A study of the philosophical proofs of the existence of God

"Canst thou by searching find out God?" This is one of the profound problems to which countless thinkers throughout the ages have directed their attention. Behind the marvellous facts which science daily unfolds, beyond the incomprehensible phenom of evolution, back of the silent forces which ceaselessly manifest themselves in nature and in mind, hidden in the glwoing suset, visible in the petal of the delicate flower, is there a Living Supreme Personality who directs and controls?

UNIVERSITY CHIVE5 A STUDY OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROOFS OF THE EXl ~TErlCE OF GOD ==*== A THESIS SUBMl TTED TO ................. :..: .... ... ..·.·...:..... : : : ....:.. ... . ..... .... ......·.....·.... . .··:. :: ·. . .. . . •: .. :. :::- ::: ..... ::: ...... .·........... .. : :: .. :::.::·.:··.:·.: ··....... THE FACULTY OF THE UMl'lERSITY OF UTAH, FOR THE DEGREE OF MAST:tm OF ARTS by ELSIE HOlm TYNDALE. SALT LA.KE CITY, UTAH, 1911. APPROVED: CONTENTS =*= Introduction - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Page 1 The Growth of the Monotheistic Idea - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - 9 - - - - - - - - - - - 17 The Causal and Logical Arguments - - - - - - 37 E Consensu Gentium and the Moral Proof - 49 Modern Arguments - - - -· - - - - - - - - 52 Conclusion - 57 The Teleological Argument 1he Ontological Proof CONTE NT S =*= Introduction - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Page The Growth of the Monotheistic Idea 1 - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - 9 - - - - - - - - - - - 17 The Causal and Logical Arguments - - - - - - 37 E Consensu Gentium and the Moral Proof - 49 Modern Arguments - - - - - - - - - - - - 52 Conclusion - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 57 The Teleological Argument The Ontological Proof A STUDY OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. **~** "A single sigh towards the a more than geometric al demonstra tion of the Deity." ---HEMSTER RUYS. "There is a natural, practical , and moral faith in the existence of a Deity which no demonstra tion can equal, to which no reasoning is adequate." ---JANET. "Canst thou _by searching find out God?" This is one of the profound problems to which countless thinkers throughou t the ages have directed their attention . Behind the marvellou s facts which science daily unfolds, beyond the incompreh ensible phenomena of evolution , back of the silent forces which ceaseless ly manifest themselve s in nature and in mind, hidden in the glowing sunset, visible in the petal of the delicate flower, is there a Living supreme Personali ty who directs and controls? Mankind is essential ly religious . The human race, from the most benighted and remote savage tribes to the peoples of highest civilizati on, has always manifested religious impulses and ideas ever since it first emerged from the night of unconscio usness into that glorious psychical inheritanc e toward which it had evolved during many eons. Some investiga tors have dis- puted this fact, but careful study has shown their mistakes and proved the truth of the foregoing statement. The awakening of this thought leads at once to many questions, among which that concerning the ration' ._ . al basis or warrant for religion assumes a prominent ~ place. Philosophy has always interested itself in this as one of its basic problems, and philosophers have evolved many ingenious proofs of' the existence of God. It is the purpose of this paper to confine 1 tself entirely to ·a study of the philosophical argu- merits which have been advanced since the idea of monotheism first took a firm hold upon thi.nldng man. This study will include a statement of the most pungent and important formal proofs . that have been conceived, - - together with the refutations thereto offered. It will also endeavor to show what real advance in thought has been effected by these arguments and what relation these formal mental possessions, based on reason alone, bear to the entire sum of human thought, which rests upon volitional, moral,and aesthetic, as well as upon rational elements. THE GROWTH OF THE M01'T0''.rHE18TlC IDEA " To one small people it was given to create the principle of Progress. That people was the Greek." - - -SIR HEN'RY SUMNER MAI1'1E. The seeker after early philosophical knowledge turns naturally to Greece. 1 t is no longer disputed that Greece held coramunication with other countries, such as Babylon and Egypt, as early-· as the first half of the C second millenium B. C., but it is not easy to say just what modifications of her religions thought resulted from this intercourse. It is known that India had developed a theological philosophy prior to the beginnings of Greek philosophy, but the thought of India, while subtle and profound, is unmethodical. When it does not confine itself to the most abstract ideas, it confuses imaginary forms with religious elements in a way that makes clear thinking impossible. It is, there- fore, safe to say that if Greece inherited any theological thoughts from India, they were at best secondary and subordinate in importance. Later, however, we can definitely trace foreign influences, especially Egyptian and Babylonian, in some aspects of Greek thought, particularly in the Orphic cosmogonies. It is scarcely necessary to say, however, so well is the Greek genius understood, that whatever may have been the original sources of Greek thought, its development was certainly more rapid and complete in Greece than in any other country. It is, then, distinctly possible to trace the evolution of the monotheistic idea and the growth of the conception of divine attributes in ancient Greek writings. The germ of the monotheistic idea was present from the very first in the Greek as it was ,indeed, in all the oldest known religions of the world. In the nature of the case it could hardly be otherwise, for the deities of these religions were at first powers of nature, and of necessity were considered as parts of a mysterious common nature, at once the source of physical and divine existences and forces. This monism, implicit in polytheism, has in individual instances, due to the action of various causes, expressed itself in ways wonderfully approximating monotheism. This expres- sion once achieved, tended to perpetuate itself and helped to d~velop the idea in the nation as a whole. The popular religion of Greece, as it appeared in the Homeric poems, was certainly as polytheistic as any of the known religions. Yet, even in Homer, we find vague traces of a monotheistic attitude. The single ex- ception to the chaos depicted in the Homeric account as resulting from the acts and passions of the dv1e·1 1ers on Olympus, is the supremacy of Moira, or Fate. Her power controlled both gods and men, and in her worship we may discern the first perception of the operation of law throughout the universe. In Romer also is a story which tells how Zeus was restrained from acting contrary to Night, where we see the faint gleam of the belief that Night was superior even to the father of the gods. In fact, the doctrine of "a first mother, Night," frequently finds expression in Greek cosmogony. Eudemus, the historian of science and disciple of Aristotle, mentions that 'in the work of *Pherecydes, a member of the Orphic _s~?t, who wrote about the middle of the sixth century, B. C., Night was the supreme primary being. With Xenophanes , of Colophon> · born about 570 B. C. 0 , a distinct advance in theological thought *Pherecydes was the earliest philosopher, a part of whose writings has come down to us. He published a prose work called "Pentemychos," indicating a quintett of first nrinciples. was made. Clement of .Alexandria, in the first book of t.he Stromat.a, assigns to Xenophanes the credit of being the founder of the Eleatic shcool, and he was gnerally regarded by antiquity as the originator of the f leatic doctrine of the Oneness of the Universe. Timon, the Phliasian, writing a poem on the teachings of philosophy, puts this expression into the mouth of Xenophanes: "Wherever I turn my mind, everything resolves ·itself into a single Unity." He was likewise long considered as the first who maintained the Unity of the Deity. Gomperz claims to have completely refuted the idea that Xenophanes was a pure monotheist, but, at any ra.te,•he was a theologian protesting against an anthropomo:rJfd c · polytheism. In a frequently quoted passage he says: " lf oxen and horses had hands and could paint and produce works of art as men do, horses would paint the ·forms of the gods like horses and oxen like oxen. In place of these imaginary beings, let us adore the one infinite being, who bears us in his bosom and in whom there is I neither generation nor corruption, neither change nor origin ....... There is one God, the greatest among gods and men, comparable to mortals neither in form nor thought ...... He is all sight, all 1nind, all ear, (i.e. not a composite organism.) Without an effort ruleth he all things by thought." 'What Xenophanes seems to express is an idea of the Deity, which identifies itself with the entire Universe, governing as a untform and all-pervading Power. Gomperz says that these pantheistic views of Xenophanes fall naturally into their place in the develop- ment of the popula,:r: religion, depending on the growing conviction of the uniformity of nature and on the heightened standard of the moral co~iousness . The sixth century~ B. C., was a time when Greek civilization made great and rapid strides. The Greeks became cognizant of .. their own powers and learned to apply them in new direc+v 1• ons. National unity began to make itself felt and, at the same time, the individual learned to value himself more high1y and to assert his independence . Rationalism put forth its claims to question belief and to enquire what there is in it that can commend itself to the refleeting mind. polytheism. This attitude has always been fatal to To the extent that reason advances along scientific and philosophica l lines and discerns order, system, law, i--md evidences of ·purpose in nature, to that extent polytheism must fall and monotheism nmst rise to take its place. The poets of the fifth century B. C. in Greece reflected a common attitude of mind whe_n they referred to the supremacy of one God. . .• The Zeus of Aeschylus and of Sophocles was a god, belief in whom was inconsistent wj_th belief in the gods of Homer. From the monotheistic idea, the dramatists developed theodicies and inquiries concerning the divine government. Aeschylus a~d Sophocles are full of such prob- lems. It is int ere sting to note that they v.rrote at about the sa..~e time as the author of the Book of Job. Empedocles and Anaxagoras were among the PreSocratic philosophers , who, entirely rejecting polythe- belief in the supremacy of one ~ i sm, came t o a r easoned Absolute Mind. Anaxagoras was born in the year 500 B.C. He was a nati"e of Clazomenae, in Ionia, 'but later went to Athens \Vhere he became a. member of that brilliant coterie of thinkers who transferred speculation from the . . - colonies to Athens and raised her to the proud intellectual supremacy which later was her boast. In striving to solve the philosophical problems bequeathed to him by Parmenides, Anaxagoras reasoned that some outside source of motion was needed in the beginning to produce a cosmos out of the primitive chaos, for Parmenides had stripped matter of all change or motion. Anaxagoras observed that the result of this moving cause was a universe in which order and harmony prevailed, and, therefore, he conceived the source to be an intelligent force, or mind, working toward special ends. he called Reason or Nous. This force Alexander says that Anaxagoras has thus the merit of being the first philosopher who recognized an intelligent principle as the orderer of the world, and that, in this way, he laid the basis of the various arguments from design, which have been deduced by different thinkers to account for the existence of an all-wise and all-powerful Creator. In considering the relation of the three great systematic philosophers of Greece to the question of religion and, in particular, to the idea of monotheism, it appears that they were all thorough believers fn the existence of one Supreme God. Socrates avoided attacks on the popular religion, fearing that, otherwise, he would weaken the reverence of the .~eo~le for d1· vine things. ~. ~ At the srune time, . however, he cherished a belief only in the one Supreme Reason, at once the source and end of all things. I "Plato attained by his dialectic a conception of God which will always deeply interest thoughtful men. God he deemed the highest object of knowledge and love, the source of all being, cognoscibility, truth, excellence, and beauty -- the One, the Good. Aristotle's idea of God is more unequivocably theistic than that of Plato. It sets forth God as without plurality and without parts, free :from matter, contingency, change, and development; the eternal unmoved. mover, whose essence is pure energy, absolute spirit, self-thinking reason; the one perfect being whose life is completely blessed and whose likeness is the goal towards which the whole universe tends."* Even some of the more profound representatives of the Stoics attained to a clear idea of theism, conceiving God as the supreme moral reason, though Stoicism was originally and fundamentally a materialistic or hylozoistic pantheism. The beautiful hymn of Cleanthes, to Zeus is full of the purest devotional reeling, springing fro!!! a cl.ear sense of individual reJ ationship to the one all-ruling personal spirit. Thus Greek philosophy proceeded throughout its whole course in entire independence of the popular polytheism and was a constant dem~ onstration of its futility. It largely contributed to the chief arguments which have since been employed as theistic proofs. *Flint: Article on Theism. THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGU]!ENT The philosophical arguments promulgated in order to prove the existence of God have varied greatly in form and content and thus have been differently classified by various writers on the subject. In the ma.in they may be considered under six different headings: (1) tel$ological or physico-theologica l (design) argument, (2) ontological or a priori, (3) logical, (4) cosmological or causal., (5) e consensu gentium, and (6) moral. Socrates has been called the father .of the design argument, which proceeds from the order in the world and in the physical - and mental organism of man to a supernal reason. The whole world in his view owes its exi$tence and place to mind. In Xenophon's Memorabilia Socrates is made to say: "Does not he, then, who made men at first, appear to you to have given them for some useful purpose those parts by which they perceive different objects, the eyes to see ~hat is to be seen, the ears to hear what is to be heard? What would be the use of smells if no nostrils had been assigned us? What per- ception would there have been of sweet and sour, and of all that is pleasant to the mouth, if a tongue had not been formed in it to have a sense of them? ln addition to these things does it not seem to you like the work of forethought, to guard the eye, since it is tender, with eyelids, like doors, which, when it is necessary 't o use the sight are set open, but in sleep are closed? To make the eyelids grow as a screen, that ~inds may not injure it? To make a coping on the parts above the eyes with the eye-brows that the perspiration from the head may not annoy them? To provide that the ears may receive all kinds of sounds, yet never be obstructed? and that the front teeth in all animals may be adapted to cut and the back teeth to receive food from these and grind it? To place the mouth through which the animals take in what they desire, near the eyes and the nose? and since what passes off from the stomach is offensive, to turn the channels of it awaJ, and remove them as far as possible from the senses? -- can you doubt whether such a disposition of things made thus appa~ently with intention, is the result of chance or intelligence? ...... When you know that you have in your body but a small portion of the earth, which is vast, and a small portion of the water, which is vast, and that your frame is constituted for you to receive only a small port:ton of each of other things, that are vast, do you think that you have seized for yourself by some extraordinary good fortune intelligence alone which exists nowhere else, and that this assemblage of vast bodies, countless in number .) is maintained in order by something void of reason?"* From the time of Socrates until the present, many writers have rung the changes on the teleological argument, and almost as many more have advanced grounds for its refutation. A statement of the design argument often includes the argument from order, which may be cited briefly thus: In the cosmos we may plainly see law and order, system and intelligibility, and we have only to refer to the physical sciences to discover many other evidences of these facts, in addition to those which "he who runs, may read." This cosmic order from the viewpoint of the theist, must be the work of an intelligent Mind. When we come to the organic world, we find not only law and system, but also real products, bearing all the evidences of purpose and adaptation. These latter facts are the data of the design argument as distinguished from those grounds cited above as upholding the argument from order. For the purposes of this paper it is not necessary to .separate the two arguments, though there is a slight difference between them, and they have even been opposed to each other; for some writers feel that the existence of fixed laws excludes the possibility of specific and detailed purposes. The argument from design has always been regarded with respect , even by Kant, al though he refuted 1 t along with other arguments for the existence of God. It is a form of proof which appeals with especial strength to the Anglo-Saxon mind. Often its rejection has been due to the fact of its having been misstated. The argu- ment is not, as Professor Bowne points cut: Design proves a designer. have had a designer. Here is design. Hence these things This would formally, at least, in- volve the fallacy of petitio principii, because the very point at issue is the question as to the truth of the minor premise. Professor Bowne says that the argument may be stated rather thus: Here are facts which have such marks of design and contrivance that we cannot explain them wt-thout referring them to purpose. The point is to solve the problem contained in the purpose ! like adaptations and combinations found in the system, and the theist refers them to design or purpose as the only ade- quate solution. Kant states the argument in his own words as follows: "{1) In the world are found everywhere clear tokens of an order which follows a definite purpose; and this purpose is carried out with great wisdom and in a whole of indescribable manifoldness .••.••• (2) This purposed order is utterly foreign to the things in the world, a.no belongs to them only accidentally, that is to say, •..... different things could not •...•. nnite to definite ends ....... were they not chosen and disposed through an ordering, reasoning principle. (3) Therefore there exists a sublime and wise cause (or several of them) which as intelligence and freedom must be the cause o:f the world." "This proof," Kant says, deserves ever to be named with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest proof and most suited to ordinary human reason . It vivifies the study of nature and itself has its source and the renewal of its strength through nature study. It supplies purposes and aims where our observation had not of itself discovered them and widens the guiding thread of a special unity." Although Kant felt strong- ly the appeal of this argument , so mu ch so that he was aroused by it to an enthusittsm which was rare for him, nevertheless he could not accept the cogency of this method of proof. For, at bottom, the argument is a form of reasoning from the nature of an effect, in this case the c·osmos with its orderly system, to a cause. Regarding the argument in this light reduces it to a case under the cosmological argument and Kant felt that he had already broken down the causal method of proof. A second point of attack with Kant was this: Even if the existence of a First Cause were granted, the design argument, in its attempt to demonstrate the free intelligence of this First Cause, would lack sufficient force, because it is only a method of reasoning from "the analogy of certain nature products with that which human art creates." "Because a human being would need thought and will in order to create objects comparable to the 'wonders of nature and the majesty of the world,' we hnve, Kant argues, no right to argue that the unknown cause of nature is intellect and will."* Berkeley's way of stating the teleological argument was as follows: "lf we attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, beau. t y, and perfection of the larger,and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts, of the creation, together with the exact harmony ..••.. of the whole, but above all, the never enough admired laws of pain and pleas- ure, and the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites and passions of animals; I say, if we consider all these things and at the same time attend to the meaning ...• of the attributes one ~et ernal, infinitely wise, good, and perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, who works all in all, and by whom all things consist." It is urged against Berkeley's assertion that he has proved the existence of an all-wise , all-good, allperfect Creator from the observation of nature that we have only to look about us to find many things which are far from being good and perfect. Alongside of the useful organs in the human body are rudimentary organs, the presence of which is sometimes actually harmful; in addition to the forms of life fitted to survive are countless others, created only to perish; pain and sorrow seem ever-present, dogging the footsteps of pleasure and joy; the alarming waste and carelessness of individual and even of type-J.ife are only too evident. If the existence of a perfect God can be proved in other ways, it will doubtless be found that explanations of these facts can be given, but an observation of nature alone cannot be considered to prove the existence of an all-good, all-perfect Creator. When the theory of evolution was first given to the world in its modern form by Darwin, it was felt that the design argument had received its death blow. But its ·supporters soon saw that the Darwinian theory, instead of weakening the argument, lent it strength. on the contrary, When we look back in accordance with the viewpoint bequeathed to us by the theory and begin to analyze the marvellous unfolding of our universe from a fiery, inorganic, whirling mass to a system of planets moving through space with order and regularity; when we consider the development of the earth from a • cast-off portion of this fiery mass to & globe covered with infinite forms of plant and animal life; when we take into account the evolution of man with his intelligence, his comprehension of moral truth, a.nd his appreciation of beauty, we can see evidences of a more wonderful design than before -- a purpose which is immanent, residing in things, rather than working with them from the outside·. Even yet, however, this statement of the thought is open to objection. To the same extent that it applies as evidence adduced in favor of theism does it serve as an argument for substantiating pantheism and deism. Professor Bowne states three grounds on which the theistic conclusion is disputed: "l. The mechanism of nature explains the fact and we need not go behind it. 2. The fact that the world-ground works as if it had plans does not prove that it has them. 3. There is no analogy between human activity and cosmic activity. we know that purpose rules in human action, but we have no experience of world-making, and can conclude nothing concerning cosmic action. The dis- tance is too great and knowledge is too scant to allow any inference." As an answer to the first point he says that mechanism and systems of necessity in general can never explain teleological problems. but only postpones the problem-, This view does not solve In replying to the second objection to the validity of the original argument he makes the assertion that we have in this objection a relic of the ancient whim that atheism is suffi- ciently established by disputing theism. Even if we grant the fact that the world-ground proceeding as if it had purposes does not prove that it really has them; it is still clear that this fact is even :further from proving that it does not have them. The whole of objective science is based on a certain truth of appearances. We do not know that the fire rocks were ever molten, but only that they look ~s "if they had been. We do not know that the sedimentary rocks were ever deposited from water, but only that they lbok so. If the nature of things can produce the appearance of intelligence without its presence, it ought to be able to mimic igneous and aqueous action without the aid of ei th.er fire or water. Deve 1 op- ing further this line of thought, our author points out that the theistic "as if" is as good as the scientific "as if." Continuing his argument , he shows that it is only by observing what it does that we can conclude mind to be in man. We know that our fellowbeings have minds only because they act as if they had, that is, because their action shows order and purpose. In short, the argument for objective intelligence is the same whether :for man, animals, or God. The evidence which discredits mind in nature throws equal doubt upon mind in man. But further reflection shows that if there be no controlling mind in nature there can be no controlling mind in man. For if the basal power is blind and necessary, all that depends upon it is necessitated also. The truth is, the design argument derives its force from the consciousness of our own free effort. Professor Bowne dismisses the third general objection, that the difference between human action and cosmic action is too great to allow any conclusion from one to the other, by remarking that it is only a large way of saying nothing. The demurrer that while intelligibility in human action points to intelligence, intelligibility in cosmic action does not point to intelligence,is ajudgment of caprice, not o~ reason. As a result of all these considerations our author holds that the design argument, when the unity of the world-ground is given, proves far more conclusively the existence of mind in nature than it does the existence of mind in man. The two stand or fall together. He does not, however, posit the belief that this argument is a complete and consistent proof of the existence of one all-wise and all-good Supreme Being. ·He says the argument seems sufficient because in its common use, it is not a deduction of the theistic idea, but only an illustration of the theistic faith which we already possess. - ln these conclusions he is supported by the great majority of thinkers. Only the extreme advocates of theism are convinced of the adequacy of the proof contained in the arguments from design. THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF Ontological or a priori proof is that sort of argument which proceeds from primary and necessary principles of thought. From its very nature it could ap.pear only at a comparatively late period in the history of intelligence. By studying profoundly the actual compo- sition of thought, by carefully analyzing consciousness into the elements which go to make it up, we can arrive at a· conception of the basic principles which, of necessity, form a foundation for al] excercise of the intellect. It is only on these principles that a priori proof is based. There is no absolutely pure argumentation of this character in the whole history of speculation and none can be expected, since the foundatio!} ·/~l~Jpp~Plp~,.,of , "',., ... ... ~ "' , . , · " - , " ' " !1..,.,1"1.,., "I I'\ thought never exist in a perfectly pu:r.:~> ~tate; that is / ~,', ,~..,· ~~ : what is universal and necessary in th\h kin~ [i]l~:;P~'Y6J~ :,,, • "':?~:~ """..,,,..., "' ... .., "l ., , .. ., ~ ..., ...... ~ -:, ~ ').., ~ "I :'I..,, found wholly apart from what is particular and contingent. Plato was probably the first to endeavor to prove tre existence of God from the essential principles of knowledge. He could not consistently reason from sense impressions or the phenomena of the visible world, for he denied that sense perceptions are knowledge and believed that things appearing in nature are no more than copies or indications of reality. He postulated, however, over against the phenomenal world, a world of ideas, comprehended by reason and not by sense. These ideas are either hypothetical or absolute principles, either scientific assumptions and definitions, or necessary and eternal truths which have their reality and evidence in themselves. The mathematical sciences deal with perceptions; but to Plato their chief value is that they help the mind to rise to the absolute science of di a lectics, which is concerned with ideas. To apprehend ideas is to grasp the common element fro m the many, to see the universal in the individual and to recognize the permanent in the everchanging. Ideas are both the essences of things and the regulative principles of cognitions. They are not isola- ted and unconnected, but are so related that each higher idea comprehends within it several lower ones. These combined constitute a graded or hierarchical series, unified and completed by the highest idea of all, which is ultimate, and which conditions all the others, while it is conditioned by none. This supreme idea is abso- lute truth, absolute beauty, absolute good, absolute intelligence and absolute being. lt is the source of all true existence, knowledge and excellence. It is God. "In this part of its course the dialectic of Plato is simply a search for God. , It is a prior-i inasmuch as it rests on necessary ideas, but a posteriori inasmuch as it proceeds from these ideas upwards to God in a manner which is essentially analytic and inm1ctive. Only when God, the principle of principles, is reached can it become synthetic and deductive."* Plato's philosophica l proof, not as explicitly stated in any one argument, but as the basic thought ·underlying and pervading all of his reasoning and all of his striving after certainty has been transmitted down through the centuries by a succession of profound and noted thinkers. Augustine, for example, argues the existence of God from the very nature of truth. He says that is impossible to think that there 'is no truth. If there were none to affirm that there is none, would be itself true; or, in other words, the denial of the existence of truth is a self-contrad iction. Augustine, what is truth? Th t=> i ~rn _ But, continues It is not merely sensuous perception, not a something which belongs to the individua1 mind and varies with its moods and peculiarities, but a something which is unsensuous, unchangeable and universal. The human reason changes and errs in its judgments, but ideas, necessary truths are not the products but the laws and conditions of the human reason they are over it, and it is only through apprehending, realizing, and obeying them, that it enlightens and regulates our nature. These ideas, the laws of our intellec- tual and moral constitution , cannot have their source in us, but nrust be eternally inherent in an eternal, unchangeable and perfect Being. This Being, the absolute truth and ultimate ground of all goodness, is God. The same spirit pervades the reasoning of Anselm and he proceeds in practically the same manner·. In one of his works he institutes an inquiry as to whether the goodness in good actions is or not the sarne thing, present in a1 1 ; and when he has convinced himself that it is the same thing, he asks, what is it and where has it a real existence? Ascending upward by stages, viz: Good is; Good is perfect: Good is God - Good is One; the one perfect he comes to the conclusfon that the good- ness constitutive of good action has necessarily its source in God, and that the absolutely and essentially Good is identical with God. In another of his works* he similarly enquires whether there is any truth except mere actual existence. argues, as he had He holds that there is, .and done before in regard to the Good, that the absolute and ultimate truth *Monologium. must be God. 1n ·regard to this matter, Thomas· Aquina·s agreed with Anselm. The very nature of knowledge seemed to him to show that it was in man only through the dependence of the human intelligence on an underived and perfect intelligence. Many modern philosophers have adopted and enforced the same doctrine. Lord Herbart of Cherburg, the founder of English deism, is very explicit on the subject. He thought of the human mind as united in the closest and most comprehensive way to the Divine mind through the universal notions of what he called the rational instinct . These notions are _the laws which every faculty is meant to conform to and obey -- the laws of all thought, affection, and action. As to nature and origin, they are in Herbart's view, Divine ~ thoughts of God present in the mind of man; true Revelations of the Father of Spirits to his children. ln apprehending one of them, we have truly an intuition of a Divine attribute,of some feature of the Di vine character. It is through contact, through communion with the Divine Intelligence, Love and Will , that we know and feel and act. The Divine is the root and law· of human thought, emotion, and ctrnduc t.. "ln Him," really and without any figure of speech, "we live, and move and have our being." Among the various metaphysical proofs of Divine existence employed by Cudworth, one is in like manner founded on the very nature of knowledge. Malebranche 's - celebrated theory of "seeing all things in God" is but an exaggeration of the doctrine that nGod is the light of all our seeing. " Other statements of the Platonic argu- ment from necessar y ideas may be found in Leipnit z, Bossuet , and Fenelon . The most recent defende rs of theism employ in one form or another the .same argumen t. In the works of Ulrici, Hetting er, and Luthard t, of Saisset and Simon, of Thompson and Tulloch , it still holds a promine nt place. Anselm was the founder of the species of argumentatio n which , many thinkers hold, is alone entitled to be describe d as a priori or ontolog ical. The Stoic philosop her, Cleanth es, above referred to as the author of the hymn to Zeus, argued that every compari son, in affirmin g or denying one thing to be better than another , implied and presuppo sed the existenc e of a superlat ive or an absolute ly good and perfect Being. Centurie s later, Boetheu s had recourse to nearly identica l reasonin g. It is only, he maintain ed, through the idea of perfecti on that we can judge anything to be imperfe ct; and the consciousne ss or percepti on of imperfe ction leads reason necessa rily to believe that there is a perfect existenc e one than whom a better cannot be conceive d God. Clean- thes and Boetheus · were thus the precurso rs of Anselm, who, however was the first to endeavor to show that, from the very idea of God as the highest Being, his necessar y reality may be strictly deduced. He reasoned thus: "The fool may say in his heart, there is no God; but he only proves thereby that he is a fool, for what he says is self-con tradictory. Since he denies that there is a God, he has in his mind the idea of God, and that idea implies the existence of God, for it is the idea of a Being than which a higher cannot be conceive d. Than which a higher cannot be conceived cannot exist merely as an idea, because what exists merely as an idea is inferior to what exists in reality as well as in idea. The idea of a highest Being which exists merely in thought is the idea of a highest Being which is not the highest even in thought, but inferior to a highest Being which exists in :fact as well as in thought."~ Miss Calkins states it more simply: "The concept of an absolutely real Being, that is God, is possible. existence. But absolute reality includes Therefore the absolutely real being must be conceived as existing. Therefore, finally, he does exist." I , Guanilo, a monk contemporary with Anselm, was the first to utter a polemic against this argument. He objected that the existence of God can no more be inferred from the idea of a perfect being, than the existence of a perfect island is to be inferred :from the idea of such an island. Anselm might have pointed out in his rejoinder, that the two cases are not comparable, for, as Windelband shows, the conception of a perfect island is completely unnecessary arbitrary fiction. It likewise contains an inner contradiction, while the conception of the most real being is necessary and not contradictory. Instead of this, Anselm expatiates further upon his argument, that if the most perfect being is in the intellect, it must also in re. Windelband remarks that Anselm was not fortunate in formulating his argument, and that what hovered before him attained in his proof but a very awkward expression. For Anselm proved only that if God is thought (as most perfect being,) he must be thought also necess.a rily as being or existent, and cannot be thought as non-existent. But the ontological argume~t of the PROSLOGIUM did not show even in the remotest degree that God, i.e. that a most perfect being, must be thought. Windeband continues: "The necessity for this stood fast for Anselm personally, not only because of the conviction of his faith, but also by the cosmological argumentat:l.on of the MONOLOGIUM. When he believed that he could dis- pense with this presupposition and with the help of the mere conception of God arrive at the proof of his existence, be exemplified in typical ma.rmer the fundamental idea of Realism, which ascribed to conception without any regard to their genesis and basis in the human mind, the character of truth, i.~. of Reality. ground alone that It was on this he could attempt to reason from the psychical to the metaphysical reality of the conception of God." Kant disposed of Anselm's argument briefly and easily. He showed that it depends on the false supposi- tion that conceived existence and real existence are synonomous. As a r!lti.tter of fact, not everything which is conceived is real. To be conscious of one hundred thaler, argued Kant, is surely not the same as to possess the hundred thaler: in other words, one may be conscious of the existent, and yet that-which-is-thought-of-asexist ;i ng does not necessarily exist. Therefore, the fact of our representing to ourselves an all-perfect being is not any guarantee for such a being's existence. Descartes gave expression to two ontological arguments. ' After having proved to his own satisfaction . . the existence of himself, his next care was to offer .. - logical proofs of the existence of God. ontological arguments he states thus: The first of his "Whatever mode of probation 1 adopt, it always returns to this, that it is only the things 1 clearly and distinctly conceive which have the power of completely persuading me •••••. And with respect to God •••... I know nothing sooner •.•.•• than the existence of a supreme Being, or God. And although the right conception of this truth has cost me much close thinking •••••. ! . feel as assured of it as of what I deem most certain."* It is evident that this argument involves the following assertions: that 1 do clearly conceive myself, that 1 do clear1J, conceive God, and finally, that clear conception is a test of reality. assumptions, however, may be chall~~nged. All of these It is by no means generally accepted truth that we have a clear idea of ourselves. Indeed, on the contrary, we realize that we have only a vague a.nd indistinct idea of our own personality. It has often been· recognized that a man's biographer, for instance, writing after his death, has a much better idea of his character than either he himself or his contempories could have had. So, too, it certainly cannot be admitted that we have what may rightly be called a clear consciousness of God. Descartes says that we m~y not know God. Even If not, how can we clear1y -conceive ·him~ - But, even if we did have *Medi ta.tions. a clear conception of God and of ourselves, we could not assert that this clear consc:1.ousness of anything is a proof of its reality. The images of our dreams and the phenomena of our imaginings are certainly very clear and yet no one counts them as real. Descartes, therefore, evidently bases his first proof upon a false standard of reality and thus nullifies its validity. The second proof of Descartes is the old ontological argument originated by Anselm, though Descartes denied that it was the same. He stated it thus: "When the mind •.••• reviews the different ideas that &re in it, it discovers what is by far the chief among them that of a Being omniscent, all-powerful, and absolutely perfect; and it observes that in thi$ idea there is contained not only possible and contingent existence, as in the ideas of all other things which it clearly perceives, but existence absolutely necessary and eternal. And just because, for example, the equality of its three angles to two right angles is necessarily comprised in the idea of a triangle, the mind is firmly persuaded that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; so, from its perceiving necessary and eternal existence to be comprised in the idea which it has of an all-perfect Being, it ought manifestly to conclude that this allperfect Being exists." The objection to this argument has already been brought out in referring to Kant's criticism of Anselm's statement of it. Too little emphasis is laid on the distinction between conception, or idea of existence, and existence itself. It is only fair to Descartes to say that he himself perceived this difficulty. He met it by postulating a difference between mere existence and necessary existence. The argument of the existence of God, then, is, that only necessary existence and not mere existence implies actual existence. This argument, however, simply postpones the difficulty without solving it. Though my idea of God is the idea of a necessary Being and my idea of a finite object is an idea only of something contingent, yet in both cases 1 have only an ide;:i. As has been pointed mt, my idea of God can con- tain only the idea of necessary existence, and from my idea, even of the necessarily existing, actual necessary existence cannot be directly inferred. Leipniz also made much of the ontological argument which he called the a priori proof. it as follows: He formulated "God alone (or the Necessary Being) has this prerogative that, if he be possible, he must necessarily exist, and as nothing is able to prevent the possibility of that which involves no bounds, no negation, and consequently no contradiction, this alone is sufficient to establish a priori his existence." In this statement of the proof Leipniz added one point to Descartes' reasoning as expressed in his original argument. That point consisted in giving a reason why the idea of God, unique among ideas, contains the idea of necessary existence. The reason is simply that no contradiction is involved in the idea of a perfect Being. This thought was not entirely original with Leipniz, for Descartes had suggested it in his "Reply to the Second Objection to the Medi t11tions." the proof. However, 1 t does not increa~~ _~he force of Leipniz still argues from the idea of a neces- - sarily existent perfect Being to the actual existence of that Being, and, therefore, the old objection urged by Guanilo against Anselm can S't il 1 be cited against Leipni z. lt may be said that the whole course of Hegel's metaphysi cs is an argument for the existence of God, an argument, Hegel himself points out, whi .c h is 111 a sense ontologic al since it leads through a study of our conception of being, to the realizatio n that the Absolute Idea necessari ly exists. In other words, "the Absolute being at once idea and existence , it follows as a matter of course that the thought of God has its real counterpa rt. As thus formulate d, the validity of the ontologic al argument stands and falls with the validity of the Hegelian principle of panlogism ."* The eighteenth century saw the elaboratio n of a great many proofs in the form of a priori theistic demonstratio ns based on the notions of existence and causality. They assumed that something is, and that nothing cannot be the cause of something. On the basis of these assumptio ns, the arguments endeavored to demonstra te the existence of an unorigina ted Being, possessing the attribute which we ascribe to God. The most fa_mous proof was that of Dr. Samuel Clarke, contained in the Boyle Lecture of 1704. Dr. Richard Fiddes, the Rev. Colin Campbell, Mr. Wollaston , Moses Lowman, the Chevalier Ramsay, Dean Hamilton and many others also worked out ingenious argu- ments similar in character . *Kulpe. Professor Flint quotes some of these proofs and regards them with great respect. He says that while probably not one of them has complet ely satisfie d more than a few speculat ive minds, yet it is not easy to detect flaws in some of them, and he feels that the more they are studied, the more will it be recognized that they are pervaded truth. by a substan tial vein of Although they may not have accompl ished all they aimed at, they have, at any rate, succeede d in $howing that unless there exists an eternal, infinite , and unconditio ned Being, the human mind is, in its ultimate princip les, self-con tradicto ry and delusive . Dr. Clarke's argument is not purely an a priori argumen t, nor was it presente d as such by its author. lt starts from a fact and it often explicit ly appeals to facts. "l. The proposi tions maintain ed in the argumen t are: That somethin g has existed from eternity ; 2. That there has existed from eternity some one immutab le and independ ent being; 3. That that innnutabl e and independ ent being, which has existed from eternity , without any external cause of its existenc e, must be self-exi stent, i.e. necessa rily existing ; 4. What the substanc e or essence of that being which is self-exi stent, or necessa rily existing , is, we have no idea, neither is it at all possible for us to comprehe nd it; 5. That though the substanc e or essence of the self-exi stent being is itself absolute ly incompr ehensibl e to us, yet many of the essentia l attribut ~s of his nature are strictly demonst rable, as well as his existenc e, and, in the first place, that he must be of necessit y eternal; 6. That the self-exist ent being must of necessity be infinite and omniprese nt; 7. gent being; 9. Must be but one; 8. Must be an intelli- Must be, not a necessary agent, but a being imbued with liberty and choice; 10. sity, have infinite power; 11. Must,of neces- Must be infinitely wise; and 12. Must of necessity be a being of infinite goodness, justice, and truth, and all other moral perfection s such as become the supreme governor and judge of the world." It will be impossible to give a complete account here of the full details of Dr. Clarke's proof. As an example, it may be cited that the intelligen ce of the Supreme Being is admitted to be "not easily proved a priori" but argued to be "demonstr ably proved a posteriori from the variety and degrees of perfection in things and the order of causes and effects; from the intelligen ce that created beings are confessed ly endowed with, and from the beauty, order, and final purpose ·or things." The demonstra tion of Dr. Fiddes is contained in his "Theologia Speculativ a, or a Body of Divinity." consists of six propositio ns: It 1. Something does now exist; 2. Something has existed eternally; 3. has been eternally se1f-e~is tent; 4. Something What is self-exis~ - ent must have all the perfectior Bthat exist anywhere or in any subject; 5. What is self-exist ent must have all possible perfectio ns, and every perfection , in an infinite measure; 6. What has all possible perfection s in an infinite measure is God. thus: He proves his fourth propositio n "Since nothing can arise out of nothing, and since there can be no perfection but what has some subject of inherence , every perfection must have been ete!nally somewhere or other, or in one subject or other, into which it must be ultimatP;lY resolved, or else it could never have been at all; without admitting , what of all things we are best able to conceive, ,an infinite progressio n of efficient causes, -- that is, an infinite series of beings derived one from another, without a beginning or original cause at the head of the series. So that, what- ever perfection s we observe in any being must have been originally and eternally in the self-exist ent being. "On behalf of his fifth propositon he advances two arguments : 1. "All properties essentiall y follow the nature and condition of the subject and must be conmensur ate to it. For this reason we say that wisdom, power, and goodness being attributes of an infinite subject, or one which is the substratum of one infinite attribute, these and all the other perfection s belonging to it must be infinite also. Otherwise the same subject, considered as a sub- ject, would be infinite in one respect, and yet finite in another; which, if it be not a contradic tion, seems to border so near upon one that we cannot comprehend the possibili ty of it." 2. "A self-exist ent being as the subject of any perfection cannot limit itself; because it must necessari ly have existed from all eternity what it is, and have been the same in all properties essentially inherent in it, anteceden tly to any act or volition of its own. Nor can such a being be limited by anything external to it; for, besides that self-exis tence necessaril y implies independen ce, properties which are essential to any subject can adinit of no increase or diminution or the lea.st im. a.. gi nable change, without destroying the essence itself of the subject. can it be said that there is any Nor yet impossibility in the nature of the thing that the perfections inhering in an infinite subject should be in the highest or even in an infinite degree. Indeed, it is scarce possible for us (for the reasons already assigned) to conceive how they should be otherwise. Neither can any such impossibility arise from the nature of the perfections themselves. If, then, the perfections of a self-existent being cannot be limited by itself, nor by ·anything external to it, nor from any invincible repugnancy in the nature of the perfections themselves, I conclude that the self-existent being must not only have all possible perfections, but every perfection in an infinite degree." The "Demonstratio n of the Existence of God against Atheists" by the Reverend Colin Campbell, has been recently printed from a manuscript now deposited in the library of Edinburgh University. :Mr. Campbell's manner of proving that there is one, and but one, infinite Being, is as follows: "As everything which hath a begin- ning forces confession of one who hath none -- because to produce is an action, and must presuppose an actor, by the same force of reason, we must confess that whatever is limited, or made of such and such a limited nature, is limited by something which did limit it to be such a thing, and no other. an actor. For~~ limit is an action, and confesseth So .that there must be a being anterior to all beings, and, consequently, some being that is not at all limited, to evite the absurd progress of running infinitely upwards unlimited beings, without a single limiter. Now, an unlimited being is the same as to say an infinite being. And so, by the force of reason, we have a being which is eternal, which is infinite. There can be but one infinite, because, were there two or more, the one would limit the other; and so the infinite would be finite, the unlimited would be limited. Therefore the unlimited, or infinite, must be one only; and that one purely single and uncompounded , else every part of the compound would limit the other parts, so that all the parts would be limited. And a whole whose parts are limited must be limited in the whole, it being impossible that a compound or conjunction of finites can, by addition, produce an infinite, unless you imagine this complex whole to consist partly of finites and also of some infinite. But, the one infinite part, if infinite, cannot leave place for any other finite to make it up, it being itself unlimited and infinite; and such an addition would speak it limited by the part which was added. And a thousand like absurdities would follow." Moses Lawman's "Argument to prove the· Unity and Perfection of God a priori" was published in 1735, and reprinted with a preface by Dr. Pye Smith, in 1836. Fol- lowing is the abstract which Dr. Smith gave of this ingenious argument in his "First Lines of Christian Theology:" "l. Positive existence is possible, for it involves no contradiction . 2. All possible existence is either necessary, which must be, and in its own nature cannot but be; or contingent, which may or may not be, for in neither case is a contradiction involved. 3. Some ex- istence is necessary; for, if all existence were contin- gent, all existence might not be as well as might be; and that thing which might not be never could be without some other thing ·as the prior cause of its existence, since every effect must have a cause. lf, therefore, all pos- sible existence were contingent, aJ.l existence would be impossible; because the idea or conception of it would be that of an effect without a cause, which involves a contradiction. 4. Necessary existence must be actual existence; for necessary existence 1s that which must be and cannot but be -- that is, it is such existence as arises from the nature of the thing in itself; and it is an evident contradiction to affirm that necessary existence might not be. 5. Necessary existence being such as must be and cannot but be, it must be always and cannot but be always; for to suppose that necessary existence could begin to be or could cease to be -- th_at is, that a time might be in which necessary existence would not be -involves a contradiction. Therefore, necessary existence is without beginning and without end eternal. 6. that is, it is Necessary existence must be wherever any existence is possible : for all existence is either contingent or necessary; all contingent existence is impossible without necessary existence being previously as its cause, and wherever existence is possible it must be either of a necessary or a contingent being. Therefore, necessary existence must be wherever existence is possible is, it must be infinite. 7. -- that There can be but one neces- sarily existent being; for two necessarily existent beings could in no respect whatever differ from each other -- that is, they would be one and the same being. 8. The one necessa rily existent being must have all possible perfecti ons; for all possible perfecti ons must be the perfecti ons of some existenc e, all existenc e is either necessar y or continge nt; all continge nt existenc e is depende nt upon necessar y existenc e; consequ ently, all possible perfecti ons must belong either to necessar y existenc e or to continge nt existenc e -- that is, to contingent beings, which are caused by and are dependen t upon necessar y being. Therefo re, since there can be but one necessa rily existent being, that being must have all possible perfecti ons. 9. The one necessa rily existent being must be a free agent; for continge nt existenc e is possible , as the concepti on of it involves no contrad iction; but necessar y existenc e must be the cause of producing agent of continge nt existenc e, otherwis e contingent existenc e would be impossib le, as an effect without a cause; and necessar y existenc e as the cause of contingent existenc e does not act necessa rily, for then contingent existenc e would itself be necessar y, which is absurd as involvin g a contrad iction. Therefor e necessar y exist- ence, as the cause of continue d existenc e, acts not necessarily but freely - that is, is a :free agent, which i _s the same thin~ as being an intellig ent agent. 10. There- fore, there is one necessa rily existent being, the cause of all other existenc es besides himself; and this being is eternal, infinite , possesse d o.f all possible perfections, and is an intellig ent free agent -- that is this Being is God." Other proofs of a similar characte r might be given, but enough have been quoted to show the general trend and force of the ontolog ical argumen t. The logical proof is so closely related to the a priori species of argument that it scarecely deserves separate treatment. Lotze adduced a logical considera tion, which, however, he did not regard as constituti ng an actual proof. lt will be seen to approxima te the ontologica l line of thought. If the greatest did not exist, he said, the greatest would not exist; and it is inconceiva ble that the greatest thing conceivab le should not exist. Another piece of reasoning , akin to the ontological argument, was formulated by Descartes , when he said that our thought can give rise only to what is adequate to us or it. But this always we&rs the character of finitude, limitation , imperfecti on. If,.. now, we can form an idea of an infinite, .perfect Being, t~e idea cannot be a product of our own thinking, but must issue from a reality which~responds to it. The truth of God then becomes, in turn, the warrant for the truth of our thought. Related to this again is the logical proof promulgated by Trendelenb urg in 1872. "Human thought knows itself as finite thought, but still strives to surmount every barrier. It knows itself dependent upon things, yet proceeds, as if they were determined by it alone. This assurance would be self-contr adictory if truth were not postulated in the real, or conceivab ility in things. Thought would be but the play of chance or the boldness of despair, if God, the truth, were not the common source ! and the band of union between ,hought and things." Here, too, it is not difficult to s~e where the spring is made from conceivab ility or truth to its objective guarantee in a true being. "It would really be much more correct to say; since all human under standi ng and knowle dge are adapte d only to the given or the prope rties of the given , they can find natura l and legiti mate applic ation only within the limits of given. If we seek to go beyond these limits , we may come to new words and defin itions , but canno t come to a larger measu re of under standi ng."* THE CAUSAL AND LOGICAL ARGUME}JTS To Aristo tle deserv edly belong s the honor of origin ating the cosmo logica l, or causa l argum ent. In a chapte r of marve llous reason ing he develo ped this line of though t and likew ise the teleol ogica l argum ent beque athed to him by Socra tes. The cosmo logica l proof argues from the fact that the world exists to a final cause of its existence in the person of a "first urunoved mover ," to use Arist otle's phrase . This theory avoids the assum ption of the etern ity of matte r and motion , per~ · In procee ding with his proof, Aristo tle first establ ished the fact that all matter is subjec t to change as the result of motion . He then reason ed that there must be a power or cause outsid e of matte r itself , to produc e this motion , for there is nothin g inhere nt in any mater ial thing that would cause it to move itself , and there is nothin g inhere nt in motion that would cause it to start itself . Each natura l object evide ntly derive s its motion from a cause behind it, and so the chain of relati vity recede s until it ends in a final cause, which itself is an unmoved energy . This energy is an absolu te, uncaus ed entity , becaus e it is indepe ndent. It is the ''First Un- moved Mo~rer, from which Heaven and :Natur e hath depend ed." *Kulpe . This Prime Mover acts as a cause upon matter, not in the same way as a physical cause, but as a final or teleological cause. God is the cause in the material world in the sense that He impels matter toward the same actuality that He Himsel.f possesses. Descartes has given expression to two causal arguments for the existence of an all-perfect God. are based upon the following principles: Both Of necessity there exists (1) some cause of every finite reality which is (2) a conserving* cause and (3) an ultimate cause; and, because ultimate, formal, or real, and perfect in its effect. The first of Descarte•s arguments embodying these principles is called his argument for God as proof of the idea of God. It is not entirely original with him but he stated it so forcibly that it is known as the Cartesian argument. He worded it as follows: "There •.•••• remains •••••• the idea of God, in which 1 must consider whether there is anything which cannot be supposed to originate with myself. By the name God, 1 understand a Substance infinite, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which I myself, and every other thing which exists, if any such there be, were created. are so great and excellent t · 1. But these properties .., • • • • • • it is absolutely necessary to conclude •••••• that God exists; for I should not •••••• have the idea of an infinite substance, seeing I am a finite being, unless it were given me by some substance in reality infinite." 0 If the assumptions of Des- cartes are accepted, the -valinity -of this argument cannot *A conserving cause is one that continues while its effect continues. be denied, but the difficulty is that the assumption s cannot be admitted. Even if it be granted that every phenomeno n has some cause~ it cannot be admitted, as the second assumption declares, that every cause if "formal," that 1 s, it is not an idea. Experience shows us every day that we may have ideas caused by other ideas. The third assumptio n, that the real cause n:nist be no less perfect than its effect, Descartes also fails to substantiate. He does not show why it follows that God must be all-power ful, all-knowin g, and all-good, because his idea of God represent s a being with these attributes . Hence this proof cannot be considered valid. The second causal proof of Descartes argues for the existence of God as the cause of "me." the method of eliminatio n. Here he adopts It is evident that there must be some cause of "me" and Descartes endeavors to show that nothing, except God, could be that cause. not, in the first place, cause of myself. (1) 1 am For if I were, 1 mist be conscious of this causality, whereas, "1 am con- scious of no such power, and thereby 1 manifestly know that 1 am dependent o.n some being different from myself. "More- over," if 1 were myself, the author of my being, 1 should doubt of nothing, 1 should desire nothing, and, in fine, no perfection would be wanting to me; for 1 should have bestowed upon myself every perfection of which 1 possess the idea, and 1 should thus be God." Descartes draws both of these arguments from the immediate consciousn ess of a human being's limitation s and defects. (2) lt is just as certain that no being less perfect than God could have produced "me." For, no finite being can be an ultimate cause, since it has to be explained by a cause outside itself. But, even admitting that a finite cause could have created "me," it could not be the cause which conserves "me" during every moment "of my conscious life," and, according to Descartes' conception of causality, every real cause must be a conserving cause. The reason he gives 1 s that, if a cause ceased, it would imply that one moment of time could be dependent on a previous moment of time; and this, he argues, is impossible. No finite cause can be conceived as conserving, in the sense that it exists throughout the life of the succession of finite beings. Therefore the conserving cause of "me" must be an infinite, not a finite cause. (3) It is, however, still conceivable th~t a group of beings, each of them less than God, might produce "me." this possibility, Descartes ~ys: Regarding "Nor can it be sup- posed that several causes concurred in my production, and that from one 1 received the idea of one of the perfections which 1 attribute to the Deity, and from another the idea of some other ,and thus that all those perfections are indeed found somewhere in the universe, but do not all exist together in a single being who is God; for, on the contrary, the unity, the simplicity or inseparability of all the p~operties of Deity, is one of the chief perfections l conceive him to possess; and the idea of this unity of all the perfections of Deity could certainly not be put into my mind by any cause from which 1 did not likewise receive the ideas of all the other perfections; for no power could enable me to embrace them in an inseparable unity, without at the same time giving me the knowledge of what they were." It is evident that the key- note to this argument lies in the principle that cause must be no less perfect than its effect. Summing up, Descartes concludes that neither ~l myself, nor any other being less than God, nor any group of beings could have caused me." sible. Only one other cause of my existence is pos- 1 must believe that God exists, and that he alone could have caused that finite reality myself, of whose existence 1 am well aware. The first conclusion of this argument, namely, that 1 myself could not be the cause of myself, is no doubt valid. Otherwise, 1 should probably be conscious of my own power. The second conclusion, namely, that a being less than God could not have caused me, may be met by objections, for it assumes that every argument has not merely a cause, but also a conserving cause, and that finite causes cannot be conserving causes. But it is not at all clear that every cause must be a conserving cause. In fact, observation substantiates the contrary. The third conclusion, that a group of beings, each less than God, could not produce me, is not valid because it is supported by the assumption, already challenged, that a cause must be as perfect as its effect. The final conclusion, that .God must be th~ cause of "me," since every finite reality must have an ultimate cause, is no doubt more farreaching than the others. objections to it. Kant, however, pointed out some He said that, although every event must have a cause, this fact does not imply an ultimate cause. All that is required is that every contingent cause, however far back in the series, should itself have a cause. Kant arp:,1ed also that a cause, to be a real cause, must be contingent and not ultimate. For cause is precisely that which stands in necessary relation to its effect and likewise to its own cause. Therefore, the supposedly ul- timate being, if it were a cause, would need to have a cause; and so would cea~e being ultimate. Kant pointed out that in addition to its being invalid, the causal argument is also incomplete. For it attempts to point out only that an ultimate cause exists and "it cannot teach what sort of attributes the necessary being has." Hobbes states the cosmological argument in this fashion: " •••••• He that from 1¥1Y effect he seeth come to pass, should reason to the next arid immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit of causes; shall at last come to this, that there must be (as even the Heathen Philosophers confessed) one first mover; that is, a first and an Eternal cause of all things; which is that which men mean by the name of God." Leipniz also adduces a cosmological, or, as he calls it, an a posteriori argument. fold: The argument is two- it is necessary, Leipniz teaches, to infer God's existence as explanation, first of contingent things, and second, of eternal truths. Both of these arguments depend on the assumption of what Leipniz calls "the principle of sufficient reason." He treats both this and his "prin- ciple of contr~diction" as self-evident, indisputable truths. "Our reasoning," he says, "is based upon two great principles: first that of contradiction, by menns of which we decide that to be false which involves contradiction, and that to be true which contradicts or is opposed to the false. And second, the principle of suf- ficient reason, in virtue of which we believe that no fact can be real or existing and no statement true unless it has a sufficient reason why it should he thus and not otherwise."* This principle of sufficient reason is thus identical with Descartes' postulate of an ultimate cause. Like that, it teache ·s first, ~hat every finite being has a cause, and, second, that there must exist some ultimate, or, as Leipniz expresses it, sufficient cause. There are two kinds of truth which must have a sufficient reason. These are "the truths of reason and those of fact." It would be"possible to one who adequately knew to give a sufficient reason why things are as they are and not otherwise ••• ~ •• Though the present motion •••••• comes from the preceding one, and that from the still preceding one, we gain nothing however far back we go, for there remains a1,11ays the same question. Thus 1 t is necessary tha. t the sufficient reason, which has no more need of another reason, should be found outside the series of contingent things, in a substance, which is cause of the contingent things, that is, in a ne cessary being carrying in it- self the reason of its existence; otherwise there would still be no sufficient reason at which one could end. Now this last reason of things is called God." But, continues Leipniz, the existence of God is necessary, not only to explain the existence of concrete, finite things, "truths of fact;" it is required also to account for the existence of necessary truths, "truths of reason." -These truths -or -reason~ - for example, *Monadology. truths of arithmetic, are actual facts of our experience; = 27 3 we are as truly conscious that 3 cold. as that a room is They differ :from contingent facts in two ways. First, the knowledge of them is not gained through repetition of experience, while the certainty of a sensetruth, as that the sun will set every twe~ty-four hours, depends upon frequent repetition. Second, truths of reason are distinguished, according to Leipniz, from truths of' fact, on the ground -tha; "they are necessary and their opposite is impossible," whereas truths of fact "are contingent and their opposite is possible." The peculiar reality of' these truths of reason can be accounted for, Leipniz teaches, only if they are regarded as dependent in a special way on God. which distinguishes, for example, That peculiar reality conviction that my 2 x 2 = 4, from my belief that it will stop snowing, must lie in the truth that the former idea is a truth of God's mind. In this sense, Leipniz calls the understanding of God "the region of the eternal truths." "1 t needs must be," he says, "that if there is a reality •••••• in the eternal truths, this reality is based upon something existent and actual, and, consequently, in the existence of the necessary Being in whom e s sence includes existence." In this proof, Leipni z postulated, as did Descartes, that things and truths m cause. t- have an ultimate But neither philosopher proved this. difficulty may be pointed out. Another According to the prin- ciples of Leipniz, such a sufficient cause must be distinct from finite things in other words, must be separate like the monads and IID1St even be outside the series of finite things. This follows as a matter of course from the fact that an ultimate, a satisfactory, a sufficient cause must be itself uncaused. But if the suf- ficient reason be both distinct from the finite things and out of the series of them, surely it cannot be related to them as their cause. di:ff icul ties: Either horn of the dilemma presents if the ultimate ca.use be in the series of the finite things, it must it~,lf have had a cause, i.e. it is not really ulti~te; i.f~ on the contrary, the supposed cause be outside the series of finite things and distinct from them, it cannot be related to them at all, and evidently, therefore, cannot be the cause of them. Leipniz, then, like Descartes, failed to posit an adequate causal proof of God's existence. The cosmological argument which Berkeley advanced differs somewhat from the arguments o.f Descartes and Leipniz. Berkeley's thought is that GOd must exist A summary of his proof as the cause of eternal objects. follows: (1) ~My own mind an~ nrJ own ideas 1 have an immediate knowledge of!' (2) These ideas :must have a cause. (3) There are three, and only three, possible causes for an idea of sense: first, a spirit or spirits; second, another idea; third, matter, that is, reality independent of and other than spirit and idea. (4) But matter, according to Berkeley's belief. does not exist; hence it cannot be the cause of ideas of sense. These ideas can- not cause, or explain each other, since they are passive that is, they have no existence except in being, known by a self; therefore a spirit, or spirits, must be the cause of the sense-ideas. (5) This conclusion is sup- ported by the immediate experience which I, a spirit, have of causing ideas. {6) But, though it is thus proved that a spirit causes ray ideas of sense, 1 am immediately certain that 1 am not the cause of them, but that 1 experience them in spite of myself. Therefore, some spirit other than myself must exist as cause of my percepts. Berkeley further contends tha~ the nature of the sense ideas furnishes the basis for our reasoning about the nature of this other creative spirit. It must be, first of all, eternal; for otherwise we could not account for the continued existence of sense impressions and their evident independence of any _and all individual perceiving selves. · "Sensible things," to quote Berkeley's exact words, " •••••• have an existence exterior to my mind, since 1 find them by experience to be independent of it. There is, therefore, some other mind wherein they exist, during the intervals between the times of my perceiving them; as likewise they did before my birth and would do after my supposed annihilation. And as the same is true with regard to all other finite, created spirits it necessarily fol- lows that there is an omnipresent, eternal Mind which knows and comprehends al 1 things and exhibits them to our view." The core of this proof consists in arguing the eternity of God on the basis that "sensible things" existed before the birth and will exist after the death of all"finite created spirits." This makes the eternity of God only as sure as the eternity of physical objects. But, with regard to these, we know only that they exist independently of ourselves; we nay infer with the highest probability, but ·ve cannot absolutely know, that they are more permanent than our ideas; and certainly we do not know that the series of physical phenomena is eternal. Therefore , if we grant to Berkeley the idealistic conception of matter, we may concede that he· has a right to argue thus: since things are the ideas of some spirit, the efore as surely as objects exist and have existed, when no human self has perceived them, there exists a spirit greater-th an-human , with as great a permanence as the series of things. cannot go. But further than this Berkeley For, since he cannot prove the eternity of sense objects, he cannot prove the eternity of the creative spirit. Among other writers who have employed the cosmological , or causal argument is Cicero,• who repeated the reasoning of Aristotle , and said it had been used also by Carneades . known: The reasoning of Augustine is well "1 asked the earth, and it answered me, 1 1 am not He• •••••• 1 asked the sea and the deeps, and the living, creeping things, and they answered, 'We are not thy God; seek above us. 1 ••• ••• 1 asked the heavens, sun, moon, stars, ''Nor ( said they) are we the God whom thou seekest.' And 1 replied •••••• 1 Ye have told me of my God, that ye are not He; tell me something of Him.' And they cried out with a loud voice, 1 He made us. '" ~homas Aquinas argued on the principle of causality in three ways: 1. From motion to a first moving principle , which is not moved by any other principle; 2. From effects to a first efficient cause; and 3. From the possible and contingen t to what is in itself •ne 1latura Deorum. more permane nt than our ideas; and certainl y we do not know that the series of physica l phenome na is eternal. Therefo re, if we grant to Berkeley the idealist ic conception of matter, we may concede that he has a right to argue thus: since things are the ideas of some spirit, theTefor e as surely as objects exist and have existed , when no human self has perceive d them, there exists a spirit greater- than-hum an, with as great a perma;ne nce as the series of things. cannot go. But further than this Berkeley For, since he cannot prove the eternity of sense objects, he cannot prove the eternity of the creative spirit. Among other writers who have employed the cosmologic al, or causal argumen t is Cicero,• who repeated the reasonin g of Aristot le, and said it had been used also by Carnead es. known: The reasonin g of Augustin e is well "1 asked the earth, and it answered me, 1 1 am not He• •••••• 1 asked the sea and the deeps, and the living, creeping things, and they answered , •we are not thy God; seek above us.• •••••• 1 asked the heavens , sun, moon, stars, 'J\Tor { said they) are we the God whom thou seekest .' And 1 replied •••••• 1 Ye have told me of my God, that ye are not He; tell me somethin g of Him.' And they cried out with a loud voice, 1 He made us.'" Thomas Aquinas argued on the principl e of causalit y in three ways: 1. From motion to a first moving principl e, which is not moved ciple; by any other prin- 2. From effects to a first efficien t cause; and 3. From the -possibl e and continge nt to what is in itself *De Natura Deorum. necessary.* Most of the English theologians of the sixteenth, seventeepth, and eiehteenth centuries who endeavored to prove Divine existence employ~d in one form or another the argument frorn causation. Charr1ock' s "Discourses on the Existence and Attributes of God" and Pearson's "On the Creed" are good examples of this somewhat modern presentation. In Scotland, both philosophers and the- ologians strove to recast the familiar argument so that it would produce a favorable impression. ln Germany Wolff, following Leipniz, laid stress on the accidental contingent character of the world and its contents, and relying on the principle of sufficient reason, concluded that there IID.lSt be a universal and permanent cause of all that is changing and transitory, and absolute ground of all that is relative and derivative. The cosmological argument has recently received a masterly exposition at the ·hands of Professor Ulrici of Halle, in his work entitled"Gott und die Natur. " -While the causal argument can thus be met with logical objections, it has, nevertheless, a subst_antial vein of truth underlying it. lf we accept Hume's defini- tion of cause, that it is simply a succession of events in time, of course our argument avails us nothing. If, however, we define cause in the way in which it appeals to common sense, and to the majority of philosophers, - the way in which it must necessarily be defined to account for experience -- we enforce the causal argument. Accord- ing to t~is interpretation, cause is an energy, which proouces activity, and 'Nhich transfers that activity to some- thing else, thus producing a change, which is an effect. Thus causality implies separa~io n-from-se lf as its basic idea. When we consider the world, we must believe either that it was caused or that it is self-exist ent. If we do not believe that the world is self-exis tent, we must credit the existence of an Intelligen ce, of which it is a manifesta tion. The only other alternativ e would be to give credence to the theory of an ultimate regression of causes, which, to the ordinary human mind, is untenable . Therefore all thinkers, except materiali sts, must believe in a self-exist ent First Cause. Kant's objection that every cause must be a contingen t cause and that an ultimate cause cannot fall under the principle of causality , loses its force when we carefully consider its meaning. Then it will be evident that an uncaused cause, a first necessary cause, alone answers truly and completely to our 1 dea. of ca.use. E COWSIDTSU GE11TlUM AND THE MORAL PROOF There still remain for our considera tion two other types of argument, neither of which, however, can be classed strictly as a proof. The argument ,! consensu gentium, was employed in ancient times by Cicero, Seneca, Clement of Alexandri a, and Lactantiu s. It has gradually developed into the science of comparativ e theology. its modern form, it ma.y be stated as follows: In Religion is a natural and universal phenomeno n, as wide-sprea d as humanity and as old as its history. Religion can only realize its proper nature in a theistic form. the God of the theists must exist. Therefore , :Mr. J. s. Mill criticis es the argumen t in his essay on Theism, where he represen ts it as an appeal to authorit y -- "to the opinions of mankind general ly, and especia lly of some of its wisest men." taltes the nature of the argumen t. But here he mis- The ablest of its sup- porters have certainl y never presente d it in a form which could justify such a report of 1 t. They have can tended only that, in contact with nature and life, man's mental constitu tion is such that he naturall y becomes religiou s, and that the demandR of conscien ce, heart, and reason, in which religion origina tes, can be satisfie d only by the belief in and worship of one God - a God who possesse s all the attribut es assigned to Him by theists. Two recent writers who have expounde d the argumen t from general consent are Ebrard, who has devoted to it the whole of the second volume of his Apologe tics, anq Baumsta rk, whose "Christi an Apologe tics on an Anthrop ological Basis" has for its exclu- sive aim to prove that man has been made for religion , and that the non-Chr isti&n religion s do not, while Christia nity does, sa.ti !3fy his religiou s cravings and needs. It has been shown 1 n the course of the discussion of the teleolog ical, ontolog ical, and causal arguments that Kant, after careful conside ration, advanced grounds for reruting all of them. He likewise contende d that no other proof lies open to the speculat ive reason. "But Kant himself .•.. aasugge sts -- what later philosop hers amplify -- another ...... proof of God's existenc e. And in this proof, when it shall disclose itself, we shall find no negation , out rather a transfor mation, of these dis- credited argumen ts. My conscio1 1sness will be shown to this is the soul of the ontological argument); my consciousness will be shown, furthermore, to imply the existence of God as ite explanation (and this it is which the causal argument has tried to express), finally, even the adaptations of nature may ser,,e to illuminate our conception of God (and thus the teleological argument shall find its rightful, though subordinate place)."* Kant states his argument, which is called the moral proof, very clearly and simply: "lt has been admitted that it is our duty to promote the highest good, and hence it is not only allowable, but it is even a necessity demanded by duty, that we should presuppose the possibility of the highest good. And as this possibility can be supposed only on the condition that God exists, the presuppositio n of the highest good is unsepara.bly bound up with duty, that is, it is morally necessary to hold to the existence of God." It has been objected to this reasoning that it depends upon a preceding dem- onstration of Kant's thfit happiness must coexist with virtue. As this last assertion was not proved, the moral or "practical" argument for God's existence falls wt th it. Many thinkers urge that Kant himself recognized ~he lack of logical validity in this argument. He saw that if other facts do not refer us back to a primary case, .neither will moral facts lead us to the pri- mary moral agent. Fichte and Hegel later took up Kant's moral argument, and it has been va.rionsly expressed by a number of more recent writers. All have found it impo ss Une, however, by the very nature of the case,to give the thought a form commensurate with a logical proof. For, even if we accept the implication that our moral nature requires the exU~tence · of a moral God, we ha Ye proved only *M_ VI_ Calkins. "The Persistent Problems of Philosophy." on ee l em en ti nt h en a t u r eo fGod . A l lt h eo t h e ra t t r i - b u t e si n c l u d e di nth et h e i s t ' sc o n c e p t i o no fGod , r em a i n a b s o l u t e l yw i t h o u tf o u n d a t i o n . MODERN ARGUMENTS H av ing n ow comp l e t eda su rv ey (wh i ch ,how ev e r , do e sn o tc l a imt ob e comp r eh en s iv e )o ft h ev a r i o u sf o rm a l p r o o f so fGod ' se x i s t e n c e ,wh i ch t h eg r e a tt h i n k e r so f a l lt im eand o fa l ln a t i o n sh av e addu c ed ,i t w i l lb e p r o f i t a b l et ot u r nt oa f ewo f th ea rgum en t swh i ch mod e rn w r i t e r si nou r ow nc o u n t r yh av e expound ed . I ti si n t e r e s t i n gt on o t et h a ts i n c eH e g e l ' st im e ,no r a d i c a l l yn ew t h e o r yo fm e t a p h y s i c a l d o c t r i n eh a sb e e ne v o l v e d . M a n y t h i n k e r sb e l i e v et h er e a s o nt ob et h a ta l ll o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e sy s t em sh av ea l r e a d yb e en c o n c e i v e d . How ev e r t h a tm a yb e ,n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r yp h i l o s o p h e r sh av ef o l l ow e d t h el i n e sl ~ i dd ow n by t h e i rp r e d e c e s s o r s ,e x c e p tt h a t t h e yh av er e comb in ed ,r e a r r a n g e~ ,andr e c o n c i l e dfo rm e r sy s t em sandp a r t so f sy s t em s . A l lp h i l o s o p h i c a lt h e o r i e s , o r fo rm so fp h i l o s o p h y ,h av en a t u r a l l yr e a p p e a r e di nt h e l a s tc e n t u r y ,n o ta sim i t a t i o n so f th eo l d e rs y s t em s ,b u t a so r i g i n a l and i n e v i t a b l er e s u l t so fp h i l o s o p h i c a lm e d i t a t i o n . I ta lm o s tn a t u r a l l yf o l l ow st h a tt h e r eh av eb e en no e n t i r e l yn ew p r o o f so fGod ' se x i s t e n c ep u tf o r t hby mod e rn t h i n k e r s . P r o f . How i son , o fth eU n i v e r s i t yo f C a l i f o r n i a ,w h o i s ap e r s o n a li d e a l i s t ,h a se l a b o r a t e d w i t h mu ch s u b t l e t yana rgum en twh i ch r e a s o n st ot h ee x i s t en c eo fG o df rom I e s s e n t i a lc h a r a c t e ro fe a chp a r t i a l __, s e l f . B e c au s eo f th eim p e r f e c t i o n so f th ehum an s e l f , God , t h ep e r f e c ts e l f ,mu s t e x i s t . T h es e l f d e p e n d e n c e o f th ei n d i v i d u a l ,h ea r g u e s ,i s h i sr e c o g n i t i o no fh i s ow u e cu i a r i t y ,and t h i si n v o l v e sh i sr e c o g n i t i o n ~~~~~~~ ~~~~~ - ~~~!es. "Th~ _~p~rit" he says, "is intrinsica lly individua l, it is itself and not any other. But such a getting to exact identity can only be by means of differ~ ; and difference again implies contrast and so reference to others. Thus, in thinking itself eternally real, each spirit _inherently thinks the reality of all other spirits." And this recognitio n of others, Professor Howison asserts, implies the real existence of these others. "This universal self-defin ing," he continues , "implies and proclaims the untversal reality, the living . - presence in all •••••• the self-consc ious intelligen ce, and this, presented iri _all rea~ly _possible forms 2!_ instances of its .£E!:_ abiding nature." The forms of self-consc ious intelligen ce thus implied, the kinds of other self which the individua l spirit contrasts with .. itself, are two: God and finite selves, or minds. "The world of minds," he says, "must embrace first the Supreme Instance in which the self-defin er defines himself from every other by the peculiari ty of perfect self~ fulfilmen t in eternity, so that all ideal possibili ties, all rational perfection s, are in him eternally actualized , and there is an absolutely perfect mind, or God, whose very perfection lies in his giving complete recognitio n to all other spirits as the complemen t in terms of which alone his own selr-defin ition is to himself completely thinkable. But, secondly, the world of minds must em- brace this complemen tal world, and every member of this complE!ment, though, indeed defining himself against each. one of his fellows, must define himself primarily against the Supreme Instance, and so in terms of God. Thus each of them in the act of defining his own reality defines and posits God as real -- as the one Unchangeable Ideal who is the indispensable standard upon which the reality of each is measured. The price at which alone his real- ity as self-defining can be had in the self-defining reality of God. If he is real, then God is real; if God is not real, then neither can he be real." Miss Calkins points out that Professor Howison•s argument is, in its essentials, precisely the old ontologi- cal argument of Anselm, Descartes, and Leipniz. "For though God, the perfect self, is, in truth, •••••• conceived in any imperfect self's adequate deftnition of himself, yet the fact that each self thus defines 'himself primarily against the Supreme Instance' cannot prove that this Supreme Instance has existence other than that of a necessary, human ideal in Kant•s terms, a~ranscendental ldea. 1 ~• The argument of Professor Josiah Royce of Harvard is somewhat similar in character. He reasons from human ignorance and fallibility to the absolute knowledge and completeness of God. for us, as we are, experience. He says: "There is Our thought undertakes the interpretation of this experience. Every intelligent interpretation of an experience involves, however, the appeal from this experienced fragment to some more organized whole of experience, in whose unity this fragment is conceived as finding its organic place. To talk of any reality which this fragmentary experience indicates is to conceive this reality as the content of the more organized experience. To assert that there is any absolutely real fact indicated *M. w. Calkins. oy -our experience is -to regard this reality as presented to an absolutely organised experience, in which every fragment finds its place •.•••• The very effort - - to deny an absolute experience involves •...•• the actual assertion of such an absolute experience. "Our result, then is: There is an Absolute Experience, for which the conception of an absolute reality, i.e. the conception of a system of ideal truth is fulfilled by the very contents that get presented to this Experience. This Absolute Experience is related to our experience as an organic whole to its own fragments. It is an experience which finds fulfilled all that the completest thought can rationally conceive as genuinely possible. Herein lies its definition as an Absolute: •••••• The conception now reached 1 regard as the philosophical conception of God ••• ~..• God is known as Thought fulfilled; as experience absolutely organized so as to have one ideal unity of meaning; as Truth, transparent to itself; as Life in absolute accordance with idea; as Selfhood eternally obtained. And all this the Absolute is in concrete unity, not in mere variety. "Do you ask then: Where is our human world, does God get revealed? -- what manifests his glory? answer: 1 Our ignorance, our f~llibility~ our imperfec-_ tion, and so, as forms of this ignorance and imperfection, our experie.nce of longing, of strife, of pain, o:f error, -- yes, of whatever, as finite, declares that its truth lies in its limitation, and so lies beyond itself." "The foregoing conception of God undertakes to be distinctly theistic, and not pantheistic •••••• ! am certainly disposed to insist that what the faith of our fathers has genuinely meant by God, is, despite all the blindne ss and all the unessen tial acciden ts of religiou s traditio n, identica l with the inevitab le outcome of a reflecti ve philosop hy." Professo r Joseph Le Conte presents an argumen t of a differen t type, which he sums up very succinc tly: He says, in consider ing the brain, "From the outside we see only physical , from the inside only psychic al phenomena." He continue s: "Now take external Nature -- the Cosmos instead of the brain. The observer from the outside . sees, and can see, only physica l phenome na; there is absolute ly nothing else there to see. But must there not be in this case also, on the other side, psychica l phenome na consciou sness, thought, emotion , will? -- in a word, a Self, a Person? There is only one place in the whole world where we can get behind physica l phenomena behind the veil of matter; viz, in our own brain; and we find there -- a self,~ person. ls it not reason- able to think that if we could get behind the veil of Nature we should find the same, i.e. a Person? But if so, we must conclude , an Infinite Person and therefor e the only Complete Persona lity is not only self-con scious, but self-exi stent. Our persona lities are self-con scious, indeed, but not self-exi stent. They are only imperfec t images, and, as it were, separate d fragmen ts of the Infinite Persona lity -- God." can be detected very easily. an inferred probabi lity. The flaw in this argumen t It reasons from a fact to Farther than that it does not go. The various other modern argumen ts which have been devised embody the differen t weaknes ses that have been pointed out in connecti on with the older proofs. In spite of the ingenuity and learning of the authors, ln short, these arguments leave us where they found us. no compelling argument for God's existence has yet been expounded. we are still waiting for a logical, specu- lative proof which shall convince all seekers that the all-wise and all-good God of our fathers exists. What, then, has been the use of our inquiry and what is the value of the formal proofs? It has already been point,3d out that there is a substantial. vein of truth underlying al 1 of these arguments though no one of them has perfectly satisfied the reason. From many of them we can infer with the highest prob1.bility the existence of the God w·hom we seek. By granting to Berkeley the phenomenality of matter, we found that he definitely proved t~e existence of a greater-than-human spirit, with a life at least as eternaJ as the world of sense-objects. What could be more probable than that this spirit is, indeed, the One Absolute Intelligence, the Supreme Being of our ideals? Moreover, the effect of the formal arguments is cumulati,,e. It has been urged that taken together, they are no stronger than the weakest link in the chain. But the analogy does not hold. By arriving at a con- ception of God through the reasoning of a certain type of argument, and then reaching the same idea by traveling in a dif~erent path, we obtain the result of multiplying the e,1idence. Furthermore, each class of argument contributes 1 ts share toward the formulation of a complete conception of God. As a matter of fact, some of the most fundamental ideas of God's nature T_h,.u:;_;: s _ ___;;;;_::--'---_ al though theism is not strictly proved by any demonstration, yet it is implicit- ly implied in all such reasoning. Logic rightly points out the inconsistencies in the formal arguments. But, if it insists that format demonstration is necessary, it assumes a role outside of its own field. The most intimate and beautiful of the experiences of our daily life are such that their reality could not possibly be logically demonstrated. Our practical trust in the uniformity of nature, our belief in the loyalty of friendship, .and our faith in the infallibility of justice, goodness, and truth, are realities for whose certainty cogent reasons cannot be given. Speculative truth appeals to only one element of our composite nature -- the intellect. Though we thus obta:tn some of the fundamental ideas of our concept ion of God, a complete grasp of the Divine nature and attributes cannot be obtained by appealing to the reason alone. Our ideas of a Superior Being are much more in- timately associated with the moral, emotional, aesthetic, and religious aspects of our nature than with the cognitive faculty. These elements reach out after God in so natural and positive a way, that they have always seemed to be the really fundamental grounds of the t~eistic belief. In a word, they are the elements of faith. The mind, inspired by faith, insists on clinging to its beliefs and ideals as long as they are not entirely disproved. These undemonstrated ideals are the groundwork of our mental existence. Without them we would stand dumb and confused before the realities of life. "Nature is morally blind, indifferent, capricious; force is unethical. Hence the call for a Supreme Power akin to the spirit of man , conscious of his struggle, sympathetic with his life, guiding it to a perfect issue the call for a supremely righteous Will."* Reason, as we have seen, contributes its ideal of a supreme Being; the affections contribute their ideal; morality and religion likewise make the same contribution; whatever else is in us which malres for completeness also contributes its ideal; the result is the Perfect Ideal of the Perfect Being Whom we seek as the satisfaction of our needs and our longings, and in Whom we may find the full account and final meaning of our own human life. Browning beau ti fully sings in "Saul": 1 have gone the whole round of creation: i 1 saw and I spoke: I a work of God's hand for that purpose, received in ray brain And pronounced on the rest of his handwork -- returned him again His creation~ approval or censure: I spoke as I saw: 1 report as a man may of God's work all's love, yet all's law. Now 1 lay down the judgeship he lent me. Each faculty tasked To perceive him, has gained an abyss, where a dewdrop was asked. Have I knowledge? confounded it shrivels at Wisdom laid bare, Have I forethought? how purblind, how blank, to the lnfinit~ Care! Do I task any faculty highest, to image success? l but open my eyes, and perfection, no more and no less, In the kind 1 imagined full-fronts me, and God is seen God ln the star, in the stone, in the flesh, in the soul and the clod. And thus looking within and around me, I ever renew {With that stoop of the soul which in bending upraises it too) The submission of man's nothing perrect to God's all-complete, As I by each new obeisance in spirit, climb to his feet." ~o o BIBLIOGRAPHY *** PLATO: 8 ff. Republic VI and Phaedrus. ARISTOTLE: SMITH: r. rv. Memorabilia, XE1lOPHON: Metaphysics: XI : 6-10. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology: Article on Xenophanes. McCLINTOCK and STRONG: Cyclopedia. Encyclopedia Britannica: DIOGENES FISKE: LAERTIUS: Anaxagoras, Melissus, Gorgias, Xenophane s. The Idea of God . BORDEN P. B0WNE: KOLPE: Articles on Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Apologetics, Theism, Homer, Hesiod, and Samuel Clarke. Phil osophy of Theism. Introduction to Philosophy. ROGERS: The Religious Conception of the World. ROGERS: History of Philosophy. JANET: Final Causes. ALEXAlIDER: WEBF.R: History of Philosophy. History of Philosophy. F. E. ABBOTT: Scientific Theism. ROBERT FLINT: Theism. CALKINS: The Persistent Problems of Philosophy. PAULSEN: Introduction to Philosophy. ALLAN J!ENZIES: History of Religion. RICHARD A. ARMSTRONG: EDWARD CAlRD: Agnosticism and Theism in the Nineteenth Centur-y. Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers. THEODOR GOMPERZ: Greek Thinkers: A History of Ancient Philosophy. SETH: Princip les. Ethical . - GEORGE A. GORDON: WlNDELBAlID: Ultimate Concepti ons of Faith. A History of Philosop hy. ROYCE HOWISON ) ( The Concept ion of God. 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