On naturalism

This dissertation is about naturalism--a philosophical view that is nothing short of orthodoxy today. Orthodoxies tend to go uncontested and unexamined, but they should not be. The bulk of this dissertation constitutes such an examination. Three distinct endeavors are undertaken. The first is to get a clear, concise, working description of 'naturalism' such that it can be evaluable in subsequent chapters. This is not an easy task given the wide range of ways in which naturalism is expressed, but I pare down the view to two distinct theses--one compound epistemological thesis and one ontological thesis. These theses are broad enough that they allow for strong and weak readings, and I give some ways of doing this. The next major task is epistemological. I give arguments for how epistemological and ontological naturalism can be given prima facie justification. I follow this by putting pressure on the epistemological thesis to see how it holds up in the face of potential defeaters. The formulations of epistemological naturalism that are most defensible are those that are weak and thus not all that controversial. Robust expressions are ruled out. Finally, I follow the same procedure for ontological naturalism. Here, however, I put pressure on the thesis by using modal metaphysics as a case study. I find that no modal theory on offer can be accommodated by robust interpretations of ontological naturalism, and so the thesis must be tempered or weakened to allow for objective modality in the world. My conclusion here is thus somewhat analogous to that in the case of epistemological naturalism. The overall upshot is that the only varieties of naturalism that should enjoy a position of orthodoxy are those that are quite benign and uncontroversial.