strip away the more recent excesses of the Muslim religion in order to find a way to reconcile the core principles of Islam with the modem world. The Muslim Brotherhood is a fundamentalist organization founded on this second principle. detlned This thesis will be divided into three sections. First, I will examine the historic evolution of Islamic fundamentalist ideology and the jurists who have shaped the course of modem fundamentalist thought. Second, I will outline the historic experiences of the Muslim Brotherhood and its relationship to the state in both Egypt and Jordan. I will conclude with an analysis of the distinctly different approaches that the Egyptian and Jordanian governments have employed in their relations with the Brotherhood and attempt to recommend what I hope might be an effective strategy for secular states to Finally, while discussing the premise for this thesis with several colleagues I have encountered skepticism and sometimes even outright hostility to the idea of accommodating Islamic fundamentalism. This has led me to believe that a reader may misinterpret my intentions with this paper. This is not an apologetic attempt to defend the Vlll fundamentalist groups from radicalizing and embracing violent tactics and revolutionary rhetoric. Furthermore, a government can use limited inclusion as a tool to control the message and to marginalize the power of the fundamentalist groups in society while maintaining peace and stability. ix government. An Egyptian version of the Islamic Republic of Iran would be a bad thing for the Egyptian people and for the region. What I am trying to do is demonstrate how allowing limited participation in government and society can prevent moderate Islamic lX CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION often regarded as highly subversive by the ruling powers, who generally reacted with repression, discrimination and violence. This combination of reprisals by the authorities and a general lack of broad societal support frequently encouraged the fundamentalist movements to radicalize and become more extreme. pan- Islamic, spread out from Egypt and gradually established independent 'national' branches Throughout Islamic history there has been a tendency on the part of many Muslims, when confronted with what they consider to be an external threat to their power or sovereignty, to develop religious organizations that advocate a retreat into fundamentalism. Such organizations believe that Islamic society has lost its way and that what is required to set it back on the 'straight path' are reforms whose general themes hark back to the original ways and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and the first generation of rightly guided caliphs (roughly 610-661). Historically, such movements have generally involved only a small minority of the population, but they were often fundamentalist The purpose of this paper is to examine the ideology, function and historical development of the Muslim Brotherhood, a fundamentalist Islamic, and would-be pan­Islamic, organization founded by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928. The Brotherhood 2 demonstrate that the repressive measures and the reprisals carried out by the Egyptian government against the Brotherhood have led to violence, terrorism and in general to profound instability. Meanwhile, the relative tolerance and inclusiveness toward the Brotherhood demonstrated by the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan has led to a largely stable, peaceful and symbiotic relationship. The monarchy has allowed the Muslim Brotherhood limited political participation, but has always ensured that the organization remained a minority in government. In return, the Brotherhood in Jordan has, over time, significantly altered its philosophy and ideology to accommodate government policies. a platform giving them access to the public from which they can deliver their message, thus making participation in the system more appealing than opposition to it. Second, the state gains legitimacy by incorporating the fundamentalists into the system and getting the fundamentalists to play by the state's rules. Third, this access to the public and to the government through incorporation into the system has tended to head off radicalization and extremism in fundamentalist movements. throughout the Middle East. I will use the experiences of the Muslim Brotherhood and their interaction with the state, using Egypt and Jordan as case studies, in order to Essentially, it seems that a state's best response to the emergence of a fundamentalist socio-religious movement is to allow it limited inclusion in the political system before rejection or persecution leads it to radicalize and become a threat to the power structure of the regime or the peace and stability of the society. The more inclusive approach accomplishes three things. First, it provides the fundamentalists with 3 motivation and objectives, yet they were not backward looking and reactionary.1 It was social and economic reform programs, to the Western (and to some extent Christian) influences of the nineteenth century that were engaged in the gradual Westernization and modernization of Muslim society. Second, the nationalist ideology of the Brotherhood led it to develop as an anticolonial movement entirely opposed to the foreign domination of Egypt. Third, the Brotherhood sought to navigate an Islamic path through the intellectual conflict between conservatism and modernism. To further clarify this point, prior to the twentieth century, Islamic fundamentalist organizations were almost exclusively conservative and traditionalist in orientation. The experiences of the Muslim world in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including the decline in the relative power of the Ottoman empire compared to the Western powers as well as the colonialism of the mandates, led to an intellectual debate within the Muslim world concerning the need to modernize society versus the desire to retain traditional conservative Islamic social values. The Muslim Brotherhood sought to discover an Islamic path that could 1 This will be elaborated upon below in Chapter II, The Intellectual Origins of Islamic Fundamentalism. 2 Christina Harris. Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt (The Hague: The Hoover Institution, 1964), p. 14. Overview of the Muslim Brotherhood The Muslim Brotherhood is an interesting case study in the history of religiously oriented organizations. Initially the Brotherhood was an organization founded upon a form of Islamic nationalism that emerged from the political tensions of nineteenth and twentieth century Egypt. Previous fundamentalist Islamic scholars influenced its reactionary.' primarily influenced by three factors. First, it was an Islamic response, through gradual 2To I 2 Christina Harris. Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt (The Hague: The Hoover Institution, 1964), p. 14. 4 fundamentalist consequences of these interactions. This study will analyze the relationships between the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood with their respective governments. My goal is to compare and contrast the largely repressive and violent methods of the Egyptian government with the much less confrontational relationship between the Hashemite monarchy and the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in order to demonstrate that allowing limited participation in government and civil society is probably the most effective means of preventing Islamic fundamentalist organizations from radicalizing and adopting an extremist position that promotes insurrection. accommodate Western style modernization programs while retaining traditional fundamentalist ideologies. This willingness to accept modernization indicates that the Muslim Brotherhood was innovative and revolutionary among Islamic fundamentalist organizations. The Muslim Brotherhood has branches throughout the Muslim world yet lacks a central directing authority. Though each branch is founded upon basically the same guiding principles as the original core Egyptian organization, all are locally organized and locally directed. This situation allows us to observe how each branch interacted with the governments and political situation in their respective countries and document the CHAPTER II THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM community's modern to the traditional Islamic environment, yet these foreign ideologies were overwhelming the Muslim world. This sense of being besieged, of having one's entire worldview called into question, lent this debate a great sense of urgency. The modern Islamic fundamentalist had to find a way to create a modern Islam that could exist in this environment without betraying the core values of the faith. Before examining the Muslim Brotherhood's efforts to address this crisis we must first explore what the core "traditional" values of Islamic fundamentalism are, how they have evolved and how they influenced Islamic fundamentalist organizations in the twentieth century. FUNDAMENT ALISM In order to understand the motives and goals of the Muslim Brotherhood it is first necessary to examine the evolution of Islamic fundamentalist thought. Twentieth century Islamic fundamentalism arose largely in response to the Islamic community'S dual need to address both modernity and colonialism. The eclipse of the Ottoman Empire by Western Europe brought up some troubling questions for the religious community. The modem world, represented by the Western powers, was an alien culture to the Muslim world. Secularism, nationalism and liberalism were foreign concepts not at all conducive overwhelming modem modem al-Turkey and Syria. As a child he and his family were forced to flee to Damascus to few years before his birth, the great Islamic city of Baghdad was destroyed. In his lifetime, Damascus was sacked, Jerusalem attacked and enemies intent on destroying it surrounded the Muslim world. The belief that God had forsaken the Muslim people and that the end of the civilized world was at hand would have been widely preached. This situation would greatly influence Ibn Taymiyya's philosophy. Circumventing most of Syria and passing through Central Asia, they reached as far west as present day Turkey and into Gaza, in Palestine where they allied with the Christian Crusader states against the 'Abbasids. However, the commanding general Hulagu withdrew with most of his forces following the Great Khan's death back in Mongolia. Later, Hulagu, now a Khan himself, had the remaining forces he had left behind in Syria resume the invasion of Syria. In 1260 the Muslim Egyptian Mamluks defeated the 6 Ibn Taymiyya The cornerstone of much of modern Islamic fundamentalist thought and practice can be traced back to the thirteenth century Muslim theologian Taqi aI-Din ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328). Ibn Taymiyya was born in Harran, near the present day border between escape the Mongol invasions. The history of these Mongol campaigns is relevant to this chapter because it had a profound psychological impact upon Ibn Taymiyya. In 1258, a The Mongols had the ultimate goal of conquering Egypt. The second incarnation of the 'Abbasid Empire was an obstacle to this and needed to be conquered as well. The Mongols began invading Greater Syria in 1253, sacking Baghdad in 1258. the' 7 Horns city before it was sacked.4 However, even though the Mongols controlled the area for several months and raided as far afield as Gaza and Jerusalem, this campaign to take Syria was also short-lived. The Mongol forces faced their final defeat by the Mamluks at the Battle of Shaqhab in the 'viewed as a punishment from God for the collective sins of their society. The success of the Mongols and the subjugation of the Muslims was viewed by many as the end of J J. 4 1299-1301 5 Mongol forces at the Battle of Ayn Jalut. Less than a year later the Mongols were again defeated at the Battle of Homs and completely expelled from Syria. 3 However, the Mongols would remain in control of Persia and would periodically mass forces in order to invade Syria. For example, in 1299 the Mongols defeated a Mamluk army at the battle of Wadi al-Khazander, causing the majority of the population of Damascus to flee the 4 Mam1uks ofShaqhab 1303.5 The Mongols had pagan, polytheistic and animistic-based religious beliefs (although Hulagu's wife was a Nestorian Christian) and a reputation for the wholesale massacre of every living thing in areas that attempted to resist them. The Mongols had brought about the fall of the' Abbasid caliphate in 1258, which was followed by the virtually complete destruction of Baghdad. Irrigation systems were destroyed, mosques torn down, libraries burnt and many thousands of people in the city were killed. To a devout Muslim, the inability of the Muslims to stand against these godless barbarians was 3 J.1. Saunders, The History of the Mongol Conquests (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1971) pp. 119-139. 4 Adh-Dhahabi, Record of the Destruction of Damascus by the Mongols in 1299-/30/ Translated by Joseph Somogyi. From: Ignace Goldziher Memorial Volume, Part 1 Ed. Samuel Lowinger and Joseph Somogyi, Budapest, 1948. Saunders, pp. 119-121. 8 Ilkhan 6 Palestinian coast and the English, French and German Christians seemed determined to capture Jerusalem and Egypt. Ibn Taymiyya lived during a period of intense and 6 civilization. This forced many to revaluate themselves and focus upon their spiritual identity. After the failure of the initial Mongol invasions, the Mongols began to adopt some aspects of the cultures that they had conquered in Persia, often incorporating Turkic and Muslim people into their military. This was formalized with the conversion to Islam of the ilkhan ruler Ghazan (r. 1295-1304) to Islam in 1296. However, this did not put an immediate end to the Mongol conquest of the Arab world as demonstrated in the campaign discussed above that ended in 1303 at the battle of Shaqhab. 6 This means they were killing fellow Muslims, a sin explicitly forbidden in the Qur'an. Anger at this hypocrisy and bastardization of the Islamic faith was the catalyst that helped to form Ibn Taymiyya's philosophy. The external threat the empire faced instigated a desire to purify the faith and to purge the faith of the false Muslims or those who had converted but failed to fully adopt all of the tenets of Islam, Specifically the Mongols who settled in Persia and the Turkic nomadic populations. Essentially, throughout Ibn Taymiyya's life, non-Muslim enemies were determined to destroy the Muslim Empire and it seemed as if the heart of Islam itself was under siege. Mongols and their allies controlled the formerly Muslim Persian Empire to the east and the Central Asian lands to the north. Crusader states dotted the 6 Saunders, pp. 126-39. 9 footsteps and quickly demonstrated an aptitude and genius for the field. He rapidly developed a reputation as an uncompromising conservative religious authority. He would kick over the gaming tables of strangers in the street. He had an amazing ability to offend powerful people with ties to the local leadership; he was imprisoned many times over the years and ultimately died in the prison of the citadel of Damascus. However, he also inspired a core of loyal followers. the contemporary teachings of the 'ulama. He claimed that the true path had been abandoned and distorted by not adhering strictly and exclusively to the Qur 'an and the hadith, the collections of the words, teachings and accounts of the actions of the prophet Muhammad. The stunning military successes of the impious Mongols, who practiced, at best, an adulterated form of Islam, was God's punishment for abandoning the true path of the Islam and allowing less worthy influences to permeate Islam. 'ulama ijtihad, interpretation of religious doctrine, were closed. Though there is some debate about the accuracy of this among modern scholars, it remained a matter of official doctrine, if not prolonged crisis for the Muslim world and this atmosphere greatly influenced his philosophy. Ibn Taymiyya's father and grandfather were both respected theologians with whom pious Muslims would consult on spiritual matters. Ibn Tamiyya followed in their In 1282 he replaced his father as a professor of Hanbali law in Damascus. In Damascus, and later Cairo, he professed that the true path of Islam was not to be found in Contemporary Islamic jurists and believed that the gates of or 7 personal relationship and interpretation of the religious texts was a prerequisite for enlightenment. These beliefs and practices put Ibn Taymiyya at odds with other contemporary religious authorities and the local rulers who desired peace and stability Muslim equivalent of Martin Luther. early ' societal reforms and the return to a purer and more idealized form of Islam. He formulated a unique vision that would, in his opinion, preserve the essence of the era of the rightly guided caliphs in the contemporary political and social context. Recognizing 7 Ijtihadclosed?" 10 the actual practices of the jurists and the 'ulama.7 This means that the 'ulama were not to search religious texts anew for meaning but rather were expected to rely upon 600 years of established precedent in order to answer religious questions. To Ibn Taymiyya, a over an esoteric exploration of the meaning of the State's religion. In a sense, he was the Ibn Taymiyya's writings were even more controversial than his sermons, since he focused particularly on the political realm. Most members of the Ulama wisely chose to avoid the topic. Ibn Taymiyya, however, believed that the issue of good and righteous governance was integral to Islam. 8 Essentially, he believed in the restoration of a unified Islamic empire ruled by a "rightly guided" Caliph. In reality, the Muslim world had not been unified under a single ruler since the early' Abbasid period. With fellow religious scholars unwilling to criticize their rulers and the realization that a Caliphate modeled after the seventh century was an impossible dream by the late thirteenth century, Ibn Tayimyya found himself virtually alone leading the call for 7 Wael Hallaq, 'Was the Gate of Ijtihad closed?" IJMES, 16, 1984 pp. 3-41. 8 Michael Cook, Forbidding Wrong in Islam: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) pp. 145-64. 11 that there was no longer a divinely chosen leader who embodied supreme religious authority and unchallenged political control, he proposed that the relationship between the ruler and the subjects was a contract under which the Emirs would provide just rule in accordance with Islamic law, and the people would give him their obedience in exchange. However, this contract presupposed the existence of a religious leader who would provide a pious example and give guidance to the people on matters of morality and faith. The modern Islamic fundamentalists generally interpret this to mean that Ibn Taymiyya believed that the clergy should fill this role, thus endowing the 'ulama with authority separate from the government. Essentially, by filtering their reading of Ibn Taymiyya through their own contemporary experiences with modern secularism they believe that he had written about a similar situation in the thirteenth century. Based on this faulty supposition modern fundamentalists believe that Ibn Taymiyya wished to reverse a centuries long trend in which the political arena had gradually become more secularized and the religious authorities more marginalized and therefore that he believed that religion should not be subordinate to government and that an impious leader who failed to follow proper Islamic law was no more than an apostate, implying that it would be the sacred duty of all Muslims to depose such a leader. To fail to do, or to follow such a leader, would be a rejection of the Word of God and would be viewed as apostasy as well. Obviously, the government did not appreciate these radical views. The notion that people not only had a right but a duty to overthrow the government was 11 12 unacceptable. This made him an enemy of the government and a hero to the marginalized and disaffected in society. Another pillar of Ibn Taymiyya's ideology was reemphasizing the concept of jihad or holy struggle. He equated the waging of jihad with righteous war. Jihad had been invoked many times in Islamic history and can be referenced in the Qur'an (Sura 2: 190) and (Sura 9:5). 9 Usually jihad is referenced in defense of Islam or Muslim land. But by the late thirteenth century, jihad was used as one of many arguments in favor of militaristic expansion, forcefully bringing the enlightenment of Islam to infidels. Prior to this, namely the initial expansion under the Umayyad caliphs, the spread of Islam was not a primary or even secondary goal of the conquest. However, by the time of the establishment of the Sultanate, Arab Muslim culture and society had evolved and developed to the point that imperial territorial expansion was viewed through the lenses of religion. Therefore, by invoking the faith, the argument could be made that it had become the duty of the entire community to assist in raising an army for this purpose. The modern Islamic fundamentalist interprets Ibn Taymiyya's elevation of the importance of jihad as a duty of every Muslim as sanctifying the use of offensive warfare. In the thirteenth century, warfare was always directed by the political authority, if not the sultan then a provincial governor or other respected individual imbued with executive authority, and was usually a seasonal exercise. However, there was also a defensive form of jihad. If Muslim lands were threatened, it became the duty of all 9 9 jihad is referenced in Islam Muslim modem jihad jihad. If 9 David Cook, Understanding Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005) pp. 5-11. Muslim individuals to fight in defense of Islam, independent of the political leadership and the community.10 Ibn Taymiyya elevated jihad to the level of one of the five pillars of Islam and declared that it was an essential requirement for all Muslims and that it should always be independent of the political authority. He then took jihad a step further and stated that it could be invoked not just for dealing with external enemies but was also appropriate for dealing with internal enemies. Essentially, he advocated invoking jihad in order to purge the faith of those perceived as being impious. To the modern fundamentalist, turning jihad inward does two things. First, it allows Muslims to kill 'impious' Muslims on the grounds that one is protecting the integrity of the umma by punishing apostasy. Second, it creates a mechanism for forcible reform within the Muslim community. 11 The Mamluk Sultan used this interpretation of jihad in order to wage war against the Muslim Mongols. In the 1320s the Mamluk sultan Nasir commissioned a fatwa from Ibn Taymiyya authorizing the campaign. The victory over the Mongols ended the Mongol threat to Syria and resulted in a long-standing peace treaty in 1323. However, in 1517 the Mamlukes were to be defeated by the Ottomans (that is, the replacement of one Muslim dynasty by another stronger one), and in a sense, with the external threat removed, Ibn Taymiyya's teachings went out of style. Though his philosophy was never mainstream or embraced by the masses, the clear and present danger faced by the 1 0 1 1 [bid., 13 d h . 10 an t e commumty. elevatedjihud oflslam tookjihud invokingjihud modem turningjihud ummu I I ofjihud afutwu 10 Ibid., pp. 57-63. 11 Ibid., pp. 65-66. 14 Mamluk empire made the doom and gloom aspects of his teachings popular among a growing religiously fanatical fringe of society. Also, since his philosophy was generally in conformity with the wider goals of the Sultan it was often expedient to invoke his unique perspective in order to bolster the military campaign against the Mongols. When the threat was removed after the military victory over the Mongols and the conclusion of the peace treaty in 1323, his doomsday philosophy fell out of vogue. However, whenever conditions in the Muslim world seemed similar to those of the thirteenth century, and the people felt threatened by an outside power, there has often been a resurgence of fundamentalist organizations and a revival of Ibn Taymiyya's radical teachings. The external threat to the Muslim empire by the invading, seemingly unstoppable Mongols and the ensuing self-analysis that the Islamic community went through led to calls for reform. The pious believed that their society had strayed too far away from the true path of Islam and that a return to the ways of the Prophet and his companions was vitally necessary. Ibn Taymiyya had been a firsthand witness of the atrocities suffered by the Muslims under the Mongols. When the Mongols later converted to Islam this tempered and focused his anger against those whom he judged were false Muslims. Out of these feelings emerged a philosophy that advocated the harsh imposition of fundamentalist ideology and violent repression of dissent within the Muslim community that allowed for no tolerance of un-Islamic behavior. Furthermore, it reinforced the standard political theory that the legitimacy of the Muslim rulers was contingent upon their piety and adherence to shar 'ia law. If the ruler failed to live up to contingent upon their piety and adherence to shar 'fa law. If the ruler failed to live up to 15 his responsibilities it was the Muslim people's religious duty to rebel against him or risk apostasy themselves. 'Abd al-Wahhab The Wahhabi movement that emerged in eighteenth and nineteenth century Arabia was an extreme fundamentalist movement based on the Hanbali school. The Ottomans ruled the Arab world from 1517 until their collapse at the end of World War I. The Ottomans originated as a regional force around 1300 and expanded first into Europe. They controlled much of the Balkans, capturing Kosovo in 1389 and then expanded into Anatolia, capturing Constantinople in 1453. Despite the opinion that the Ottoman Empire was essentially in a slow and steady decline for five centuries as expressed by Bernard Lewis in What Went Wrong? 12 many periods of Ottoman rule can be characterized as prosperous and relatively stable. The central government was firmly in control and there were no real external threats. In fact, the early history of the Ottoman Empire was generally one of expansion. Without a crisis or an external threat to act as a catalyst for self-analysis and instigate a call for fundamentalist reform, the citizens of the Ottoman Empire were content to live life in much the same way as they had for generations. Essentially, there was no significant undercurrent of dissent or public sentiment calling for the reform of society, government or the practice of the faith. 1 2 Wrong ? East, 15 1. 12 periods Ottoman rule 11 Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2002). 16 However, this gradually began to change in the eighteenth century, with the Empire's slow but growing loss of power and territory in Europe to Russia and Austria, and later its loss of its own economic monopoly to Western European powers that were emerging as colonial and trade oriented power bases. The central government in Istanbul had been losing control of the periphery of the empire, increasingly to both European powers and local warlords in the late eighteenth century. It remained more or less in control of the urban centers, but partly due to financial constraints, had to rely increasingly on local, if not always loyal or dependable, notables to govern and control the rural hinterland. This sense of the weakness of the central government and the "decline of civilization" in general caused the beginning of the stirrings of movements that could trace their intellectual ancestry more or less explicitly to Ibn Taymiyya. One of the most prominent and influential of these new fundamentalists was Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, who was born in 1703 in the village al-'Uyayna in Najd in present day Saudi Arabia. He was descended from a line of Islamic judges and went through formal religious training in Medina and Baghdad. He developed a reputation for extreme and radical ideas. For example, while still a young man studying at a seminary in Basra he was thrown out for accusing the entire population of apostasy. al-Wahhab continued his religious studies by traveling east to Isfahan and Qum in Persia. This broad course of study across the Muslim world exposed him to many different approaches to Islam. This experience directly led to al-Wahhab formulating an interpretation of an unadulterated Islam, based upon his conception of the true Islam of ci vilization" different 17 its seventh-century founders. His interpretation of Islam was stripped of all innovation and reinterpretation. al-Wahhab believed in the primacy of monotheism, the denunciation of all forms of meditation between God and worshippers and believed that a true Muslim was required to pay a religious tax to the leader of the community. Furthermore, al-Wahhab believed that it was the obligation of a Muslim to engage in jihad against anyone who did not conform to these principles. When al-Wahhab began to develop a following he promoted the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya and reestablished respect for his teachings among the new fundamentalist movements and those movements that would follow, essentially rescuing Ibn Yaymiyya from the dustbin of history. Like Ibn Taymiyya, al-Wahhab focused upon the Qur'an and the hadith and rejected later practices. He also attacked the folk customs that had become an integral element of rural society and had taken on quasi-religious significance, such as visiting the tombs, venerating saints, leaving food offerings for the dead, etc. 1 4 He further denounced Sufism and Shi'ism as being un-Islamic, believing that such practices should be punished by death. 1 5 He and his followers would desecrate popular shrines in protest. 1 6 al-Wahhab viewed innovation (bid'a) as the path to sin and believed that innovation had perverted the message of Islam, returning society to jahiliyya, the age of barbarism that preceded the Prophet. al-Wahhab believed it was necessary to avoid all l j al-Arabia, 1 4 1 5 1 6 injihad 13 ofIbn fundamentalist 14 15 16 bid 'a) jahiliyya, 13 Madawi aI-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). p. 16. 14 Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, (New York: New York University Press, 2000). pp. 77-78 & Rasheed, pp. 17-18. 15 Cook, p.75. 16 Vasiliev, pp. 77-78. 18 forms of shirk, polytheism, and to reform society to bring it back to the true path of Islam. One of his most significant contributions to Islamic jurisprudence was his liberal use of takfir, or the process of denouncing a Muslim as an infidel for not adhering strictly to the faith. 17 Radical militant fundamentalist groups would revive this practice in the 1970s and 1980s with violent results. The increasingly radical opinions and actions of al-Wahhab and his followers led to his expulsion from al-'Uyayna by the local political leadership in 1744. He relocated to the village of Dara'iya at the invitation of the Shaykh Muhammad ibn Sa'ud (r. 1735- 65), whose wife was one of his supporters. This would lead to the development of a remarkable partnership that has lasted to the present day, the formation of a symbiotic relationship that helped each side achieve its goals. The Sa'udis gained political power and territorial control while the "Wahhabis" were allowed to carry out their program of radical reform throughout the newly acquired land. When Muhammad ibn Sa'ud died in 1765, much of the Arabian peninsula had been consolidated under Sa'udi control and 1 Q 'Abd al-Wahhab's version of Islam reigned supreme. The Sa'ud family and the Wahhabis continued their partnership; Sa'udi armies, led first by 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Muhammad (1765-1803) and then by his son Sa'ud (1803- 1814), conquered most of central and eastern Arabia by 1792, acquired Bahrain and Qatar by 1797, sacked the Shi'i holy city of Karbala' in 1802, occupied the Hijaz, 1 7 Cook, 1 8 Cook, p. 86. takjir, 17 'Abd al-Wahhab's version ofIslam reigned supreme. 18 The Sa'ud family and the Wahhabis continued their partnership; Sa'udi armies, led first by 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Muhammad (1765-1803) and then by his son Sa'ud (1803- 1814). conquered most of central and eastern Arabia by 1792, acquired Bahrain and Qatar by 1797, sacked the Shi'i holy city of Karbala' in 1802, occupied the Hijaz, 17 C ook, p. 75. 18 Cook, p. 86. 19 including Mecca and Medina, by 1803-1804.19 They also raided Iraq and Syria in the early nineteenth century, forcing the Ottomans into series of confrontations in which they were eventually pushed back. The Sa'ud family's fortunes declined throughout much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries but the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance continued to thrive.2 0 Ultimately, the doctrines of the Wahhabi movement showed similarities with those of Ibn Taymiyya, with the important difference that al-Wahhab managed to put his fundamentalist reform project at the service of a politically and territorially expansionist regime. This combination of political and military strength combined with an uncompromising religious devotion would be a model that future extremist groups would attempt to recreate in the late twentieth century. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (18387-1897) was most likely born in Asadabad, Iran, although, since he would have more resonance politically as a Sunni than as a Shi'i, he claimed to be from Afghanistan. He was the first modern Muslim activist to attempt to utilize the power of Islam specifically in the political arena. His goals were essentially political, but he recognized the power of religion and made use of it. Moreover, by recognizing the appeal of Islam, he was able to integrate his calls for internal reform into a 'religious' argument: in order to confront the challenge of the West, it would be 19 Vassiliev, pp. 83-111. 2 0 Cook, p. 86. 1804. 19 thrive?O ofIbn aI-aI-aI-aI-1838?-19Yassiliev, pp. 83-1 1 I. 20 Cook, p. 86. necessary to reform society and Islam itself, which he determined to have become debased by poor leadership. Afghani recognized that foreign influence and sometimes even outright foreign control of civil society, economic policies and even occasionally some of the governments of the Muslim world were occurring throughout the Muslim world. This situation alarmed and outraged Afghani. Therefore, he emphasized the political side of Islam as an anti-imperialist doctrine that would help revive "national pride" and mobilize the Muslim world to resist Western interference. al-Afghani argued strongly against the idea of the creation of individual Muslim national states, and called for a single Islamic state, the unification of all countries with an Islamic tradition. His approach was a break with tradition, calling for the restoration of purified Islamic values and the unification of all Muslims in defense of Islam. al-Afghani traveled widely throughout the Islamic world and Europe, gaining first-hand knowledge of the conditions of European progress and Muslim subjugation. He instigated a life-long campaign of political agitation that took him from Iran to Afghanistan, India, Egypt, France, Britain and Russia. He served at the Qajar court and eventually at the Ottoman court in Istanbul. Everywhere he went, he counseled leaders, led religious and political demonstrations against Western imperialism and its local allies, and called for external unity and internal reform of the Islamic world. As a political program, Pan-Islam was no match for the challenges and opportunities of the newly developing world of nations. Instead, one of the major new developments that emerged from the collaboration between al-Afghani and his disciple 20 ai-ai-ai-21 Muhammed 'Abduh was the emergence of Islamic modernism, in which people in a number of areas worked to create an effective synthesis of Islam and modernity. In addition, although indirectly and unintentionally, al-Afghani laid the basis for later radical Islam or Islamic fundamentalism. Ultimately, the pan-Islamic movement was a calculated political maneuver that used Islam as the primary tool in an attempt to unify the diverse Muslim peoples of Asia and Africa to combat Western territorial and political encroachment on the Muslim world. The relative decline in power of the Ottoman and Persian Empires when compared to the Western Empires demanded that drastic reforms take place. Modernization and the adoption of certain Western institutions were essential to the survival and the success of these civilizations. However, they risked losing their culture through assimilation to Western ideals. al-Afghani wished to thread the needle by reasserting the fundamental religious ties that defined Muslims as separate from and superior to the West while adopting many of the technologies, sciences, military and bureaucratic structures of the West. Attempts to unify the Muslim people under a single banner failed. Nevertheless in Iran, the Tobacco Revolt of 1891, the assassination of Nasser ed-Din Shah in 1898, and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-09 can all be traced to al-Afghani's influence. His legacy included anti-imperialism, anti-absolutism, and Islamic reform. To a considerable extent, these legacies converged in the constitutional movements in the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and Iran. Many modern Islamist movements have adopted al- Afghani as their founding father and extremist movements have embraced radical Muhammed' aI-fundamentalism. aI-al­Afghani 22 militant Islam as a tool to achieve pan Islamic goals and emphasize the political power of Islam. One of the earliest Islamic political movements was Ikhwan al-Muslimin, the Muslim Brotherhood, established by Hasan al-Banna in 1929. He adopted an absolutely Utopian approach towards the problem facing the colonial countries." The failure of previous anticolonial efforts, and the relentless pressures on nonreligious opposition movements in the Middle East exerted by the Western powers eventually opened the way to the political Islam of the last few decades. Political movements like the Muslim Brotherhood see Islam as a binding social force that transcends the borders of secular nation states, although in practice, members' activities are generally confined to their 'own' countries. At the present time, Brotherhood members are actively involved in the politics of Egypt, Jordan Sudan and several other Middle Eastern states. The Muslim Brotherhood will be explained in greater detail in the following chapters. However, al-Afghani's pan-Islamic political ideology was significantly different from today's political Islam. Islamic nineteenth-century political and social reformers could pursue three different projects: they could strive for a return to fundamentalism, much like the Wahhabis. Second, they could embrace Western-style modernism and accept the gradual secularization of Islamic society. Third, they could reinterpret the basic tenets of Islam in the context of modern rational and liberal thought, that is, 22 Thus the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood are not administratively linked. The major exceptions here are the more militant transnational (and usually clandestine) associations like al-Qa'ida. ai-Muslim in, utopian countries.21 22 different fundamentalism, ofIslamic 21 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962). p. 114. 22 Thus the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood are not administratively linked. The major exceptions here are the more militant transnational (and usually clandestine) associations like al-Qa ·ida. 23 essentially reopening the gate of ijtihadr Although not a 'conventional religious scholar' (he had no formal training) al-Afghani chose the third path, thus using religion in order to achieve political goals. Modern Islamic fundamentalist organizations seek to achieve the opposite, to reshape the political arena to conform to their religious interpretation of the world. al-Afghani's principal disciple was an Egyptian, Muhammad 'Abduh (1849- 1905), who would become one of the primary inspirations for the Muslim Brotherhood. Both al-Afghani and 'Abduh believed that reason, Islam and modern science were compatible, though this required the dismantling of the traditional social, economic, and political institutions of the Muslim world, which had gradually become perversions of true Islam. Whereas 'Abd al-Wahhab had sought a return to a purer form of Islam through emulation of the past, al-Afghani and Abduh sought to find new meaning by intepreting the Qur'an in a modern context. In Paris, al-Afghani and 'Abduh founded an Islamic society and a journal called al- 'Urwa al-Wuthqa, 'the Indissoluble Bond'. While there, al-Afghani engaged in a running debate with the philosopher Renan. However, 'Abduh would break with al- Afghani in 1892, when the latter returned to Istanbul at the invitation of Sultan 'Abd al- Hamid II. 'Abduh himself returned to Egypt in 1889, and was later appointed Grand Mufti, a position he held until his early death. 'Abduh differed from his mentor in several crucial areas, and in particular was less of a revolutionary and more of a gradualist. He also had a limited role in the Egyptian nationalist movement. 2 j ijtihad.23 aI-aI-Whereas' ofIslam aI-modem aI-ajournal aI-al­Afghani Sultan' al­Hamid 23 Harris, p. 115. 24 Another aspect of al-Afghani's pan-Islamic vision was his reinterpretation of the role of leaders in an Islamic society. He argued that The divisions which have occurred in Muslim States originate only from the failure of rulers who deviate from the solid principles upon which the Islamic faith is built and leave the road which was followed by their early ancestors. When those who rule Islam return to the rules of their law and model their conduct upon that practiced by the early generations of Muslims it will not be long before God gives them extensive power and bestows strength upon them comparable to that wielded by the orthodox caliphs, who were leaders of the faith." 2 4 al-Afghani also believed that leaders should be held accountable for their actions, and argued that limitations on the absolute authority of the ruler are essential to prevent despotism. The people have the right to depose and replace a bad leader. We can observe al-Afghani putting his theory into practice with the assassination of Nasser al-Din Shah, ruler of the Qajar Empire in 1896. This questioning of the leadership rejects the idea of divine right of kings and shares many aspects of the nationalist view of the exceptionality of the nation rather than the king. It also flirts with the democratic principle of popular sovereignty, or rule by the consent of the governed. It also echoes Ibn Taymiyya's teaching that it is the duty of the people to remove a bad leader. Some of al-Afghani's ideas on the nature of leadership and reform would be highly influential in the prelude to the Iranian constitutional movement of 1905, especially an attempt to prevent absolutism. However, the promise of reform brought by the constitutional revolution collapsed in 1911, when pressures from Britain and Russia combined with powerful internal forces to disband the parliament and suspend the 2 4 ofal-24 aI-aI-aI-ofal-24 Hourani, p. 114. 25 constitution. What followed was rule by a series of Bakhtiari chiefs and the reestablishment of the monarchy under Ahmad Shah, and subsequently somewhat more permanently under the Pahlavis. According to Keddie, al-Afghani's vision of pan-Islam expressed through his writings bore many hallmarks of the traditional definition of nationalism. These include an aggressive cultural defensiveness, a superiority complex in relation to Christianity and a call for a revival of a distant and idealized past.2 5 His rhetoric was focused upon uniting against Western encroachment under the banner of Islam. Essentially, he wanted the national identity of the umma to become Islam. In a sense, al-Afghani tried to use Islam as a political tool in order to bind the people together into a cohesive single nation. As in other nation-building efforts, he accentuated the differences between "us" (Muslims) and "them" (Western imperialists) while downplaying the regional, ethnic, linguistic, class and cultural differences within the national identity he was forging. Unity around Islam was conducive to this because of the strict separation of identity within Islam: there are Muslims and there are infidels. Cultural differences that existed within Islam, (ethnic, linguistic, geographic) were secondary to religious identity. Specifically, Islam was considered a stronger bond in unity of the umma more than any other binding social tie, so that the difference between a Muslim and a non-Muslim trumps any other similarities or differences among the Muslim population as a whole. An individual's membership in the community is based upon his/her submission to God and his/her adoption of the faith. Ethnicity, status, birth etc. do not matter. This makes 2 5 25 oflslam. aI-and his/her adoption of the faith. Ethnicity, status, birth etc. do not matter. This makes 25 Keddie, pp. 24-25. identifying the nation easier. It also makes the composition of the pan-Islamic nation fluid. Calls to aid a Muslim country under the yoke of foreign oppression could be a rallying cry in support of 'our brothers'. However, the people or rulers of a Muslim country willingly cooperating with foreign interests could be characterized as "bad Muslims" and "infidels" and therefore not part of the nation. However, by ignoring or not addressing the differences between the diverse groups that make up the pan-Islamic nation, al-Afghani failed to provide a model that could be implemented beyond the theoretical level. Basically, his rhetoric was appealing but it would be impossible to realize such a far-reaching and all-encompassing plan. Pan-Arabism would face similar problems that would lead to its ultimate failure, but it had an advantage over pan-Islam in that it acknowledged the need to address some of the fundamental differences within the umma. 'Abduh and al-Afghani believed that Muslims must cooperate both to reverse internal decline and to counter European colonialism. They called for a return to the spirit of early Islam and a reinterpretation of the Qur'an to meet the needs of the modern world. They believed that some limited borrowing of Western ideas was permissible and that the use of reason was not in conflict with religious revelation. After 'Abduh's death his disciple Muhammad Rashid Rida continued to carry and develop the reformist message of al-Afghani and 'Abduh to the Islamic world. 26 ai-aU-umma. ai-Qur' an After' aI-and' 27 Muhammed 'Abduh and Rashid Rida Muhammad Rashid Rida (September 23, 1865, - August 22, 1935) was born in Tripoli, Syria in 1865, and was an admirer of the writings of Muhammed 'Abduh. Upon completion of his studies in 1897 he immigrated to Egypt, where he became a disciple of 'Abduh, eventually becoming his biographer. In fact, much of what is known of the details of 'Abduh's life comes from the writings of Rida and at times it becomes difficult to determine to whom to attribute certain ideas and philosophies, although a handful of ideas clearly originated with Rida. Rida supported the restoration of a religious caliphate; while 'Abduh largely ignored the issue, Rida viewed it as a viable Islamic alternative to Western nationalism. Rida also placed a heavy emphasis on the importance of the Sayyids or blood descendants of the Prophet while Abduh did not. Like Muhammad 'Abduh, Rida regarded education as the primary instrument of 27 * * social change. He stressed the importance of incorporating religion into the educational system, ultimately establishing his own school with a curriculum that he designed. This school was aimed at young religious men and counted among its students an impressive • 28 list of twentieth-century Muslim leaders. The emphasis on the need for religious education would become a cornerstone of the Muslim Brotherhood's philosophy. Under the guidance of Muhammad 'Abduh, Rida established the magazine al- Manar (The Lighthouse) in 1898 and continued to publish it for thirty-seven years. In it he spoke for the Salafiyya movement, which combined a form of Islamic modernism with 2 6 of 101-102. 2 7 116. Muhammed' Muhammed' of' Abduh' s difficult while' 26 social change.27 He stressed the importance of incorporating religion into the educational system, ultimately establishing his own school with a curriculum that he designed. This school was aimed at young religious men and counted among its students an impressive list of twentieth-century Muslim leaders?8 The emphasis on the need for religious education would become a cornerstone of the Muslim Brotherhood's philosophy. Under the guidance of Muhammad 'Abduh, Rida established the magazine al- Manar (The Lighthouse) in 1898 and continued to publish it for thirty-seven years. In it he spoke for the Salafiyya movement, which combined a form of Islamic modernism with 26 M.A. Zaki Badawi. The Reformers q{ Egypt (London: The Muslim Institute, 1978) pp. 1 0 I-I 02. 17 Badawi, p. I 16. 28 Ibid. 28 the search for inspiration in the example of early Islam. It sought to promote social, religious, political and economic reforms that demonstrated that Islam was compatible with contemporary conditions and that the shar 'ia was a practical judicial tool for a modern government.2 9 Rida republished many of Afghani and 'Abduh's writings in al Manar. Though Afghani and 'Abduh had been published before, their writings were not well known or widespread, and al-Manar introduced them to many sympathetic readers around the world. In a real sense, much of what is known of the teachings of al-Afghani and 'Abduh exists because of the efforts of Rida to continue spreading and expanding upon their ideas after their deaths. In response to a question in al-Manar about the nature of jihad, Rida addressed the aspect of the defensive qualities of jihad outlined in the Qur'an in the face of the obviously offensive expansion of the first empire in the seventh century. Rida had a very careful answer, positing that the proclamation of the truth is a primary goal of Islam. Non-Islamic neighbors are an obstacle to truth and thus opponents of Islam. Therefore, •J A aggressively removing them by force is, in effect, a defensive act. Though the vast majority of Rida's work on jihad calls for only limited and defensive warfare and focuses upon truth, this exchange is significant because, though not taken directly from Rida, the interpretation of offensive jihad is at the ideological core of modern radical and terrorist Islamic groups, and is their justification for carrying out violent attacks against Western - } 3 0 modem govemment.29 and' and' al-Manar sense. aI-and' jihad aggressively removing them by force is, in effect, a defensive act.30 Though the vast majority of Rida's work onjihad calls for only limited and defensive warfare and focuses upon truth, this exchange is significant because, though not taken directly from Rida, the interpretation of offensive jihad is at the ideological core of modem radical and terrorist Islamic groups, and is their justification for carrying out violent attacks against Western 19 Badawi, p. 99. 30 Cook, p. 96. civilians and local noncombatants. al Qaeda in Iraq is a perfect example of this principle in practice. Though Rida echoed his mentor's call for the purification of Islam and the improvement of higher education, he chose to emphasize the need to defend Islam from external attack. 31 While 'Abduh could be interpreted as being pro-Western (at least with regard to structures and institutions) Rida sought to emphasize the need to eliminate the influences of Western culture without abandoning Western style reforms, including the incorporation of Western sciences and technologies. However, he viewed nationalism with some suspicion, since he associated it with secularism. Though he supported the nationalist goal of ending colonialism in the Muslim world, he viewed the inherently secular nature of nationalism as a threat to the Islamic community. He also believed that the Muslim world was a single entity and that nationalism would lead to the dismemberment of the umma. Rida was always an outsider in Egyptian affairs. Though he carried the fundamentalist torch for al-Afghani and 'Abduh he never received the political and social appointments that his predecessors received. This was partly due to his unwavering inflexibility on his positions and partly because of his foreign origin during a period of increasing nationalism. However, through Rida's writings and his preservation of the work of previous writers, twentieth-century Islamic fundamentalism found a message and a voice. j l 1973-1993 3 2 29 3 1 While' umma.32 ai-and' a VOlce. 31 David Sagiv, Fundamentalism and Intellectuals in Egypt /973-1993 (London: Routledge, 1995) p. 23. 32 Badawi, p. 128. 30 Rida grew more anti-Western after World War I, and exercised a profound influence upon Hasan al-Banna and the Muslim Brethren. His position never wavered and barely evolved over the decades. Ironically, he found himself beginning his career as a radical modernist only to see his position adopted, adapted and passed over by Egyptian nationalists. In effect, he became a traditionalist by default. The reform movement seemed to become increasingly irrelevant as it was eclipsed by the nationalist movement in Egypt. Yet the ideas would remain, to be embraced by another generation. Conclusion Ibn Taymiyya believed in restoring a romanticized golden age of Islam, and that the restoration of the caliphate would once again unite all Muslims under a single religiously-based government that possessed the mandate of Heaven. The Caliph would exercise an enlightened rule, based on shar 'ia law and would reverse the erosion of core Islamic values in society. This belief is a prime example of how extremism develops and evolves. The failure of government of his day to face the external threat of the Mongols was perceived as a punishment from God. If God is punishing the Muslim people it must be because they had failed to be good, pious Muslims and had strayed from the true path of Islam: the way to return to the true path is to reform society using the early days of the faith as a model. Ibn Taymiyya organized and led a minority movement in society that demanded that these changes be made, even though it was based upon a romanticized and glorified interpretation of the past. His fundamentalist followers were never in the majority and faced resistance from the government, the religious elites and mainstream society. Frustrated, the fundamentalist movement then abandoned rhetoric and persuasion through dialogue and began to explore more radical means of achieving its goals. At this point it assumed an adversarial position in relation to the power structure. Ultimately, when the Mongol threat was removed, Ibn Taymiyya's movement to recreate the golden age of the first generation of Islam fell into disfavor and was almost forgotten until 'Abd al-Wahhab revived it in the eighteenth century. 'Abd al-Wahhab expanded upon Ibn Taymiyya's teachings and re forged Islamic fundamentalism for his time. Under the Wahhabis, Islamic fundamentalism became fused with religious philosophy in the service of political-territorial expansionist goals. With the emergence of the modern age in the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire and Islamic civilization were both in decline. The West continued to outpace the Ottomans in military technology as well as in relative power and wealth, and the periphery of the empire gradually began to break away from Ottoman control. One by one the Ottoman territories in the Arab lands were taken over first by rebellious local forces and then by European occupiers. In Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Libya, Egypt, Greater Syria and Iraq, Ottoman rule came to an end. In the process, the empire fell increasingly in debt to Western banks, and Ottoman institutions became characterized by corruption, inefficiency and patronage. This stagnation and corruption hindered the Ottomans from being able to keep pace with Europe. The reforms in the Ottoman Empire, known as the tanzimat, occurred between the years 1839 and 1876 under a number of different sultans and marked attempts to preserve the empire in the face of direct Western competition. In addition, the Ottoman 31 until' reforged tanzimat. 32 state sought to redefine itself as a modern, bureaucratic, and tolerant state rather than simply as a Muslim dynasty. These moves alarmed pious Muslims who saw the role of their religion purposely being diminished. This situation of obvious weakness in the central government provided fertile ground for new calls for reform. Some, like al-Afghani, sought to redefine Islam in modern terms, which included a fundamental shift in the understanding of jihad. Instead of actual warfare and violent struggle, jihad was perceived as an internal struggle against the evil impulses within an individual's soul. This was called the greater jihad with the physically violent struggle now becoming the lesser jihad, a concept which would have been completely alien to both Ibn Taymiyya and ' Abd al-Wahhab. In the eighteenth and nineteenth and centuries the Muslim world had to face the increasing influence of the Western powers, which forced it to reexamine some of its most basic assumptions while compelling it to adopt many alien institutions. al-Afghani and 'Abduh emerged from within this environment, believing that the secret of the West's strength lay in its political and social organization. al-Afghani and 'Abduh sought to find a way to incorporate these structures into a Muslim ideology. Their disciple Rashid Rida had the task of continuing the work of his mentors while being faced with the further development of regional nationalist movements throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds. He preserved the teachings of his mentors and made them available to a wider audience. Islamist radicals today tend to prefer the example of al-Afghani, the relentless activist, to that of 'Abduh, the patient reformer; that they have access to both is largely due to the efforts of Rashid Rida. modem, aI-modem jihad. jihad aI-and' aI-and' aI-of' largely due to the efforts of Rashid Rida. Other Muslims during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries would reject calls for modernizing Islam, finding their own answers in the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya and ' Abd al-Wahhab. They borrowed the idea of reforming society and returning to the fundamental practices of the golden age of the first generation (al-salaf al-salih). However, their worldview was also colored by the anticolonialist and nationalist sentiments of the time. In addition, many other Islamic jurists and intellectuals inspired the Islamic fundamentalist movement over the centuries, including al-Ghazzali, al-Farabi and Maududi. However, I believe that the core of modern fundamentalist ideology is contained in the writings and teachings of these outlined above. Together, the political philosophies of these five writers are essential to an understanding of modern fundamentalist movements in Islam. Many of the founding principles and core values of the Muslim Brotherhood are directly traceable to the writings of these men. 33 sala! al-salih). modem modem CHAPTER III THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN EGYPT Throughout most of the twentieth century, Egypt has suffered sporadic bouts of internal violence caused by confrontations between the government and Islamic militants. The history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt can be characterized by long periods of an adversarial relationship with the government, characterized by repression and animosity with brief periods of cooperation. For the most part, the Brotherhood has been a nonviolent organization whose long-term goals revolve around bringing about gradual change by winning over the masses through social and educational programs. The stated goal of the Brotherhood is to first prepare the individual, then the society and eventually to achieve an Islamic state. Occasionally, the radical fringe of the organization has engaged in violent activities, but the organization has periodically purged these elements from its ranks. The Egyptian government's reaction to the Brotherhood has seemed entirely out of proportion and counter-productive in any attempt to promote peace and stability in Egypt. The government has feared the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and sought to curb their successes. In a sense, the Egyptian government has been more concerned with their inability to control the message of the Muslim Brotherhood than 3 p. 33 and sought to curb their successes. In a sense, the Egyptian government has been more concerned with their inability to control the message of the Muslim Brotherhood than 33 Ramadan, p. 157. 35 worried about the potential for violent radical rebellion stemming from governmental repression of a popular religious organization. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna in 1928. Initially it began as a movement for the reform of individual and social morality. It stressed three things: revival, organization and upbringing. The goal was to transform society into as close an approximation as possible to what the founder believed to be the original Islamic society established in Medina by the Prophet Muhammad in the 620s, there should be no distinction or barriers between religion and government. The Muslim Brotherhood soon expanded its goals to include challenging the secular leadership of all Muslim societies. Its strategy of change was to facilitate the emergence of a 'more Muslim' society through grassroots programs in education, charity, and social activities. The Brotherhood stressed the defensive definition of jihad and opposed violent or revolutionary tactics.34 Over time, branches of the Muslim Brotherhood were founded in other Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Kuwait, Syria and Jordan. However, despite the paranoid opinions of some writers, like Robert Baer the different branches are only loosely associated with each other and enjoy complete administrative independence. 3 4 3 5 34 Baer35 34 Cook, p. 98. 35 Robert Baer. Sleeping With the Devil (New York: Crown, 2003). 36 The Early History of the Brotherhood The Muslim Brotherhood's humble origins date from 1928, when six workers employed by the British, in the Suez Canal Zone in Egypt, approached a young schoolteacher named Hasan al-Banna and asked him to become their leader. They had heard him preach in mosques and coffee-houses on the need for a revitalization and renewal of Islam. al-Banna accepted, and the Society of the Muslim Brothers was established.36 al-Banna and his followers began by starting an evening school. In its first few years, the Brotherhood initially resembled an ordinary Islamic welfare society, focusing on Islamic education, with an emphasis on teaching students how to implement into their daily lives an ethos of solidarity and charity, rather than on philosophical issues. The Muslim Brotherhood grew quickly. In 1931 there were three branches, and by 1938 there were three hundred throughout Egypt: It had thus developed into a major political opposition group with a highly diverse membership and widespread mass 37 appeal. al-Banna's vision of renewing broken links between tradition and modernity enabled the Brotherhood to gain a degree of popularity and influence enjoyed by no other welfare society. Furthermore, al-Banna felt that the ideas of Islamic religious reformers and religious education were no longer accessible to the general public, especially young people. He was determined to rectify this by training a group of young, motivated preachers equipped with modern teaching methods who would be independent both of the government and of the religious establishment. In this environment we can observe the 3 6 36. 3 7 j 8 53-57. renewalofIslam. 36 appeal.al-Banna's vision of renewing broken links between tradition and modernity enabled the Brotherhood to gain a degree of popularity and influence enjoyed by no other welfare society. Furthermore, al-Banna felt that the ideas of Islamic religious reformers and religious education were no longer accessible to the general public, especially young people. He was determined to rectify this by training a group of young, motivated preachers equipped with modern teaching methods who would be independent both of the government and of the religious establishment.38 In this environment we can observe the 36 Lia, p. 36. 37 Mitchell, pp. 12-13. 38 Lia, pp. 53-57. 37 Muslim Brotherhood acting in vocal opposition to the Egyptian government. It advocated widespread social and political reform but restricted itself to its social welfare programs and its preaching. As long as the government allowed the Brotherhood to operate and did not restrict its access to a forum from which it could express its views to the public, it remained peaceful and generally followed the law. The Brotherhood's first major project was the construction of a mosque, which was completed in 1931. They began to receive favorable attention in the press, and a Cairo branch was founded. In 1932, al-Banna was transferred to Cairo at his request, and the organization's headquarters moved there.3 9 In the early 1930s, the Brotherhood's welfare activities included small-scale social work among the poor, building and repairing mosques, and establishing a number of Qur'anic schools. Members also set up small workshops and factories, and organized the collection and distribution of the alms tax. As the organization expanded it opened pharmacies, hospitals and clinics for the general public, and launched an adult literacy program, offering courses in coffee shops and clubs.40 In 1931-32, the Brotherhood underwent an internal crisis in the course of which several members challenged al-Banna's leadership decisions, particularly his control over the organization's funds, his general stubbornness, and his insistence on having a carpenter as his deputy. This conflict reflected a more basic disagreement with al- Banna's concept of the Brotherhood's mission. Some members felt that the Brotherhood 3 9 4 0 39 Qur' anic 4o 39 Ibid., pp. 40-42. 40 Ibid., pp. 109-111. 38 should simply be a traditional Islamic welfare society which wealthy local notables could support, meaning in particular that it should have open and transparent accounts and socially respectable leaders. al-Banna threatened to expel his enemies from the Brotherhood, at which point they resigned. 1 an effort to resolve the situation, al-Banna sought to clearly define the structure of the leadership in the organization. the mid-1930s the Brotherhood developed a formal hierarchical structure, with the General Guide (al-Banna) at the top, assisted by a General Guidance Bureau and a deputy. Local branches were organized into districts, whose administration was largely autonomous. Categories of membership were introduced as well. Membership fees depended on the means of each member, with poor members paying no fees. Promotion through the hierarchy depended on the performance of Islamic duties and on knowledge attained in the Brotherhood's study groups. This merit-based system was a radical departure from the traditional practice of basing hierarchies on social status. In 1933, the Brotherhood founded a publishing company and purchased a printing press, which it used to print several newspapers over the next decade. Funds were raised by creating a joint stock company in which only members of the Brotherhood were permitted to buy shares, thus protecting the organization's independence from the government and from the wealthy elite by guaranteeing that its members were the sole owners of its institutions, and that they alone financed new projects.43 4 1 Ibid, 60-67. 4 2 Ibid, 98-104. 4 3 Ibid, pp. 97-98. 41 In In 42 ajoint 43 41 Ibid., pp. 60-67. -12 Ibid., pp. 98-104. 43 Ibid., pp.97-98. 39 al-Banna began to emphasize the Brotherhood's political responsibilities concerning a variety of issues such as prostitution, alcohol, gambling, inadequate religious education in schools, and the struggle against imperialism. This political involvement attracted large numbers of young, educated Egyptians, particularly students, to the Brotherhood by encouraging and supporting them in campaigning for political 44 causes. The Brotherhood became the standard bearer of the ideology of the disenfranchised classes, the voice of the educated middle and lower middle classes, and the conduit through which many members of those groups demanded political participation. Throughout the 1930s the Brotherhood placed increasing emphasis on social justice, and closing the gap between the classes became one of its main objectives. al-Banna voiced increasingly strong criticisms of the upper class and the class system as a whole Islam is equal for all people and prefers nobody to others on the grounds of differences in blood or race, forefathers or descent, poverty or wealth. According to Islam everyone is equal... However, in deeds and natural gifts, then the answer is yes. The learned is above the ignorant... Thus, we see that Islam does not approve of the class system. 5 The Brotherhood called for the nationalization of key industries, and for government intervention in the economy. It encouraged laws to protect workers against exploitation, supported social welfare programs, including unemployment benefits, public housing and health and adult literacy programs, which would be funded by higher taxes on the wealthy. By 1948 the Brotherhood was advocating land reform to enable 4 4 Ibid, 58, 67-69, 183-184. 4 5 Ibid, causes.The Brotherhood became the standard bearer of the ideology of the disenfranchised classes, the voice of the educated middle and lower middle classes, and the conduit through which many members of those groups demanded political participation. Throughout the 1930s the Brotherhood placed increasing emphasis on social justice, and closing the gap between the classes became one of its main objectives. al-Banna voiced increasingly strong criticisms of the upper class and the class system as a whole Islam is equal for all people and prefers nobody to others on the grounds of differences in blood or race, forefathers or descent, poverty or wealth. According to Islam everyone is equal... However, in deeds and natural gifts, then the answer is yes. The learned is above the ignorant... Thus, we see that Islam does not approve of the 4- class system. ) The Brotherhood called for the nationalization of key industries, and for government intervention in the economy. It encouraged laws to protect workers against exploitation, supported social welfare programs, including unemployment benefits, public housing and health and adult literacy programs, which would be funded by higher taxes on the wealthy. By 1948 the Brotherhood was advocating land reform to enable 44 Ibid., pp. 57-58,67-69,183-184. 45 Ibid., pp. 73-74. small farmers to own land. al-Banna was attempting to bring about social renewal through a modern reinterpretation of Islam, arguing that religion should not be confined to the domain of private life, but should rather be applied to the problems of the modern world. Essentially, he believed that Islam should be used as the moral foundation of a national renaissance with a total reform of political, economic and social systems. The Brotherhood's openness to different forms of Islamic belief and practice represented another aspect of its appeal to young people. al-Banna condemned the rigid preoccupation of some Salaflyya societies with minor points of religious doctrine, and advocated tolerance and goodwill between the different forms and sects of Islam. Recent scholarly work even suggests that Hasan al-Bana and the Muslim Brotherhood accepted the validity of Shi'ism in Iran.4 8 He felt that Sufism and other traditional practices should be welcomed, and that the Brotherhood should focus on basic social and political issues rather than on theological hair-splitting.49 Militancy and World War the late 1930s, some members pushed for the Muslim Brotherhood to form a military wing to conduct armed struggle against British rule. Others were already disobeying the Brotherhood's leadership and had engaged in isolated clashes with the police. al-Banna felt that the Brotherhood was not ready to engage in military activities, 4 6 74, 81-82, 206-and Carre, pp. 4 7Lia,, 4 8 Ikhwan Miislimun-Dirasatfi ltifaq lftiraq Istratijiyyah 4 9 Lia, 114-40 46 47 SalC{/iyya 48 splitting.49 II In 46 Lia., pp. 73-74,81-82,206-211 andCarre,pp. 45-47. 47Lia" pp. 74-77. 48 Abbas Khamma Yar Iran wa al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun--Dirasatfi 'Awamil al-ltifaq wa al-Iftiraq (Beirut: Markaz al-Dirasaat al-lstratij iyyah wa al-Buhuth wa al-Tawthiq, 1998) 49 Lia. pp. 59-60, I 14-117. 41 and feared that those who wished to do so "might take the wrong course and miss the target." He advocated a more cautious, long-term plan of forming groups of particularly dedicated members, called "battalions" who would receive rigorous spiritual and physical training: Once their numbers were sufficient, al-Banna felt, the Battalions might be prepared to engage in warfare. However, the battalion system failed to develop satisfactorily, and pressure from members for armed struggle against the British increased. In 1939, conflict over this issue developed into a major crisis, during which some of the more extreme members left the Brotherhood to form a rival organization called the Youth of Muhammad. The following year the Brotherhood created a military wing called the secret apparatus. 5 0 Later, in 1941 the elected General Assembly was replaced by a smaller appointed body called the Consultative Assembly. However, the Society's structure remained decentralized, so that branches could continue to operate if the government arrested leading members. 51 During the Second World War the Brotherhood adopted the position that Egypt should remain neutral. In 1941 Britain replaced the Egyptian government with a puppet regime, martial law was imposed, and some public figures that Britain considered subversive were arrested. al-Banna was imprisoned twice but was quickly released. The Brotherhood's publications were suppressed, its meetings were banned and any reference to the organization in the newspapers was forbidden. 52 In the course of the war, the Brotherhood alternated between avoiding sensitive issues that could give the government 5 0 31. 5 1 5 2 50 5 I 52 50 Lia, pp. 172-178 and Carre, pp. 30-3 I. 51 Lia, pp. 186-192. 52 Mitchell, pp. 19-23. 42 an excuse to crack down on the organization, and taking risky political positions such as calling for the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. While it generally kept a low profile, the Brotherhood concentrated on maintaining and expanding its membership base and extending its social welfare programs, which included helping the victims of Axis bombings of Egyptian cities. War-related shortages contributed to political unrest in Egypt. In February 1942, a mass demonstration of students led to the resignation of the government. British troops surrounded the royal palace and forced the king to accept a government headed by the Wafd party, which had remained loyal and obedient to the British throughout the war. 33 The first act of the Wafd government was to dissolve parliament and call for new elections. When al-Banna declared his candidacy, the Wafd prime minister asked him to withdraw it; he agreed, but in return he obtained the prime minister's promise that the Brotherhood could resume its normal activities without governmental interference. Also, the government would enact measures to curtail prostitution and the sale of alcohol. The government did make prostitution illegal, and restricted the sale of alcohol on religious holidays. The Brotherhood was allowed to resume some of its work, but over the next few years the government's attitude alternated between repression and friendliness towards the organization. 54 As a result of sporadic repression, the call for violent action and increased militancy within the organization grew. Essentially, a movement for the 5 3 Ibid. 5 4 53 54 and increased militancy within the organization grew. Essentially, a movement for the 53 Ibid. 54 Mitchell, pp. 26-28. 43 radicalization of the organization emerged within the Brotherhood in response to the government's attempts to limit its exposure to the public. The Brotherhood then reorganized itself into a system of cells in order to minimize the impact of arrests on the membership. In 1943, the Society replaced its failed battalion system with a cellular form of internal organization called "families" which consisted of groups of five members. The families met regularly, usually in their own homes, and assumed responsibility for one another's welfare. 5 5 Similar organizational structures have proven to be extremely successful when employed by guerrilla and insurgency groups around the world throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Postwar During the postwar years the Brotherhood grew rapidly, and by 1948 had two thousand branches with over a million members. 3 6 In September 1945 it adopted a new constitution that formally recognized the structures and organization put in place during the 1938 reorganization mentioned above. It also submitted its records to the Ministry of Social Affairs as was required by law, and was classified as a "political, social and religious institution" but did not receive legal recognition as a political party. Basically, this meant that government assistance given to charities would be available for some of the Brotherhood's activities but that its legal status was dependent upon the whims of the government. Therefore the social welfare programs were divided into separate sections, 5 5 266, 176-177. 5 6 Carre, 2 1 . called" 55 56 55 Lia, pp. 256-266,176-177. 56 Carre, p. 21. 44 each with its own director and structure, in order to protect them from governmental 37 al-Banna and several other Brotherhood candidates were defeated in the rigged elections of 1945. The Brotherhood's publications expressed hostility and criticism towards the government and its policies, and it organized strikes and nationalist demonstrations. In October 1945, the Society organized a "people's congress" on national liberation in Cairo and seven other cities. Its exclusion from parliamentary politics strengthened the position of those members who advocated a more radical and violent confrontation with the government. By this time many were becoming increasingly • 58 dismissive of al-Banna's policy of nonviolent action. The Muslim Brotherhood had arrived at a point where there was considerable risk of its stated goals of gradual societal change evolving into a call for violent revolution. al-Banna's concept of nationalism was Islamic in origin, and its long-term goal was to see all humanity united by the Muslim faith. On the other hand the Brotherhood had no clear definition of the sort of political system it wished for. The primary consequence of the Brotherhood's affirmation of Islamic nationalism was its support of the anticolonial movement in Egypt and other Islamic countries before World War II and anticommunism after the war. The Brotherhood was also vehemently against the existing social order and the government that supported it, which was one of the main reasons for its popularity, "Mitchell, 5 8 interference. 57 dismissive ofal-Banna's policy of nonviolent action. The Muslim Brotherhood had arrived at a point where there was considerable risk of its stated goals of gradual societal change evolving into a call for violent revolution. al-Banna's concept of nationalism was Islamic in origin, and its long-term goal was to see all humanity united by the Muslim faith. On the other hand the Brotherhood had no clear definition of the sort of political system it wished for. The primary consequence of the Brotherhood's affirmation of Islamic nationalism was its support of the anticolonial movement in Egypt and other Islamic countries before World War II and anticommunism after the war. The Brotherhood was also vehemently against the existing social order and the government that supported it, which was one of the main reasons for its popularity, 57Mitchell, pp. 36-37. 58 Ibid., p. 33. 45 especially among young people.* However, government attempts to suppress and marginalize the Muslim Brotherhood seemingly backfired and, in effect, nearly created a violent revolutionary movement. After the fall of the Wafd party from power in 1945, the Brotherhood and the Wafd became the two main opposition parties in the political arena. Out of power, the Wafd was more eager to champion the nationalist cause, with the result that the Brotherhood found itself in direct competition with the Wafd for the leadership of the Egyptian nationalist movement. However, the communists chose to support the Wafd. Despite their deep mutual distrust, the two groups occasionally joined in the same mass demonstrations against the government. However, the Brotherhood's refusal to cooperate with the communists led to the breakdown of relations between the two groups. The Wafd party accused the Brothers of being tools of the government and of the ruling class while it alone represented the masses. The Brothers took offense at these accusations, and organized competing strikes of their own. This further damaged their already poor relationship with the government, and the Brotherhood again became the target of police harassment and summary arrests.60 In 1946, al-Banna was nearly killed by a bomb attack, suspected of being carried out by Wafd supporters. Tensions continued to escalate and followers of the Wafd party and members of the Brotherhood had a series of violent encounters. After these clashes, representatives of the Brotherhood and the Wafd party held secret meetings in order to 5 9 Lia, pp. 79-81. 6 0 people. 59 60 59 Lia, pp. 79-81. 60 Mitchell, pp. 42-49. 46 alleviate the tension between the two groups.6 1 The ability of these rival organizations to disrupt the peace and mobilize the population did not go unnoticed by the government. The government's reaction would be more repression and tighter control of the political currents in Egypt. In October 1946, the Egyptian Prime Minister, Sidqi Pasha, and the British reached agreement on a draft treaty according to which the British agreed to evacuate Cairo, Alexandria, and the Nile Delta by March 31,1947 and the rest of Egypt by September 1, 1949. The government agreed that in case of aggression by any of Egypt's neighbors, the British would be allowed back to their former bases in Suez and the Egyptians would cooperate with them as they had done during World War II. These pro- British terms were unacceptable to many Egyptian nationalists, and their announcement was followed by violent student riots. Members of the Brotherhood's secret apparatus started to carry out attacks on British interests as well as on targets related to the Egyptian government. The government responded to the outbreak of violence with harsh and repressive measures, including arresting many members of the Brotherhood and other nationalist groups. Rioting continued throughout 1946, and in December the government 62 resigned. ~ However, the postwar global political environment quickly became a major focus of regional policy. In Egypt and across the Arab world, the plight of the Palestinian people continued to outrage people. The 1947 UN resolution on the partitioning of Palestine gave the issue 6 1 Ibid. 6 2 Ibid., 49-50, 60. 61 31, 1947 resigned.62 However, the postwar global political environment quickly became a major focus of regional policy. In Egypt and across the Arab world, the plight of the Palestinian people continued to outrage people. The 1947 UN resolution on the partitioning of Palestine gave the issue 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid., pp. 49-50, 60. 47 a sense of urgency, and the Brotherhood sent volunteers to fight in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. During the war, there were numerous bomb attacks on Jews in Cairo, many of which were attributed to members of the Brotherhood's Secret Apparatus. 3 In March 1948, members of the secret apparatus assassinated a judge who had given a prison sentence to a Muslim Brother for attacking British soldiers. al-Banna expressed his revulsion at the assassination,64 but the violence of the secret apparatus demonstrated that Hasan al-Bana and the core of the Muslim Brotherhood was losing control of its members. The decentralized structure of the organization allowed for independent operations to be carried out by individual cells. However, without direct logistical control, the leadership could only influence its members and hope for the best. As tensions and repression on the part of the government escalated, so did the violence. In December 1948, the Egyptian government released a decree outlawing the Muslim Brotherhood. The police had discovered stockpiles of bombs and other weapons accumulated by the secret apparatus, and the government feared, or purported to fear, that the Brotherhood was planning a revolution. Also, since the Brotherhood had its own infrastructure in the form of hospitals, factories and schools, as well as an armed military force, the government saw it potentially developing into a parallel state, which some Egyptians might come to see as more legitimate than the official one. A few weeks later, with the organization's hierarchy and communications thoroughly disrupted because of the arrests, a member of the Brotherhood assassinated Prime Minister 6 3 Ibid., 55-58. 6 4 Ibid., pp. 62. 6 5 Ibid., 58-66. urgency. 63 In ajudge 64 65 63 Ibid., pp. 55-58. 64 Ibid., pp. 62. 65 Ibid., pp. 58-66. 48 Nuqrashi. Several trials followed, and Nuqrashi's assassin was executed. The prosecution attempted to demonstrate that al-Banna had been responsible for the assassination, while the defense argued that he had been unable to maintain control over "extremists" in the secret apparatus. In the end he was exonerated.66 The new prime minister, ' Abd al-Hadi, attempted to suppress all dissent by subjecting the population to brutal repressive measures, including the systematic use of torture against political prisoners. 6 7 al-Banna again rejected all the accusations leveled at the Brotherhood. Once more he condemned the use of violence by Brotherhood members, including attacks on Jews, declaring that the leaders of the organization would never have sanctioned this violence, and were unable to prevent it because the arrest of the leaders had made it impossible for them to exercise their authority. He also denied that the Brotherhood had been planning to overthrow the government, insisting that the stockpiles of weapons had been intended for use in Palestine in open partnership with the Arab League. In February 1949, probably on the orders of the prime minister, the political police assassinated al-Banna. 6 8 However, the gradual escalation of repression and reprisals by the government did not put an end to the Brotherhood as it had originally intended. Instead, it encouraged members to radicalize and join the more extreme elements of the organization that advocated violent opposition to the government. As control of the Muslim Brotherhood began to slip away from the leadership, due in large 6 6 Ibid., pp. 72-74. 6 7 Ibid., pp. 68-69. 6 8 66 67 Banna again the 68 66 Ibid., pp. 72-74. 67 Ibid., pp.68-69. 68 Carre, p. 33, and Mitchell, pp. 70-71. 49 part to the imprisonment of the leaders, the violence increased. Rather than handicapping the organization, this allowed the more radical elements of the Brotherhood to act with greater impunity. In May 1949, following a series of arrests of Brotherhood members, a group of Brothers made an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate prime minister 'Abd al-Hadi, which sparked yet more arrests. By July, more than four thousand members of the Brotherhood were in prison. While in prison they continued to maintain their organization and hierarchy.69 When the Wafd returned to power in 1950 the Brotherhood attempted to have the government give recognition to the Muslim Brotherhood again, but this was unsuccessful. Martial law was ended, and all its provisions were suspended except with regard to the Brotherhood. The Parliament passed a "Societies Law" that was clearly aimed at the Brotherhood, requiring a description and photograph of every member to be registered with the government. The Ministry of the Interior announced that it intended to buy the Muslim Brotherhood's headquarters in Cairo and use the building as a police station. The Brotherhood responded by filing a lawsuit against the government and actually won, thus reacquiring its legal status and its property. In pnson. hl· erarc h y. 69 70 69 Mitchell, p. 80. 70 Ibid., pp. 82-84. 50 The 1952 Egyptian Revolution In 1951, an outsider, Hasan Isma'il al-Hudaybi, an experienced judge known for his strong aversion to violence, was chosen as al-Banna's successor. It was believed that he could reestablish the Muslim Brotherhood's respectability and legitimacy which had been tarnished as a result of the political violence of the late 1940s. He struggled against being treated as a mere figurehead and actively spoke out against the secret apparatus and its violent tactics. He attempted to dissolve it, but only managed to alienate its members, who considered themselves fighters in a noble cause.71 On 8 October 1951 the Egyptian prime minister withdrew Egypt from the Anglo- Egyptian Treaty of 1936, which immediately triggered mass nationalist demonstrations in favor of Egyptian independence. Over the next few months, antigovernment riots broke out all over the country, expressing the nationalist movement's frustration with the government's failure to follow up its actions with more vigorous efforts to achieve actual independence. On 25 January 1952, British forces attacked an Egyptian police station in the Canal Zone and a battle occurred. The next day, students in Cairo, police and military officers marched together to the parliament to demand a declaration of war against Britain. al-Hudaybi maintained his opposition to violent action and deepened the conflict between himself and his opponents within the organization and the secret apparatus. Several new governments followed and fell in rapid succession. Then, on July 23, 1952 the Free Officers, led by Muhammad Naguib, seized power, overthrowing the monarchy. 7 1 71 Anglo­Egyptian 71 Mitchell, pp. 82-88. 51 This largely bloodless coup was greeted with enormous enthusiasm throughout Egypt. The Brotherhood did not participate in the coup, or its aftermath, as an organization but had agreed to assist the revolution, mostly by maintaining order, protecting foreigners 73 and minorities and encouraging popular support for the coup. After the revolution, relations between the Brotherhood and the new government rapidly deteriorated. Many members of the Free Officers, including Gamal 'Abd al- Nasser and Anwar al-Sadat, had had close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood since the 1940s. However, there was a deep animosity and distrust between Nasser and al- Hudaybi. Furthermore, the new government was unwilling to share power and did not want to have a constitution based on Islam. In 1953, the government banned all political parties and organizations except the Muslim Brotherhood. It then created a new party, the Liberation Rally, and suggested that the Brotherhood should merge with the Liberation Rally. The government was attempting to marginalize the Brotherhood without sharing any real political power with it.7 4 Despite strong criticisms from within the Brotherhood, al-Hudaybi retained control and had the secret apparatus formally dissolved and its leaders expelled from the organization.75 This demonstrates the extent of the commitment of the Brotherhood leadership to nonviolence and its willingness to cooperate with the secular government provided that it was allowed to maintain a public space in which to operate legally. 7 1 7 3 7 4 7 5 72 and minorities and encouraging popular support for the COUp.73 After the revolution, relations between the Brotherhood and the new government rapidly deteriorated. Many members of the Free Officers, including Gamal 'Abd al- Nasser and Anwar al-Sadat, had had close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood since the 1940s. However, there was a deep animosity and distrust between Nasser and al- Hudaybi. Furthermore, the new government was unwilling to share power and did not want to have a constitution based on Islam. In 1953, the government banned all political parties and organizations except the Muslim Brotherhood. It then created a new party, the Liberation Rally, and suggested that the Brotherhood should merge with the Liberation Rally. The government was attempting to marginalize the Brotherhood without sharing any real political power with it.74 Despite strong criticisms from within the Brotherhood, al-Hudaybi retained control and had the secret apparatus formally dissolved and its leaders expelled from the organization.75 This demonstrates the extent of the commitment of the Brotherhood leadership to nonviolence and its willingness to cooperate with the secular government provided that it was allowed to maintain a public space in which to operate legally. 72 Mitchell, pp. 88-96. 73 Ibid., pp. 96-104. 74 Ibid., 106-111. 75 Ibid., pp. 116-125. In January 1954, the government sent members of the Liberation Rally to disrupt a Muslim Brotherhood student rally, and the confrontation turned violent. The government then decreed that the Muslim Brotherhood should be dissolved because al- Hudaybi and his supporters were planning to overthrow it, and al-Hudaybi was arrested along with hundreds of others. This use of severe and repressive measures to maintain power, which was perceived as Nasser's policy, caused the government's popularity to plummet. There were anti-Nasser demonstrations, which led to a power struggle between him and General Naguib. al-Hudaybi sided with Nasser and with the revolution, gaining the release of most of the imprisoned Brothers and, once more, the restoration of the Brotherhood's legal status. However, the government repression of January had disturbed many members who felt that the secret apparatus should not have been abolished so * • 76 quickly, and it was rebuilt under a new leadership without al-Hudaybi's knowledge. This situation demonstrates that members of the Muslim Brotherhood were willing to use violent tactics when the government denied them access to a public forum. Repressive measures, including the jailing of the leadership, did not silence the organization, but only radicalized it. It also unintentionally removed the strongest voices for nonviolence in the organization. If the government had permitted the Brotherhood to remain as a political opposition group, it would have legitimized the whole political process which it had initially put in motion. Instead, it attempted, first, to co-opt the organization and when that failed, to dismantle it. The result was the temporary loss of public support for the 7 6 52 al­Hudaybi quickly, and it was rebuilt under a new leadership without al-Hudaybi's knowledge. 76 This situation demonstrates that members of the Muslim Brotherhood were willing to use violent tactics when the government denied them access to a public forum. Repressive measures, including the jailing of the leadership, did not silence the organization, but only radicalized it. It also unintentionally removed the strongest voices for nonviolence in the organization. If the government had permitted the Brotherhood to remain as a political opposition group, it would have legitimized the whole political process which it had initially put in motion. Instead, it attempted, first, to co-opt the organization and when that failed, to dismantle it. The result was the temporary loss of public support for the 76 Ibid., pp. 126-134. 53 government and the revitalization and encouragement of the wing of the Brotherhood which advocated greater radicalization. In a letter to the government, al-Hudaybi called for the lifting of martial law, a return to parliamentary democracy and an end to censorship of the media. Relations between the government and the Brotherhood fell apart again after the latter criticized the terms of the negotiations between the British and the Egyptian government over the Suez Canal. After an agreement on the terms of a new treaty was announced, al-Hudaybi immediately criticized it as too generous towards the British and as a threat to Egyptian sovereignty. Accordingly, the government began using the police to provoke violent confrontation with the Brotherhood at peaceful gatherings in mosques and other places. A clinic run by the Brotherhood was raided and destroyed, and the government blamed the Brotherhood for the violence. al-Hudaybi went into hiding, and the state-run press launched a propaganda campaign to discredit him. The government also declared that several Brothers who were traveling abroad were guilty of treason, and stripped them of their Egyptian citizenship.77 The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was signed on 19 October 1954. Members of the new Secret Apparatus saw the treaty as a betrayal of Egypt and decided to act independently. On 26 October, a member of the secret apparatus allegedly fired shots at Nasser while he was making a speech. There is some evidence that Nasser and his close associates may have staged the assassination attempt themselves. Regardless of the truth of this allegation, the attempt on his life gave a huge boost to Nasser's popularity and enabled 7 7 ofa 77 77 Mitchell, pp. 134-144. 54 him to prevail in his power struggle with General Naguib. It also gave him the perfect opportunity to eliminate the Brotherhood. The organization was officially dissolved, its headquarters burned, and thousands of its members were arrested. Large show-trials with little regard for due process of law were held. Six Brotherhood members were executed, 78 and seven, including al-Hudaybi, were sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labor. The Nasser Years Throughout Nasser's presidency many members of the Muslim Brotherhood were held in prisons that were barely more than concentration camps. While imprisoned they were routinely tortured. Some died in custody, including twenty-one Brothers killed in their cells in June 1957. Those who escaped arrest went into hiding. Sayyid Qutb, the former editor of the Society's newspaper, became the leader of the Brothers held in prison and became the organization's General Guide in 1959. Qutb was the quintessential Islamic fundamentalist who encouraged the radicalization of the movement. Essentially, the consequence of the large-scale repressions by the Nasser's government was to push the Muslim Brotherhood towards a more radical form of fundamentalism that advocated 7Q armed struggle rather than social reform. Those Brothers who had gone underground began to reorganize. In 1956, those who had been imprisoned but not judged were released.8 0 Outside the prisons, Zaynab al- Ghazali, head of the Association of Muslim Women, played a key role in rebuilding the 7 8 7 9 pp. 8 0 pp. and seven, including al-Hudaybi, were sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labor. 78 armed struggle rather than social reform.79 Those Brothers who had gone underground began to reorganize. In 1956, those who had been imprisoned but not judged were released. so Outside the prisons, Zaynab al- Ghazali, head of the Association of Muslim Women, played a key role in rebuilding the 78 Mitchell, pp. 144-160 and Carre, pp. 59-63. 79 Cook, pp. 102-06. 80 Carre, pp. 65-76, 83-86. 55 organization. She had been a member of the Brotherhood since the late 1940s and • 81 • maintained contact with the imprisoned leadership. Her focus was on Islamic education, but other autonomous groups of Brothers also began to organize. They found their analytical framework and political agenda in Qutb's writings, which were circulated by al-Ghazali. Qutb's writings included Social Justice in Islam, which set out the principles of an Islamic socialism and his assessment of the Nasser regime, and how it could be overcome. In 1964, Qutb was released for several months, and his book Milestones was published. In it he argued the theme of the failure of both capitalism and socialism. Qutb saw Islam as the solution to humanity's predicament: The entire world, including Egypt, was living in a state of jahiliyya, roughly translated as a way of life characterized by ignorant hostility towards God's will. In particular, human beings erred in allowing themselves to establish their own value systems, instead of accepting God's sovereignty (hakimiyya). According to Qutb, a true Muslim society must reject all laws and traditions made by humans. Therefore, modern Islamic societies were in reality unbelievers (kafir), a view which clearly deviated from the ideology of Hasan al-Banna and the original core principles of the Muslim Brotherhood. A core of believers was needed to begin recreating the ummah. This vanguard would then grow until it encompassed the entire world. Confronted by a totalitarian state, 11 Voll, p. 1 2 Ibid. ; 3 ' 1 5 6 maintained contact with the imprisoned leadership.sl Her focus was on Islamic education, but other autonomous groups of Brothers also began to organize. They found their analytical framework and political agenda in Qutb's writings, which were circulated byal-Ghazali. Qutb's writings included Social Justice in Islam, which set out the principles of an Islamic socialism and his assessment of the Nasser regime, and how it could be overcome.82 In 1964, Qutb was released for several months, and his book Milestones was published. In it he argued the theme of the failure of both capitalism and socialism.83 Qutb saw Islam as the solution to humanity'S predicament: The entire world, including Egypt, was living in a state ofjahiliyya, 84 roughly translated as a way of life characterized by ignorant hostility towards God's will. In particular, human beings erred in allowing themselves to establish their own value systems, instead of accepting God's sovereignty (hakimiyya}.85 According to Qutb, a true Muslim society must reject all laws and traditions made by humans. Therefore, modern Islamic societies were in reality unbelievers (kafir), a view which clearly deviated from the ideology of Hasan al-Banna and the original core principles of the Muslim Brotherhood.86 A core of believers was needed to begin recreating the ummah. This vanguard would then grow until it encompassed the entire world. Confronted by a totalitarian state, 81 VolI, p. 373. 82 Ibid. 8' o Cook, p. 103. 84 The conventional usage of the word describes the 'time of ignorance' before the coming of Islam. 85 Carre, pp. 94-95. 86 Ramadan, p. 156. 56 Qutb urged them to prepare a jihad, whose military objectives were aimed at the Milestones example set by Hasan al-Bana and limit itself to educational work until it had three quarters of the population on its side. This policy, which has been a characteristic of the official policy of the Brotherhood ever since, has earned it the scorn of more extreme revolutionary Islamic fundamentalist militant groups. In August 1965, the government claimed to have discovered that the Brotherhood was organizing a huge revolutionary plot. Roughly 18, 000 people were arrested, including Qutb and al-Ghazali. One hundred to two hundred were imprisoned, and thirty-eight were killed in custody during the investigation. The police used torture and coercion during the interrogations. Raids throughout Egypt were accompanied by an intense propaganda campaign against the Brotherhood. Based on confessions obtained under 89 torture, Qutb and two other Brothers were executed in August 1966. In the 1970s, it emerged that the plot had been fabricated by the security services as part of a conflict between different factions within the regime.90 8 7 8 8 8 9"The Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1993, p. 9 0 87 ajihad, overthrow of those who had usurped the sovereignty that should be God's alone. sparked a debate within the Brotherhood between young activists who favored radical, violent action in the form of an immediate coup, while more experienced members such as Zaynab al-Ghazali, believed that the organization should follow the 88 torture, Qutb and two other Brothers were executed in August 1966.89 In the 1970s, it emerged that the plot had been fabricated by the security services as part of a conflict between different factions within the regime.9o 87 Carre, p. 76. 88 Voll, p. 373. 89"The trial [of Qutb and others in 1966] offered the accused all the guarantees of fairness characteristic of a military court in a dictatorial state trying defendants broken by torture." Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism 34. 90 Carre, pp. 76-82, 96-97. 57 The result of the government repression of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic fundamentalist organizations was that it acted as a catalyst for the radicalization of the rhetoric emerging from the fundamentalist movement. Sayyid Qutb's advocacy of violent opposition to the government gained many supporters in the fundamentalist cause, both inside and outside prison. Following the release of most of the religious and political prisoners by 1971, the fundamentalist community had effectively been divided into two broad groups. The first followed the old established leadership of the Brotherhood that supported gradual social change over revolutionary confrontation. This group was headed by al-Hudaybi, who, while in prison, wrote Missionaries Not Judges, in refutation of the notion of takfir and the radical views expressed in Qutb's Milestones and other insurrectionist writings. 9 1 The second group consisted of radicalized militant fundamentalists who advocated violent revolution in order to change Egypt into a 'true' Islamic state. An ironic consequence of the campaign of widespread arrests and detention of political and religious dissidents was that this actually provided the radical militants a fertile recruiting ground with a "captive" audience. Nonradicalized students who were members of student groups or Islamic organizations were thrown into the prisons with the hard-core leadership of the radicalized movements. The prisoners were allowed to socialize and mingle. The result was that prisons became education centers where the writings of Qutb and Mawdudi, an Indo-Pakistani Islamic fundamentalist writer, would be studied and discussed. It was not hard to convince the young and impressionable prisoners that a 9 1 Judges, oftakjir Milestones 91 91 Voll, p. 273. 58 society that had established prison camps for pious Muslims and tortured and executed dissidents was a society in jahiliyya. What emerged from the prison camps was a new generation of radicalized Islamic fundamentalists who rejected cooperation with the government and were receptive to violent revolutionary tactics. Through their repressive tactics the Egyptian government had created a stronger and better-defined opposition movement, which posed a far larger threat to the safety and security of the regime than the Muslim Brotherhood had ever done. The Sadat Years In 1967 the Arab world was delivered a devastating defeat by Israel in the Six Day War. One of the consequences of this defeat was the gradual decline of support for the Pan-Arab and Arab-Socialist ideologies developed and supported by Nasser. In fact, many people throughout the Arab world viewed the defeat as punishment from God for straying too far from the true path of Islam. The population of the Arab world, including Egypt, began to reexamine its religious roots and to question the pervasive secularism that had been in vogue during the preceding decades. When Nasser died in 1970, his successor, Anwar Sadat, was faced with a reemergence of Islamic awareness in popular culture and civil society which was sympathetic to the expressed goals of the Muslim Brotherhood and other moderate fundamentalist organizations. In addition, the 2 1 3 Ibid., 376. injahiliyya.92 93 92 Ibid., p. 374. 93 Ibid., p. 376. 59 popularity of these organizations was further increased since they were providing many of the social services to the poor that the government failed to provide. In 1971 Anwar Sadat introduced a policy of economic and political liberalization. The concentration camps were closed, and the government began to release members of the Brotherhood from prison, although the organization remained illegal. In fact, the government tolerated the Brotherhood unofficially. It was allowed to resume printing various publications as well as establish new schools and mosques.9 4 The Brotherhood was allowed to publish its monthly newspaper, al-Da 'wa, and the identity of many members was public knowledge.9 5 With the moderate leadership firmly back in control, this lessening of the tensions between the government and the Muslim Brotherhood had some positive effects. The Brotherhood retreated from the jihadist rhetoric that had advocated violent insurrection and instead demanded the application of shari'a law. In response the government initiated a lengthy review of all Egyptian law to determine how best to combine it with shari'a. In 1980, the constitution was amended to state that the shari'a was "a principal source of legislation,"96 although not, as the radical fundamentalists wanted it, "the source of all legislation." Another goal of the Brotherhood was to persuade the government to allow it to operate legally again as a political party, but this was not allowed. The Political Parties Law of 1977 specifically prohibited parties based on religious affiliation, though as a Voll, p. 95 Carrie Wickham. Mobilizing Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 65, 96 and Ramadan, pp. 165-66. 9 6 Carre, pp. 107-112 and Voll, p. 377. 94 95 shari/a shari/a. shari/a legislation,,,96 94 VolI, p. 380. 95 Carrie Wickham. Mobilizing Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 65, 96 and Ramadan, pp. 165-66. 96 Carre, pp. 107-112 and Voll, p. 377. concession Sadat appointed members of the Brotherhood to high positions in the ruling Center Party.97 Sadat's primary goal in embracing the religious revival and tolerating the fundamentalists was to undermine the leftists and the remaining Nasserists in Egypt. Furthermore, the Brotherhood provided a moderate alternative to the radical takfir organizations. Hence the Brotherhood, with its intense hatred of communism, became the natural ally of the regime. Furthermore, by overtly aligning himself with the Brotherhood, Sadat was able to gain popular support to liberalize and privatize the Egyptian economy.9 8 In exchange, he had to concede to allow the popular fundamentalist organization access to civil society and allow it to play an active role in the ruling party. Sadat's economic policies were drastic and caused severe price increases for basic necessities while government-sponsored public services degraded, which led to huge riots in January 1977. Student religious and political groups began to exercise a great deal of influence outside universities as well. al-Da'wa supported the student Islamic movement, and leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were invited to speak at large, festive gatherings organized by student groups on Islamic holidays. When the government began to obstruct the student movement, and then to attack its members with riot police, the Brotherhood's relations with the government deteriorated as well.99 Voll, 34, 115-117. 60 97 Furthennore, takfir Furthennore, 98 fundamentalist int1uence 99 97 Ramadan, pp. 166-67. 98 VolI, p. 377. 99 Wickham, pp. 32-34,115-117. 61 In the late 1970s and early 1980s the Brotherhood attempted to use its influence within the Islamic student movements to consolidate the groups under its leadership. 1 00 Independent of the student groups, Islamic groups outside the universities organized the Permanent Islamic Congress for the Propagation of Islam, and proceeded to elect al- Talmasani, the leader of the Brotherhood since 1973, as leader of the organization. 1 0 1 The Egyptian government viewed this as a threat, considering it indicative of the Brotherhood's intention to regain the political power that it had lost in 1954. Furthermore, the government preferred that the Islamic fundamentalist movement should remain fractured. They wished to deal with various organizations individually so that they could control them better and ensure that the Islamic groups were working towards the state's goals. Consolidation of the fundamentalists meant that rival organizations could no longer be played off against each other. Essentially, a consolidated fundamentalist movement would become a powerful social force that would be working to advance their own cause instead of being a tool of the government. Furthermore, Sadat had angered the fundamentalist organizations, especially the radicalized militants, by moving towards reconciliation with Israel. Most Egyptians had perceived the 1973 war as a victory and many had long regarded Israel as an illegitimate entity comprised of infidels that were repressing good Palestinian Muslims by occupying their land. According to many Islamic fundamentalists, including the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Congress, there could be no reconciliation with Israel. The 1 0 0 1 0 1 Ibid. int1uence 100 Pernlanent 101 otT 100 Ramadan, p. 170. 101 Ibid. 62 Camp David accords of 1978 were met by widespread condemnation throughout Egypt and were criticized by the Brotherhood in al-Da'm102 This political faux pas combined with the decline in Egypt's economic situation and the explosive growth of radical fundamentalist organizations following Nasser's ill-conceived crackdown on religious organizations proved to be a legacy that would continue to destabilize Sadat's regime. 1 03 The radical fundamentalist groups, forged in Nasser's prisons and educated on Qutb's writings, began to exercise more influence over Egyptian society. Their stated goal was to end jahiliyya and establish a truly Islamic society by destabilizing and overthrowing an "unbelieving government."1 0 4 While these radicalized militant groups were always fringe groups with relatively small numbers of followers, they played an important role in affecting Sadat's policies towards the fundamentalist organizations. New radicalized fundamentalist groups called for violence against the regime with the stated goal of overthrowing the atheist leadership and replacing it with an Islamic state. The first of these groups was the Military Technical College Organization headed by the Palestinian, Salih Adb Allah Siriyya. They believed that the biggest mistake of the Islamist movements of the past was the gradualist approach. Siriyya believed that they must seize control of the state and establish an Islamic society from the top down. A second group was the Society of Muslims. They believed in a course of emigration out of Egypt. They viewed Egypt as a land of atheism led by infidels. However, the emigration was only necessary in order to gather their forces for an 1 0 2 p. 1 0 3 Voll, p. 377. 1 0 4 Voll, p. 381. Da 'wa. 102 lO } endjahiliyya government.,,104 101 Ramadan, p. 168. 103 VolI, p. 377. 104 VolI, p. 381. 63 offensive retaking of Egypt. Furthermore, the society of Muslims was willing to go a step further than other takfir groups and was willing to label everyone within the atheist society who does not actively fight against the regime as infidels and atheists as well. The society also engaged in kidnappings and assassinations of Egyptian officials. Perhaps the biggest takfir group to emerge during the