Moving beyond the Lipset hypothesis: examining the correlation between economic development and democracy

Following the logic of Seymour Martin Lipset's 1959 hypothesis, the main axis of the Democratic Transitions debate has long been the strong correlation between economic development and democracy. More recent empirical evidence puts in doubt the direct relationship of economic development and democracy in cases where liberal economies are able to persist without the presupposed necessity for a transition to democracy. This thesis seeks to investigate the inconsistencies of the correlation between economic development and democracy. Specifically, why do some countries fail to transition to democracy despite having high economic development, and why do some countries fail at developing economically after transitioning to democracy? My findings reject the preconceived notion that economic development and democracy are directly intertwined, and propose that certain conditions of political stability and political legitimacy are required to produce the positive correlation between the two and explain the role of political institutions in explaining these inconsistencies.

MOVING BEYOND THE UPSET HYPOTHESIS; EXAMINING THE CORRELATION BETWEEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY By Kevin Khong A Senior Honors Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the University of Utah in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for lhe Honors Degree of Bachelor of Science Political Science Approved: �� Benjamin Judkin Matthew B Faculty Supervisor Chair. Political Science Mar Button bank Martha S. Bradley Departmental Honors Advisor Dean. Honors College May 2009 Table of of Contents Abstract i1 Introduction Introduction 11 Defining Interest Defining the Debate and Variables of of Interest 3 The Role of of Political Institutions in Democratic Transitions 5 Clarification of Economic of Measuring Lipset's Lipset' s Indices for Economic Clarification Development Development 7 Economic Development Development in South Korea and China 10 of the thc South Korean Case Study An Overview of South Korea's Failed Democratic State: The Syngman Myon Rhee and Chang My on Years 13 14 Examining Why Economic Development Development Failed in South Korea's First Democracy 16 Military Rule, Economic Development, and the Eventual Transition to Democracy: The Park Chung-Hee Years 18 The End of Military-Dominant Authoritarianism: of Military-Dominant Towards a Transition to Democracy in South Korea 21 Towards a Transition to Democracy in South Korea 21 Analyzing South Korea's Military-Dominant Regimes 22 Analyzing South Korea's Military-Dominant Regimes 22 Party-Dominant Rule and the Authoritarian Reality of China Party-Dominant Rule and the Authoritarian Reality of China Today Today Summary Observations on China's Party-Dominant Summary Authoritarianism Military-Dominant Authoritarianism Vs. South Korea's Military-Dominant Authoritarianism Authoritarianism 23 23 27 Concluding Observations on Economic Development Development and Democracy 28 References References 31 Following the logic of Seymour Seymour Martin Martin Lipset's Upset's 1959 hypothesis, the main axis of of the Democratic Transitions debate has long been the strong correlation correlation between between economic development doubt the direct development and democracy. More recent empirical evidence puts in doubt relationship of of economic development development and democracy democracy in cases where liberal economies are able to persist without without the presupposed presupposed necessity for a transition to democracy. This thesis seeks to investigate the inconsistencies of of the correlation correlation between between economic development and Specifically, why development and democracy. Specifically, why do some countries fail to transition to and why do some countries fail fail democracy despite having high economic development, and at developing after transitioning to democracy? My findings developing economically economically after findings reject the preconceived preconceived notion that economic development development and and democracy are directly intertwined, and propose that certain certain conditions of of political stability and political legitimacy are required required to produce the positive correlation between between the two and explain legitimacy the role of explaining these inconsistencies. of political institutions in explaining 1i of Seymour Following the logic of Seymour Martin Lipset's 1959 hypothesis, the main axis of of the democratic transitions debate has long been centered on the strong correlation between between economic development development and democracy. Lipset started the conversation conversation in his book, Political Political Man, generalization linking political Man, stating, "Perhaps the most common common generalization of society has been that democracy is related to the state of of systems to other aspects of economic development." His conclusion from from this correlation was that "The more well1 to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain a democracy." I That statement opened the way for authors to substantiate that claim. Yet recent empirical cases put in doubt the direct relationship between economic development democracy where devclopment and democracy liberal economies are able to persist without the concurrent concurrent transition to democracy. While both Lipset and the authors that followed followed him are able to establish that a strong correlation exists between economic development development and democracy, why do some countries fail to transition to democracy despite having high economic development? development? While authors like Lipset are able to show the connection between between economic development development and democracy democracy on a macro level, few authors in the democratic transitions field field are able to agree on how they interact. The inability to establish a centralized centralized theory of Lipset' about democratic transitions based off off of Lipset'ss hypothesis has made the authors in the field focus on explanations for countries fitting fitting the correlation field correlation trend, leaving states that don't don't fit the trend largely ignored in the discussion. This is a miscalculation miscalculation on the part of current current authors in the field. Although it is indeed practical to institute case studies of countries that fit the correlation correlation trend and extrapolating differences extrapolating similarities and differences 1 1 Lipset, S. M. (1960). Political Man: The The Social Social Bases Bases of of Politics. Politics. New New York, York, NY: NY:Doubleday Doubleday &&Company, Company, Lipset, Inc., p. 31. 1 bctween half of of the between their transitions to democracy, such approaches only complete half centralized theory. Applying the findings made in these necessary work towards a centralized of of the correlation correlation trend of comparative studies to those in which countries fall outside of development and democracy democracy presents the next logical step in exploring economic development Lipset's original hypothesis. accomplish this second goal. In doing so, it expands Lipset's This thesis seeks to accomplish original hypothesis by questioning whether whether high economic development development is the only factor directly affecting affecting a country's decision and ability to transition to democracy. Through Through the different case studies, it ultimately rejects the preconceived preconceived notion examination of of two different that economic development development and democracy are directly intertwined, and proposes instead of political stability and legitimacy legitimacy are necessary to produce a that certain conditions of of the positive correlation between the two. This thesis explores the inconsistencies of Lipset hypothesis to show that a democracy can fail to develop economically economically and how an economically This paper economically developed country may not always transition to a democracy. Thispc;),per concludes that political institutions play of these playaa vital role in the explanation of inconsistencies. development as a precondition precondition of of The following study will investigate economic development democracy democracy by comparing two case studies: South Korea, a country that fits the correlation trend of development and a of Lipset's hypothesis for both high economic development transition to democracy of the correlation by democracy and China, a country that falls outside of having high economic development development and failing to transition to a democracy. The cases begin by examining the economic development development indices first proposed proposed by Lipset's original work in the context of of the political institutions present present in each country country in order to 2 , '., detennine determine how they interact and which type of of factors are more important in detennining determining a potential transition to democracy. democracy. Defining Defining the Debate and the Variables of of Interest The very crux of of this approach centers on the breakdown and transition of of a regime or the state's ability to maintain a regime despite social and political pressures. This thesis examines "political stability" and "political legitimacy" as the main variables determining if if a country stays authoritarian or transitions to a democracy. In defining defining in detennining political legitimacy, much is drawn from how Lipset framed framed it: "Legitimacy "Legitimacy involves the belief that the existing political capacity of of the system to engender and maintain the belief institutions are the most appropriate ones for society.,,2 belief that society." What is meant by the belief 2 the current institutions are the "most "most appropriate" is how well a government is able to satisfy the social demands of of the population. Political stability is defined as the capacity satisfy • of a regime to remain in power and is best simplified as the durability ofr»a government. 3 of a regime to remain in power and is best simplified as the durability of a government. Examining how political stability and political legitimacy interact will be the main issue of of concern in detennining determining to what level Lipset's hypothesis holds true that high economic development development results in a transition to democracy and to what level the role of of political institutions play in detennining determining that transition. In almost all instances, political stability and legitimacy can interact in one of of two ways. First, appealing to political legitimacy offers offers a way of of positively upholding a government's political stability 2 2 Lipset, Lipset, S. M. (1960). Political Man: The The Social Bases of of Politics. New York, York, NY: Doubleday Doubleday & Company, Inc., p. 64. 64. 3 3 The Breakdown of of Democratic Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Crisis, Breakdown, & Reequilibration. Reequilibration. Baltimore, Linz, J. J. (1978). The MD: John Hopkins University Press, p. 3. 3 by meeting the demands of of the population to preserve that stability. Second, a government government can negatively uphold political stability by ignoring and suppressing political legitimacy through force and coercion. In examining political legitimacy, this study will legitimacy put developmental factors in context of transition or the of how they affect affect a democratic transition maintenance of of the status quo. In looking at political stability, the circumstances of of how political institutions affect affect a democratic transition or not will be observed. The next important step after after defining defining the units of of measure for both debates is introducing this thesis' independent independent variable. As made evident earlier, this thesis argues introducing for political institutions as the independent independent variable in determining a country's likelihood to transition to a democracy or remain an authoritarian (regime type is the dependent dependent variable). The structure of of the political institutions in each case study is the main point of focus in examining institutional factors that may affect affect political stability and legitimacy in a way that determines a democratic outcome or a strengthening of of authoritarianism. authoritarianism. Authors like Lipset who argue that high economic development is what determines a democratic transition, state that a high level of of economic development development raises the demands of of political legitimacy. The authoritarian government government lacks the political stability necessary to meet the elevated legitimacy legitimacy demands and the breakdown and transition to a democracy results. This logic fails to address the role political institutions play in affecting affecting the level of of political stability a government government has. Depending on the types of different different political institutions that exist in various countries, some countries will be of able to deal with political legitimacy issues better than others. As it is, there exists no universal brink or threshold for which democratic transition is inevitable due to developmental factors alone. Without examining institutional factors, the cross4 comparison of of different different case studies based off of economic development factors are comparison off of ultimately useless4 because although they serve to endorse Lipset's original hypothesis 4 that economic development development and democracy are correlated on a macro level, there is no examination of economic examination of of what role political stability has in determining what level of development is necessary to induce a transition. As a result, Lipset makes a unitary assumption that political legitimacy legitimacy is only affected affected negatively by high economic development. 5 This assumption results in the 5 possibility of of the previously previously discussed inconsistencies: a country that does not economically economical1y develop after after becoming a democracy and a country that does not transition despite having signs of of high economic development. This thesis will show that even though South Korea and China today show the accuracy of of Lipset's correlation on a macro level based off off of of his economic development development indices, his theory fails to explain how both of of these inconsistencies are able to appear between between these two countries. The Role of Democratic Transitions of Political Institutions in Democratic The difference difference between how an authoritarian authoritarian government government and a democratic government functions is the next logical step in the discussion. A democratic government government is able to maintain political stability as a function of political legitimacy. In a democracy, function of 4 4 Haggard, S. & Kaufman, R. R. (1996). The The Political of Democratic Democratic Transitions. Princeton, NJ: R. R. Politicol Economy of NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 7. 5 5 For example, Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi's analysis of of aggregate patterns on a per capita income basis show that "increasingly likely" likely" as per capita income of of dictatorships increases, but transitions are indeed "increasingly but trend ends when it reached about $6,000. They showed that dictatorships become more stable as countries become more affluent past the per capita income to a democracy. Przeworski, A. & Limongi, F. level of of $6,000, ifif they had not not already already transitioned to F. (1997). (1997). "Modernization: "Modernization: Theories and Facts." World Politics. 49:2, p. 155-183 5 all political groups must submit their interests to "uncertainty,,,6 "uncertainty," and the resulting 6 of political conflicts separation of of control over the outcome of conflicts allows for legitimacy legitimacy to threaten political stability. Foljtjpal stability for q~qlOcratic democratic PQlit~~al staPility remain at level that does not trreaten regimes therefore therefore remains at the same level despite who is in charge, and a violent change in government government is prevented by mandating elections of of political officials. officials. The only way a violent change in government of this uncertainty government happens is through a violation of principle. Authoritarians, alternatively, focus solely on building political stability to a high coercion to maintain enough level that it can utilize coercion maintain political legitimacy at a reasonable of authoritarianism authoritarianism in question. Much of of the level. How this is done depends on the type of following framework Kaufman's analysis of of "militaryframework is drawn from Haggard and Kaufman's dominant" authoritarian authoritarian institutions vs. "single party-dominant" authoritarian institutions. of physical force to raise They conclude that military-dominant military-dominant regimes utilize the fear of political stability, while party-dominant party-dominant regimes utilize a pervasive bureaucracy bureaucracy to raise legitimacy concerns than partystability. Military regimes are more at risk from political legitimacy party-dominant and military-dominant dominant regimes because even though both party-dominant authoritarians face strong challenges from from civil society, military-dominant military-dominant regimes lack the "mediation" and the ability to make adjustments adjustments to dips in legitimacy legitimacy that a dominant-party regime has. 7 dominant-party 6 6 Przeworski, A. A. (1986). {1986}. "Some Problems in the Study of of the Transition to to Democracy." Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for for Democracy. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 58. 7 7 Haggard and Kaufman argued that "Military regimes in middle-income countries generally generally appeared more vulnerable to to economic economic {1996}. The Politicol Economy of shocks" than their party-dominant counterparts. Haggard, S. & Kaufman, R. R. R. (1996). The Political of Democrotic Democratic Tronsitions. Transitions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 37 6 Looking at the political institutions of of both China and South Korea will be central in discovering why South Korea was unable to economically economically develop after after transitioning to a democracy the first time, and why China has not transitioned to a democracy despite of high economic development. In examining signs of examining South Korea's first democratic experiment, this thesis argues that the structure of of its democratic institution did not allow South Korea the flexibility flexibility to develop economically. This had to wait until it became an authoritarian of interest will be examining how China as a partyauthoritarian state. Another Another point of dominant authoritarian state and South Korea as a former former military-dominant military-dominant authoritarian actor each dealt with legitimacy issues differently differently due to the structure of their political oftheir affected the political stability of of both regimes in institutions. Those institutions in turn tum affected different different ways. As the following analysis will show, South Korea's high economic development today hides the fact that their first democratic transition was a result of of failed economic of their economic development of a development and the start of development development success was a result of military-dominant authoritarian authoritarian regime. Additionally, the role of of political institutions will military-dominant eventually able to transition to democracy, and how help show why South Korea was eventually economic development development helped raise the political legitimacy of of China's authoritarian government, creating a greater political stability threshold that must be overcome in order for a transition to democracy democracy to take root. Clarification of of Measuring Measuring Lipset's Indices for Economic Development Clarification Development In measuring each of of Lipset's economic development development indices, this thesis has which each index of updated the way in which of wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and 7 education are measured. Lipset's measures in 1959 may have been appropriate for his of variables in each of of the four work at the time, but this thesis has substituted substituted a number of indices in order to better operationalize their use in comparing South Korea and China. Wealth: originally measured wealth by "per capita income, number number of Wealth: Lipset originally of persons per motor vehicle, and thousands of of persons per physician, and the number of of radios, telephones, and newspapers per thousand persons." persons."g This thesis substitutes purchasing power power parity per capita as a more appropriate measure since it standardizes per capita income across countries for comparison. It also substitutes household consumption of the economy and life expectancy in order to better consumption by percentage share of measure division of of wealth and services in society in which this study believes Lipset's original measures of of wealth tries to account for. Industrialization: Lipset's measure of Industrialization: of "employed "employed males in agriculture" is expanded to include all people employed expanded employed in the agricultural sector and replaces "per capita commercially commercially produced 'energy",9 of electricity electricity consumed. The 'energy'" with amount of 9 possibility of difference production and consumption consumption of difference between production of energy accounts for the possibility of transferring of between countries by purchasing intervening factors, such as the transferring of energy between of energy usage because of electricity. Consumption Consumption is the more logical measure of of this. 8 Lipset, S. M. (1960). Political Man: of Politics. New York, NY: NY: Doubleday Man: The Social Bases of Doubleday && Company, Company, Inc., Inc., p. p. 33. 33. 9 Ibid, Ibid, p. p. 35. 35. 8 Urbanization: This thesis replaces Lipset's of population concentrations Urbanization: Lipset's measure of cities 10 with a measure of of overall concentration concentration of of urbanization urbanization and a rate of in cities of 10 urbanization in order to better measure its overall effects effects on economic growth. Education: Education: On education, Lipset's measure through literacy is kept, as it is one determination that has withstood the test of of time in measuring the degree of of education in determination a country. country.I I 11 of Lipset's development Much ofthe of the revisions in the variables of development indices were necessary because they are quite dated. For example, Lipset's use of necessary of newspapers, telephones, and radio to measure the division of of wealth and services in a society would yield inaccurate results in the 22115t century. Since the rise ofthe of the internet, news websites st of individuals who still read the newspaper in print; a significant portion of replaced a significant of individuals have cell phones now instead of of home telephones; and growing majority majority of communications medium medium ever since the advancements in radio has been a dying communications television has made them virtually available for everyone. The goal in replacing a lot of of Lipset's original variables in the development development indices was to utilize variables that more objectively objectively measured wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education in order to operationalize operationalize them as they would apply today. 10 Lipset, S. s. M. (1960). Political Man: Man: The The Social Bases of of Politics. New York, NY: NY: Doubleday Doubleday && Company, Company, Inc., p. 38. 11 Ibid, p. 40. 9 Economic Development Development in South Korea and China of economic South Korea's economic development development history is a fascinating fascinating story of failure during their first transition transition to democracy, and then economic success during the rule of of a military junta junta following a coup d'etat. Since the takeover takeover of of Park Chung-Hee of becoming becoming a and beyond beyond his assassination, South Korea has jumped jumped to the status of developed nation, with "real GDP growth of of between between 7 and 9 percent percent per year (compared to 2.3 percent in 1960) and an unprecedented unprecedented national per capita income of of US $10,000." South Korea's miraculous growth since the 1960s makes it seem like a $10,000.,,12 12 development leading to classic story of of Lipset's perceived hypothesis of of economic development democracy. This is compared compared to China, whose growth over the past 27 years measured measured in GDP averaging 9.6% per year. In economic size, China in 2005 was 4 th,, behind only the th United States, Japan, and Germany. In renewing memories of of other economic miracle stories in Asia, China's growth "matches that of of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan at an earlier of their development." development."IJ Not only is a comparison comparison of of economic development stage of between between China China and South Korea appropriate given their close proximity, but may be indicative of of China's readiness to transition to democracy, given that Lipset's assumptions are correct. In examining the economic development development indices that Lipset initially proposes of of wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education, the evidence of of developmental factors does seem to fit Lipset's expectations that democratic South Korea would fare 12 12 s. W. (2001). A New paradigm for Development: From Government Jwa, S. for Korea's Economic Development: Government Control to NY: PALGRAVE PALGRAVE publishers, publishers, p.p. 1.1. Market Economy. New York, York, NY: 13 13 Holz, C. A. A. (2008). "China's Economic Growth 1978-2025: What We Know Today About China's Economic Growth Tomorrow." World Development. 36:10, pp. 1665-1691. 10 better than undemocratic China in almost all the categories. The following is the of South Korea's and China's economic development: compiled compiled results of South Korea Korea14 Figure 1 Wealth -Purchasing Power (PPP) per Capita -Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) -Household Consumption Consumption by Percentage -Household Percentage Share -Lowest 10% 10% -Highest 10% -Highest 10% -Life Expectancy Expectancy 14 15 China China 15 $6,100 $26,000 Industrialization Labor Force in Agriculture -Percentage of Labor -Percentage Agriculture -Electricity Consumption Consumption (in kilowatt hours) -Electricity (in kilowatt Urbanization -Total Percent Percent of Population Population Urbanized Urbanized Urbanization -Rate of Urbanization Education -Literacy -Literacy Rate 2.70% 24.20% 79.72 years 1.60% 34.90% 73.74 years 7.20% 385.1 billion 10.60% 3.721 trillion 81% 0.60% 43% 2.70% 97.90% 90.90% between South Korea and China in economic When examining the stark contrasts between difference between between all of development, one can see the difference of the four different different economic development factors. South Korea far exceeds China in all four categories and lives up to what Lipset would expect in comparing a democratic country vs. an authoritarian one, save for electricity consumption consumption on China's part, which may be accounted accounted for by its vastly larger population population size. In the case of wealth, Lipset would expect higher per capita income and of income, as well as higher life expectancy, to come from the more distribution of 14 (2009). "South Korea." CIA World Factbook. Factbook. Retrieved from https:!lwww.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.htmlon https://www.cia.Rov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html on 3/25/2009. 15 Factbook. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the(2009). "China." CIA World World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/librarv/publications/the- world-factbook/geos/ch.html on 3/25/2009 world-factbook/geos/ch.html 11 democratic country, which it docs. does. South Korea's purchasing power parity per capita is of China, the household consumption by share is more evenly more than four times that of expectancy spread between the upper, middle, and lower classes than China, and the life expectancy in South Korea is higher than that of of China's by almost half industrialization, half a decade. In industrialization, Lipset would expect the authoritarian country to have more percentage labor in agriculture and less electricity consumption consumption as a result, and for the most part this is true. of its China outpaces South Korea in electricity consumption probably because of population size, but this should only work to increase developmental theorists' claim that China is close to democratization. In urbanization, Lipset would expect the more democratic country to be living in urban areas and be more complete in urbanizing than the undemocratic one, and again his expectations are met. Finally, South Korea's literacy rate is greater than China's by 7%, but China is still impressively representing a well educated populace in spite of of their large population population size and low urbanization. Nevertheless, what do these developmental indices really show? It is indeed true that the indices match Lipset's expectations well and fulfills fulfills the trend that democratic economically developed than authoritarian countries, countries are more likely to be more economically but as this thesis argued, these statistics do little to determine a threshold for when a democratic transition should happen for China or why a transition has not happened yet. developmental Even though China has maintained an incredible growth rate over time, developmental factors alone are unable to determine a brink for any of of their variables at the point where democratic transition and economic development happens because the social-political landscape of of each country is different. different. Having looked at the enormous difference difference between of economic development, developmental authors such South Korea and China in terms of 12 as Lipset would argue that the way forward forward towards democratization would be the of more economic development, but analyzing the political institutions of promotion of promotion of China will show that this may not necessarily be the case. affect the brink Without looking at how the political institutions in each country affect for each of of these development of the development indices, there is no way to measure the capacity of government government to transition to democracy democracy or remain authoritarian. authoritarian. 16 Even though the 16 development of economic development indices give a quantitative analysis for comparing the level of development similar quantitative measure that development in each country, there ultimately is no similar determines a specific specific threshold the thesis will show, threshold for transition. As the next section of ofthe institutional factors are ultimately more important specific characteristics important in determining specific of of democratic transitions, while developmental factors can only seek to substantiate the correlation between development and democracy on a macro level. between high economic development An Overview of of the South Korean Case Study Two different different "democratic transitions" were actually required to consolidate the South Korean government government as it exists today. Understanding the way political stability of democratization, as well as and legitimacy interacted interacted is central to unraveling this story of understanding development really played in its success. What is understanding what role economic development off of of his correlation. In the first and found is not what Lipset would have expected expected based off of political stability inherent in democracy led second regimes, the uncertainty principle of both Rhee Syngman and Chang Myon to focus on maintaining power, rather than focus focus 16 16 They explain: "A 'fA certain threshold of of national income may constitute an important condition for for of economic economic development cannot tell us anything about the dynamiCS democratic rule. But the level of dynamics of democratic transitions or why why they occur when they do." Haggard, s. S. & Kaufman, Kaufman, R. R. R. R. (1996). The The Political Economy of of Democratic Democratic Transitions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press., p. 28. 13 on economic development. It was only after military-dominant authoritarian regime after a military-dominant After the rise of of economic took over that economic development development started to occur. After development in South Korea, Lipset's hypothesis would have us believe that the increased economic development development was the reason for the transition to democracy. This thesis offers different explanation based off of its military-dominant military-dominant offers a different off of of the structure of authoritarian regime. authoritarian South Korea's Failed Democratic State: The Syngman Rhee and Chang Myon Years South Korea's move towards democratization democratization begins with the United States, following government to following the Korean War. Syngman Rhee's regime was the first civilian civilian government be established after the war. During his term tenn in power, Rhee stabilized the newly created established after country but was unable to develop economically despite assistance from the United of Rhee's government lent itself itself to low political stability because it States. The structure of majority of of its political legitimacy through the support of held the majority of the United States. survived almost completely on U.S. foreign aid and as a result, economic Rhee's regime survived reconstruction was not the top priority of of the government. 17 reconstruction As a result of of the U.S.' prioritization prioritization on economic development, the U.S. felt the need to eventually eventually help in destabilizing Rhee's regime in order to get new leadership to of the steps the U.S. took was to step back their move economic progress forward. One ofthe foreign aid to South Korea, which had an enormous effect on Rhee's regime. After enonnous effect After 1957, foreign the U.S. "slashed "slashed economic aid to South Korea from from $382,893,000 in 1957 down to 17 G. (2007). Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Koreans, Americans, Brazinsky, G. Americans, and and the the Making Making of of aa Democracy. Chapel Hill, NC: University of of North Carolina Press, p. 98-99 14 1959.18 Rhee, whose sole goal U.S. $222,204,000 in 1959. gQl;l.l was to remain in power, had used u.s. 18 a way of of paying off off a~li~s ajlies that kept him ip in power. Since South Korea's president aid as (j.S '" was elected by the majority majority of of the General Assembly at that time, losing allies meant losing the presidency. As a result, Rhee took drastic measures me(j.sures in order to retain power, freedom of of the press to curtail criticism offfrs of his regime including passing a law to restrict freedom and executing Cho Pongam, a strong political opponent who had a chance of of winning the presidential election against him. Each step Rhee took in trying to maintain temporary temporary political stability came at the cost of of more and more political legitimacy legitimacy.. His political legitimacy tanked to the point that on April 19th , 1960, the day th known as the April Revolution, Rhee's Liberal Party enacted covert plans for "group voting, ballot stuffing, stuffing, and the removal of of opposition ballots" in order to win the upcoming election. Rhee's actions resulted in a chain of of violent events culminating in a student led peaceful peaceful protest that turned deadly when the police fired "point blank" into the crowd. More protests erupted and Rhee finally finally resigned before the widespread protests threatened the state of of the country. country.19 19 Chang Myon's government followed followed the student revolution when it won the election in July 1960. Chang intended to learn from the mistakes of of his predecessor by election committing his government government to economic development on a level that Rhee had previously established a new exchange rate for their currency, ignored. Consequentially, Chang established consolidated power companies, and increased the rate for those services that were heavily 18 18 Brazinsky, Brazinsky, G. G. (2007). Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Koreans, Americans, and the Making of of a Democracy. Chapel Chapel Hill, NC: University of of North Carolina Press, p. 105. 19 19 The results of of the election gave Rhee 88.7 percent of of the vote, his vice-president 8,225,000 votes. Ibid, p. 107. p.107. 15 subsidized by the government. govemment. 20 However, the political cost of subsidized of enacting these economic measures would detract focus on national security. Crime rates in South Korea grew exponentially as a result of of Chang's failure to address the need for a police structure. In exponentially addition, demonstrations from students still unsatisfied unsatisfied with the government government were widespread. WI·despread .21 21 robbed Chang of These developments robbed of any economic success as he was unable to reforms once his political support base deteriorated. In a cabinet follow through with his reforms after Chang came into office, office, only 3.7 percent "unreservedly poll taken months after "unreservedly see.,,22 Chang's inability inability to quell supported" him, while 51.5 percent would "wait and see." 22 the risks to national security and his inability to follow through with his economic development of South Korea's first democracy, as a development policies would result in the end of 3,500 troops assembled around a military coup d'etat d'etat on May 16th, 1961, "carried out by 3,500 officers,,23 started started South Korea's period of corps of250 of 250 officers" of military authoritarianism. Examining Why Economic Development Development failed in South Korea's First Democracy Examining development was slow in South Korea during its first first In examining why economic development period examined in context of of the of democracy, political stability and legitimacy are examined period of political pressures that are inherent in democratic institutions. As discussed earlier, 2 0 20 Brazinsky, Koreans, Americans, and and the Making of of a Brazinsky, G. (2007). Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Democracy. Chapel of North Carolina Press, p. 108 Chapel Hill, NC: University of 21lbid, lbid , 21 p. 109. 2 2 Henderson, G. G. (1968). Korea: The Politics of of the Vortex. Vortex. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 20. 2 3 Brazinsky, G. (2007). Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of Brazinsky, G. of a 22 23 Democracy. Chapel Chapel Hill, NC: University of of North Carolina Press, p. 113. 16 of political stability as democracy requires that political leaders adhere to a set level of founding document document to allow other political mandated by the constitution or other founding opponents the opportunity opportunity to gain office. Therefore, if if one particular particular leader seeks to of the democracy must do so by raising retain office, office, that leader under the general rules of accomplishments?4 The problem for Rhee's regime was political legitimacy through their accomplishments. 24 that he did not focus on accomplishing accomplishing policies that raised political legitimacy; he focused on artificially artificially raising political stability (much like an authoritarian would) by paying off off allies with foreign aid and restructuring the constitution constitution to his benefit benefit when that aid ran out. Similarly, while Chang attempted economic reform, he was unable to follow through because of of his inability to also deal with national security risks, eroding the majority majority of of his political support. The lesson that is learned from Rhee and Chang'S Chang's regimes is the incongruent nature of of South Korea's democracy and economic development. Economic development is a long-term long-term investment investment and is politically politically unprofitable unprofitable given democracy's need to fulfill fulfill short-term political demands. As a result, even though economic reform reform may be in high demand, it is also unable to fulfill conflict between the shortfulfill needs immediately. This conflict long-term is what Adam Przeworski calls the "valley of oftransition.,,25 term and the long-term transition." Haggard and Kaufman Kaufman also argue that the only way to overcome this "valley of 24 Linz linz and Stepan explain, "If "If aa democracy democracy never never produced policies that generated government-mandated public goods in the areas of of education, education, health, and transportation, some safety net net for for its citizens hurt by major market swings, and some alleviation of of gross of Democratic Democratic Transitions and Consolidation. inequality, democracy democracy would not not be sustainable. " linz, Linz, J. & Stepan, A (1996). Problems of Consolidation. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, p.13. 25 2S Przeworski, A. (1991). (1991). Democracy Democracy and and the Market: Political Political and and Economic Reforms in in Eastern Eastern Europe and Latin Przeworski, A. the Market: Economic Reforms Europe and Latin America. America. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Cambridge University Cambridge, MA: University Press, Press, p. p. 136-137. 136-137. 17 centralized executive authority. 26 In a democracy, this means transition" is with strong, centralized having the political capital to overcome the risks inherent in politically uncertain policies. Contrary to what Lipset would expect, the institutional factors inherent in its democracy reform during its first did not make it ideal for South South Korea's attempted economic reform democratic state. In the next section, South Korea will show how the ability to circumvent political legitimacy during its time as an authoritarian authoritarian was the reason why it was able to economically develop. Military Rule, Economic Development, and the Eventual Transition to Democracy: The Park Chung-Hee Chung-Hee Years Park's regime introduces the discussion of of "military-dominant" "military-dominant" regimes vs. "authoritarian After the coup d'etat "authoritarian regimes" in the transitioning to democracy. After d'etat ousting to power, power, he he initiated initiated major major developments Chang, and Park's Park's subsequent ascent to Chang, and subsequent ascent developments in in economic policy policy and as as aa result, Korea's Korea's industrialization industrialization has has since been been "carried out economic under strong strong government-led government-led economic management." management." Park's Park's efforts efforts were were largely under successful successful in radically increasing growth rates by mobilizing domestic capital and promoting exports, leading those exports to grow from $54.8 million in 1962 to $250.3 million in 1966. The previous Korean regimes and their American allies were unable to of a lack of do so before before because of of commitment commitment from the executive authority. Park's ability to focus on policy actions instead instead of of reelection helped launch a five-year five-year economic economic development plan in 1962 that put the power power of of the central bank and other major major commercial banks under the national government. This allowed Park to support 2 6 26 They argue that, "the successful initiation of reform depends on rulers who who have personal control over economic "the successful economic decisiondecision­ making, the the security to to recruit and back a cohesive 'reform team' and the political authority to override bureaucratic and political opposition to policy change." Haggard, S. & of Democratic Democratic Transitions. Princeton, NJ: & Kaufman, R. R. R. (1996). The Political Economy of NJ: Princeton University Press., p. 9. 18 government policy with loans to target industries that would help boost the export-led government policy.27 This influx influx of drive policy. of capital was the necessary impetus to galvanize South 27 Korea's industrialization industrialization and growth. In that timeframe, timeframe, the economy grew at an • 28 impressive 8.3 percent, "exceeding even the most optimistic projections.,,28 impressive 8.3 percent, "exceeding even the most optimistic projections." Despite these indicators, however, South Korea's eventual transition to democracy had as much to do with the authoritarian regime being militarily-ruled militarily-ruled as it did with its economic success. Despite his achievement achievement in leading South Korea toward economic development, Park faced continual political legitimacy issues due to his initial promise to hold free elections in South Korea within two years of of his military 29 occupation. of this promise, Park made the delineation between occupation. As a result of between the military 29 and political authority in South Korea a priority in the mindset of the population mindset of population and the Americans, and limited his options in being able to maintain or raise political legitimacy in the country by continual military rule. Given South Korea's first transition to democracy with the Rhee regime, Park was left with little recourse in being able to justify finally left justify a continual continual military occupation. He finally caved to pressure to allow free elections in October 1963, in which he came out victorious in a slim margin. 3D However, the reintroduction of democracy was in name reintroduction of assassination in 1979 through only, as Park made sure he won each election up until his assassination 2 7 27 for Korea's Economic Development: Development: From Government Jwa, s. S. W. (2001). A New paradigm for Government Control to Economy. New York, NY: NY: PALGRAVE publishers, p. 5-6 Market Economy. 2 8 28 Brazinsky, G. Koreans, Americans, and the Making of of a Brazinsky, G. (2007). Nation Building Bui/ding in South Korea: Koreans, Democracy. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press., p. 147. Democracy. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press., p. 147. 29 2 9 30 3 0 Ibid, p. 128. Ibid, p. 128. Ibid, p. 132. Ibid, p. 132. 19 the restructuring of of government. He clandestinely clandestinely passed an amendment amendment to modify modify the term-limits restriction on the presidency in 1969 so that he could serve an additional term 31 , and continued to consolidate his power with the announcement announcement of of the Yusin constitution. consti tution. Park's desperation to maintain power led him to destroy what remained of of South "banned political parties, Korea's first democracy in 1972. Declaring martial law Park "banned dissolved the National Assembly, and closed the country's universities." Park continued the removal of of democratic protocols by instituting the Yusin constitution. Under the of the assembly, to Yusin system, the president had the authority to appoint one-third of designate and dismiss all members of of the cabinet including the prime minister, and to immediately. issue emergency emergency decrees that would become law immediately.32 government had, but Park's actions all but dissolved any political legitimacy his government provided him with enough political stability to insulate his power to govern for another 7 provided years by legalizing his dictatorship. Had he opted to allow the populace to vote on these measures and have them passed, he may have been able to maintain maintain some political legitimacy. However, by completely ignoring legitimacy in enacting these changes to battle political conflicts, he chose in favor of of regressing back toward his authoritarian days in re-enforcing re-enforcing political stability through coercion, and was eventually assassinated assassinated in 1979 as a result. result.33 33 31 31 Brazinsky, G. (2007). Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy. Chapel Hill, NC: Brazinsky, G. (2007). Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press., p. 158 University of North Carolina Press., p. 158 32 32 Ibid, p. 160 33 33 Haggard, Haggard, S. S. & & Kaufman, Kaufman, R. R. R. R. (1996). (1996). The The Political Political Economy Economy of of Democratic Democratic Transitions. Transitions. Princeton, Princeton, NJ: NJ: Princeton Princeton University University Press, Press, p. p. 86-88. 86-88. 20 The End of of Military-Dominant Military-Dominant Authoritarianism: Towards a Transition to Democracy in South Korea Democracy After Park's Park's assassination, Chun Doo-Hwan, Doo-Hwan, aa military military partner partner of of Park Park took took over After assassination, Chun over etat amongst the anarchy of protests protests against in another another coup in coup d' d'etat amongst the anarchy of against authoritarian authoritarian rule. rule. The The of the military infrastructure infrastructure and allowed for second coup allowed for the reunification reunification of the restoration of of the political stability needed to insulate itself itself from further further opposition of the military structure did not result in the reestablishment of for the time being. The reestablishment of the return of of political legitimacy, however. Chun was forced to use the brute strength of power over the next seven years in which he would head the military in order to maintain power 34 34 of force to maintain government. However, just as it did with Park, the excessive use of government. political stability in absence of of being able to appeal to political legitimacy would catch up to Chun, though not in death like it did with his predecessor. Chun was faced with the same options as his predecessor predecessor to suppress political legitimacy through force or to capitulate to demands from the public for direct elections for the presidency. Hoping probably probably to avoid the same fate as his predecessor, he chose to allow the election. Ironically, the division between the opposition split the vote needed to win and allowed for Chun's nominated candidate and former military partner Roh Tae- takeover. 35 Having lived through Woo to win in the first legitimate election since Park's takeover. 35 of political rule through both military-dominant military-dominant occupations, Roh made the vicious cycle of a declaration on June 29 th, 1987, that provided the direct election ofthe of the president, as well th 34 Ibid, 91. Ibid, p. p. 91. 35 Haggard, S. & Kaufman, R. R. (1996). NJ: R. R. (1996). The ThePolitical Political Economy Economyof of Democratic Democratic Transitions. Transitions. Princeton, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 95-98. 21 of civil and political rights long sought after after since the first democratic as guarantees of transition failed. Since this time, South Korea's democracy democracy has prospered. Analyzing South Korea's Military-Dominant Military-Dominant Regimes Analyzing South Korea's example shows the fragility of a military-dominant military-dominant authoritarian fragility of regime in a couple of of ways. First, it was evident of evident that a military junta's junta's takeover of government government limits the options in which the military government government is able to stay in power. Both Park and Chun realized that any remedies they could utilize addressed only the political stability of of the situation and not the legitimacy of of the issue. Second, South Korea's example shows that the use of of force is only a temporary temporary solution to raising political stability. Political suppression through force raises stability for a little while, but at the cost of of legitimacy needed to prevent a revolution or a of raising the amount of different military takeover later. different Finally, South Korea shows that focus on only political stability and ignoring legitimacy is not sustainable. Conflicts legitimacy Conflicts due to low political legitimacy are cyclical and require a more extreme action to preserve enough stability to govern each successive of their immediate immediate rise to power, the military-dominant time. As a consequence of military-dominant authoritarians in South Korea could depend only on ad-hoc methods of of retaining political stability, leading to their eventual withdrawal. The way in which these three factors apply difference between South Korea's militarywill be fundamental fundamental to understanding the difference dominant rule, and the party-dominant of China in the next section. dominant party-dominant rule of 22 Party-Dominant Rule and the Authoritarian Reality of of China China Today Party-Dominant China's history of differs from from that of of authoritarian rule substantially differs of South Korea concentration of in the way that it was established. China is a big country with the largest concentration of government as it is known today was established people in the world. Chinese political government by "an official official political philosophy, Confusionism, Confusionism, which served as a principal official ideology emphasized of governance. This official emphasized unity, order, and collective instrument of moral values over individual initiative.,,36 initiative." As a result, China's authoritarianism authoritarianism drew as 36 much from its ability to appeal to political legitimacy legitimacy as it did from being able to establish establish its political stability. of that philosophy philosophy was engendered in the establishment of the Chinese Much of establishment of of the principal elements in the CCP's rise to Communist Communist Party (CCP), where "one of capability in adjusting power" was its capability adjusting policies to meet changing obligations to political legitimacy.37 consolidated Marxism quite successfully successfully in the legitimacy. Mao Zedong had consolidated establishment establishment of of the CCP, and through its integration, the mix of of Marxism and of the revolutionary tactics in Confucianism served as the philosophical Confucianism philosophical basis for much of China. A huge difference difference between the CCP and the military-dominant of South military-dominant regimes of Korea was the time horizon of of its priorities. The military-dominant military-dominant regimes' rise to power came without preparation. A coup d'etat garner of the military military in order to gamer d'etat uses the might of 36 36 Change in in Hungary Hungary and and China. China. Lanham, Lanham, MD: MD: Rowman Rowman & & Tong, Y. (1997). Transitions from State Socialism: Economic and Political Change Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 37 37 Dickson explains: "Particularly after the relocation of of the party's base to to Yan'an following the the Long March, during which Mao of the party, party policy varied over time and in different regions in response both to to the the changing Zedong emerged as as a leader leader of fortunes of the of party activities." Dickson, the party and to to the location of Dickson, B. J. (1997). Democratization in China and Taiwan: The The Adaptability Parties. New York, York, NY: Oxford University Press, Inc., p. 71. Adaptability of of Leninist Panies. 23 the initial political stability to govern, and requires no real preparation beyond making of the opposition. sure their guns and soldiers far outnumbered outnumbered any of Party-dominant Party-dominant regimes like the CCP relied on structure, not force, in order to fulfill its new political, economic, and social goals. As a result, the party's focus was on fulfill expanding its influence influence broadly through bureaucracies, and maintaining authority through 38 in which institutional coercion. Dickson calls this the "efficient form of adaptation,,,38 institutional coercion. Dickson calls this the "efficient form of adaptation," in which resources are put toward the widespread influence of power, rather than expressing power resources are put toward the widespread influence of power, rather than expressing power only through forcible coercion. Following this idea, the CCP extended this power through only through forcible coercion. Following this idea, the CCP extended this power through the creation of party schools, which served to indoctrinate members to think along party the creation of party schools, which served to indoctrinate members to think along party ideologies and philosophies without compulsorily committing members to do so through ideologies and philosophies without compulsorily committing members to do so through physical force. physical force. After the revolution and its subsequent rise to power, the CCP began immediately After the revolution and its subsequent rise to power, the CCP began immediately to spread its infrastructure and ideology across the nation. The party's structure to spread its infrastructure and ideology across the nation. The party's structure "expanded horizontally to control the government bureaucracy and vertically to lower "expanded horizontally to control the government bureaucracy and vertically to lower levels of political hierarchy.,,39 In December of 1951, the party created a "General Party levels of political hierarchy." In December of 1951, the party created a "General Party 39 Committee,,40 to manage all party members under its control and to centralize a method Committee" to manage all party members under its control and to centralize a method 40 of distributing authority to lower levels while keeping power centralized to the party. of distributing authority to lower levels while keeping power centralized to the party. Eventually, the CCP was able to establish enough political stability through its efforts at Eventually, the CCP was able to establish enough political stability through its efforts at mobilizing legitimacy that it could utilize the foundation of that new stability to renege mobilizing legitimacy that it could utilize the foundation of that new stability to renege 3 8 38 Dickson, B. J. (1997). Democratization in China Parties. New New Dickson, China and Taiwan: The Adaptability of Leninist Parties. York, NY: Oxford University Press, Inc., p. 75. York, NY: Oxford University Press, Inc., p. 75. 39 3 9 40 4 0 Ibid, p. 87. Ibid, p. 87. Ibid, p. 75-76. Ibid, p. 75-76. 24 on some of of its obligations to political legitimacy. Much of of this was evident after after 1949, when the CCP no longer tried as hard to reach out for popular popular support. While it still offered established institutional offered a "mass line" for public opinion, the party's well established structure allowed it to restrict the opportunity for exit or voice, and as a result the mass line was "merely "merely an exercise in demonstrating loyalty.,,41 loyalty." 41 The most relevant example of of this is the Hundred Flowers Movement, when the voices of of dissent were eventually prosecuted prosecuted in what became the Anti-Rightist dissention due to fear of of reprisal; a movement. People became too scared to express dissention of political stability in luxury afforded afforded to the party because of of the extremely high level of the CCP's institutional bureaucracy. Mao's original speech inviting public criticism was completely rewritten rewritten in the state run newspaper newspaper with a new addition limiting what could be criticized, and reinforced reinforced this by punishing pUflishing those individuals who had spoken out under the original context. context.42 42 This explains much of difficulty China has faced thus far in trying to initiate a of the difficulty democratic movement. Despite there being "organized "organized activities to promote democracy", no significant significant democratic opposition exists because the CCP has a considerable means to eliminate that opposition. Anything resembling noteworthy opposition opposition was crushed overseas." immediately, and "dissident groups had to go underground or operate overseas.,,43 43 4 1 41 Dickson, Adaptability of of Leninist Parties. New Dickson, B. J. (1997). Democratization in China China and Taiwan: The Adaptability York, NY: Oxford University Press, Inc., p. 94-95. 4 2 42 Pan, P. of a New China. New York, NY: Simon P. P. P. (2008). Out of of Mao's Mao's Shadow: The The Struggle for for the Soul of & Schuster, Schuster, p. 43. 43. 4 3 43 Tong, Y. (1997). Transitions from State Socialism: Economic and Political Change in Hungary and China. Tong, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., p. 140-141. 25 That is not to say that China China has not faced its fare share of of legitimacy legitimacy conflicts. The nature of of an authoritarian authoritarian regime to suppress opposition in some way will always backlash of result in a backlash of legitimacy. In China's history, Mao's failure to muster enough support for the Hundred Flowers Movement, the Socialist Socialist Education Movement, and the Red Guards of Revolution44 prove that no amount of of political stability can of the Cultural Revolution 44 substitute for the legitimacy required of a government's goals. Political required to accomplish accomplish all of stability stability only ever guarantees a degree of of insulation from legitimacy conflicts; it does not guarantee immunity from them. As South Korea clearly shows, some concessions to political legitimacy must always be made at some point. In this manner, China's economic development has been its most considerable concession to political legitimacy. As this paper has shown, China has developed a concession wonderful capacity for economic growth and has done so through the allowance of of a wonderful 45 economy in the economic reform reform program program begun in 1978. liberal market economy 1978. One example 45 of this liberalization: from 1985 to 1987, "all firms with fixed assets ofless of of less than 1.5 1.5 profits of of under 200,000 yuan" were chartered out under the million yuan and annual profits years.,,46 Allowing these non-state control of of non-state actors for lengths of of "up to five years." 46 actors creative control over the decisions and operations of of the business gave political 4 4 44 Dickson explains: "The Hundred Flowers campaign faced overwhelming elite opposition, and the scope of of criticisms raised during the campaign made even Mao Mao turn against itit and retaliate with the of peasant the the Anti-Rightist Movement. The weakness of supervising local cadres in a way Mao for the the Socialist Education Movement, organizations prevented them from supervising organizations Mao envisioned for which became an internal rectification against corruption rather than a mass mobilization against revisionism. The Red Red Guards Guards became divided against themselves themselves and created the new problem of of social instability instead of of solutions to to the problems Mao identified by Mao. Although the details are different, each attempt to mobilize the the masses against the party failed because Mao was unable to to to control the movements he had initiated (this is equally true for for the Great Leap) and was therefore unable to achieve his intended results. Dickson, of Leninist Parties. Parties. Dickson, B. J. (1997). Democratization in China and Taiwan: The Adaptability af New York, York, NY: Oxford University Press, Inc., p. 106. 4 5 Productivity, Efficiency, and Economic Growth in China. China. New York, NY: NY: Palgrave Wu, Y. (2008). Productivity, PalgraveMacmillan. Macmillan. 4 6 Tong, Y. (1997). Transitions from State Socialism: Economic and Political Change Change in in Hungary Hungary and and China. China. Lanham, Lanham, MD: MD: Rowman Rowman & & 45 46 Littlefield Publishers, Inc., p. 89. 26 government at the cost of of some stability, but ultimately by being more legitimacy to the government lenient in the economic sector, the CCP was able to get away with more on the political side. This idea became what is known as the "people's democratic dictatorship,,,47 dictatorship," in 47 which which China China would develop a market economy, but preserve public ownership over its citizens' political rights. This is most visible today in China's strict control over its press and media, where the population population allows for a state run television channel (CCTV) and two newspapers (The People's freedom of of the press and People's Daily Daily and Xinhua) Xinhua) to restrict freedom criticisms of of its government. In essence, economic development development in many ways helped maintain maintain China's authoritarian authoritarian regime, not destroy it. Summary Party-Dominant Authoritarianism Summary Observations on China's Party-Dominant Authoritarianism Vs. South Korea's Military-Dominant Military-Dominant Authoritarianism Authoritarianism China proves proves ultimately ultimately how how party-dominant party-dominant regimes regimes are are able to to utilize utilize a balance between political stability and legitimacy to maintain an authoritarian between authoritarian regime. As a result of maintenance of of both political stability and political legitimacy, party-dominant of its maintenance military-dominant regimes in a large portion of regimes are able to outlast military-dominant of legitimacy conflicts facing all authoritarian party-dominant regimes must first create conflicts authoritarian regimes. While party-dominant a sense of of political legitimacy before establishing the stability to rule, military dominant dominant regimes' quick entry into power power through military coup d'etats do not provide them with enough political legitimacy legitimacy to sustain power power over the long term. South Korea's two enough military-led authoritarian regimes are evidence of of this fact: despite the ability to postpone military-led power through violent coercion, there was not enough political their decline from power 47 Tong, Y. (1997). Transitions from State Socialism: Economic and Political Change Change in Hungary and China. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., p. 1. 27 stability to maintain maintain power power without eventual concessions to legitimacy and that resulted in a democratic transition. China shows how a balance between between maintaining maintaining political stability and political legitimacy on some level are necessary prerequisites to maintaining an authoritarian regime and is the reason why they were able to do so, despite Lipset's hypothesis that they should be transitioning toward democracy democracy because of of their high economic affected development. Lipset makes a unitary assumption assumption that political legitimacy legitimacy is only affected negatively by economic development. China proves this assumption assumption to be false. By developing economically, China was able to make a concession to garner political legitimacy by opening up its economic markets, allowing it the political maneuverability to maintain an authoritarian regime in the process. Its economic growth has enabled it to avoid a prescribed prescribed transition to democracy. Concluding Development and Democracy Concluding Observations on Economic Economic Development Democracy development should Lipset's hypothesis makes a strong argument that economic development preconceived notion results in democracy. This paper's main purpose was to dispel the preconceived development and democracy democracy are directly related. Instead, it has repeatedly that economic development demonstrated demonstrated the importance of of political institutions and their effects effects on the balance between between political stability and legitimacy legitimacy as the ultimate determinant of of whether whether a country transitions to democracy or not. In examining the two case studies of of South Korea and China, this thesis showed short-term goals of that a democratic country faces certain constraints between their short-term of power and the long-term goal of maintaining power of developing economically. In order to be 28 able to economically economically develop successfully, successfully, a democracy must have the centralized executive authority to overcome political opposition opposition that will be present present in the immediate timeframe. Opportunities to exert this executive authority are limited in democracies given the short time horizon of of elections. As a result, successful successful use of of executive authority towards economic development development in democracies have usually been limited to emergency powers, mandates claimed "special constitutional provisions and emergency claimed by newly elected governments during their 'honeymoons,' and powers delegated to the executive legislators.,,48 In South Korea's example, no such opportunities presented presented themselves by legislators." 48 and it was only after after a military-dominant military-dominant authoritarian authoritarian regime took over that South Korea was able to develop economically. This finding shows the magnitude that political institutions have in determining a capacity for economic development, and places a limitation on how Lipset's correlation can be applied for economic development development in democracies. In addition, this study upholds Stephen Haggard Haggard and Robert Kaufman's Kaufinan's analysis military-dominant authoritarian regimes are much more vulnerable to a democratic that military-dominant transition than party-dominant party-dominant regimes. Party-dominant Party-dominant regimes are better able to maintain authoritarianism authoritarianism by balancing commitments to both political stability and legitimacy. As a result, party-dominant party-dominant regimes are more able than military-dominant military-dominant deflect legitimacy conflicts authoritarian states. Party-dominant regimes to deflect conflicts facing all authoritarian actors come to power by first creating a political base of of legitimacy through a omnipresent bureaucratic infrastructure omnipresent infrastructure before before establishing enough political stability to 48 48 Haggard, S. & & Kaufman, R. (1996). Economy of of Democratic Democratic Transitions. Princeton, NJ: Haggard, S. Kaufman, R. R. R. (1996). The The Political Political Economy Transitions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Press., p. p. 10. Princeton University University Press., 10. 29 rule. China's continual ability to function function as an authoritarian state speaks to the importance of of maintaining both political legitimacy and political stability. Conversely, military dominant regimes enter immediately into power through military coup d'etats d'etats of political legitimacy to sustain power over the long term. South and thus lack the base of military-led authoritarian authoritarian regimes prove that attending only to political Korea's two military-led stability through through violent coercion is not enough to retain power. Eventual concessions to political legitimacy were required, resulting in South Korea's inevitable democratic of authoritarian withdrawal should pay close attention to the transition. Future studies of specific type of of authoritarian regime being analyzed. specific Finally, this thesis observes that economic development development affects affects political legitimacy in a way that can both help and hurt the stability of of a government. In legitimacy examining Lipset's assertion that economic development examining development results in a social demand for significant observations that Lipset does democracy, this study'S study's findings conclude two significant of Lipset's hypothesis is possible: a lack of of economic not account for. First, the inverse of of democracy. South Korea's democratic state development development can result in the withdrawal of Syngman Rhee and Chang Myon show that a democracy can fail as a result of under Syngman of falling short in providing economic development. Second, Lipset overlooked the possibility possibility that high economic development development does not always result in a democratic transition. China's example of "people's democratic dictatorship" proves that high of a "people's development and the capacity for growth may help in the preservation of the economic development preservation of status quo for an authoritarian authoritarian regime. 30 References References Brazinsky, G. Building in South South Korea: Korea: Koreans, Koreans, Americans, Americans, and and the G. (2007). Nation Nation Building the Making of of a Democracy. Democracy. Chapel Hill, NC: Making NC: University of of North Carolina Press. Dickson, B. JJ.. (1997). Democratization Adaptability of Democratization in China China and and Taiwan: Taiwan: The Adaptability of Leninist Leninist Parties. New New York, NY: Parties. NY: Oxford Oxford University Press, Inc. Haggard, S. & R. R. Political Economy & Kaufman, R. R. (1996). The Political Economy of of Democratic Democratic Transitions. Transitions. Princeton, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Princeton University Press. o/the Henderson, Henderson, G. G. (1968). Korea: The The Politics of the Vortex. Vortex. Cambridge, MA: MA: Harvard Harvard University Press. Holz, C. C. A. (2008). "China's Economic Economic Growth 1978-2025: 1978-2025: What We We Know Know Today About Tomorrow./I World Development. 36:10, pp. 1665-1691. China's Economic Economic Growth Tomorrow." World Development. 1665-1691. paradigm for for Korea's Korea's Economic Jwa, S. W. (2001). A New New paradigm Economic Development: Development: Fram From Government to Market Government Control Control to Market Economy. Economy. New New York, NY: NY: PALGRAVE publishers. publishers. Social Bases Politics. New Lipset, S. M. M. (1960). Political Political Man: Man: The Social Bases of of Politics. New York, NY: NY: Doubleday Doubleday & & Company, Inc. Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, Linz, JJ.. JJ.. (1978). The Breakdown Breakdown of of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown & Reequilibration. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Reequilibration. Hopkins University Press. Democratic Transitions Linz, JJ.. & Stepan, A (1996). Problems Problems of of Democratic Transitions and and Consolidation. Consolidation. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Hopkins University Press. Pan, P. for the the Soul of P. P. P. (2008). Out Out of of Mao's Mao's Shadow: The Struggle for of a New New China. New New York, NY: NY: Simon & Schuster. Przeworski, A. & Theories and Facts./I & Limongi, F. F. (1997). "Modernization: Theories Facts." World World Politics. Politics. 49:2, p. 155-183 155-183 the Study Study of ofthe to Democracy./I Przeworski, A. (1986). "Some Problems Problems in the the Transition Transition to Democracy." Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for for Democracy. Baltimore, MD: Johns Transitions Hopkins University Press. Hopkins Y. (1997). Transitions State Socialism: Socialism: Economic Economic and Political Change Tong, Y. Transitions fram from State and Political Change in Hungary and Hungary and China. Lanham, MD: Rowman Rowman & & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Y. (2008). Productivity, Productivity, Efficiency, Economic Growth Wu, Y. Efficiency, and and Economic Growth in China. New New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Macmillan. 31 (2009) ." CIA ctbook. Retrieved from (2009).. "South "South Korea Korea." CIA World Fa Factbook. https:l!www.cia.gov!library!publications{the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html on 3/25/2009. https://www.cia.gov/librai^/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html on 3/25/2009. (2009). "China." CiA World Factbook. Retrieved from (2009). "China." CIA World Factbook. Retrieved from https:l!www.cia.govLlibraryLpublications!the-worid-factbook!geos/ch.htmlon 3/25/2009. https://www.cia.gov/librarv/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html on 3/25/2009. 32