Commitment regimes: the intersection of violence and development

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Title Commitment regimes: the intersection of violence and development
Publication Type thesis
School or College College of Social & Behavioral Science
Department Economics
Author Bond, Ryan Brady
Date 2014-05
Description Development practice in conflicted countries is conceptualized and carried out upon a shaky economic theoretical foundation. These theories were built upon research conducted on the development of European nations. This has led to a focus in the development community on investment led growth models, which state that large and small scale government grants can be targeted to touch off latent engines of economic growth. In this thesis I contest that model drawing from counterinsurgency (COIN) examples in Iraq and Afghanistan, demonstrating how such investments can be a source of instability through increased incentives for rent seeking behavior as well as direct theft. I propose a better focus would be to investigate and improve what I call commitment regimes: the methods whereby commitments are made and enforced in a society, be it through religious, tribal, regulatory or violent means. As these regimes are improved, reducing transactions cost and increasing stability, more investment will be made in society as returns become more certain.
Type Text
Publisher University of Utah
Subject COIN; Commitment; Contract; Development; Iraq; Reconstruction
Dissertation Institution University of Utah
Dissertation Name Master of Science
Language eng
Rights Management Copyright © Ryan Brady Bond 2014
Format application/pdf
Format Medium application/pdf
Format Extent 583,128 Bytes
Identifier etd3/id/2952
ARK ark:/87278/s64r136n
Setname ir_etd
ID 196521
Reference URL https://collections.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s64r136n
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