| Description |
The capitalist market theory of libertarianism is often attacked as failing to adequately protect many of the principles which it seeks to uphold. Often, these criticisms are well founded, as some formulations of libertarian theory lack an articulation of adequate sophistication, rendering the claims proffered by certain advocates seem little more than polemic rhetorical exercises, persuading only those already convinced. G.A. Cohen, in his monograph "Illusions about Private Property and Freedom," makes a careful presentation of a number of problems present in some; versions of libertarian theory that seeks not simply to respond to a number of arguments critical to the libertarian project, but to undermine many of the premises on which the model operates. Here, I contend that while Cohen's analysis is strong, it is not conclusive, and that his critique of libertarian theory may not reflect an acknowledgment of other, more reflective formulations of the libertarian perspective. Preceding on a selected definition of libertarianism, Cohen contends that the theory selectively defines freedom in a manner which artificially restricts the actions available to individuals in order to reinforce the practice of private property, an institution essential to the success of the libertarian project. This limited or "moralised" libertarian definition of freedom, then, maintains a false dichotomy which limits the range of actions available to moral agents, ultimately compromising the freedom it proclaims to defend. However, Cohen's arguments on this point presume a somewhat narrow description of libertarian theory, which does not adequately recognize how more sophisticated articulations of the libertarian doctrine of freedom might preclude the success of his contentions. Further, his suggestion that libertarianism provides an economic freedom only of degree fails to convince, as Cohen mistakes an equality of personal holdings for an equality of economic access. Finally, Cohen's presentation of the communalized model of property succeeds only when applied to a relatively limited number of situations, as the shared-property arrangement he advocates maintains only as long as the properties in question are non-essential in nature, limiting his proposal's range of application. At bottom, Cohen's contentions represent a challenge to libertarianism that cannot be successfully addressed by simple recitation of familiar capitalist mantra. However, the arguments he presents are not beyond critique, and under examination allow the libertarian to respond in ways which limit the success of Cohen's objections. |
