| Description |
This dissertation identifies a type of injustice often overlooked in the philosophical literature: spatial injustice. Spatial injustice occurs when one is wronged and/or harmed as a direct result of a "consequential geography." A consequential geography is a spatial arrangement primarily constructed by humans, and thus, shaped significantly by formal and informal political, social, and cultural processes. So, whereas hazardous waste sites, city parks, and public transportation systems are consequential geographies, glaciers and deserts are not. I focus mainly on urban spatial arrangements and explore how someone's spatial position within a consequential geography interacts with their social position, such as their gender, race, and class. This account unfolds in four stages. First, I outline the nature of spatial injustice, arguing for an account of spatial injustice that captures how a critical spatial perspective can further our understanding of injustice. I also criticize political philosophers for overlooking the importance of social space in theories of (in)justice and suggest that my notion of spatial injustice bridges a gap in the literature. Second, I argue that spatially just geographical urban domains take into account human differences. This view, which I identify as "representational pluralism," encompasses three moral rights: the right to flourish, the right to recognition, and the right to access. Striving for representational pluralism in urban environments minimizes the harms and wrongs of spatial injustice by ensuring that these rights are preserved for all. Third, I investigate how ideology, such as racism and sexism, infiltrates the processes that shape consequential geographies and lead to spatial injustice. |
