“ENEMIES AT HOME”: RACE, CITIZENSHIP, AND THE ROOTS OF JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT POLICY

by

Barbara Jones Brown

A thesis submitted to the faculty of
The University of Utah
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of History
The University of Utah
August 2012
The University of Utah Graduate School

STATEMENT OF THESIS APPROVAL

The thesis of Barbara Jones Brown has been approved by the following supervisory committee members:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date Approved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robert Goldberg</td>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>April 30, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wesley Sasaki-Uemura</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>April 30, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Paul Reeve</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>April 30, 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and by Isabel Moreira, Chair of the Department of History

and by Charles A. Wight, Dean of The Graduate School.
ABSTRACT

On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, authorizing the mass incarceration of some 110,000 Japanese Americans and aliens from the West Coast, southern Arizona, and Hawaii. About two-thirds of those interned were American citizens; most of the others were longtime residents of the United States prohibited from becoming naturalized because of their “race.” Mainstream interpretations assert that the internment was a hasty decision made in the racist hysteria that erupted after Japan’s December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. This perception maintains that the public’s long-held animosity toward Japanese in America, exacerbated by war hysteria, influenced West Coast pressure groups, media, and military and political leaders to implore federal officials in Washington for the mass incarceration, and the federal government eventually succumbed.

This paper addresses questions, raised by primary research, that challenge this interpretation. If the impetus for the internment came from West Coast grassroots after Pearl Harbor, then why had federal officials considered this option long before December 7, 1941? If the impetus stemmed from a regional effort to rid the West Coast of people of Japanese descent, why did the federal government effect the internment of Japanese not only on the West Coast, but from throughout the Western Hemisphere?
Based on a broader study of internment policies and practices across time and space, this paper argues for a revision of the mainstream interpretation of the internment policy. This study demonstrates that wartime, mass internment of civilians was not limited to Japanese Americans and aliens, to the United States, or to World War II. Rather, it was an international strategy of total war that developed decades before 1941.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. iii

1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1

2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE .................................................................................. 3

3. DEVELOPING INTERNMENT POLICY THROUGH WORLD WAR I ........ 7

4. BETWEEN WARS ............................................................................................... 18

5. AFTER PEARL HARBOR .................................................................................... 29

6. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 45

NOTES ...................................................................................................................... 47

REFERENCES .......................................................................................................... 58
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On February 19, 1942—another “date which will live in infamy”—President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, authorizing the forced evacuation and incarceration of more than 110,000 Japanese Americans and aliens from the West Coast, southern Arizona, and Hawaii. About two-thirds of those interned were American citizens; most of the others were longtime residents of the United States prohibited from becoming naturalized citizens because of their “race.” Though scholars have debated the causes of the policy, the perception that the internment was a hasty decision made in the racist furor following Japan’s December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor prevails. This interpretation maintains that the public’s longstanding animosity toward Japanese in America, exacerbated by war hysteria, influenced West Coast political and military leaders to press their superiors in Washington for mass incarceration, and the federal government eventually succumbed.

This article challenges this interpretation. If the impetus for the internment came from the West Coast grassroots after Pearl Harbor, why had federal officials considered this option long before December 7, 1941? If the impetus was a bottom-up effort to rid
the West Coast of people of Japanese descent, why did the federal government effect the
internment of Japanese not only there, but throughout the Western Hemisphere?
Political scientist Morton Grodzins first proposed the interpretation that the internment policy originated on the West Coast in the wake of Pearl Harbor. Grodzins’s *Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation* (1949) placed primary responsibility for the internment on West Coast newspapers, pressure groups, Congressional delegations and other local political leaders. Driven by racism, war hysteria, and economic jealousy, these entities lobbied the national government for a military evacuation. Western Defense Commander John L. De Witt, headquartered at San Francisco’s Presidio, requested that the War Department order a mass evacuation on February 11, 1942, after the mayor of Los Angeles visited him in a “high point . . . of personal pressure on the commanding general.” The War Department presented the recommendation to President Roosevelt, who signed Executive Order 9066 without review or consideration. Grodzins’s work criticized military authorities for capitulating to regional, civilian pressure that had more to do with domestic considerations than with the war effort.¹

Concurring with Grodzins’s view that the World War II internment was “extraordinary” and “without precedent” in United States history, Jacobus tenBroek,
Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Matson wrote in *Prejudice, War, and the Constitution* (1954) that the policy represented “a radical departure from American ideals and principles.” These authors agreed that Pearl Harbor set off “unprecedented racism” on the West Coast, which led to the internment policy, though they emphasized the racism of De Witt and his staff as pivotal. However, in *Guarding the United States and Its Outposts* (1964), Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild reassessed De Witt’s role. These Army historians argued that General De Witt’s position on the necessity of Japanese American internment vacillated under pressure from the War Department as well as West Coast influences.

Roger Daniels synthesized these interpretations in *Concentration Camps U.S.A.: Japanese Americans and World War II* (1971), blaming racism, war hysteria, economic and political interests, and De Witt for the internment policy. He argued that after Pearl Harbor, De Witt’s “panic-ridden, amateurish Western Defense Command began to pressure Washington for more drastic action against the presumably dangerous enemies in their midst.” This pressure, according to Daniels, supported by West Coast public, press, and politicians, compelled federal officials to comply with the mass evacuation and internment of Japanese Americans.

With their focus on the West Coast, these interpretations assume that the impetus for internment was regional, timed to the Pearl Harbor attack, and limited to Japanese Americans and aliens in the United States. These assumptions contribute to the general perception that the internment, as Walter LaFeber summarized it in *The Clash*, “resulted from a combination of fear, racism, intense political pressures, and judgments by usually balanced officials who became unbalanced during the 1942 crises.”
In 1976, Michi Weglyn’s *Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America’s Concentration Camps* offered evidence inconsistent with the standard interpretation. *Years of Infamy* contended that federal officials suggested internment of Japanese aliens as early as August 1941. After Pearl Harbor and under State Department pressure, authorities throughout Latin America also arrested civilians of Japanese ancestry, both aliens and citizens, and deported them to the United States for internment. Weglyn based her findings on documents declassified after publication of the work of other internment historians. Though some scholars acknowledged Weglyn’s work and her findings were well-documented, her book did not revise the standard interpretation.\(^6\)

Four years after *Years of Infamy*’s appearance, Daniels published *Concentration Camps, North America: Japanese in the United States and Canada*. The new edition included a chapter on Canada’s internment of Japanese Canadians, but Daniels did not revise his interpretation of the internment policy. In an article published the same year, he wrote that although some evidence of international pre-planning for the internment had been uncovered, he did not believe such material necessitated “a major revision of anything now in print.” He did, however, acknowledge that “given the swollen nature of modern bureaucracies, one can never be sure that one has seen all the relevant surviving papers, and additional such material may be unearthed.”\(^7\)

Like Weglyn, Gary Y. Okihiro extended his research beyond the continental United States, though he focused on Japanese residents of Hawaii, both alien and citizen. In *Cane Fires: the Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, 1865-1945* (1991), Okihiro theorized that the origins of the Japanese American internment policy could be found in pre-World War II Hawaii. He demonstrated that after Japanese immigrant laborers
orchestrated a 1920 plantation strike that burned thousands of acres of sugar cane, U.S. military intelligence framed Japanese aliens as agents in complex sabotage and espionage operations, supporting a Japan-led conquest of America. In 1923, John L. De Witt, then a colonel in the Army’s War Plans Division, formulated a containment strategy that authorized martial law, alien registration, and selective internment of those deemed to be risks to “national security.” Okihiro argued that military intelligence developed these plans over the next twenty years, adding Japanese Americans to internment lists by 1933, forming the basis for the internment policy put into place after Pearl Harbor.  

Building on Okihiro’s and Weglyn’s work, this article expands the chronological and geographical scope of inquiry, adding further insight into the roots of the internment policy. A broader, more comprehensive look at primary sources across time and space provides a more detailed and contextualized understanding of the policy and suggests “a major revision” of mainstream interpretations “now in print.”
CHAPTER 3

DEVELOPING INTERNMENT POLICY THROUGH WORLD WAR I

World War II was not the first time that anti-Japanese war hysteria had gripped the United States. A similar uproar erupted after 1905, when Japan won control over the Korean peninsula and parts of southern Manchuria by defeating Russia in war. This first modern triumph of an Asian power over a Western one strengthened Japanese nationalism and resistance to Western imperialism. A Japanese-language newspaper in San Francisco proclaimed in 1906, for example, that Japan’s victory proved that the Caucasian race did not have a monopoly on power and civilization. Now, the editorial urged, Japanese should engage in a peaceful invasion by migrating to the United States in large numbers.\(^9\)

In the West, Japan’s triumph raised fears. “The situation in the far East is one which needs careful watching,” President Theodore Roosevelt wrote before the Russo-Japanese War’s end. Roosevelt did not think that “the Japanese people” drew distinctions between Russians and Americans. “I have no doubt that they include all white men as being people who, as a whole, they dislike, and whose past arrogance they resent; and doubtless they believe their own yellow civilization to be better.”\(^{10}\)
Increasing Japanese emigration to the United States and its recently annexed territories of Hawaii and the Philippines in the years surrounding the war aggravated fears of the “yellow peril.” Japanese immigration peaked between 1901 and 1908, when an estimated 125,000 Japanese entered the United States and its territories. Japanese immigration to North America reached its high point in 1907, when nearly 30,000 Japanese arrived in the United States and more than 8,000 in Canada.\textsuperscript{11}

That same year, reflecting growing anxiety, the War Department took count of the Japanese population—with a separate tally of Japanese males of military age—in the United States, Hawaii, and the Philippines. Roosevelt negotiated the so-called Gentlemen’s Agreement with Japan, mandating a dramatic decrease in Japanese immigration. He also dispatched the U.S. battle fleet from the Atlantic Coast to the Pacific in a show of military might. The fleet’s navigation around North and South America “is an indication that the Nation’s guard must extend around the continent, being especially needed on the Pacific Coast because of the warlike attitude of the Japanese,” lectured U.S. Congressman, Spanish-American War hero, and Naval Academy instructor Richmond Hobson on December 17, 1907, the day the fleet departed.\textsuperscript{12}

Hobson’s statement exhibited a viewpoint which later officials shared, that the nation’s defense perimeter against Japan must encompass the Western Hemisphere. “The Japanese victory over Russia,” Hobson continued, and “the whole trend of events is [leading] toward a contest by the yellow race, aided by the other colored races, a struggle to wrest from the white man his present supremacy. . . . The yellow wave that is forming is already moving eastward over the Pacific Ocean and lapping the shores of America, and America’s facing westward to check this wave is in the interest of all the white
nations of the earth.” The white hulls of the American fleet’s battleships earned the armada the nickname of the “Great White Fleet,” but the name had a double meaning as the fleet sailed toward the Pacific.

A month after the fleet’s departure, Sam Hughes, a member of Canada’s Parliament, wrote to the United States War Department that “there seems no doubt but that the Japanese aim to make the Pacific slope of America an Oriental settlement, peacefully if they may, aggressively if they must.” Hughes worried about maintaining “the supremacy of the old Anglo Saxon race” on the North American continent. He warned that “the Japs” had plans and charts of the western United States and Canada pinpointing the location of tunnels, bridges, and other strategic points on every railway and road. Within a day’s notice, he claimed, resident Japanese could sabotage these strategic points, preventing mobilization of American troops while shiploads of armed Japanese from Hawaii invaded America’s shores. Hughes had served as chief of intelligence in the 1899-1902 British campaign against the Boers in southern Africa. Based on this experience, Hughes wrote that “the Boers were, as the Japs are, adept at cunning operations, but such are easily thwarted by energetic watchful action.”

After receiving Hughes’s letter, Secretary of War William H. Taft asked Army Chief of Staff J. F. Bell for an opinion. Bell’s response was informed by his experience in fighting Plains Indians during the late nineteenth century and subjugating insurrectionists in the Philippines at the turn of the century. Bell helped quell the Filipino rebellion by moving native peoples into protected zones and camps, warning that those who remained outside would be given no quarter. This action mirrored the “reconcentration” policies that the Spanish military used in Cuba during the Ten Years’ War (1868–1878), the U.S.
military implemented in the American Indian wars, and the British employed against the Boers.  

“The question arises,” Bell responded to Taft on March 12, 1908, “should cessation of peaceful relations with Japan become imminent, whether any steps should be taken by our government looking toward the restraint of Japanese residing in this country.” Bell agreed that at the outset of war, Japanese residents might “do serious injury” to public utilities as Hughes warned. Though “it might be highly desirable from our point of view to exercise physical restraint upon Japanese in this country,” Bell added, any restraint of these Japanese before they had actually committed sabotage would provoke reprisals from Japan and prejudice the American cause with other nations. Experience had taught Bell a way around that obstacle. “The only solution,” he said, was to treat Japanese in America as if they were in danger. “The unruly elements of our own people might engage in unlawful acts against them. Therefore we could with entire propriety say to these Japanese residents, at least to those in places where there are many of them, that for their own safety we deem it advisable to escort them to the frontier in order that they may return to their own country.” Such action against Japanese residents “would effect the end that we desire, to protect ourselves from hostile acts of some of these Japanese.” Taft forwarded Bell’s letter to Secretary of State Elihu Root. The letter, marked “Action to be taken regarding Japanese residents in the U.S. in case of war,” remained in the “confidential” files of the State Department.

The opinions expressed by Bell, Hughes, Hobson, and Roosevelt reflect the tenets of Social Darwinism, a theory of society and race highly popular in Great Britain and the United States from the late nineteenth century through World War II. As scientists
embraced the theory of evolution explained in Charles Darwin’s *On the Origin of Species* (1859), intellectuals projected the principles of natural selection, or “the survival of the fittest,” onto sociology and politics. Seeking confirmation from the natural world for their prejudices, American and European expansionists manipulated science to justify their subjugation of “inferior” peoples. The Western attainment of world power, they reasoned, had proven that Caucasians were most fit for rule, alone at the top of a racial hierarchy. Confident in this belief, in the 1870s and 1880s Social Darwinists in America lectured and published extensively not only on the Manifest Destiny of their nation, but on the worldwide manifest destiny of the “Anglo-Saxon race.”

The panic of 1893 and a prolonged economic depression shook that racial exuberance. A Darwinian America feared that the nation was in social decline. Looking for explanations, nativists claimed that an increase in immigration, particularly from Eastern Europe and Japan, caused the decay of “the American type.” Believing in “a patriotism of race as well as of country,” white Americans feared that people of color were uniting to contain and infiltrate what should be an expansive Anglo-Saxon civilization. “The dark races are gaining on us,” wrote Henry Adams in 1894. The threat was serious. “In another fifty years, at the same rate of movement, the white races will have to reconquer.” Americans spoke of the “yellow peril,” racial degradation, and the destruction of Western civilization.

This atmosphere fostered a eugenics movement in the United States. A term coined from the Greek roots for “good” and “origins,” eugenics encompassed a belief that genetic inheritance or “breeding” determined intelligence, abilities, morals, and behavior. “I look upon race as far more important than nurture,” explained the father of the
eugenics movement, Great Britain’s Sir Francis Galton, a cousin of Darwin. Eugenics claimed that racially superior Caucasians had a moral obligation to improve society by raising up people of superior breeding or race while expanding civilization throughout the world. Expansionists conflated this civilizing mission with a determination to subvert indigenous peoples’ cultures while lusting for their economic resources.

Nathaniel S. Shaler, an admirer of Galton and his work, was the dean of Harvard’s Lawrence Scientific School and arguably the foremost promoter of the eugenics movement in the United States. Like his colleagues, Shaler professed that democracy could only exist where Anglo-Saxon superiority was acknowledged and perpetuated. Described by his biographer as “a figure of legendary stature,” for more than three decades Shaler taught eugenics as “science” to a large percentage of the Harvard student body. Harvard students of this era went on to assume positions of power that shaped federal policy far into the twentieth century. “It was they who made up a disproportionate segment of the leadership that guided America as it emerged as a world power,” wrote anthropologist C. Loring Brace. Among Shaler’s students were the young Theodore Roosevelt and his fifth cousin, Franklin D. Roosevelt. FDR took more classes from Shaler than from any other Harvard professor. Like his cousin, Franklin imbibed Social Darwinian ideas of the time, writing of the Anglo-Boer wars that “it will be best from the humanitarian standpoint for the British to win speedily and civilization will be hurried on.” Later he wrote that Ethiopians were “probably in very much the stage of civilization as the small Kings and Barons were in Europe in the 12th Century.” Ethiopia’s emperor, he said, “is six centuries behind us.”
As president in 1908, Theodore Roosevelt drastically reduced Japanese immigration through the Gentlemen’s Agreement, temporarily assuaging the “yellow peril” hysteria. Japan’s government cordially invited the Great White Fleet to visit Tokyo in October 1908, where hundreds of Japanese acknowledged the armada and the authority it represented, waving American flags and singing the “Star-Spangled Banner” in English.26 Though war fears in the Pacific abated, the clash of two opposing waves of expansionism had intensified racialized crosscurrents that remained just below the surface.

Conflict in Europe diverted attention from the Pacific. On declaring war in 1914, Great Britain resurrected the internment policies proven effective in its defeat of the Boers. The British Empire’s Aliens Restriction Act and Defense of the Realm Act set the standard that other belligerent nations followed during World War I and expanded during World War II. The acts required aliens to register with the government and defined “alien enemies” as those born in nations with whom Britain was at war. Following these acts, authorities interned German and Austrian alien enemies throughout the empire. Internment camps spread rapidly around the world as belligerent governments followed Britain’s lead. By the end of World War I, Great Britain, Australia, South Africa, Canada, France, Austria, Germany, Russia, Romania, Italy, Portugal, the Ottoman Empire, and China had interned tens of thousands of “alien enemy” men, women, and children.27

Belligerents had various reasons for interning alien enemies: to keep military-aged males from joining enemy forces, to protect against espionage and sabotage, and to take hostages in retaliation for the actions of an enemy nation. Warring governments threatened reprisals against civilians and made reciprocal exchanges of internees. Women
and children were ostensibly interned for humanitarian purposes—to provide for them when their husbands and fathers were incarcerated—but they, too, came to be seen and used as hostages. Governments also utilized concentration camps and subsequent deportations to rid their nations of “undesirable” persons.\textsuperscript{28}  

After its declaration of war in 1917, the United States followed suit. Woodrow Wilson signed two presidential proclamations practically identical to Great Britain’s alien acts, citing Congress’s “Alien Enemy Act” as legal precedent. One of four “Alien and Sedition Acts” passed in 1798, the Alien Enemy Act authorized the president to prohibit from any area and to arrest and deport all “natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of a hostile nation” in time of war.\textsuperscript{29} Unlike the other three Alien and Sedition Acts, the Alien Enemy Act included no sunset provision.\textsuperscript{30}  

Wilson’s proclamations forbid alien enemies from “any locality which the President” or the Attorney General “may from time to time designate by Executive Order as a prohibited area.” Alien enemies were required to register with the government and carry registration cards at all times. They could not possess wirelesses, weapons, or explosives. They must not be found within the District of Columbia, the Panama Canal Zone, within a half mile of a government naval yard or war-materials factory or within one hundred yards of the shoreline of the United States or its territories. The proclamations authorized United States marshals and local officers to arrest, intern, and deport summarily all alien enemies who violated or were believed “to be about to violate any of these regulations.” They could also arrest any alien enemy whose freedom might cause “danger to the public peace or safety.” The proclamations concluded, “all such agents, agencies, officers and departments are hereby granted full authority for all acts
done by them in the execution of this regulation.”

Though the Alien Enemy Act and Wilson’s presidential proclamations only prescribed the evacuation, internment, and deportation of alien enemies, they laid the foundation for Executive Order 9066, which expanded the laws’ reach to encompass “any and all persons,” including American citizens.

The Labor and Justice Departments ran the internment program in the United States. Police arrested German and Austrian aliens from nearly every state, with most arrests in New York. Federal officials interned these aliens in camps at Ellis Island; Gloucester City, New Jersey; Hot Springs, North Carolina; Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia; and Fort Douglas, Utah. Under War Department pressure, authorities in Cuba, Haiti, Panama, American Samoa, Hawaii and the Philippines interned German and Austrian aliens and permitted their deportation to the United States. Like its European counterparts, the United States repatriated several thousand interned aliens and their dependents after the war, many against their will, including those shipped in from outside the country. It would have been impossible to intern millions of resident aliens and citizens of German and Austrian ancestry. Instead, local authorities arrested those alien enemies whom they arbitrarily judged to be in violation of Wilson’s presidential proclamations. Because they were not American citizens, these aliens had no public trial or habeas corpus rights.

Like other belligerent governments, the United States interned alien enemies in prisons and military forts or in race tracks, stables, and show grounds while larger detention centers were hastily constructed. These “camps” throughout the world, arbitrarily referred to as concentration camps, detention camps, or internment camps, were often wooden barracks heated by coal stoves, surrounded by barbed-wire fences,
and located in isolated areas. Sentries guarded the camps, shooting internees who drew too near the fences.\(^{34}\)

With few exceptions, Americans did not question the legality or the necessity of alien enemy internment. “While war was in progress,” Yale Law School professor and international law specialist Edwin Borchard explained in 1920, “there was every reason why we should exercise control and custody over those persons who might be deemed of potential danger to the United States, whether in fact they were so or not.”\(^{35}\)

In discussing internment policy, a watchword that officials repeatedly used was “loyalty.” A person’s professed or even demonstrated loyalty was irrelevant. During World War I, officials worldwide assumed that citizenship automatically determined loyalty. “Any enemy subject in any country” at war “would, no doubt, deem it patriotic and as constituting loyalty to their respective countries to do what they could to injure the common enemy,” explained one American Consul-General in 1918. “If I were similarly situated I would assist my country wherever possible, and would naturally expect to be interned.”\(^{36}\) Many believed that place of birth trumped citizenship. Thus the Justice Department, under British and Canadian insistence, permitted the internment of naturalized United States citizens who had been born in Germany or Austria. “The present war has shaken to its foundations the whole fabric of naturalization,” protested the head of the State Department’s Citizenship Bureau.\(^{37}\)

Still others argued that the government should intern any American judged to be “disloyal,” regardless of citizenship status and native birth. In his 1917 book, The Foes of Our Own Household, former president Theodore Roosevelt advocated the internment of “disloyal” German Americans along with German aliens. “Every disloyal German-born
citizen should have his naturalization papers recalled and should be interned during the term of the war,” he said. “Every disloyal native-born American should be disfranchised and interned. It is time to strike our enemies at home” by “suppress[ing] the tens of thousands of Germans and German Americans who . . . intrigue and conspire against the United States.” 

38
Four years after World War I, in a continuing atmosphere of nativist suspicion of immigrants’ nationality and race, the United States Supreme Court ruled in 1922 that Japanese immigrants could not become naturalized citizens. The withholding of citizenship from these individuals kept them on permanent probation as aliens and limited their rights. As long as immigrants remained aliens, the Bureau of Naturalization reasoned in 1922, they could be deported, “but once they succeed in obtaining their citizenship, this method of purging our country becomes more difficult.” Two years later, Congress passed the Oriental Exclusion Act, cutting off all Japanese immigration. 39

Franklin D. Roosevelt, now practicing law in New York, agreed with the legislation and rulings. In March 1923 he penned an article he titled “The Japs—A Habit of Mind.” Asia, a popular American magazine that reported on Asia and its people, published Roosevelt’s piece on July 23, under the edited title of “Shall We Trust Japan?” Though the Japanese and other Asians were a “race . . . of acknowledged dignity and integrity,” Roosevelt wrote,

it must be admitted that, as a whole, [Americans] honestly believe—and in this belief they are at one with the people of Australasia and Canada—that the mingling of white with oriental blood on an extensive scale is harmful to our future citizenship. . . . Americans object to the holding of large
amounts of real property, of land, by aliens or those descended from mixed marriages. Frankly, they do not want non-assimilable immigrants as citizens. \(^{40}\)

Roosevelt reiterated this position in one of nine weekly columns written for Georgia’s *Macon Telegraph*. On April 30, 1925, one week after his column defending European immigrants, Roosevelt complained that “Japanese jingoes” were protesting Asian exclusion laws. He offered a racial justification for the exclusion. Californians had “properly objected” to the many thousands of Japanese settling in the United States and raising “children who become American citizens,” he wrote, “on the sound basic ground that Japanese immigrants are not capable of assimilation into the American populations.”

Reflecting the views of Social Darwinists and eugenicists, Roosevelt claimed that “anyone who has traveled in the Far East knows that the mingling of Asiatic blood with European or American blood produces, in nine cases out of ten, the most unfortunate results.” He continued: “many cultivated, highly educated and delightful Japanese” had told him that “they would feel the same repugnance and objection” to thousands of Americans settling in Japan and marrying Japanese as he himself felt “in having large numbers of Japanese come over here and intermarry with the American population. In this question then of Japanese exclusion from the United States, it is necessary only to advance the true reason—the undesirability of mixing the blood of the two peoples.”

Legislation had stopped the flow of Japanese immigrants to the United States. But the previous immigrants’ American-born children, in the minds Roosevelt and others, presented a more perplexing problem because they already were United States citizens. \(^{41}\)

In the 1930s, as worry grew about Japan’s growing militarism and expansionism along the Pacific Rim, U.S. leaders called for the internment of Japanese persons, both
citizen and alien, in Hawaii. In March 1933, the same month that Japan withdrew from the League of Nations after being censured for its expansionist policies, newspaper publisher Frank Knox sounded an alarm about Asian residents of the Hawaiian Islands. Knox had been one of Theodore Roosevelt’s “Rough Riders” in the Spanish-American War and, after pressing for American involvement in World War I, held the rank of Major as an artillery officer in France. After a trip to Hawaii, Knox wrote fellow World War I veteran and Deputy Chief of Staff Hugh Drum that he was “tremendously impressed and alarmed at the threat to our security” by “the swift growth and power of Japanese, Chinese, and Filipino citizens, who dictate to the political government and imperil the safety of our army garrison and our naval base in case of trouble with Japan. The first military precaution to be taken in Hawaii is to intern every Japanese resident before the beginning of hostilities threatens.” Knox’s words were reminiscent of Chief of Staff J.F. Bell’s 1908 letter.

Drum, who became commanding general of the Hawaii Department in 1935, agreed with Knox. For Knox, Drum, and other Americans fearful of an Asian enemy, loyalty now became a matter of race. “Orientals,” they believed, would not be loyal. After visiting each of the Hawaiian Islands and meeting with “leading American residents thereof,” Drum wrote on September 21, 1935, “I am convinced that few of the Orientals will be loyal in case of war. . . . It is the experience of all nations, including the United States, that mixtures of widely dissimilar racial elements constitute a serious problem in time of emergency. . . . The World War shows that during an emergency armed forces are often necessary to protect loyal citizens as against disaffected and rebellious ones.”
In October 1935, the Military Intelligence Division in Washington evaluated the danger. Using the code word of “Orange” for “Japan” or “Japanese,” a General Staff assessment claimed that “if Hawaii could be taken internally by Orange adherents in the territory[,] Orange could without great risk dispatch an expedition to make its capture secure.”

On May 19, 1936, the Joint Board’s Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral W. H. Standley, wrote Secretary of War Harry Woodring, arguing that American defensive forces must guard against a surprise sea or air attack on the Hawaiian Islands. Such an attack, Standley warned, could be aided by “the great potential power of hostile sympathizers on those Islands” through “sabotage or armed insurrection.”

President Franklin D. Roosevelt became concerned after reading a May 25, 1936, report of Hawaii’s Joint Planning Committee. The report noted that Japanese residents were entertaining sailors from Japanese naval vessels visiting Hawaiian ports. “One obvious thought occurs to me,” Roosevelt wrote Standley on August 10, 1936, “that every Japanese citizen or non-citizen . . . who meets these Japanese ships or has any connection with their officers or men should be secretly but definitely identified and his or her name placed on a special list of those who would be the first to be placed in a concentration camp in the event of trouble.” Roosevelt advised that “a Joint Board should consider and adopt plans relating to the Japanese population of all the islands.” Roosevelt’s “obvious thought” was consistent with the internment and deportation policy of World War I, when the United States Navy helped carry out the policy and Roosevelt served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Though now, fearing an Asian foe as well as European ones and believing in Social Darwinism’s “patriotism of race,” Roosevelt and
his contemporaries advocated the internment of Japanese American citizens along with alien enemies.\footnote{Standley wrote to the Army Chief of Staff that the president had asked him and the Navy Secretary “what arrangements and plans have been made relative to concentration camps in the Hawaiian Islands for dangerous or undesirable aliens or citizens in the event of national emergency.”} In late August, Secretary of War Harry Woodring reported to Roosevelt that the Joint Board was evaluating the president’s recommendations and that Hawaiian Department Commander Drum had established an Army “Service Command” to control “aliens and alien sympathizers.” In war time, Woodring said, military and civil forces would join to prevent civilian sabotage and uprisings, “aided in its control of potentially hostile Japanese by the local knowledge of its agents” and “the backing of Regular Army units.”\footnote{Under Drum’s orders, World War I veteran and Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence George S. Patton Jr. drew up operational plans for the Command. Though the report was titled “A General Staff Study. Plan: Initial Seizure of Orange Nationals,” the plan applied to Japanese American citizens as well as Japanese aliens. Lieutenant Colonel Patton wrote that the primary objective was to maintain “internal security” through the internment of “certain persons of the Orange race” who were “most inimical to American interests” and “those whom, due to their position and influence in the Orange community, it is desirable to retain as hostages.” Following World War I strategies, the military could use these hostages to control the Japanese community in Hawaii and as a reprisal reserve in case of Japanese attack. The plan included a list of 128 Japanese “citizens and non-citizens” in the Hawaiian Islands who would be interned first.}
concluded its evaluation in October 1936, Standley wrote Woodring that “it is a routine matter for those responsible for military intelligence to maintain lists of suspects, who will normally be the first to be interned . . . in the event of war.”

By May 1937, Roosevelt was also worried about rumors of a sudden increase in the Japanese population on the west coast of Mexico. He called on his staff to evaluate the reports. In a May 21 memo, Woodring responded that there had been no “clandestine influx of large numbers of Japanese” to Lower (Baja) California and that Japanese fishing activity in the area was legitimate. “Considering the alertness of the United States Consuls on the West Coast of Mexico, the periodic visits of our naval vessels to the coast line of Lower California, . . . and the continued watchfulness of the War Department agencies” in Mexico, Woodring said, there was no cause for alarm.

Clearly, a Japanese menace loomed large in Roosevelt’s mind. He rejected Woodring’s findings. “I do not think that this report is satisfactory,” Roosevelt replied to Woodring the next day. Roosevelt called Woodring’s assertion that naval ships would notice irregularities in the Japanese population of Baja “wholly absurd. The officers and men see nothing of what goes on one hundred feet back from the beach.” Roosevelt insisted that Army intelligence “procure a careful check” of the area. Within a few weeks Roosevelt also asked Woodring for a report on “Japanese activities” throughout Mexico, Central America, and Panama. That October, the Joint Board in Washington proposed the regulation of Japanese fishing boats along the California coast and Hawaii, as well as the replacement of Japanese workers on U.S. defense projects.

Roosevelt’s May 16, 1940, address to Congress elucidated the president’s thinking. As war raged in Asia and Europe and conflict threatened in North Africa,
Roosevelt asked Congress to appropriate more than one billion dollars to prepare for war. Though the Atlantic and Pacific oceans previously provided a buffer around the Western Hemisphere, Roosevelt explained that recent developments in air navigation had brought “new possibilities of the use of nearer bases from which an attack or attacks on the American Continents could be made.” From West Africa, airplanes could fly to Brazil within seven hours. Brazil was but four flying hours from Venezuela. Venezuela was only two-and-a-half hours from Cuba and the Canal Zone, which were two and one-quarter hours from Tampico, Mexico. Tampico was just over two hours from St. Louis, Kansas City, and Omaha. “On the other side of the continent,” Roosevelt continued, “Alaska, with a white population of only 30,000 people, is within four or five hours of flying distance to Vancouver, Seattle, Tacoma, and Portland. The Islands of the southern Pacific are not too far removed from the west coast of South America to prevent them from becoming bases of enormous strategic advantage to attacking forces.” Without providing specifics, Roosevelt also stated that “We have seen the treacherous use of the ‘fifth column,’ by which persons supposed to be peaceful visitors were actually a part of an enemy unit.”

Roosevelt’s speech brought the far-off wars of Europe and Asia home to Americans. It also laid out his policy that protecting the nation meant guarding the entire Western Hemisphere, the same view that President Theodore Roosevelt and his colleagues had in 1907 as the Great White Fleet sailed toward the Pacific. Reflecting his Social Darwinian beliefs, FDR concluded that the United States must protect “the whole American hemisphere against invasion or control or domination by non-American nations.” Later he privately expressed his concern that “the yellow race, which is far
more numerous than the white,” might “eventually use all the machines of western civilization to overrun & conquer the white race.”

A few days after his address to Congress, Roosevelt received a letter from his friend and informal advisor, Henry L. Stimson. Like Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt, Stimson received a degree from Harvard during the era when the tenets of Social Darwinism were so strongly professed. Stimson then served as Secretary of War from 1911-13, as a Lieutenant Colonel during World War I, as Governor-General in the Philippines from 1927-29, as Secretary of State from 1929-33, and as Roosevelt and Hull’s informal advisor beginning in 1933. “I sincerely hope that those of our fellow countrymen who have been asleep thus far have at last awakened,” Stimson wrote FDR, expressing his “most hearty sympathy and approval” of Roosevelt’s speech to Congress. Dismissing the concerns of what he called “last ditch isolationists,” Stimson told the president that he was “gratified to see what appear to be the evidences of a truly united national feeling springing up over the country, and I feel confident that you will meet and cooperate with such a feeling.”

The following day, Roosevelt confided to Stimson that he was “worried both by ‘fifth column’ activities over here, and also by the large number of college student groups who are not only isolationists but completely pacifist.” Stimson concurred. “Experience in Europe had given warning of the danger of the fifth column,” he later said, “and had shown that residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy are a greater source of danger than those of different ancestry.”

Within a few weeks, Roosevelt asked for the resignation of his non-interventionist Secretary of War Harry Woodring. In June 1940 Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison
also resigned. The Democrat president then made an unusual move by replacing them with two Republicans, Stimson and Frank Knox, the newspaperman who in 1933 called for the internment of “every Japanese resident” of Hawaii as a “military precaution.”

Within weeks of these replacements, the War and Justice Departments stepped up surveillance of alien enemies from Japan, Germany, and Italy, while Congress passed the Alien Registration Act. Reminiscent of World War I, the act required alien residents of the United States and its territories to register, be fingerprinted, and file a statement of their personal and occupational status and political beliefs. From this registration, Army Intelligence and the Justice Department’s FBI compiled a list of German, Italian, and Japanese aliens considered dangerous or subversive to be arrested or interned on the outbreak of war. At this point, the focus was only on noncitizens of the United States. But the statements of Roosevelt, Stimson, and Knox reveal that those in the highest echelons of government were already open to the wartime internment of Japanese Americans.

In the summer of 1941, Japan detained one hundred American citizens in retaliation for the United States’s freezing of its assets. Such escalating conflicts between the two nations sparked fears of official retribution in the United States. “We talk of almost nothing but this great crisis,” one Japanese American told a Los Angeles Times reporter in early August. “Sometimes we only look for a concentration camp.” Exactly one month before Pearl Harbor, the November 7, 1941, “Munson report” informed Roosevelt and other federal officials that “Japanese on the West Coast” were already worried, “hop[ing] that by remaining quiet they can avoid concentration camps.” Others, perhaps recalling the World War I experience, championed retaliatory internment
of Japanese nationals even before a declaration of war. On August 18, Congressman John Dingell of Michigan wrote Roosevelt that, “if it is the intention of Japan to enter into a reprisal contest,” then the federal government should “cause the forceful detention or imprisonment in a concentration camp of ten thousand alien Japanese.” Dingell argued that the government should also “remind Japan that there are perhaps one hundred fifty thousand additional alien Japanese in the U.S. who will be held in a reprisal reserve whose status will depend upon Japan’s next aggressive move.”  

As the Justice Department and Army prepared lists of alien enemies to arrest in the United States and its territories on the outbreak of war, the State Department, through its foreign embassies, orchestrated internment plans in the wider Western Hemisphere. On October 20, 1941, U.S. ambassador to Panama Edwin Wilson reminded Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles of Panama’s internment of German aliens during World War I. Now, “in the event that we suddenly find ourselves at war with Japan . . . the attitude of the Panamanian Government is thoroughly cooperative. . . . Immediately following action by the United States to intern Japanese in the United States, Panama would arrest Japanese on Panamanian territory and intern them . . . all expenses and costs of internment and guarding to be paid by the United States.”

Ambassador Wilson and other officials throughout World War II typically used the blanket term, “Japanese,” failing to distinguish between citizens of Japanese ancestry and Japanese aliens. Eight days after the ambassador wrote his letter, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall attempted to make that distinction, writing Welles that while it was “gratifying” to know of Panama’s willingness to cooperate with the United States, he suggested “that the agreement be enlarged to provide for internment of all persons
believed dangerous, who are regarded by the US as enemy aliens,” including Germans and Italians.  

By the day after Pearl Harbor, Secretary of State Hull had initiated negotiations for the exchange of Japanese aliens in the United States for Americans in Japan, with Roosevelt helping him find vessels for the exchange. After Germany declared war on the United States, Hull also worked out an agreement for the exchange of Americans and Germans. The State Department chartered two Swedish cruise ships, the *Gripsholm* and *Drottningholm*, and used them throughout and after the war to exchange internees and deport “undesirable” civilians, including aliens and Japanese Americans. Some of these Japanese Americans were minors who were deported to Japan with their Japanese-immigrant parents. Others were adults with dual citizenship who revoked their United States citizenship and accepted deportation to Japan to free themselves from internment.
Within twenty-four hours of Pearl Harbor, following the patterns of World War I, Canada, Panama and other cooperating countries in the Western Hemisphere began arresting people of Japanese, German, and Italian ancestry while the Justice Department, working through the FBI and local police, rounded up some 1,200 enemy aliens in the United States and Hawaii using long-prepared lists. Many of those arrested in Latin America were eventually shipped to the United States for internment. Five days after Pearl Harbor, Hull instructed Ambassador Wilson to build a camp in Panama to serve as a holding area for the transshipment of arrestees to detention centers in the United States. In theory, the internment policy only applied to enemy aliens. In reality, Latin American citizens of Japanese, German, and Italian descent were interned along with aliens.68

On January 2, 1942, the Japanese army captured the Philippine capital of Manila. By January 5, the Japanese had rounded up some 3,500 British, Dutch, and American citizens in the Philippines and forced them into a makeshift internment center in two buildings at Manila’s Santo Tomas University. Subsisting on a meager diet of rice, garlic, and occasional fish and cornmeal, these internees slowly starved. Dysentery, measles,
smallpox, and jaundice ravaged the compound. The Japanese army also detained thousands of Allied citizens in various parts of Japan and occupied China.  

With War Department support, the State Department intensified its efforts to incarcerate Japanese, German, and Italian aliens from throughout the Western Hemisphere. At a Conference of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics held in Rio de Janeiro on January 19, 1942, Undersecretary of State Welles warned of “subversive activities.” He outlined “numerous measures to be taken against potential fifth columnists and the control of all foreigners.” He recommended the creation of an inter-American “Emergency Committee for Political Defense” to coordinate these measures. The committee immediately formed and adopted a State Department-drafted resolution stressing the necessity of immediate, preventive detention of “dangerous aliens” from all Axis nations and the “deportation of such persons to another American republic for detention when adequate local detention facilities are lacking.” The United States offered to be that American republic, providing not only detention centers but also shipping transports for the deportees “at its own expense.” Many aliens had spouses and children born in Latin America. These could choose to be deported and interned as dependents to keep their families together. A second part of the resolution revealed an additional motive: the State Department offered to include any detained “nationals of the participating republics in whatever exchange arrangements the U.S. would subsequently make with Axis powers.” Immediately after the formation of the Emergency Committee for Political Defense, a member of the U.S. embassy in Mexico criticized Mexico for its “apathy” and wrote Secretary of State Hull that he “hoped that pressure from this
Committee may increase the effectiveness of Mexican cooperation in the relatively near future.”

The inter-American agency was effective in Mexico and Central America, “but it required the dispatch to the four northwestern countries of South America [Columbia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru] a special representative of the Department and constant contact and supervision of the expulsion movement in order to have it succeed,” wrote Secretary of State Hull. When the arrests were made, simply being an alien was the criterion that made a suspect “dangerous.” By August 1942, the governments of Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Venezuela, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia had incarcerated and shipped to the United States for internment more than 3,000 civilians—Japanese, German, and Italian nationals along with those born in Latin America. Chile and Paraguay later joined that list, and by 1945 the United States interned thousands more deportees from Latin America. Brazil instituted its own detention program, interning at least 8,300 Japanese Brazilians and aliens.

The State Department also secretly used propaganda to win and maintain support for its internment policies. The U.S. ambassador to Chile submitted a twenty-page memorandum to the Chilean government suggesting that an alien spy network existed in that country. This network was not only a violation of Chilean sovereignty, declared the memo, but also a menace to the Western Hemisphere.

In Peru, which had a population of some 30,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, the U.S. embassy recommended the removal of key Japanese leaders and the encouragement of “propaganda intended to call attention of the Peruvians to the Japanese dangers. . . .
Ways may be found to provide . . . material without of course permitting the source to become known as the Embassy.”

These tactics were effective. Three months later, the American embassy in Peru could report to the State Department that Peruvian President Manuel Prado was “very much interested [in] getting rid of the Japanese in Peru. . . . He is thinking in terms of repatriating thousands of Japanese. . . . The President’s goal apparently is the substantial elimination of the Japanese colony in Peru,” which included Japanese Peruvian citizens. One of these deportees later reported, “We were taken to the port of Callao [in Peru] and embarked on an American transport under strict guard and with machine gun[s] pointed at us by American soldiers.”

U.S. Army transports brought prisoners from Latin America to ports in New Orleans, San Francisco, and San Pedro, California. Because soldiers on the transports seized passports and other personal documentation of the deportees before their arrival at American ports, officials of the Immigration and Naturalization service had the deportees arrested on the grounds that they were illegal immigrants. The Justice Department then interned them in camps in California, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Mexico, New York, Texas, and Wisconsin. These camps were distinct from the ten “War Relocation Authority” (WRA) camps that housed Japanese Americans and Japanese resident aliens of the United States.

While the State Department garnered support for the internment policy throughout Latin America, the War Department worked to win support for it at home. Following precedent, the Justice Department was responsible for civilian affairs and the internment of alien enemies. War Department leaders in Washington could not carry out plans to
intern Japanese American citizens as well as aliens until it had the approval of the Justice Department. This created conflict between the two departments. During the last week of December 1941, U.S. Attorney General Francis Biddle sent Assistant Attorney General James Rowe to the San Francisco headquarters of Western Defense Commander John De Witt. Rowe’s mission was to ensure General De Witt’s support for keeping alien internment efforts under the civilian control of the Justice Department. At that time, De Witt said that although he supported the internment of “enemy aliens,” he did not see the internment of Japanese Americans as necessary. “I don’t think it’s a sensible thing to do,” said De Witt. “An American Citizen, after all, is an American citizen. And while they all may not be loyal, I think we can weed the disloyal out of the loyal and lock them up if necessary.”

When Washington-based Provost Marshal General A.W. Gullion telephoned De Witt on December 26, De Witt also stated that “it would be better if [the internment of enemy aliens] worked through the civil channels.” Irritated, Gullion said that “the Attorney General is not functioning” and threatened to have Stimson complain to President Roosevelt. Gullion apparently followed through on his threat. Several weeks later, Stimson reported to the president that he had been “pressing hard on the Panama defenses, and spending a good deal of time on De Witt and the West Coast.”

Immediately after his phone conversation with De Witt, Gullion sent the head of the aliens division for the provost marshal general’s office, Major Karl R. Bendetson, to De Witt’s Presidio headquarters, even while Rowe was still present. Bendetson was a Stanford Law School graduate in his early thirties who went on active duty as a captain in 1940. Within a few months after his arrival at the Presidio he changed the spelling of his last name and received a double promotion to colonel. Bendetson became the Army’s
instrument in shifting authority for the internment of noncombatants in the United States from the civilian control of the Justice Department to the military control of the War Department. Under Bendetson’s pressure, De Witt’s opinion on Japanese American incarceration also quickly changed. In a January 1 phone conversation, De Witt told Gullion’s deputy, Colonel Archer Lerch, “I don’t want to go after this thing piece meal. I want to do it on a mass basis.”

To please his superiors, De Witt changed his argument from “an American Citizen . . . is an American citizen” to “a Jap is a Jap,” trumping citizenship with race.

West Coast agitation for mass evacuation also shifted shortly after Bendetson’s arrival. In an effort to shape public opinion and win widespread support of mass evacuation, Bendetson quickly set up a publicity office at the Presidio. He gave public speeches and, using journalistic experience he had gained while working for his hometown and Stanford newspapers, issued official press releases and gave interviews advocating the military necessity of interning not only enemy aliens, but also Japanese Americans. Bendetson’s office closely monitored the reactions of the press and the public, keeping clippings of hundreds of news articles on the subject until the spring of 1942. Through Bendetson, the War Department fanned the flames of racism to win public, political, and ultimately Justice Department support for its plans to intern American citizens of Japanese descent. In other words, public sentiment did not lead Washington to initiate internment plans. Rather, Washington mobilized the grassroots.

A February 4, 1942, memorandum provides an example of the racialized propaganda Bendetson released. Interning only alien Japanese “would accomplish little as a measure of safety,” he wrote, because Japanese Americans’ “affections, if any, for
the U.S. will not be stimulated by the wholesale removal of their parents.” The vast majority of those who have studied “the Oriental” believed that a majority of Japanese Americans are loyal to Japan and “at the proper time will engage in organized sabotage, particularly should a raid along the P[acific] C[oast] be attempted by the Japanese,” he claimed. “As you cannot penetrate the Oriental thinking and as you cannot tell which ones are loyal and which ones are not, . . . it is the easiest course to remove them all from the West Coast.”

On the day he issued this memo, Bendetson changed the spelling of his name to “Bendetsen.” His colleagues adopted the change. Though his grandparents were Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe, Bendetsen claimed Danish ancestry.

Playing on fears of the “yellow peril,” Bendetsen’s efforts were effective. “Colonel Bendetson . . . has developed a publicity organization that [Assistant Secretary of War] John J. McCloy thinks is doing a good job,” a State Department employee wrote in an interdepartmental memo. McCloy “receives each day large quantities of clippings from West Coast papers giving publicity to statements that are issued by Colonel Bendetsen’s office.”

The ground had been well prepared. Just in time for publication in Sunday morning newspapers on January 25, 1942, the government released the findings of the Roberts Commission on Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt appointed the commission, chaired by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, to ascertain the facts relating to the Pearl Harbor attack. The report mentioned rumored espionage activities of Japanese consular agents, which the media reported as “the fifth column at work.” Though Honolulu Chief of Police W. A. Gabrielson, congressional delegate Samuel King of Hawaii, and FBI director J. Edgar Hoover refuted the stories of sabotage and espionage by Japanese aliens and citizens, the report had a significant effect
on the West Coast press, politicians, and public. During the week of January 26 through
February 1—beginning the day after the publication of the Roberts Report—the number
of editorials, letters, and telegrams demanding expulsion of Japanese Americans along
with aliens jumped. That number dramatically increased each week until Roosevelt
signed Executive Order 9066.  

On January 29, four days after the Roberts Report’s publication and two days
after meeting with California Governor Culbert Olson, De Witt reported to Bendetsen
that “there’s a tremendous volume of public opinion now developing against the Japanese
of all classes, that is aliens and non-aliens, to get them off the land. . . . Since the
publication of the Roberts Report they feel that they are living in the midst of a lot of
enemies. They don’t trust the Japanese, none of them.”  Though War Department
officials had urged De Witt to advocate Japanese American internment rather than the
other way around, Bendetsen asked De Witt if he would be willing to accept
responsibility for such a program. “As I understand it,” Bendetsen said in summarizing
De Witt’s phone conversation, “you are of the opinion that there will have to be an
evacuation on the west coast, not only of Japanese aliens but also of Japanese citizens,
that is, you would include citizens along with alien enemies, and . . . if you were
requested you would be willing on the coast to accept responsibility.”

“Yes I would,” De Witt answered. “And I think it’s got to come sooner or later.”

“Yes sir, I do too,” Bendetsen replied, “and I think the subject may be discussed
tomorrow at the congressional delegation meeting.”

Bendetsen referred to an informal meeting of the Pacific Coast House delegation,
an ad hoc caucus of western representatives. Though he said that “he was present as an
observer,” in his telephone conversations with De Witt before and after the meeting he made it clear that he had promoted the internment of all West Coast Japanese. Bendetsen told the delegation that “the War Department would be entirely willing” to accept responsibility for a mass internment “provided they accorded the War Department, and the Secretary of War, and the military commander under him, full authority to require the services” of any federal civil agency (meaning the Justice Department), and that the civil agency would be “required to respond.” 90

“That’s good,” De Witt replied. “Mr. Hoover himself as head of the FBI would have to function under the War Department exactly as he is functioning under the Department of Justice.” 91 Hoover had refused to respond to military alarms regarding fifth-column activity among Japanese Americans. In 1940, complaining that he did not trust the competence of the Military Intelligence Division, he had directed FBI agents to investigate Japanese aliens. In November that year, these agents reported that only Japanese-alien “leaders; that is, the Buddhist and Shintoist priests, the Japanese language-school teachers, the consular agents and a small percentage of prominent alien Japanese businessmen,” would be a threat in case of war with Japan. “Upon the interning of the Japanese leaders in the community, there need be no fear” of other Japanese aliens or Japanese American populations, the report stated. 92 Clearly, Hoover did not join the rush to judgment that pressed Roosevelt and military officials toward mass evacuation.

Bendetsen encouraged De Witt to continue to push for military authority over the “Japanese problem” as if it had been De Witt’s idea in the first place, telling him that “opinion is beginning to become irresistible, and I think that anything you recommend will be strongly backed up . . . by the public.” 93
The Pacific Coast congressional delegation immediately prepared its recommendations. On the day of their meeting with Bendetsen, in a letter to Secretary of War Stimson, the delegation requested mass evacuation of “all enemy aliens and their families,” which encompassed Japanese Americans. California Attorney General Earl Warren entered the fray on the same day, when an Associated Press news release quoted him saying that “the Japanese situation as it exists in this state today may well be the Achilles’ heel of the entire civilian defense effort.”

Two days later, on February 1, Bendetsen, Gullion, and Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy visited Attorney General Biddle and Assistant Attorney General Rowe in Biddle’s office in Washington D.C. Though Biddle supported the wartime internment of “alien enemy” Japanese, he protested the growing public and political pressure for the internment of Japanese Americans. He argued that neither he nor the FBI had found any evidence of Japanese American sabotage. Biddle presented the Army men with a proposed joint press release, which read in part: “The Department of War and the Department of Justice are in agreement that the present military situation does not at this time require the removal of American citizens of the Japanese race. The Secretary of War, General De Witt, the Attorney General, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation believe that the appropriate steps have been and are being taken.”

The meeting became tense when the Army officials refused to approve the press release. Rowe brought up his earlier visit to De Witt’s headquarters, when the Western Defense Commander had told him he did not think mass evacuation was necessary. Rowe wondered aloud what had changed De Witt’s mind, then made uncomplimentary remarks about Bendetsen. He then said there was “no evidence whatsoever of any reason for
disturbing citizens.” When Biddle insisted that the Justice Department would have nothing to do with the unconstitutional disturbance of innocent citizens, Gullion reportedly became “sore” and said, “Well, listen, Mr. Biddle, do you mean to tell me if the Army, the men on the ground, determine it is a military necessity to move citizens, Jap citizens, that you won’t help us?” After Biddle restated his position, McCloy answered, “If it is a question of safety of the country, [or] the Constitution of the United States, why the Constitution is just a scrap of paper to me.”

Such pressure on the Justice Department head was unrelenting, even from within his department. The following day, February 2, California Attorney General Earl Warren called a conference of California law enforcement officials, where he secured passage of a resolution that “[a]ll alien Japanese be forthwith evacuated from all areas in the state of California to some place in the interior.” But by February 7, Warren changed his statement as De Witt had done, saying the military should remove “any or all Japanese” from military zones. On February 21, Warren echoed the racial argument set forth in Bendetsen’s February 4 memo when he testified before a U.S. House of Representatives committee. “When we are dealing with the Caucasian race, we have methods that will test the loyalty of them,” Warren said, but “when we deal with the Japanese, we are in an entirely different field and we cannot form any opinion.” This testimony came just a day before Stimson told Roosevelt that he had been “pressing hard” on the West Coast. Even Justice Department officials were coming on board with the War Department’s goals.

On February 5, Stimson had written Hull that General Douglas MacArthur reported that the Japanese army’s harsh treatment of Americans and British in occupied
Philippines, in sharp contrast to its moderate treatment of Filipinos, was “unquestionably
designed to discredit the white race.” Stimson suggested that Hull “present a threat of
reprisals against the many Japanese nationals now enjoying negligible restrictions in the
United States, to insure proper treatment of our nationals in the Philippines.” On the same
day, Stimson drew up formal plans that would authorize the internment of Japanese
Americans as well as Japanese nationals. Six days later, after presenting these plans to
Roosevelt, Stimson wrote in his diary that he “fortunately found that he [the president]
was very vigorous about it.” After that meeting, Assistant Secretary of War McCloy told
Bendetsen, “We have carte blanche to do what we want to as far as the President is
concerned.”

The following day, Biddle capitulated to the pressure. He wrote Stimson on
February 12 that he had “no doubt that the Army can legally, at any time, evacuate all
persons in a specified territory if such action is deemed essential.” Though “American
citizens of Japanese origin could not, in my opinion, be singled out of an area and
evacuated with the other [alien] Japanese, . . . the result might be accomplished by
evacuating all persons in the area and then licensing [allowing] back those whom the
military authorities thought were not objectionable.”

On February 19, Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, transferring authority to
designate restricted areas from the Attorney General to the Secretary of War. The carefully
worded order also authorized the Secretary of War and his designees to exclude from these
areas and intern “any or all persons.” Though Japanese Americans were not specifically
mentioned, the War Department applied this broad categorization to them. Finally, the
order stipulated that the Attorney General and the Justice Department continue to prescribe
“regulations for the conduct and control of alien enemies,” except as superseded by the military. Hence, Secretary of War Henry Stimson authorized his designee Colonel Karl Bendetsen to oversee the forced evacuation of Japanese Americans and Japanese aliens and their placement in WRA camps, while the Attorney General oversaw, in separate “Justice Department camps,” the internment of Japanese aliens from Latin America and German and Italian aliens from the United States and Latin America.102

The day after Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, a conciliatory Biddle wrote the president that the Justice Department “gives very broad powers to the Secretary of War and the Military Commanders. . . . The decision of safety of the nation in time of war is necessarily for the Military authorities. Authority over the movement of persons, whether citizens or non-citizens, may be exercised in time of war.”103

The military had led West Coast representatives to believe that they were primarily responsible for making the internment happen. “The Army was only slightly more willing than the Justice Department to evacuate the Japs,” said Congressman Ed V. Izac of California. “Evacuation would never have taken place if the united Pacific Coast delegations had not applied pressure—not only upon the Attorney-General and the Secretary of War—but also on the President himself.” Congressman John Coffee of Washington stated. “The War Department was not at all anxious to take over evacuation. It would not have taken action without the strong remonstrance of the congressional delegation. The War Department needed prodding, and the ‘flag-wavers’ supplied it.”104

Until late 1942, Stimson, Knox, and Roosevelt advocated interning the entire Japanese population of Hawaii, including aliens and citizens, either in mainland camps or on the island of Molokai. Though Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, head of Army intelligence
in Hawaii, conceded that it had “long been realized that from a security standpoint it would be desirable to remove all persons of Japanese extraction from the Territory of Hawaii,” he reported in December 1942 that such a measure would be impractical. The United States did not have sufficient ships to transport the potential internee population of 160,000. Even if it did, such a mass internment would disrupt the territory’s economy to the detriment of the American war effort. Fielder’s report demonstrated that workers of Japanese ancestry comprised 45 percent of the territory’s manufacturing industry, 30 percent of its transportation industry, and 24 percent of its agricultural labor. As an alternative to mass internment, he recommended keeping the Japanese community under military control through continuing its policy of “periodic searches” and “detention” of the community’s prominent aliens. Fielder’s recommendations prevailed. The military interned fewer than 2,000 Japanese aliens in Hawaii—Buddhist and Shinto priests, publishers, editors, reporters, language-school teachers, businessmen, and doctors.105

In August 1942, Secretary of State Hull wrote to Roosevelt of the State Department’s ongoing Latin American policy of arrest, internment, and repatriation. Two shiploads of German aliens and their family members had been exchanged for citizens of Western Hemispheric countries. These German exchangees were “aliens whom the Latin American Governments desired to be rid of,” said Hull, deported from the American Republics of Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Venezuela, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia on the condition that they would be traded for their detained citizens.

Secretary of State Hull’s letter was reminiscent of Bell’s 1908 position. Like Bell, Hull was “very much concerned” about the potential for sabotage from German aliens
still at large “in those countries to the south of us, roaming more or less at liberty throughout areas where they can do serious damage and send information detrimental to our cause.” Loyal to their country of birth, they might destroy power plants, communication facilities, mines producing “essential materials,” storage houses, and harbor facilities that American ships used. These aliens must be deported to their “home” country, Hull wrote, or interned. Hull also focused on the “Japanese situation.” Some 3,300 American citizens were now detained in Japan-occupied China. “Many of them are substantial persons who have represented important American business and commercial interests.” Some were in concentration camps and some had limited liberty, but all were subject to “cruel and harsh treatment by their oppressors. Under our agreement with Japan, which is still operating, we will be able to remove these people [through] two more trips of the Gripsholm. . . . In exchange for them we will have to send out Japanese in the same quantity.” Separating loyalty from citizenship, Hull recommended that the United States continue “efforts to remove all the Japanese from these American Republic countries for internment in the United States.” Joining loyalty to citizenship, he suggested that “[we] continue our efforts to remove from South and Central America all the dangerous Germans and Italians still there, together with their families.”

That month, some 1,500 persons of Japanese ancestry—many of them Japanese nationals traveling with family members who were citizens of the United States or Latin America—were shipped to Asia from the U.S. in a second exchange of prisoners with Japan. A Life magazine reporter, Shirley Mydans, was one of the thousands of Americans interned in Asia who was exchanged. She described watching Japanese repatriates and expatriates disembark from the Gripsholm as Allied citizens prepared to board. “The
Japanese repatriates filed in a line far outside of us,” Mydans wrote. “Compared to us they seemed healthy and well-dressed—all in American clothes.” Mydans apparently did not realize that the exchangees wore American clothes because many were Americans—North and South Americans with names like Agnes, Michael, and Paul, or Ricardo, Eduardo, and Ana Maria.

As the Allied exchangees boarded the New York-bound Gripsholm, the American Red Cross handed out American chocolate bars and cigarettes. The freed prisoners joyfully sailed for home, appeasing their two-year hunger with buffets of American food, reading American magazines, and sipping iced tea as they lounged in the sun. Who could blame them? For twenty-two months they had starved in concentration camps. The men had “all taken their belts in so much that their pants looped around their waists,” Mydans said. “We women looked the same.” When the Gripsholm steamed into New York harbor on December 1, 1943, the Americans waved as they passed the Statue of Liberty.
Historians and political scientists have long argued that the Roosevelt Administration’s decision to intern Japanese Americans came under pressure from West Coast grassroots agitation. Following Pearl Harbor, simmering anti-Japanese sentiment found opportunity to vent in editorials and letters and petitions to California, Washington, and Oregon congressional delegations. They, in turn, pressured the White House to act. Yet, in internning Japanese Americans and aliens during World War II, the federal government did not capitulate to West Coast political pressures in a moment of hysteria. Rather, from the top down, federal officials fanned pre-existing racism to win broad support for its previously planned actions.

The policy was long in the making. For decades, federal officials had developed their options for “enemies at home” in the event of war. At the turn of the century, Great Britain and the United States created concentration camps to suppress rebellion in South Africa and in the Philippines, respectively. By 1908, U.S. officials discussed the “restraint” and deportation of “Japanese residents” in the event of war with Japan. During World War I, belligerent nations, including the United States, interned tens of thousands of civilians of
“enemy” nationality, exchanging and deporting many of them during and after the war. These practices would continue through World War II. Shaped by the ideology of Social Darwinism, Western governments sought to create ideal societies, using war to purge what they deemed “unfit” or “undesirable” elements.

In the 1930s, President Franklin D. Roosevelt encouraged the military to develop internment plans for both Japanese “citizens and non-citizens” in the event of hostilities with Japan. After Pearl Harbor, War Department officials fanned the flames of anti-Japanese racism in the United States to force Justice Department capitulation to their plans to internment Japanese Americans as well as alien enemies. Meanwhile, the State Department pressured Latin American government to arrest and deport Axis nationals to the United States for internment. By February 1942, Executive Order 9066 was not extraordinary to Franklin D. Roosevelt, who served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 1913-1920, or to the World War I veterans of his Cabinet. Informed by Social Darwinism, recalling their experiences in World War I, and building on their fantasies of Japanese invasion during the interwar years, they plotted a course expansive in numbers and space. Casting a wide net, federal officials beat the drum of internment on the West Coast and Latin America. Backed up against the demands of national security, Justice Department officials capitulated, surrendering to the needs and fears of the President, his advisors, and military policymakers.
NOTES


12 Confidential memo, Chief of Staff Office, War Department, October 2, 1907, 1766-29, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Records of the Military Intelligence Division (MID), Record Group 165, National Archives at College Park, MD (NACP); Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, 134; “Hobson on Race Supremacy: Says Yellow Peril Means the White Man Against the World,” New York Times, December 17, 1907, 2.

13 “Hobson on Race Supremacy,” 2.


16 J.F. Bell to Secretary of War William H. Taft, March 12, 1908, 1766, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Records of the MID, RG 165, NACP.

17 Secretary of War (William H. Taft) to Elihu Root, March 12, 1908, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Records of the MID, RG 165, NACP. Root preceded Taft as Secretary of War. In Secretary of War Taft’s typescript letter to Secretary of State Root, someone, apparently Taft, wrote “Athos” in longhand on top of the typescript salutation “Root,” and signed “Porthos” above the typescript signatory title, “Secretary of War.” Athos and Porthos were two of the three musketeers in Alexandre Dumas’ novel, Les Trois Mousquetaires, first serialized in 1844.


19 Ibid., 177.


Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism*, 185-86.


“Spy Organization in England,” *London Times*, October 9, 1914; Lansing to American Embassy, London, October 29, 1918, 763.72115/34019, National Archives Microfilm Publication M367, roll 353, Civilian Prisoners and Enemy Noncombatants; Records of the Department of State Relating to WWI and Its Termination, RG 59, NACP. During World War I, the British interned “enemy alien” civilians in England; in their possessions in the Mediterranean, Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean; and in their dominions of Australia, Canada, and South Africa. France incarcerated enemy aliens in camps throughout its mainland and in its possessions in Africa, the Caribbean, and Tahiti. Russia, Romania, Italy, and China interned both German and Austrian civilians. Portugal interned Germans living in its colony of Mozambique. Germany had civilian camps in Germany, in occupied northern France, and in German East Africa. Austria interned Italian civilians. The Ottoman Empire imprisoned British and French civilians throughout the Mediterranean. Even some neutral nations took up the practice: The Belgian government interned German civilians in Belgium and the Belgian Congo. Under pressure from Great Britain, Siam (Thailand) arrested Germans and Austrians at Bangkok and then deported them to India for internment. See National Archives Microfilm Publication M367, rolls 332-355, Civilian Prisoners and Enemy Noncombatants; Records of the Department of State Relating to WWI and Its Termination, RG 59, NACP.

24, 1914, 763.72115/243; Acting Secretary Lansing to American Embassies in Berlin and Rome, November 21, 1914, 763.72115/239; J. Bernstorff, Imperial German Embassy at Washington, D.C., to Secretary of State, November 19, 1914; all in National Archives Microfilm Publication M367, rolls 332-355, Civilian Prisoners and Enemy Noncombatants; Records of the Department of State Relating to WWI and Its Termination, RG 59, NACP.


33 See, for example, American Consul at Ontario Jose de Olivares to Secretary of State, May 14, 1917, 763.72115/3136, with enclosed newspaper clipping, Brand Whitlock [American Minister in Belgium], “How Huns Aroused Belgian Hatred,” Hamilton Herald, May 11, 1917; L. de Cartier de Marchienne, Belgian Minister, to Robert Lansing, May 23, 1917, 763.72115/3145; Louis F. Post, Assistant Secretary of Labor, to Secretary of State, January 22, 1918, 763.72115/3254; Legation of Switzerland, Washington, D.C., to Secretary of State, June 25, 1918, 763.72115/336; Assistant Secretary of State William Phillips to Chairman Vance McCormick, War Trade Board, January 8, 1917, 763.72115/3341a; Legation of Sweden, Washington, D.C., to Mr. [Christian Archibald] Herter, June 27, 1918, 763.72115/3344; Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, to Charge d’Affaires of Switzerland, July 24, 1918, 763.72115/3338; W.P. [William Phillips] to Mr. [J.C.] Grew, February 11, 1918, 763.72115/3360; Louis F. Post, Assistant Secretary of Labor, to Secretary of State, November 12, 1917, 763.72115/3220; Acting Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee to Secretary of War, January 25, 1918, 763.72115/3249; Alien enemies were typically held in local jails or in immigration stations in San Francisco and Honolulu until they were transferred to the larger internment camps. W.S. Benson, Acting Secretary of the Navy, to Secretary of State, August 6, 1919, 763.72115/3679; William Jennings Price, American Minister at Panama, to Secretary of State, November 10, 1917, 763.72115/3224; William Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State, to Elliot F. Goodwin, June 5, 1918, 763.72115/3318; Congressman John Nolan to Robert Lansing, June 13, 1918, 763.72115/3328; all in National Archives Microfilm Publication M367,
rolls 332-355; Civilian Prisoners and Enemy Noncombatants; Records of the Department of State Relating to WWI and Its Termination, RG 59, NACP.

34 Eugene L. Belisle, American Consulate at Limoges, France, to American Ambassador, Paris, October 20, 1914; L. de Cartier de Marchienne, Belgian Minister, to Acting Secretary of State Frank L. Polk, May 29, 1918; Frank L. Polk, Acting Secretary of State, to Belgian Minister L. de Cartier de Marchienne, June 7, 1919; 763.72115/3340; Acting Secretary [Robert] Lansing to American Embassy, Berlin, November 20, 1914, 763.72115/236; Hugh R. Wilson, Charge d’Affaires ad interim, to Secretary of State, December 14, 1917, 763.72115/3241; translation of statement from German Army Administration, enclosed in Pleasant A. Stovall, American Legation in Berne, to Secretary of State, June 28, 1918, 763.72115/3349; all in National Archives Microfilm Publication M367, rolls 332-355; Civilian Prisoners and Enemy Noncombatants; Records of the Department of State Relating to WWI and Its Termination, RG 59, NACP.

35 Edwin M. Borchard to Secretary of State, June 29, 1920, 763.72115/3746, National Archives Microfilm Publication M367, rolls 332-355; Civilian Prisoners and Enemy Noncombatants; Records of the Department of State Relating to WWI and Its Termination, RG 59, NACP; emphasis added.

36 Thomas Sammons to Paul S. Reinsch, April 18, 1918, National Archives Microfilm Publication M367, rolls 332-355; Civilian Prisoners and Enemy Noncombatants; Records of the Department of State Relating to WWI and Its Termination, RG 59, NACP.

37 Citizenship Bureau Chief R.W.F. [R.W. Flourney Jr.] to the Solicitor, August 13, 1917; Report by the Aliens Registration Committee: Subjects and Protected Subjects of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria, in Egypt, April 1917, 2; both in National Archives Microfilm Publication M367, rolls 332-355; Civilian Prisoners and Enemy Noncombatants; Records of the Department of State Relating to WWI and Its Termination, RG 59, NACP.


39 Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 313; Preston, Aliens and Dissenters, 64.


41 Ibid., 40-41.

42 Frank Knox to Hugh Drum, March 13, 1933, Frank Knox papers, 1898-1944; Library of Congress.
Hugh Drum to Adjutant General, September 21, 1935, Adjutant General’s Office 381, NACP.

Military Intelligence Division (General Staff), “Estimate of the Situation Orange,” October 1935, 242-12-147, RG 165 MID, NACP, quoted in Okihiro, Cane Fires, 173.

Admiral W. H. Standley to Secretary of War, May 19, 1936, 242-12-155, RG 165 MID, quoted in Okihiro, Cane Fires, 173.

Okihiro, Cane Fires, 174. FDR to Chief of Operations, August 10, 1936, President’s Secretary’s File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY (FDRL).


W. H. Standley to Chief of Staff, August 24, 1936, 3675, RG 165 War Plans Division, NACP, quoted in Okihiro, Cane Fires, 174.

Harry H. Woodring to the President, August 29, 1936, President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.


W.H. Standley (Joint Board) to Secretary of War, October 14, 1936, 242-12-159, RG 165 MID, NACP, quoted in Okihiro, Cane Fires, 175.

Harry H. Woodring to the President, May 21, 1937, President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.

F.D.R. to Secretary of War, May 22, 1937, President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL; Okihiro, Cane Fires, 175.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Message to Congress on Appropriations for National Defense,” May 16, 1940, The American Presidency Project, accessed September 8, 2011, at www.presidency.ucsb.edu. The term “fifth-column” was coined during the 1936–39 Spanish Civil War, when the four columns of a nationalist general invading Madrid were assisted by a “fifth column” of his supporters living within the city. Okihiro, Cane Fires, 96.

56 Ward, 314.

57 Henry L. Stimson to Mr. President, May 18, 1940, President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL; David F. Schmitz, Henry L. Stimson: The First Wise Man (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2001), 113, 119.

58 Franklin D. Roosevelt to Harry Stimson, May 21, 1940, President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.

59 Henry L. Stimson, Memorandum for the President, December 13, 1944, President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.

60 “Edison Doubts If German Planes Can Seriously Harm Royal Navy,” The Montreal Gazette, May 8, 1940, 1.

61 Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 331; Daniels, Concentration Camps, North America, 27; Okihiro, Cane Fires, 226.


63 Curtis B. Munson, “Japanese on the West Coast,” November 7, 1941, President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.

64 John Dingell to FDR, August 18, 1941, Official File 197, FDRL.

65 Edwin C. Wilson to Sumner Welles, Department of State File 740.00115 Pacific War/1 1/3, RG 59, NACP; Okihiro, Cane Fires, 207-09.

66 George Marshall to Sumner Welles, October 28, 1941, Department of State File 740.00115 Pacific War/1 2/3, RG 59, NACP, emphasis added.

67 “What about this?” Roosevelt wrote to Hull, enclosing a December 8 letter from his old friend, New York City Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia. Swiss ships had all been chartered, LaGuardia said, but Swedish vessels were available. Roosevelt to Hull, December 9, 1941, Office File 20, FDRL; Tsurumi Shunsuke, Kato Norihiro, and Kurokawa Sou, Nichibei Kokansen (Japan-U.S. exchange ships), (Tokyo: Kabushiki Kaisha Shinchosha, 2006), 262; Takateru Izumi, Nihon/Obei Kan Senji no Tabi (Wartime travels between Japan and Europe/U.S.), (Kyoto: Tankosha, 2005), 112; Cordell Hull to Mr. President, August 27, 1942, Office File 20, FDRL. Cordell Hull to Ambassador, December 12, 1941, Department of State File 740.00115 Pacific War/6, RG 59, NACP; Izumi, Nihon/Obei, 112-13.

68 Hull to Ambassador, December 12, 1941; Lane to State Department, December 8, 1941, Telegram 375, Department of State File 740.00115 Pacific War/9, RG 59, NACP;


71 “Cool Reception for Argentine Note on Unity,” Associated Press article in *Milwaukee Journal*, July 7, 1943, 32; Harold D. Finley, First Secretary to Embassy, to Secretary of State, January 19, 1942, Department of State File 740.00115 Pacific War/53, RG 59, NACP.

72 Cordell Hull to Mr. President, August 27, 1942, Office File 20, FDRL; Special War Problems Division, Entry 1351, Transcripts of Proceedings Before the Hearing Board of the Alien Enemy Control Section of the Department of State, NACP; Edward N. Barnhart, “Japanese Internees from Peru,” *Pacific Historical Review* 31 (May 1962), 172 n13; Weglyn, *Years of Infamy*, 59, 287 n14; Taoke Endoh, *Exporting Japan: Politics of Emigration to Latin America* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2009), 34.

73 “Chile: Apfel, Pedro and Bach,” *Time Magazine*, November 16, 1942.

74 John K. Emmerson, Third Secretary of Embassy, to Ambassador Norweb, April 18, 1942, in Enclosure 1 of dispatch no. 3422 to State Department, April 21, 1942, Department of State File 894.20223/124, RG 59, NACP.

75 Henry Norweb, American Ambassador to Peru, to Sumner Welles, July 20, 1942, Department of State File 740.00115 Pacific War/1002 2/6, RG 59, NACP; Endoh, *Exporting Japan*, 26.

76 V.K.T. to Spanish Ambassador, June 30, 1944, unnumbered document in Department of State File, RG 59, NACP.
Marc Peter, Red Cross delegate, to James H. Keeley Jr., State Department, June 28, 1944, Department of State File 740.00115 Pacific War/6-2844, RG 59, NACP; C. Harvey Gardiner, “The Latin-American Japanese and World War II,” in Roger Daniels, Sandra C. Taylor and Harry H.L. Kitano, eds., Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress (Salt Lake City, Utah: University of Utah Press, 1986), 144.

Conn et al., Guarding the United States, 117-18.

Telephone conversation, Gullion and De Witt, December 26, 1941, Stetson Conn, “Notes,” Office, Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, quoted in Daniels, Concentration Camps, North America, 45.

Stimson to Roosevelt, February 22, 1942, President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.


Bendetsen to Gullion, February 4, 1942, Provost Marshal General (PMG) 014.311 Gen. A/E, RG 389, NACP.

de Nevers, Colonel and the Pacifist, 4.

Harold B. Hoskins to Adolph Berle, April 6, 1942, Department of State File 740.00115 Pacific War/455 PS/MNP, RG 59, NACP. Note that Hoskins used both spellings of Bendetson’s name in this memo.


89 Ibid., 52.


91 Telephone conversation, De Witt and Bendetson, January 30, 1942, quoted in Daniels, *Concentration Camps, North America*, 53.

92 Okihiro, *Cane Fires*, 182.

93 Telephone conversation, De Witt and Bendetson, January 30, 1942, quoted in Daniels, *Concentration Camps, North America*, 53.

94 Lea to Stimson, January 30, 1942, Secretary of War, RG 107, NACP, quoted in Daniels, *Concentration Camps, North America*, 54.


101 Letter, Biddle to Stimson, February 12, 1942, Secretary of War, RG 107, NACP, quoted in Daniels, *Concentration Camps, North America*, 69.

103 Francis Biddle to Roosevelt, February 20, 1942, Office File 4805, FDRL, quoted in Weglyn, Years of Infamy, 71.

104 Field notes of Grodzins’s interviews with Ed V. Izac, October 14, 1942, and John Coffee, October 12, 1942, quoted in Grodzins, Americans Betrayed, 62.


106 Frank Knox to Roosevelt, August 16, 1943; Cordell Hull to Mr. President, August 27, 1942, both in Office File 20, FDRL, emphasis added.

REFERENCES

Archival Collections

President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Office Files, 1933-1945. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY.

Records of the Office of Assistant Secretary of War. Record Group 107. National Archives, College Park, MD (NACP).

Records of the Department of State, Pacific War. Record Group 59. NACP.


Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Records of the Military Intelligence Division. Record Group 165. NACP.

Government Documents


Special War Problems Division, Entry 1351, Transcripts of Proceedings Before the Hearing Board of the Alien Enemy Control Section of the Department of State, NACP.


Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, Photostats of Newspaper and Periodical Clippings and Pamphlets I-IV. San Francisco: Wartime Civil Control Administration, November 1, 1941, to March 31, 1942. Hoover Institute, Stanford University.

Papers and Manuscripts


Periodicals and Newspapers


“Chile: Apfel, Pedro and Bach.” Time (November 16, 1942).


“‘Enemy Origin’ Defined,” and “One Man’s Job,” The Daily Mail, July 9, 1918.


*Secondary Sources*


