
Hayim, a sociologist, presents Sartrean arguments and analyses as correctives to positivism, determinism, and the emphasis on objectivity in the social sciences. She seems at her best in recognizing problems in sociologists' work and in delineating concrete and important differences that would follow if sociologists were to adopt a Sartrean perspective.

Her presentation of Sartre's ideas is uneven. Some of her writing is careless and may seriously mislead the sociologists for whom she writes. For example, she presents the *en-soi* as "the social world" (p. xv), as the agent being acted upon (p. 14), and as "totalized matter" (p. 81), each characterization at best utilizing only a part of what she presented elsewhere (p. 15) as the meaning of *en-soi*. Another example is her claim that the individual "remains the author of all social products" (p. 106), clearly contradicted later by her acknowledgment that the authority of the state "precedes and awaits new generations" who do not themselves participate in the pledge that originally constituted the state (p. 127).

However, in her presentation of Sartre, Hayim recognizes and develops the continuity so many have missed between *Being and Nothingness* and the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. Moreover, some of her restatements of Sartre's analyses are particularly clear, perceptive, and illuminating.  

L. A. B.


*Life Chances* is a collection of related essays which attempt to define a liberal's view of the meaning of history. Much of the writing is rhetorical in style, and often straw men are set up and knocked down in a single sentence. Still chapters 1 and 3, which form the heart of the argument, are quite provocative. Dahrendorf's central thesis is that all societies can be analyzed in terms of the opportunities they offer individuals to realize their talents and hopes (hence, a liberal view). The life chances of individuals are determined by two factors: options or choices and bonds or linkages. From Dahrendorf's point of view, these two dimensions can vary independently and both are potentially quantifiable. In his analysis of social change, Dahrendorf takes great pains to emphatically deny that the history of man has been the progression of increasing life chances. Instead he argues that the emergence of life chances has been uneven over time and place.

The other focus of the essays is an attempt to analyze the problems of liberalism as a political philosophy. His diagnosis of the current ills of Western democracies is that as the pursuit of equality of opportunity shifts to the equality of outcomes, the choices available to society and hence the life chances of society are increasingly threatened. Paradoxically, as society decreases inequality, it also threatens to decrease life chances.

N. F.


These papers by radical British criminologists critique 1960s legislation once thought "liberal": post-Wolfenden decriminalization of private moral behavior;
divorce, abortion, and juvenile law reform; lesser penalties for marijuana posses­sion; treatment of family breakdown and childhood hyperactivity; and race relations reform. These theses pervade: the 1960s “reforms” represent liberalization of private life coupled with increased social control of other conduct; the “medical” model, with its ideological focus on individual “cure” rather than structural reform, has increasingly replaced law as a mechanism of social control; the line between permissiveness and control has been drawn at least partly as a response to the needs of advanced capitalism for increased consumption and the reproduction of a stable labor force; and finally, the economic crises of the 1970s have led to increasing breakdown of reform.

The essays range from vituperative condemnation of drug prescriptions for hyperactive children to subtle social critique. Hall’s Gramsci-influenced analysis of post-Wolfenden moral legislation and Lea’s argument that racial integration requires changes in the structure of acceptance as well as the structure of rejection are both the best essays and the essays which will be of as much interest to American as to British readers.

L. P. F.


The intellectual history of England in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is rich in philosophical thought and social action. At one end of this period there stand Jeremy Bentham and the redoubtable James Mill, whose efforts ranged from penology to the founding of the University of London, from the rearing of John Stuart Mill to the inspiring of the Philosopich Radicals—to whom credit for the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832 is largely due. While there were other important thinkers such as Lyell in geology and Ricardo in economics, this early period gave way to a middle period whose luminaries were John Stuart Mill in his own right, the passionate Marx, and the patient Darwin. Later T. H. Huxley, Matthew Arnold, and John Ruskin assumed a kind of intellectual leadership, leadership whose extent and quality are still being assayed. A similar figure stands at the turn of the century, and he is credited with being “the founding father of British sociology.” L. T. Hobhouse, philosopher and journalist and sometime academician, is the subject of Stefan Collini’s masterful account of the intellectual climate in turn-of-the-century England.

Hobhouse was educated at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, where he took firsts in classical moderations and "greats." He was elected to a prize fellowship at Merton College in 1887 and to a fellowship at Corpus Christi in 1894. In 1897 he joined the staff of the Manchester Guardian and there he remained, in one position or another, the rest of his life. His chief interests lay in the areas of ethics, history of religious and social institutions, social psychology, and social anthropology. His works included Mind in Evolution (1901), Morals in Evolution (1906), Social Evolution and Political Theory (1911), The Metaphysical Theory of the State (1918), The Rational Good (1921), The Elements of Social Justice (1922), and Social Development (1924). Hobhouse’s writings show an intellectual indebtedness to Herbert Spencer’s evolutionary theory, to Auguste Comte’s Positivism, and—in considerable measure—to the social philosophical thinking of John Stuart Mill and T. H. Green.