Locke's temporal-spatial theory of personal idenity

The opening article in Locke's chapter on identity sets temporal-spatial location as a general principle for determining identity, and this thesis is an attempt to show how Locke's general claims about temporal-spatial location fit into his theory of personal identity. I have two aims in advancing this interpretation. Since the temporal-spatial aspect of Locke's theory of personal identity has been nearly universally overlooked, my first aim will be to provide strong textual evidence that Locke does in fact take temporal-spatial location to be a part of his account. My second aim is to show that on my reading of Locke his theory turns out to be a more plausible theory of personal identity than the view which is typically attributed to him. In this thesis I argue that Locke takes veridical memory to be necessary and sufficient for personal identity over time, and the temporal-spatial aspect of Locke's theory partly determines what can count as a veridical memory. There are two aspects, then, of Locke's theory of personal identity, of which the temporal-spatial aspect has been overlooked.