Hitler and Stalin: military command relationships and the couse of world war two on the eastern front

This thesis examines the highest command relationships that existed in the Soviet Union's Red Army and in the German Army just prior to and during the Second World War. The roles of Hitler and Stalin as supreme military commander are considered in relationship with their higher generals and how these relationships bore significantly on the course of the war. Hitler's increasing micromanagement of the German war effort, and Stalin's belated willingness to delegate military authority make up the central themes of this work. A variety of secondary sources, as well as generals' memoirs and diaries, point to the conclusion that Hitler and Stalin were both military amateurs who possessed grand strategic visions, but lacked the competent operational understanding of the trained military technician. After the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler inserted himself further and further down into the chain of command and directed tactical movements from hundreds of miles away. By contrast, Stalin began the war dominating the Red Army but gradually came to respect the abilities of his military specialists. Hitler's disdain for his generals and Stalin's respect for his proved a major factor in the Soviet victory in the Second World War.