| Description |
Relying on moral testimony has been widely considered to be problematic in a way that relying on testimony about nonmoral matters is not. One explanation for this difference is the problem associated with identifying trustworthy sources of moral testimony. Moral knowledge involves knowledge of appropriate ends; as such, those who do not have moral expertise have no way of checking on the results of the testimony of purported moral experts in order to verify their expertise. As a result of this problem, the "credentials problem," those who would benefit most from moral testimony (i.e., non-experts) have no way of identifying reliable testifiers. I argue that a view of moral knowledge and cultivation like that found in the Xunzi is a plausible alternative that has advantages over the view that informs the modern discussion of moral testimony. In particular, Xunzi's system of "politically sanctioned moral expertise" provides a way for those without moral expertise to recognize appropriate sources of moral testimony on the basis of their sanctioned authority; trust in the institution which accredits and sanctions moral experts functions as a shortcut to identifying reliable sources of moral testimony. I conclude that, despite the potential problems for such a system, having an institution which accredits moral experts, functioning much like the scientific and medical institutions we already rely on, is better than the alternative of distrusting moral testimony and depending on individual effort to acquire moral understanding or to identify trustworthy sources of moral guidance. |
