| Description |
Presidents have requested line-item veto power for over one-hundred years. The Line-Item Veto Act of 1996 gave the executive branch the long desired budget tool. However, the power was not constitutionally given and is statutorily limited with a sunset date of 2005. When the Line-Item Veto Act comes up for renewal, legislators should be properly informed about how the item veto was exercised. The decision to extend the power will rest upon proper knowledge of its effect upon fiscal policy, separation of powers and the federal budget process. A modeled framework must be created to measure the impact of the tool. Scholars must begin asking the proper questions about the item veto and place the device in its proper context. This essay begins the process of asking informed questions and placing the item veto in a proper investigatory setting. To understand the impact of the item veto, a historical, constitutional and theoretical background is given. Furthermore, the federal line-item veto is distinguished from its state counterparts. Many studies have been done on the gubernatorial line-item veto as predictive of presidential use. This essay contends that the predictive nature of those studies is problematic. The dissimilarities between the two vetoes are numerous and vast. Furthermore, this essay examines and critiques individual state studies and methodologies. Those criticisms provide a starting point for creating a final framework of study. While creating a modeled framework is beyond the scope of this essay, suggestions for focus areas and preliminary models are provided. |
