

ETHNOGRAPHY OF IDENTITY, ASSIMILATION AND  
THE DYNAMICS OF COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP:  
THE STUDY OF MUSLIMS IN THE UTAH  
SALT LAKE VALLEY AREA

by

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## ABSTRACT

This study examines the early Muslim immigrants' challenges of adaptation to and assimilation into the American mainstream society in the Salt Lake Valley in Utah. It finds that some Muslims in the pre-1965 era accepted the melting pot notion of total assimilation as the Americanization process, e.g., Moses Kader's family. Others rejected total assimilation, choosing not to lose their original identity. They lived in isolation as outsiders for decades before they finally returned to their home countries, e.g., Darwish and Ismael Kader.

Another consequence of this uncompromising challenge was that Muslim community organization did not form in the Salt Lake Valley area during the early pre-1965 era primarily because of the melting pot assimilationist norm of American mainstream society. The development of Muslim community organizations was delayed until the new era marked by the liberalization of American immigration policy in 1965.

The study also found that in the initial years of Muslim community building there was a better coordination and solidarity of internal relationships among Muslims of diverse backgrounds, such as Shia, Sunni, Pakistani and Arab etc., as the size of the community was smaller and weaker when confronting the challenges of the dominant melting pot notion and culture. With time, however, the size of the community grew larger and so did the self-confidence among the groups, so much so that what followed was increased dispute and conflict between Muslim groups. Eventually, the condition of the Society changed: increased membership, increased number of mosque facilities within the community and an increased number of internal conflicts such as sectarianism,

factionalism and ethnic groupings. Yet, Muslims in general and those divided groups in the Salt Lake Valley area are adapting well to the new American phenomenon of the multicultural American mainstream.

Dedicated to my wife, children and to the memory  
of my father and mother.

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# INTRODUCTION

## **Significance of the Study**

This dissertation study is significantly useful as an historical and socio-ethnographic document about Muslims both in the age of cultural melting pot and of multicultural America. Little is known about Muslims living in the Salt Lake Valley area, primarily because no substantial research has yet been conducted for an in-depth study about the presence of Muslims and their struggle to adapt to the American life style as they migrated and joined the process of becoming Americans or rather Muslims-Americans.

Moreover, the Salt Lake Valley area is blessed with two prestigious institutions of higher learning: the University of Utah in Salt Lake City and Brigham Young University in Provo. Both of these have very strong programs in Middle East Studies with an emphasis on Islam and Arabic. The Middle East Center at the University of Utah has a Middle East Library which is fifth largest in the country in terms of its collection and size. Added to that, there is the rapid sudden growth of Muslim population in the area since the 1990s with the influx of refugees from the war-ridden areas of Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Somalia. Yet, no study has been conducted to understand these growing religious communities, their culture, attitude and activities as members of this predominantly Mormon society, which is quite homogenous religiously.

The understanding of the plight of this immigrant Muslim community and its individuals is also crucial because of its religious origin, the youngest of three Abrahamic religions after Judaism and Christianity. Notwithstanding the common root, American people know very little about Islamic religion and Muslim people. Learning and understanding about Muslims living in America has become even more crucial in the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy because American attention and suspicion has been doubled towards this people. As perceptions are developing concerning Islam and Muslims in a negative way, the issue of understanding Islam and Muslims in this country continues to increase each day.

Muslims are part of the American mainstream and mosaic, as Diana Eck, a Harvard Professor puts it, in almost all urban societies including the Valley area. This study, therefore, is a very needed attempt to contribute to the understanding of Muslims living in America with a focus on the aspects of Muslim adaptation to the American culture vis-à-vis their own identity as Muslims. The study also examines the dynamics of internal relationship among the Muslims in the process of their community development and internal politics.

It is my hope that the information gathered from the interviews and other data sources will help Muslims and others understand the present phenomenon of a growing community in America and forecast a potential creative role that Muslims are likely to play in the country. With the increasing concern regarding cultural and ideological differences that exist between the Islamic and the Western societies, this role is fundamentally important for the wellbeing of all.

## **Nature and Focus of the Study**

This dissertation is a qualitative and ethnographic study using the grounded theory approach in the analysis of Muslim immigration, assimilation, identity maintenance and identity formation from the early 1900s to the present in the Salt Lake Valley area of Utah (henceforth Valley). The primary focus of this study is the growth of Muslim community and Muslim-American identity from the early isolated immigrants to the development of mosque congregations under the organization of the Islamic Society of Salt Lake City, ISSLC, established in 1981 and later changed in 1997 to the Islamic Society of Greater Salt Lake, ISGSL (henceforth Society).

The geographical area of the valley is approximately eighty miles long between Brigham City in the north and the city of Provo in the south. The width of the area is approximately thirty miles between the east and west edges of the valley. Muslims have been living in the region since the early 1900s, although their identity as a growing community did not take shape until the late 1960s. Today most Muslims live in the urban areas of the Salt Lake Valley with concentration in the neighborhoods around the University of Utah. With very few local converts, Muslim demographics represent primarily persons from the Middle East, Eastern Europe, South Asia and Africa.

## **Purpose and Objective of the Study**

The purpose of this dissertation is to present the understanding of the successive patterns of Muslim immigrant assimilation into the American culture in relationship to changes in the United States' immigration laws, as well as changes in the American cultural definitions regarding immigration. It also intends to present the dynamics of

Muslim community building and internal relationship, as it experienced its growth during the era of multiculturalism, as opposed to melting pot culture, in terms of unity within the community leading eventually to disunity and pluralism.

This study begins by tracing the history of early Valley Muslim immigrants, the Kader family, who immigrated to Provo, Utah from Jerusalem beginning in 1915. Tensions of identity and assimilation experienced by these isolated early immigrant Muslims reveal an extreme pattern in adapting to the American-Anglo-Mormon culture of the Valley. In that, the Kader family members either fully assimilated into the American culture losing their own identity and earning the new identity of Mormon-Americans, or went back to their home countries retaining their original identities after decades in this country as economic immigrants.

The Immigration Act of 1924 (Johnson-Reed Act) set quotas that favored immigrants of European descent and severely limited the possibility of immigration of non-Europeans into the United States. In 1965 the Immigration and Nationality Act (Hart-Celler Act) repealed the Immigration Act of 1924 and opened the door for increased numbers of people from all over the globe including Muslims to migrate to America.

The 1965 change of immigration law signaled that America was culturally redefining itself from melting pot to a society where cultural pluralism was the norm. The post-1965 embrace of pluralism was a proactive response from American society and culture, a significant turnaround of American notions concerning immigrants from non-European backgrounds. While in the earlier period it was almost impossible for Muslim immigrants to maintain the dual identities of Muslim-Americans, in the post-1965 era

with the advent of the notion of cultural pluralism the maintenance and promotion of dual identities of “Muslim” and “American” became almost guaranteed.

The life of Muslim immigrants became further improved as a result of the law of October 9, 1981 which repealed the earlier law of 1939 that barred foreigners from forming any kind of organization or association while living in the country. Since 1981 Muslims like any other group could organize as a community, build mosques and promote their culture and values without facing any discrimination.

Finally this dissertation examines the ways in which Muslims in the greater Salt Lake Valley from different home cultures interacted with each other and with the American culture, creating new models of mosque yet retaining their own identities. This initial interaction between Muslims of various backgrounds was characterized by a suppression of their internal differences and grievances towards each other and a sense of solidarity in facing the dominant culture. With the growth in Muslim population there was a movement from the general unified Muslim identity to the development of sectarianism, factionalism and ethnic differentiation. The situation of group-identity politics within the Society’s original organization went out of control and resulted in the division and splitting of the Society. Consequently, numerous mosque congregations and centers emerged from the original Society, such as Al-Rasul Islamic Center (Shia), Islamic Society of Bosniaks, Al-Huda Islamic Center (Somali) and Utah Islamic Center (factional).

## Literature Review

Not much research has been done regarding the early Muslim immigrants to America, especially between 1900 and 1965. The pioneering major contribution to the understanding of the early Muslim immigrant experience remains *The Arab Moslems in the United States: Religion and Assimilation* by Abdo Elkholy in 1966. This pioneering socio-ethnographic work is a comparative study of assimilation and acculturation of two Muslim communities in Detroit, Michigan and in Toledo, Ohio.

In Elkholy's examination of this uneducated working class community of Muslims primarily from the Middle East he demonstrates that soon after their arrival in America they abandoned Islamic identity and assimilated fully into the American secular culture including such behaviors as alcoholism, free mixing of the sexes and conversion to other faiths. He also demonstrates the impact of education on the Muslims' behavioral changes after they immigrated to America. He shows the significant role of the mosque in preparing Muslims to assimilate into the American society without losing their original Arab-Islamic identity. The more educated and mosque going Muslims were able to assimilate into the American society without losing their original identity. In other words, Muslims who became fully Americanized and abandoned their original Arab-Islamic identity were mostly the uneducated and nonmosque going immigrant Muslims.

Following Elkholy, a number of sociological works were written by the scholars of Muslims in North America. Well known among them are Yvonne Haddad, Jane Smith, Kathleen Moore, Earle Waugh, Baha Abu-Laban, Regula Qureshi, John Esposito and many more. Their contributions present the Muslim presence, demography and impact on the American mainstream society. There are some recent studies done on the concept of

the “new immigrant” by Stephen Warner and number of other scholars of sociology of religion.

Under the auspices of the New Ethnic and Immigrant Congregations Project – NEICP, a group of scholars led by Stephen R. Warner and Judith G. Wittner studied a number of new immigrant communities including Muslims in America. The focus of their study was on the immigrant patterns of adaptation to the alien society of America. The findings of the research project were published in 1998 (Warner & Wittner, 1998). A similar project, “Religion, Ethnicity and New Immigrant Research – RENIR, was undertaken almost simultaneously by Helen Rose Ebaugh and Janet Saltzman Chafetz in Houston. Their project results were published in 2000 (Ebaugh & Chafetz, 2000).

Both projects conducted an in-depth study on the inner dynamics of Muslim communities in the relevant locations and concluded that Muslims are among those immigrant communities who are the fastest growing in America as a result of the liberalization of immigration policy in 1965. They assert that the structural shape of American society has also changed from a monocultural and monoethnic America to a multicultural and multiethnic America.

Warner and his school, who foresee the inevitable development of a multicultural and multireligious society in America, mention that the growth of religious and ethnic diversity in America is a healthy reality suited to the American dream. They argue that the new immigrants are adapting to and participating in the Americanization process progressively, especially in the areas that are morally and ethically neutral and do not conflict with the basic moral values of new immigrants. They further observed that upon the arrival the new immigrants find their respective communities and religious

institutions that provide cultural and ethnic guidance and that most new immigrants associate with these communities for the rest of their lives in America, indicating an “adhesive and selective assimilation” to the host society (Warner, Wittner, Young, & Abusharaf, 1998).

Studying the “Structural Adaptations in an Immigrant Muslim Congregation in New York,” Rogaia Abusharaf argues that Muslims in America are making positive and progressive gestures to adapt to the American society effectively. Hoda Badr reached a similar conclusion from her study of the Muslim community in Houston, focusing on aspects of strength and weakness in the Al-Noor Mosque community.

The findings of my study, which focuses on the religious, social and organizational aspects of Muslim community life in the context of Mormon Utah in the Salt Lake Valley area, likewise demonstrate that Muslims are committed to selective change and adaptation in a process of assimilation and adaptation as they seek to be active members of mainstream American society.

This section provides background information on adaptation and identity development of religious and ethnic immigrant communities. To my knowledge, there are no studies that specifically address the Muslim religious and ethnic minority adaptation and identity development issue in the context of American diaspora, let alone the Valley of Salt Lake in Utah. Thus, this section focuses on theoretical positions in terms of this assumption by reviewing the studies on adaptation theories related to individual immigrant adaptation, the role of ethnic community in the adaptation process and the theories of identity development.

Cultural adaptation or cross-cultural adaptation has been recognized as both a process and a resultant state. “Assimilation, acculturation, adjustment, accommodation and social integration are just a few of the terms, have been used interchangeably in sociological and anthropological studies” (Kim & Gudykunst, 1988). Writing in 1964 Gordon visualized a structure of change between the immigrants and the host culture in different aspects of social and cultural life. To suggest his view of a multicultural America he references the origins of the American nation and its ideal of being immigrant and diverse (Gordon).

The vast majority of the over 300 million Americans is the result of historical and contemporary patterns of global immigration. More than one million immigrants were granted legal permanent resident status during 2001 alone (*Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service*, 2001). This follows a long history of people from around the world entering the United States. For example, since 1820, regions of Europe such as Italy, Spain, Greece, Austria, France and Poland immigrated over 35 million people who became citizens. Asian countries such as China, India, Japan, Turkey and Vietnam have immigrated more than 9 million citizens. The Caribbean, Central America and South America have immigrated more than 18 million citizens. These and other global cultures extend deeply into American society through an immigration and globalization process. Shirane (2002) further explains:

Multiculturalism is not simply a political issue of recognizing ethnic communities and identities in the United States; nor is it simply a matter of combating Eurocentrism, of fitting nonWestern courses in among courses on Western civilization. Rather, it is an absolute necessity for understanding the functioning of culture and society in the twenty-first century. Other societies and cultures, particularly those that are non-European in origin, extend deeply into American society through immigration and globalization, just as American culture extends

deeply into other cultures and societies, sometimes creating a painful backlash. (p. 513)

For each culture it is a challenge to form an identity in America that represents both the culture of origin and American culture. Muslim-Americans face a unique challenge not only in forming two identities, but also in being associated with terrorism.

Muslims first came to America during the Atlantic slave trade in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Today, there are an estimated 3.5 million Muslims in the United States. However, it is difficult to tell the exact number of Muslims because of the diverse characteristics of the culture. Others estimate that there may be 6 to 8 million Muslims in the United States, approximately 30 % of whom are African American Muslims. Min (2002) explains that since September 11, the resultant powerful representations of Islam have forced Muslim Americans to think consciously about who they are and how they want to be identified publicly.

## **Dissertation Structure and Chapters**

The main theme of this dissertation is the “Ethnography of Muslim identity, adaptation and dynamics of community relationship in America: The Study of Muslims in Utah’s Salt Lake Valley,” which is further theorized following the subheadings of part one and two, through the Chapters from I through VI. Driven by the data collected from interviews, observations and literature information, I have divided this dissertation into two main parts. Part One, consisting of Chapters I through III, presents the methodology of the study and the early Muslim immigrants’ struggle in the pre-1965 America for a dual identity of Muslim and American, in which it illustrated one unit of the Kader family that earned American dream and identity at the expense of their original Muslim identity

in favor of Mormonism, while the other two units of the family retain their Muslim identity by going back after spending decades in America to their home country in Jerusalem on the expense of American identity and dream, hence one unit Mormon American and the other two units Muslim Arabs. Part Two, consisting of Chapters IV through VI, presents the post-1965 era of new Muslim immigrants identity and community relationship, illustrating the factors that kept them together and united in the early period and the rise of pluralism within the community beginning in the 1990s paving the way of numerous independent communities in the Valley area by 2007. The concluding chapter presents the summary of findings in the previous chapters of the dissertation.

In the introduction, I have presented the dissertation topic, its significance and the focus of the study, while in Chapter I, I have described the research methods and the use of both ethnographic research method and the grounded theory approach of categorizing and discovering theories from the data about the immigrant Muslim community living in the Valley area for about a century now, although the actual history of Muslim community is as old as the last 4 decades, a perspective outlined in the following chapter description.

Chapter I outlines the process of assimilation of the first through third generation Moses Kader family into the Mormon society of Provo, Utah. Out of three units of the Kader family that lived in Provo, Utah the unit of Moses Kader sought American identity in disregard of Islamic identity and eventually lost children and grandchildren to Mormon-American assimilation in the melting pot. This chapter further examines the Americanization process of the Moses Kader family which undermined their original

Arab-Islamic identities. Finally, it illustrates the challenges of Muslim immigrants in the pre-1965 era and their predicaments of assimilation into their adopted home of America.

Chapter II is concerned with the other two units of the same family, Darwish and Ismael, who also lived in Provo for decades. They came to America as economic immigrants, unlike Moses Kader who came with the American dream. Darwish and Ismael neither gave in to the American notion of melting pot culture, nor did they consider the earning of American citizenship worth the sacrifice of their original Muslim identity. For them, living in America permanently with its unicultural melting pot was not appropriate. When they could not maintain their original dream of dual identities they decided to go back to their home country in Jerusalem where they felt secure and safe.

Chapter III demonstrates aspects of structural adaptation in the later Muslim community of Salt Lake Valley area with a focus on organization, leadership formation, the role of imam in the mosque congregation, Islamic religious education for children and the role of women in the community. It also discusses Islamic tradition in regard to flexibility and accommodation with the local customs of a society in which Muslims are living as long as those customs do not threaten the basic principles of faith.<sup>1</sup>

Chapter IV is concerned with the dynamics of the internal relationship between two main Islamic sects, the Sunnis and Shias, within the Islamic Society of Salt Lake City –ISSLC. It demonstrates that in the 1960s when the size of the community was small, the relationship between these two sects was good and the sense of tolerance and unity was strong within the Society. However, the dynamics of relationship have changed since the 1990s when the size of the community grew larger from the influx of refugees

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<sup>1</sup> The essentials of faith: the Oneness of God, the truth of divine books especially the Quran, the final seal of Prophethood in Muhammad, the Day of Judgment, the existence of angels, destiny (good and bad, here and in the hereafter) and the life after death.

from Bosnia, Somalia and Iraq. A sense of sectarian identity and a new dynamic of sectarian relationship emerged as the Shia sect began to introduce ideas of having their own center separate from the mainstream Sunni Society and the mosque based congregation of which they had been part of for almost four decades.

Chapter V is concerned with another aspect of the inner dynamics of Muslim community relationship in the Valley area. It focuses on the development of factional conflict within the elite subgroups of the community leadership. Using the interpretive model of factional conflict, I have categorized the factional rivalries as nondisruptive and disruptive in the context of Muslim Society in the Valley area. This chapter demonstrates how disruptive factional conflicts were unruly, unconstitutional, often irreligious and destructive taking the Society to the brink of division and disunity.

The conclusions summarize the findings of the dissertation research that are demonstrated in the above chapters. It includes some recommendations for the future research.

PART ONE:

AMERICAN OR MUSLIM AMERICAN DREAM:

THE PRE-1965 ERA

# I. METHODOLOGY

## **Ethnography and Grounded Theory**

This study uses a qualitative research method of ethnography, which is primarily, but not limited to, the participant observation, interviews and published as well as unpublished, both primary and secondary literature. Thus, ethnography in the context of this dissertation is telling a credible, rigorous and authentic story (Fetterman, 1998) about the experience of life of Muslim Americans in the pre – and post-1965 America. The objective of this study is to explore and understand the phenomenon of the early Muslim immigrants' struggle for assimilation in the melting pot culture of America as compared to the later Muslims' identity construction and community formation in a multicultural America.

This study uses Glaser and Straus' grounded theory methodology of data analysis that leads to the discovery of theories inherent in the data, extracted from the data. This method of discovering a theory based on the research data is diametrically different from the traditional methodology in which data is analyzed to fit into the preconceived hypothesis and theory to prove the validity of the theory. In grounded theory data is collected and analyzed not to prove an already selected hypothesis and theory, but to produce assumptions leading to theories based on the data at hand followed by

description and explanation to prove the validity of the theory that has just been discovered.

## **Research Questions**

This study was largely exploratory and guided by the following research questions: (1) What was the position of pioneer Muslims who came and lived in the Valley area with regard to their original identity vis-à-vis the Americanization process and their assimilation into the American society? (2) What challenges did the early Muslim immigrants face, especially in the pre-1965 era? (3) Who were the first Muslim immigrants to arrive in the area and to introduce the concept and process to form the nucleus of Muslim community in the area? (4) How did the Muslim immigrants in the post-1965 era adapt to the American mainstream society? (5) What were the dynamics of growth within Muslim community in the Valley area? (6) How did Muslim immigrants deal with the dynamics of internal differences based on factionalism, ethnicity and sectarianism? An exploratory study using both an ethnographic research model and a grounded theory approach of analysis, in my view, was the most effective approach to discover the answers to these questions.

## **Ethnographic Research**

As a result of research findings, "step-by-step" (Fetterman, 1998) and one leading to the next, I was able to discover about the existence of Kader family that lived in Provo for more than half a century, hence early and new immigrants in the Valley area.

Therefore, in terms of early Muslim immigrants I interviewed members of the extended

Kader family, a Palestinian Muslim family, whose immigrant roots in Utah reach back to 1915.

Currently Muslims in the Salt Lake Valley area represent a number of different ethnic and geographical groups from primarily the Middle East, Asia, Europe and Africa. They are immigrants who have come in waves as students, refugees and those simply seeking the American dream. Since the Muslim community does not have an official and written recording system, especially concerning the early period of its formation and subsequent activities, I decided to conduct interviews with the senior members of the community and those who represent different ethnic backgrounds. In this way I was able to collect information as well as perspective about different activities that Muslims are performing both individually and collectively.

## **Interviews**

In preparing and organizing interviews, I received direct guidance from Professor Lawrence Young,<sup>2</sup> external member of my Ph.D. supervisory committee, who suggested that interviewing 15 to 18 people would be a sound number for my dissertation. I then selected a total of 25 people from the active members of the community from different ethnic backgrounds such as Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Iraqi, Afghani, Indian, Iranian, Somalis, Bosnian, Kosovan and Palestinian, with an assumption that out of them I would be able to retain the required number of interviewees as indicated earlier. I have interviewed a total of 24 community members and 5 individuals from the Kader family.

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<sup>2</sup> Professor Young was an Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology of Religion, BYU, Provo, Utah.

The primary purpose of the interviews was twofold: to collect historical data about the emergence and growth of the Muslim community and to study the inner dynamics of the community in its role to preserve and construct Islamic identity on one hand; and to adapt and assimilate into the mainstream American society, the host country, on the other.

The interview questions were open-ended giving the interviewee the option to say all that he wanted to say. In the initial question I asked the interviewee to speak about himself, the history of the community and the aspects of Islamic faith, culture, values, identity and adaptation to the host society. Then I followed with questions that in most cases sprang from their previous answer. Each individual interviewee was unique in the combination of age, experience and perspective. Both the initial and the subsequent questions combined revealing patterns of information needed to develop an understanding of the community. The main question was designed to gather information about early days of Muslims here and the activities they were engaging religiously and socially. The second part of the question was designed to gather information and views of each individual over the issues of unity, identity, assimilation and relationship with the main society.

In most cases, the initial communication was done over the phone during which time I sought for an appointment to meet with the person. I also explained to the person that I would be interviewing them following some guidelines and questions, the interview would be taped and transcribed later on and I would submit the hard copy of it to him for approval.

While making myself available in the community and mosques, including the Shi'a mosque, I met all individuals interviewed personally, talked to them over the phone, visited some of them at the family level and invited some others for dinner etc. as I deemed it appropriate. They all welcomed me and the spirit of my work interviewing them. For interviews I gave the interviewees the absolute freedom of choosing time, place and days and in each case I made sure that I was present on time, if not before. Some of the interviewees preferred the mosque, some my home, some others chose their work places.

In order to verify their accounts I asked them to read through the document, make changes, edit, add and refine the data and then initial their approval regarding its authenticity. They were then to mail it back to me in an enclosed self-addressed stamped envelope. The documents were sent both in postal mail and email, as was convenient for the recipients. I also followed up with them over the phone, and/or scheduled meetings to discuss and receive the documents back from them. It worked well.

I was able to successfully conduct interviews and transcribe them. Before I could proceed any further in decoding, discussing and analyzing the data I needed to become aware of my own participation in the interview process. I began taking note of my participation in various mosque base religious and social activities, including my role as a Sunday School teacher and Principal, Chairman of the Curriculum Committee, occasional leader of Friday sermon and prayer, active participant in the weekly Study Circle and other religious, cultural and social activities.

I had to note that all of the interviewees were male, except for the Kader family interviews, not because I meant to ignore interviewing female members of the

community out of my personal bias against females, but because culturally I felt more comfortable to conduct face to face interviews with males than females. The focus of the research has been the historical development of the community and its socio-religious inner dynamics. The female participation in the process has been minimal, but there are specific areas of study such as women's study circle, Sunday school activities and leadership activities that could be of specific interest. Subsequent studies could very well include aspects of women's activities in the communities.

Finally, before analyzing the interview, data from other resources needed to be integrated..Among them were newspaper publications, community and mosque pamphlets and resolutions (although only a few are available, as they do not really maintain a genuine trail of paper work). Among all, however, the most valuable sources were the data collected from individual interviews.

### **Participant Observation**

Participant observation has been an integral part of ethnographic study of religious communities, especially in Europe and North America. In the European phenomenon the indigenous society and culture are confronted with foreign and immigrant cultures and values. In the North American phenomenon, except for Native American peoples, both the host society and the new immigrants represent the same background of immigrants, new and old: "America is a nation of immigrants." The relationship within the new immigrant community of Muslims and between the new and old Mormon immigrant community is interesting to observe.

Mormons are not only the old immigrant community in the Valley; they are also a religious minority within the old immigrant society of North America. If not fully, definitely partly, the Mormons find the presence of Muslims in the society a supportive gesture and may eventually find a common ground in building a future relationship in the broader perspective of American society.

I have been participating in the Muslim community activities actively since my joining the University of Utah several years ago. Attending the mosque from time to time in the daily prayers, surely in Friday service and sometimes delivering the sermon and leading the prayer made my presence quite visible. I participated in Sunday Islamic School in the capacities of teaching and administration for quite some time. That experience gave me a good understanding of how committed the individual parents and the community is with regard to the Islamic education of children. That education is the catalyst of preserving and reconstructing their Islamic identity in a foreign society. My active participation in various other religious, cultural and intellectual activities such as Eid festival, fund raising parties and other gatherings of celebration helped me appreciate the inner dynamics of the community in the making.

I also represented the Muslim community to interfaith activities such as Religious Divide sponsored by the Mayor's Office of Salt Lake City in which religious leaders from numerous denominations joined together to discuss the situation, misunderstandings and ignorance that persist within the communities in the region. The main purpose of the organization was to bridge the gap between the religious and nonreligious groups and establish a better and well informed understanding among them. It was a success for both

the Muslim community and the Mayor's office to improve the relationship among the diverse groups in the area.

My research interest was also partly influenced by the Middle East Center at the University of Utah of which I am a member. I assumed that, like me, perhaps a good number of graduate students came to Utah from different parts of the Islamic world and laid the foundation of this new and growing community in this western part of the country. I believed that studying the local Muslim community would enhance the natural inter-connections, the interactions and the relationship and between the Middle East Center and the greater Muslim community in the Valley.

### **Discovery of Kader Family in Provo**

The discovery of the history of early Muslim immigrants to Utah, the Kader family, changed my perspective in the development of a theory regarding Muslims living in the Valley area. This family has lived in Provo at the southern end of the Valley since 1915. Most of the members of one unit of the family have been fully assimilated as Mormon-Americans. The life of this isolated extended family of early immigrants was part of the history of Muslim community in the Valley area. Their history and their inability to retain Muslim identity posed several questions about assimilation, identity and the development of Muslim-American community.

At a dinner party at the home of a friend in Salt Lake City in the summer of 2007 I met a Kader family member, Jeanie, along with her husband, Eric Hyer and son, Jihad Hyer. Jeanie's husband, Eric Hyer, is a professor of political science at the Brigham Young University. Jeanie's actual name is Jamila, an Arab Muslim name as is her son's

name, Jihad, an Arab Islamic name that means to strive. Both the husband and wife chose the name Jihad for their son. The name felt like a symbol of support for the sufferings of their extended family in Palestine.<sup>3</sup> However, Jihad reverted to Islam as a result of a trip to Jerusalem where he spent the entire summer with his extended Muslim family who live there.<sup>4</sup>

In the course of conversation Jeanie revealed her unique background. Her parents, Moses and Ayesha Kader, were Palestinian Muslims and lived as such for more than half a century in the city of Provo located 40 miles south of Salt Lake City. They lived there as an isolated Arab-Muslim family, but their eight children did not. Some of them formally baptized as Mormons, while others became the visitors of Mormon Church, or married Mormon spouses without being formally baptized. Following her marriage, Jeanie also converted to Mormonism and is now an active member of the Mormon Church in Provo. As a final discovery in my ethnographic research I now included the failed struggle of this Kader family in Provo to become American and at the same time salvage their original Muslim identity.

## **Published and Unpublished Literature**

I researched both published and unpublished sources of books, newspaper articles and a term paper. In addition I researched the Society's constitution, written communications and meeting resolutions. Other sources of data collection were also used, for instance, the daily and weekly activities in the mosque, the process of electing

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<sup>3</sup> A number of educators and professors of the University of Utah were invited to the party including my supervisor, Professor Bernard Weiss, Professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies in the Middle East Center.

<sup>4</sup> Jihad, however, is now Muslim and I knew him from the campus of the University of Utah without knowing or asking about the background, as usual, taking it for granted that he was an Arab and born Muslim.

community leadership, meeting proceedings and minutes, pamphlets, posters, resolutions, school bi-laws and curriculum, correspondences, new buildings and expansion projects etc. My personal observations which I identify as appropriate in the main body of the work also inform the study.

### **Sampling, Coding and Categorizing the Data**

Upon completing the interviews, I listened to each tape two times. This was followed by the transcription and the saving of the document to a separate disk. Thus, each individual interview had one disk and one file, making the total number 25. After that, I reviewed the written transcripts twice and edited the documents without making any major changes so that the originality of the documents remained intact. I mailed a hard copy along with a forwarding letter with instructions to the authors of the transcript for their review and approval. When I received the documents back, I finalized the documents as authenticated by the authors. I then read repeatedly and decoded the documents also repeatedly in order to develop the themes and ideas which emerged from them. I developed outlines of historical descriptions and analysis of aspects and issues which came out of the categorized data.

In order to decode, first I sorted out the unique nature of the information, as compared with information that was repetitive and overlapping with other documents. Obviously, the information that had been repeated by all the interviewees made the essential discussion points. If information coming from different sources said the same thing then that certainly made a subtopic to be discussed, while, in another case, one

person alone mentioned a certain issue of importance. In this way I was able to create a subtopic out that source and elaborate it.

I then reorganized the documents by replacing the name with abbreviated letters following their first and last name. Although I kept the original copy of the documents with the names of the interviewees for my personal references I will in this paper be using those initials for in text references, for instance (interview, S.M). This way the name and information about the individual informants will not be documented, although in some cases, I will have to mention the name of particular person (informants or not), the Imam of the mosque, for instance. I chose to do this because some of the informants' names will come in the discussion as the subject of discussion who could also be one of the interviewees. The reader will find text like this: according to S.M, the first president of Muslim community in Salt lake City was X or Y, to avoid mentioning the exact name of the president himself who was the source of information.

The interview transcripts reflect the open-endedness of interviews and discussion, although I made the purposes of the research clear to all: both historical and ethnographical origin and development of the community in this region. For instance, each of them were asked to tell all that he knew about the beginning aspects of the community building followed by the subsequent events, incidents and activities. Included in the questions were individual opinions over such issues as assimilation, identity, family value issues, society, religion, education and work opportunities, issues of theological differences between Shi'a and Sunnis, religious liberalism versus conservatism, ethnicity and nationalism in the context of community integrity and unity.

Answers to all questions were taped, transcribed, reviewed and edited with new points added and finally confirmed by the informants.

Briefly, I used the data to extract themes and issues of discussion, sort them, categorize them and separate out the redundant or repeated points from the data, with a special note of how many of the subjects had made the same points so as to develop analytical points out of those repeated themes. These data were then used to complete an historical description of the community as well as an ethnographical explanation and analysis of the growth, inner dynamics and development of the community.

### **Grounded Theory Methodology**

Data is a fundamental property of grounded theory approach. That means all is data. Anything that helps generating concepts for the emerging theory is an acceptable data (Glaser & Straus, 1967). In exploring the research questions mentioned above, this dissertation used qualitative research methods, specifically the ethnographic methods of participant observation, in-depth interviews, community surveys, newspaper information, published and unpublished materials including books, journal articles and online resources. After collecting the data, I coded and decoded it until I developed the main categories and subcategories of themes of this dissertation. This categorization process guided the researcher to develop for this dissertation what the scholars of sociology call grounded theory. The components of grounded theory are described in this section.

The grounded theory methodology of theory development is indeed the most appropriate approach in studying a society or a culture as the researcher attempts to learn about characteristic phenomenon of that particular culture. In this case the focus is the

culture of the Muslim minority group with its struggle to sustain its identity in difficult or more fortunate times. Certainly, the pre-1965 era of American cultural singularity of melting pot was more difficult when compared to the changed notion of American cultural plurality and diversity in the post-1965 America. The grounded theory approach of this dissertation has led the researcher to discover the inherent factors and notions that dictated the fate of minority Muslims in America in the more distant and recent pasts.

Noresh R. Pandit has outlined the process of constructing grounded theory methodology in an online journal called the “Qualitative Report.” According to him the construction of grounded theory follows the elements of conceptualization of data, categorization of data and a proposition, instead of hypothesis, based on the data.

The creation of a grounded theory proposition is an interactive, inductive and reciprocal relationship process (Pandit, 1996). One does not begin with a theory and then prove it. Rather, one begins with an area of study and what is relevant to that area is allowed to emerge. (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

The process of building the theory follows five phases of development and in each phase there are number of steps to take to pursue the process towards its completion.

They are as follows:

Research design phase:

Step 1: Review of technical literature, definition of research question, focused efforts.

Step 2: Selecting cases, theoretical sampling, focused efforts on theoretically useful cases.

Data collection phase:

Step 3: Develop rigorous data collection protocol, create case study database (employ multiple data collection methods), increase reliability and validity (strengthens grounding of theory).

Step 4: Entering the field, overlap data collection (qualitative and quantitative), synergistic view of evidence (refining process).

#### Data Organizing Phase:

Step 5: Data ordering, arraying event chronologically, facilitate data analysis and allows examination of process.

#### Data Analysis phase:

Step 6: Analyzing data relating to the first case, use coding (use open, axial and selective coding), open coding develop concepts, categories, axial coding develop connections between a category and its subcategories and selective coding integrate categories to build theoretical framework resulting in the internal validity.

Step 7: Theoretical sampling, literal and theoretical replication across cases, confirms, extends and sharpens theoretical framework.

Step 8: Reaching closure, theoretical saturation when possible, ends process when marginal improvement becomes small.

#### Literature Comparison phase:

Step 9: compare emergent theory with extant literature, comparisons with conflicting frameworks and comparison with similar frameworks; improves construct definitions and therefore internal validity. Also improves external

validity by establishing the domain to which the study's findings can be generalized.

These phases and steps should be evaluated against four research quality criteria: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability (Pandit, 1996). In my view, a qualitative study of human society based on ethnographic research and grounded theory approach of analysis is explained in terms of "Tell me who admires you and loves you and I will tell you who you are." (Charles Augustin d. 1806) and "Tell me a story and I will tell you who you are! Lens model analyses of personality and creative writing" (Back, Egloff, K ufner, & Nestler, 2010).

### **Discovery of Grounded Theory**

The above process of data collection and analyzing methods continued to evolve throughout the research as I reached a point of discovering theories about those Muslims who immigrated in the earlier period compared to the new Muslim immigrants. The research of this dissertation finds that the social, cultural and political norm of pre-1965 America was unfriendly and unwelcoming to non-European immigrants. Yet, a very insignificant number of those people managed to live in the country for decades. Their status was like weeds in a farm or garden that were unexpected and unfit in the mainstream American society.

They, however, had the option to be Americanized, naturalized and fully assimilate according to the principles of the melting pot notion into the Anglo-Eurocentric American culture at the sacrifice of their original immigrant identities. Those with intense desire to pursue American dream accepted the reality. They adopted the

prevailing culture, faith, behavior, look and thought as the way to pursue their American dream. One common and easy way to begin the process was to join the US military, especially during the First and Second World Wars.

On the other hand, there were those who refused to give up their identities and rejected the American way of life. They lived in suspense and isolation for quite some time until they finally departed this country and went back to their homelands. The situation of Kader family exemplifies both consequences.

One unit of the family, Moses Kader, opted for the American dream by way of the melting pot of complete assimilation. The other two units of the same family, Darwish and Ismail Kader's, decided not to give up their original identity in exchange for the American dream. They lived isolated lives in America for more than a decade until they returned home to Jerusalem. Consequently, the unit that stayed in Provo changed and adapted to Mormon-Americanism. The other two units retained their original Islamic identities, not in the soil of America, but by returning home to Jerusalem. Although this Muslim family came and lived in America, no formation of Muslim community was possible in the Valley area for almost half a century until the new immigrants poured in and settled in the area in the post-1965 era. This assertion is developed in the first part of the dissertation. The second part develops themes surrounding the constructing of Muslim identity and community by the new immigrant Muslims who came to the Valley area following the liberalization of immigration law for non-European people in 1965.

Equally consequential was the law known as the "law of October 9, 1981" that repealed the law of 1939 that had banned the formation of organizations or associations in America by foreigners. Unfortunately, until the repeal, foreigners in America were

barred from observing their cultural and socio-religious affairs like the mainstream Americans do. These favorable changes of policies with regard to foreigners reshaped the notion of American mainstream society towards the non-White and non-European cultures and values in a new multicultural, multireligion and multiethnic definition of the American dream. As such, the nucleus of Muslim community in the Valley area was founded in the late 1960s and early 1970s by the concerted effort by the handful of foreign Muslim students most of whom were graduate students at the University of Utah, professionals and immigrants among whom were the Sunnis of multicultural and multiethnic backgrounds and the Shias from Iran.

In approximately 4 decades, the size of the community grew to over 15,000 members; a good number of them were also worshipers. Almost 5,000 worshipers attend the Eid festivals twice a year and hundreds attend Friday services. But that growth came with a cost, the cost of losing the unity and solidarity within the community that had existed in the past when the Muslim community was newer and small and not able to influence the perspective of American mainstream favorably.

Now, when the demographics of the Muslim community is larger and more diverse, it faces the challenges to unity from old divides. Sectarian, factional and ethnic communities have emerged on the ruin of the mainstream unified Islamic Society of Greater Salt Lake. This scenario of Muslim immigrants both in the hard times of pre-1965 America and the good times of the post-1965 era represents the growing pains of a new community that is still struggling to consolidate and define its identity.

Using the context of grounded theory important themes emerged regarding immigrant identity formation as Muslim-American. The effects of American law and

American self-definition, the melting pot or cultural pluralism, greatly impact the success in maintaining original identities. The pre-1965 struggle to maintain identity within the host society was significantly more difficult in the Salt Lake Valley area than in the post-1965 era. The later identity struggle of post-1965 involved maintenance of different Muslim identities while remaining united under the single Islamic Society's leadership.

## II. AMERICAN IDENTITY, THE MOSES KADER FAMILY

“Tell Me Who Your Friends Are and I Will Tell You Who You Are”

### **Introduction**

This chapter explores the challenges that immigrant Muslims faced in pre-1965 America in their efforts to fit into and to be accepted by their adopted home. Focusing on a Palestinian Muslim family, the Kaders, in Provo, Utah and utilizing data gathered from personal interviews and other resources, this study examines both the identity crisis encountered by first generation Muslim immigrants and the identity transformation experienced by second generation immigrant families, such as the Kaders, whose members abandoned Islam to conform to dominant American standards of religiosity. The process of assimilation by which the Kaders exchanged their Islamic heritage in favor of Mormonism shows that second generation family members were overwhelmed by the power and influence of the dominant culture.

This chapter outlines the background and methods of the study used in tracing the assimilation of the first through third generation Kader family into the Mormon society of Provo, Utah. It further examines the pursuit of the American dream at the expense of their Arab-Islamic identity by the Kader parents and children; looks at the transformation of the second generation from Islamic to Mormon Americans; and finally it illustrates the

challenges of Muslim immigrants in the pre-1965 era and their predicaments of assimilation into their adopted home of America. In conclusion it summarizes the foregoing discussion concerning Muslims in America in general and the Kader family in particular, along with specific recommendations for further studies on the early immigrant Muslims in North America.

### **Early Muslim Identity: An Uphill Battle**

In the essentially religious and cultural isolation of Provo the Kader parents, Moses and Ayesha, attempted both to maintain their faith and to assimilate into the American dream within the framework of “Anglo-Mormon” conformity. They practiced their Islamic faith on a private and personal level, while also adopting new behaviors publicly and socially that conformed to “Mormon-American” attitudes, habits, traditions and values. As such, the local people recognized them as Muslims who appreciated the Mormon faith, Mormon values and Mormon social norms (Kader Siblings).

Regarding the latter, I found the children to be very proud of their father’s patriotism and his thankfulness to the country of his adoption for granting him opportunities to succeed financially, socially and professionally. One of the children states:

My father was a very proud American. When he came home from the war injured he was not forgotten. He was given land, followed up on his medical condition; he was deaf, provided a pension and given hearing aids whenever he needed one or a new model was developed.<sup>5</sup>

Both parents and children were proud of being American and grateful for the support and fortune they received from America since the initial days of their migration.

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<sup>5</sup> According to the source, land was awarded to him for his service in the US military during World War II.

Significantly, Moses and all his six sons served in the American military and Air Force. Some joined the military voluntarily and others were drafted. Regardless, they felt honored and proud of themselves for their service.

Reportedly, Moses attempted to maintain Muslim practices while serving in the U.S. military. Hyer states that in the military Moses was well known for keeping a copy of the Quran with him all the time including the war situation. He was well respected for having and spreading his special prayer rug and performing his daily prayers, as well as for avoiding meals containing pork or pork products. He would eat a vegetarian dish if necessary or even go hungry on a day that had pork in the menu (Hyer, 1978). However, there are numerous other by-product of pork, lard included, which must have been almost impossible for him to avoid. At that time there was no provision for a Muslim meal or *halal* meat as there is today.

Back in the states the American business community of that time had little or no reason to cater for Muslim dietary products. The understanding of Muslim dietary restrictions of *halal* or *Zabiha* meat did not develop until very recently. Alternate market places such as Muslim community stores did not exist at that time. Even today, Muslims are not without difficulty in consolidating their lives Islamically in America, since the super markets do not supply Muslim *halal* meat.<sup>6</sup>

The *Daily Herald* of Provo reprinted an article about the life and religiousness of Moses's wife, Ayesha Kader. The article states, "every day of the year, five times a day,

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<sup>6</sup> It is true that most liberal Muslims, now and before, would not take those basic Islamic principles, e.g., dietary restrictions and gender issues, seriously. They would rather easily be swayed by the Americanization process (Gordon, 1964), without much effort to preserve their heritage, because for them Islam as religion and values is as good as any other religion and culture, if not worse. In that sense, they would argue, Christianity and Western values are proven to be superior since the West is so much advanced in almost every aspect of human life and civilization and find all reasons and grounds to assimilate into the society without questioning its values.

she [Ayesah] places the small rug on the floor, kneels and faces to the east, touches her forehead to the floor and prayers” (Daily Herald Provo, December 21, 1975). This quotation explains well the religiosity and punctuality of Ayesha, as a Muslim mother – a mother who is expected to play a very effective role in raising her children and training them about Islamic rituals and worship.

The children observed Islamic dietary standards by never eating pork products including at the school lunch. One of the Kader siblings stated:

To avoid pork in all its forms we took our own lunch from home when mother could prepare it. With some many of us in school at the same time that was not always possible. However even with no home lunch, we would go hungry for a few hours rather than eat[ing] pork products and remain that way today.

One of the siblings described his father as a devout Muslim who never missed his daily prayers. Even in a strenuous circumstance like traveling, he would stop on the way while driving to another city as he used to drive for business purposes, e.g., a farmers’ market or a flea market. He would spread his prayer mat, offer his Fajr (dawn) prayer early in the morning for about 5 to 7 minutes and continue driving to the destination. He would do that in order not to miss the prayer time. Otherwise, by the time he would reach the market place the prayer time would expire.

Despite the lack of cultural and religious support and the isolation that entails the Kaders tried to keep up with the celebration of main festivals such as *Eid al-fitr* (post-Ramadan) and *Eid al-Adha* (Abrahamic sacrifice) festivals. As one of the Kader siblings states: “we celebrated *Eid* every year. My father would buy 50 bags of flour, oranges and baklava and have us distribute it to all the neighbors.”

These festivals are socially very relevant in Islamic culture and tradition, especially for the children. Children look forward to them because they get *Eid* presents.

When the Kader siblings were younger and growing in the 1930s and 1940s the family was larger with the presence of Darwish (including his wife Zahra and daughter Maryam), Ismael and Hassan in addition to Moses, the father and Ayesha, the mother, the family was able to observe the *Eid* festivals. The elders in the family, uncles, would buy the Kader siblings the *Eid* gifts.

The Kader children also testified about the religious orthodoxy of their parents (Omar, Ghazy, Deen, Abe and Jeanie). About the father they had the following to say:

He [Moses] was an orthodox Muslim. He would always pray five times a day. Even if he was traveling, he would stop on the way and perform the prayer. He always wanted to build a mosque in Provo, but he did not succeed. He was indeed unhappy for not being able to see or build a mosque in the area during all these years of his life in Provo from 1915 until his death in 1976.

Usually children practice religion and tradition as they are taught and demonstrated by the parents and in most cases children follow the model of their parents. However, this was not so with the Kader family. The children appreciated the religious commitments of their parents and believed that their parents were true conservative Muslims. Yet, the majority of them converted out of Islam and joined Mormon Church. Regardless of their religious affiliation, one principle most continued to maintain was the Muslim sensitivity about eating pork. Yet, the general rules regarding *halal* meat were no longer an issue next generation of Kaders. They had converted out of the Islamic faith and embraced almost everything of the Anglo-Mormon conformity.

The pressure from the host society to conform and assimilate fully to the norm of Mormon society was so high that a single Muslim family of Kader could not but give in to the prevailing notion of “Anglo-Mormon” conformity in Provo, Utah. Ethan R. Yorgason characterized this tension as an “unusual place” for people of different faith

and culture within the United State of America. This pressure on Muslims to choose to opt out of Islam for any of the Christian denominations which dominate mainstream religious America is a pressure that remains in place even today. The survival of any other minority culture and religion in the midtwentieth century Mormon society of Utah was almost impossible.

It is only those basic aspects of social and religious behaviors that Muslims are not allowed to abandon permanently while adapting to a foreign culture and values. But most Muslim immigrants in the earlier period failed to seek such dual identities as Muslim Americans. Social and religious isolation, the prevailing model of the melting pot in which one's original and unique identity melts into the prevailing norm were obstacles in that path. These early immigrants also lacked the resources and perhaps the understanding of the basic Islamic guidance regarding living in foreign cultures and specifically in this case, dealing with the dilemma of assimilation into the American mainstream society like other ethnic groups such as Chinese, Koreans, Vietnamese and the Jews (Warner & Yang, 1998).

Parental ability to articulate and explain issues of religious and social stature to children in order to guide them to what they know and believe as right is an important element in transmission of faith. Neither Moses nor Ayesha was educated and intellectually trained enough to teach and guide their children about the excellence of Islamic faith as opposed to Mormonism or mainstream Christianity. Their knowledge about the religion of Islam was based on what they had learned from the practices of the tradition, not so much from the text. This ignorance was the source of weakness and

vulnerability. Therefore, they themselves were influenced by the dominant religion and culture of Anglo-Mormon conformity.

Among the added factors were such that all children went to the Utah public school system which was Mormon-centric. Church leaders and missionaries are active on a regular basis keeping Mormons actively religious and in proselytizing others into their faith. As such the children were taught better at schools about Mormon faith than they were taught at home about Islamic faith. Mormons had almost absolute victory over the Kader family children.

For the Kader family there were important similarities between these two faiths. Most importantly, Mormons recognize several truths of Islam and the Muslim way of life. But for the Kaders to be fully accepted, something they wanted very much, conversion was the price to pay for the majority community to accept them as part of the mainstream Mormon-American society in the way of their full assimilation.

From the start, Moses and Ayesha were engaged with the neighborhood, church and government agencies. Moses used to donate fruits, vegetables and other agricultural produces to different religious, social and governmental departments including the police department during the harvest seasons. The family eventually became very liberal towards Mormonism partly because the Church and the community leaders as well as the literature expressed their high regard for Islam, its Prophet, the Quran and Muslim people.

When I asked about the main reasons for them to become Mormon the answer came like this:

Part of it may be that Mormons respected Mohammed as a prophet and early Mormon leaders wrote of their respect for Islam. The only Muslims

we met growing up as children were Iranian students at BYU and traveling salesmen. It was hardly a thorough exposure. Did it occur to you that it may have appealed to us because it was closer to Islam than Catholics or other Protestants? Mormons are a lot like Muslims, they practice their religion as a social and religious custom, a way of life. They are to this day confused about separation of Church and State. It is a short coming in both religions.

Yet the Mormons were also untiringly aggressive promoters of the notion of Anglo-Mormon conformity. This “tough love” situation must have influenced the Kader siblings to eventually affiliate themselves with Mormonism. One of the Kader siblings stated:

There were far more people hostile to Islam and Arabs than friendly people. Remember this is a very conservative Republican community where racism was a major attribute of public opinion. We were not like lambs going to slaughter. We mostly became democrats and opposed 98% of the political views of the community.

Thus, while the Kaders were experiencing hostility and racism and were missing the spirit, practice and promotion of the Islamic way of life within an Islamic community, Mormonism found a place in their heart and won them over. Out of eight children, six boys and two girls, all but one became involved, directly or indirectly, with the Mormon Church activities.

With his perception that Mormons showed much respect for Islam, its prophet, the Quran and Muslim people, Moses, the father, would say that all religions are good, especially Mormonism. But Moses Kader still wished all his life to build a mosque in Provo, Utah, something he could never succeed in due to the lack of Muslim population. Although he was better off living in America for many reasons, including his medical conditions, like many other early immigrants, he wanted to go back home to Jerusalem and he did.

## **Lack of Commitment in Early Muslim Immigrants**

Scholars of sociology and American Muslims such as Abdo Elkholy and Yvonne Haddad and number of other scholars have studied about the immigrant Muslim assimilation factors in the United States (1967 and 1994). This dissertation confirms the views of those scholars who studied the process of immigrant Muslim assimilation in the pre-1965 America. They demonstrate that early immigrant Muslims failed to preserve and promote their religious identity and became very deinspired to teach and train their children about the same. In Utah this resulted in the conversion of the Kader children who were born and raised in America to both the Mormon religion and WASP culture of America defined by two authorities of sociology, Will Hergerb and Milton Gordon (Kaufmann, 2004).

Several factors contributed to this consequence. First, the family suffered severe religious, ethnic and cultural isolation. No Islamic community or mosque existed in the area until the late 1960s. Without social, religious, educational and cultural support it was difficult for them to sustain the religious practices, cultural holidays, or to instill religious cultural values in their children. Parents were unable to teach children the written texts of Islam because they themselves were uneducated. Children went to public schools fully dominated by Mormonism and experienced peer pressure from Mormon friends, teachers, administrators and church leaders. Without a weekend religious school system, children's socialization was centered on Christian events.

In such extreme isolation, the need for social acceptance and support was strong. Mormon missionaries were effective as they actively pursued their mission to convert the family, at least the new generation. The process of conversion of the family to

Mormonism and their assimilation into the American mainstream was also further enhanced by their choice to serve in the US military. The family took pride in being part of American mainstream society.

On the other hand, the American mainstream was actively Eurocentric, Christocentric and ethnocentric (Haddad, et al., 2004), a notion that immigrant Muslims could not challenge or alter at all. Instead, they became fully influenced and captured by it, the Anglo-Mormon conformity. The father of sociology, *Ibn Khaldun* (1332 - 1406), has been quoted to predict that the subordinate groups almost by default imitate the dominant group of society, as it happened with Muslims in America, especially in pre-1965 America (Rosenthal, 1989). We find an example of this in the lives of one such pioneering Muslim immigrant family, the Kader family, who have been living in Provo, Utah for approximately one century now. The findings of this research reveal that the immigrant parents were devout Muslims and yet their children converted out of Islam and embraced Mormonism as they grew up in the 1940s and 1950s.

### **Muslim Adaptation to Foreign Cultures and Values**

The Islamic religion provides guidance for adapting to foreign cultures and foreign values as long as that adaptation does not amount to rejecting the basic principles of the Islamic code of conduct. Even the observing of those basic obligations could also be alternated as the situation dictates, but only on a short term basis, e.g., *salat al-Qasr wa al-Jam'a* (shortening and combining the five daily prayers) in a situation when one is traveling and/or is afraid of potential danger. Such alternatives cannot be allowed for an extended time longer than 2 weeks (Islamic Jurists). In fact, other than certain specific

restrictions, Muslims are virtually free to adapt to a new culture, social habits and traditions which may be considered morally neutral and decent called *al-‘urf* in Islamic *fiqh* orthodoxy. Thus it is permissible to assimilate to foreign culture and society.

In this provision of adaptability and assimilation, however, it is not acceptable for Muslims to adapt to the Americanization path in its absolute model, which would mean a total abandonment of Islamic faith and way of life.

The image of the great American melting pot almost requires an abandonment of basic Islamic faith in the Oneness of God in favor of the dominant Trinitarian faith. The melting pot with its dominant economic, social, political and cultural behaviors also challenges certain aspects of fundamental Islamic understandings, precepts and behaviors. American secularism, spiritualism and sexual mores contradict aspects of Islamic faith and behavior.

### **Anglo Conformity and Melting Pot Process**

According to scholars of ethnography and the sociology of religion the terms assimilation, acculturation, amalgamation and Americanization are synonymous (Gordon, 1964) and used interchangeably or complementing each other. “Anglo-conformity” or “the melting pot” were the two primary models of Americanization, the process of immigrant assimilation.

The notion of Anglo-conformity is as old as the beginning of European settlement in the new world; the notion of ‘melting pot’ was first introduced to the Americanization process in 1782 first by John Crevecoeur then subsequently reinforced by Emerson in 1845 and Turner in 1893. Finally, in 1908, Israel Zangwill effectively promoted the

concept of ‘melting pot’ notion of American culture through his play entitled, *The Melting Pot*, hence all immigrants assimilate to the Americanization process.<sup>7</sup>

It is suggested that the melting pot model of assimilation has been multidimensional, e.g. single melting pot, multiple melting pot and triple melting pot (Brettell & Hollifield, 2007). Nonetheless, its actual beneficiaries were immigrants from European background, because almost all ethnic immigrant groups in America at the time were from Europe with negligible exception (Huntington 2004, 171; Rose 1997, 80; Jacoby 2004, 239). Asians and people of Middle Eastern background were insignificant minorities too small to affect the process of assimilation in any way.

At the turn of the last century William James introduced the concept of cultural pluralism, a significant turnaround in his book, *A Pluralistic Universe* published in 1909.<sup>8</sup> The opponents of cultural pluralism criticized James’ view expressing an historic fear of the West concerning the Islamic counterpart of multiculturalism which might signify the Islamization of the West (Boening, 2007).

Horace M. Kallen is also regarded as the one who pioneered the concept of “cultural pluralism” in American society between 1906 and 1915 as a solution to an ideological conflict over “Americanization” process (Ratner, 1984, 185).

Seventy-five years later in the 1990s the concept of cultural pluralism or multiculturalism, with or without Muslim perspective, was regenerated by the scholars of sociology of religion who argued that religious and ethnic diversity in American culture is a pure reality in a “culturally impure American society” (Warner, 1997).

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<sup>7</sup> For the theory of “melting pot,” see [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The\\_Melting\\_Pot](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Melting_Pot)

<sup>8</sup> For more about the work of William James, see [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William\\_James#Works\\_by\\_James](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_James#Works_by_James)

The assimilation of other non-European immigrants became part of the discourse in the 1980s and 1990s, a period of high immigration in America (Bean & Stevens, 2005). It was the time when Muslims emerged as a distinctive community in the Multicultural America (Haddad, 1994), when America also began to emerge as a society of ethnic and cultural diversity with laws passed against any discrimination based on race, religion and ethnicity. Until then it was almost impossible for a Muslim individual or family to assimilate into the mainstream American society as Muslim, maintaining his/their original Islamic identity, especially in small and remote cities.

### **Discovering the History of the Kader Family**

I met Jeanie Kader Hyer, along with her husband, Eric Hyer and son, Jihad Hyer in Salt Lake City in the summer of 2007. I was fortunate to learn about Jeanie's unique background in the course of my conversation with her. Her parents, Moses and Ayesha Kader, were Palestinian Muslims who immigrated to Provo, Utah and lived there for more than half a century as an isolated Arab-Muslim family. The family background prompted me to ask about the Islamic identity of the family, first through the subsequent generations. Some of their children formally baptized as Mormons, while others became visitors to the Mormon Church and married Mormon spouses without being formally baptized. Following her marriage, Jeanie also converted to Mormonism and she is now an active member of Mormon Church in Provo.

Jeanie and Eric have two children. Their daughter is married to a Mormon. Both Jeanie and Eric chose the name, *Jihad*, for their son and they liked it, perhaps as a symbol

of support for the sufferings of their extended family in Palestine.<sup>9</sup> However, *Jihad* reverted to Islam as a result of a trip to Jerusalem where he spent the entire summer with his extended Muslim family there. He now is married to a Palestinian Muslim bride. Listening to the description of her parents and siblings, I became very interested in learning about this pioneering Muslim immigrant family's approximately one century in Provo, Utah. I interviewed Jeanie, Jihad and Eric Hyer a number of times.

From Jeanie I was able to collect copies of articles published in local newspapers about her parents. I also interviewed her husband, Eric Hyer, and her brothers (Ayub, Dean, Ghazi and Omar) over the phone and email. I acquired a copy of an unpublished paper written on the "Biography of Moses Kader" by Eric Hyer when he was an undergraduate student at the Brigham Young University (Hyer, 1978).

The Kader family of Provo, Utah had to confront the challenges of the American melting pot in isolation as did other immigrant Muslims of pre-1965 America. The history of the Kader family illustrates how early immigrant Muslims acting under the pressures of adaptation into the melting pot paved the way for the subsequent generations to cut off their Arab-Islamic connection and assimilate into the American mainstream fully. As such, most of the Kader siblings were fully subjected to Anglo-Mormon conformity and the pursuit of their American dream, as Mormon-Americans. Not until the 1980s with redefinitions of multiculturalism and pluralism did the challenge of the melting pot begin to clearly change (Suleiman, 1999).

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<sup>9</sup> A number of educators and professors of the University of Utah were invited in the party including my supervisor, Professor Bernard Weiss, Professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies in the Middle East Center.

## The Kaders Into the American Melting Pot

Between 1915 and 1944 Provo became the destination of six members of Kader family, four males and two females. They were Darwish and his wife Zahra, Moses and his wife Ayesha and her brother Hassan and Ismael Kader. The first Kader, Darwish, arrived in Provo in 1915, the last in 1944. In the process of migration to America, however, the family name split into two: one Anglicized as Kader and the other un-Anglicized remaining *Abukhdair*. Literally the Arabic word *Abukhdair* is a compound name of ‘*abu* and *khdair*’ meaning “father of Khdair.” When placed together it is usually assumed that “*Khdair*” was the first child of the parents. Evidence suggests that the original name was Anglicized by the government officials at the arrival in the port of Ellis Island shown in the passenger record of 1923.<sup>10</sup> Henceforth we will use the Anglicized family name, Kader instead of *Abukhdair*, for convenience.

Darwish and Moses Kader were the first Muslim Palestinians to immigrate Provo, Utah, Darwish in 1915 and Moses in 1920. According to sources, Moses arrived in the United States of America when he was still a teenager (Hyer, 1978), and settled in the State of New York in 1912/1915. He came to America uneducated and unskilled and earned his living as a peddler.

He then joined the US military and served in Europe at the frontier of France until the end of the War in 1919. He came back to the United States to finally settle in Provo, Utah where his uncle (or nephew), Darwish Kader, was already living (*Daily Herald*, Provo December 21, 1975). According to the *Daily Herald* of Provo Moses lost his

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<sup>10</sup> See <http://www.ellisland.org/> for the record of Musa’s arrival. However, there is no record of Musa’s first arrival in the shore of America which was either in 1910 or 1912. Moses went back to Jerusalem in 1921 to get married and came back in 1923 which was recorded in the Ellis Island passenger record registry of arrival as “Moses Kader” (Retrieved on August 4, 2010)

hearing due to extreme artillery fire and bomb blasts in the war zone and came back as a wounded war veteran.

Soon Moses owned a farm which produced fruit and had a barn for cattle that produced dairy products. He was doing well. In 1922, he returned to Palestine to marry his cousin, Ayesha. In 1923 after marrying Ayesha, he returned to Provo without her. She waited 10 long years before she could travel to Provo in 1933 to join him (*Daily Herald Provo* 1975). Since then, they permanently settled in Provo where they parented all 10 of their children who were born and brought up in Provo.

The eldest of the Kader siblings, Kamel, was born in Provo in 1933, the youngest, Jamila (now Jeanie), in the early 1950s. Two children died in infancy and two others in adulthood.<sup>11</sup> The Kader parents, Moses and Ayesha, lived in Provo all their lives until their death subsequently in 1976 and 1994.<sup>12</sup> They left behind two daughters and four sons, two of whom were formally baptized into Mormonism. The other four fully assimilated in the American society of Utah including attending the Mormon Church, although they were not formally baptized.

Provo became the adopted home of the Kader parents who stayed there until the death of Ayesha in 1994. Two of their children, the Kader siblings, Jeanie and Ayub, known as Abe, are still living in the same region. Jeanie's daughter is married and moved out. Her son Jihad also moved out after finishing his first degree from the University of

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<sup>11</sup> Obituary: Kamel Moses Kader, *Deseret News*, Thursday, Jan. 6, 2000:  
<http://archive.deseretnews.com/archive/736974/Obituary-Kamel-Moses-Kader.html>

<sup>11</sup> Four other sons, Ghazi, Kemal, Yousuf and Dean, were already serving in the United States military. They joined the military in the mid 1950s. Later on in the 1960s both Omar and Ayub also joined the military. Among them Ayub served the longest to retire in 2006, after serving both in Afghanistan and Iraq.

<sup>12</sup> [http://contentdm.lib.byu.edu/cdm4/item\\_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/UCOI&CISOPTR=107451&CISOBX=1&REC=1](http://contentdm.lib.byu.edu/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/UCOI&CISOPTR=107451&CISOBX=1&REC=1) (Retrieved on August 4, 2010)

Utah in 2008. Ayub (claims to be Muslim) and his Mormon wife have two children who are also Mormons and are still living in the Provo area.

### **Unsuccessful Attempt to Relocate in Jerusalem**

In 1961 Moses and Ayesha tried to resettle in Jerusalem, to marry their daughter, Maryam, to a Muslim groom and resettle there.<sup>13</sup> They took two of their sons, Omar and Ayub, and the daughters, Maryam and Jamila, with them. They arranged for their elder daughter, Maryam, to marry her cousin, but the marriage was a bitter experience and short lived, a first experience of the failure of resettling due to the culture clash between homeland and the culture of the adopted home.

In addition to Maryam's failed marriage Moses tried to arrange a marriage between his brother's daughter, Massada and his 18-year-old-son, Omar. Omar, however, could not be convinced that marrying his first cousin was a good thing for him or the young woman, who at the time was 16. After that failed attempt on the part of the parents, Omar soon arranged a flight back to the US with the help of an uncle Ismael and "escaped." This effort exemplifies the desperate desire of the Kader parents to establish a cultural integration in the family relationships between their American born children and those relatives in Shufat, Jerusalem.

Their children returned to the United States within months. Their mother, Ayesha, returned in 2 years in 1963. Moses, himself, finally came back following his performance of Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1968. That was their first and only attempt to resettle

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<sup>13</sup> Four other sons, Ghazi, Kemal, Yousuf and Dean, were already serving in the United States military. They joined the military in the mid-1950s. Later on in the 1960s both Omar and Ayub also joined the military. Among them, Ayub served the longest to retire in 2006, after serving both in Afghanistan and Iraq.

in Jerusalem. This experiment with the American born children trying to live in the home country of their parents failed measurably. The children became absolutely convinced that Jerusalem, the Arab society and its culture, were good for their parents, but not for them. The experience also helped them discover it was almost impossible to change to Arab-Muslim tradition and heritage. They had already been Americanized and fully adapted to the American culture. Upon their return they became fully assimilated into American society with no reservation and no plan even to reconsider upholding their parent's heritage.

The second generation Kaders who were American by birth and by upbringing did not totally neglect nor fail to incorporate the cultural values of their parents. They remained religious but in a "Mormon-American" way without being affiliated to the Islamic religion. Islam had never existed in their public and social life in any way. But one of the siblings who formally converted to Mormonism and held the position of Mormon Bishop for several years stated that the teachings of Islamic values and morals have always been in the back of their minds as their parents practiced and taught them. He states, "Our values came from our father. Generosity, compassion, humility, keeping sacred things sacred are all things my father taught and in effect the Islamic way of life" (e-mail interview).

The second generation Kaders have been living a Mormon life since their childhood in the 1930s through the 1950s. They are now more Mormon-Americans than Palestinian-Arab-Muslim-Americans. Between the 1940s and 1950s almost all Kader children were Mormonized, some of them were formally baptized while others were not. They all married Mormon and Christian spouses. Reportedly four Kader siblings, Joseph,

Dean, Ghazy and Kamel, were not officially affiliated with Mormonism and were at times quite hostile to Mormonism. Three of these still struggle with their Mormon spouses and children over this to this day. Yet they were part of the Mormon Church and community by becoming the regular visitors of the Church along with their spouses and children.<sup>14</sup> Two of the siblings, Kemal (67) and Joseph (32) who died subsequently in their sixties and thirties, evidently died as Mormons, at least not as Muslims (obituaries).<sup>15</sup> Only Ghazy was not married to a Mormon spouse and remained Muslim.

Even until the 1990s the self-identified Muslim siblings regularly visited the Mormon Church along with their spouses. All their children were affiliated with the religion of their Mormon parents and went to church with them. Currently, out of four brothers and two sisters who are now alive, only one sister, Jeanie, is an active Mormon. The rest are reclaiming their religious identities, regenerating their Islamic past, not by active participation in Islam but by claim of heritage. Without any Islamic religious and community support, in the midst of a society that was staunchly Mormon and Eurocentric in culture the Moses Kader family fell prey, almost by default, to Mormonism. It was almost impossible to live a life with Islamic demeanor.

A lack of exposure to fellow Muslims and Islamic community, culture and values, especially in a situation where the host society is actively promoting its mission of converting people, eventually lured the Kader siblings out of Islam. Almost all of the

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<sup>14</sup> Not until the beginning of this century Muslim professionals started to settle in Provo area on their employment with scientific industries and educational institutions. In 2004 local Muslims rented a house space in the city of Orem, 4 miles North of Provo, to use it as mosque for their daily and Friday prayers. The cities of Orem and Provo are now shared by their Muslim neighbors like any other cities in America. However, until 2004 this was not a Muslim friendly area.

<sup>15</sup> See obituary for Kemal: <http://www.deseretnews.com/article/736974/> For Joseph M. Kader see Obituary for Kader, Joseph Moses, *Orem-Geneva Times ISSN*, April 22, 1971, Sorry AREAL, call #Or3, Location: MFILM. (Retrieved on August 4, 2010)

Kader siblings that I interviewed expressed a felt pressure to assimilate into and to be accepted by the mainstream society. They had nowhere to turn for support except the Mormon people, church and authorities. Likewise, they could have isolated themselves from the mainstream society in which they sought citizenship.

Although integrated and assimilated well, the Kader family was indeed living an isolated and lonely life in the middle of a Mormon community without fellow Muslim community support. Had they not been proactive and not taken initiative to socialize and interact with the local Mormon neighbors, the family would still be living an isolated life like those in Detroit and Michigan (Elkholy, 1966). Instead, they assimilated well and pursued the American dream like any other American citizen, but at the expense of their original identity as Muslims.

They found themselves better off marrying American spouses, converting out of Islam and assimilating fully into the American mainstream. Conversion to Mormonism was the only way to fit in and earn respect and acceptance into the society (Leonard, 2003). Changing religion was indeed a radical move for people of Islamic background. But in their case, the parents gave up. The children, born Americans and living American lives, could not understand why they should remain with the religion of their parents. The pressure from the mainstream society was so intense that they almost by default became Mormon Americans out of a desperation to fit in.<sup>16</sup>

The peer pressure and the dominant notions of the mainstream society were much too strong for them to fight against in order to preserve their own identity of which they had learned only from traditions, not from textual study. It was difficult for them, parents

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<sup>16</sup> According Kader siblings, their parents were devout and conservative Muslims. They were practicing their Islamic faith and rituals with full commitment and stayed away from things un-Islamic.

and children, to hold any negative view against Mormonism. It was never clear if the children's conversion out of Islam went against the parent's wishes, or the parents purposely allowed their children to adopt American notions in a survival movement of "Anglo-Mormon" conformity. Reportedly, they used to allow children not only to socialize with the Mormon friends, but also to go out with them including the church activities.

The parent's loss of confidence in their own heritage and the absence of any Islamic community support created as far as their religious identity and culture were concerned a helplessness in the face of Anglo Mormon society. But the Kaders did not allow themselves to suffer from that situation. They dealt with it in a proactive manner by their neighborliness.

### **Kaders Toward Their Mormon Neighbors**

For any ethnic group, especially in the American diaspora, including Catholics, Jews and Muslims, if not the Protestants, the Americanization process and the pursuit of American dream does cause a moral predicament in how to assimilate and integrate into to the dominant culture (Gordon, 1964). Each immigrant group, religious and ethnic alike, takes its time and toll to adapt and assimilate into the mainstream society. Challenges of assimilation for Muslims are profound because their Islamic religious principles and the cultural values of the host society have significant differences. Islamic spirituality and civil life have a history of interconnection. The daily prayers are both ritualistically timed and public. The Islamic dietary restrictions on meat, alcoholic beverages and other proscribed unclean or unhealthy activities also have a history of

being integrated into the society. There are fundamental differences in some areas between Islamic and Western ways in aspects of life style such as cleanliness, financial transaction, dress code and the norm of social interactions between male and female, etc. In these areas of life style, Muslims maintain a particular way of life that is not the same as people in the West.

The Kader family's way of life went through a process of change from Arab-Muslim to Mormon-American with the parents still clinging to their tradition, yet unable to block the process of assimilation, incapacitated to resist the trend of "Mormon-conformity" (Luther, 2009),<sup>17</sup> and to promote their own cause of self-identity in Arab-Islamic culture and tradition. In this predicament Moses and Ayesha were not able to do any better than observe the changes and accept the inevitable (Haddad, 2002).

Religious issues have always been part of the challenges Muslims experience, like their Jewish counterparts, while assimilating into the American mainstream society during the early 20<sup>th</sup> century (Goldstein & Goldscheider, 1968). Stephen Warner argues that this situation began to change through the 1980s and 1990s when religious, cultural and ethnic differences began to be perceived as legitimate (Haft, 2006).

### **From Islam to Mormon Conformity**

What we find in the experience of the Kader family is the cost of those early efforts of assimilation into the mainstream society and culture of America. For the Kaders Islamic faith and values became irrelevant in the context of American diaspora, although they did continue to observe some cultural aspects of their Arab-Islamic past. Many

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<sup>17</sup> See for details Benjamin Luther, "Mormon Conformity," <http://benjimanluther.blogspot.com/2009/09/mormon-conformity.html>

scholars of Muslims in America believe that Muslims who wanted to adopt America as their home experienced a similar fate in the country, e.g., in Detroit, Michigan and Toledo, Ohio (Elkholy, 1966).

Elkholy found that Muslims, on one hand, abandoned their own religion and values and, on other hand, adopted new religions and life style in order to fully assimilate into the mainstream American society. The Kader siblings are of the view that they “adopted additional values but never abandoned Islamic values” (Kader, 2010). One may consider this view of the Kader siblings as an attempt to ease the family loss of original culture in light of their own conversion to Mormonism, including one member reaching the status of Bishop.

The Kader family were determined to live in an America that was not yet pluralistic and diversified to include Muslims along with their Jewish and Christian counterparts. For them, like those in Detroit and Toledo (Elkholy, 1966), the process of assimilation could not follow any other models but “Anglo-Mormon” conformity, because the prevailing notion of the society was “Mormon-centric,” a socio-cultural counterpart of Anglo-conformity.

Moreover, the Kadars were one single extended family who were not able to endorse or promote any social, cultural and religious activities in public, as there was no one else to collaborate with in organizing such activities. Therefore, they did not have the status of a community or interest group yet.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, the experience of the Kader family in Provo, Utah stands as evidence of Muslim immigrants who came to America and tried their best to preserve their original Islamic identity as long as they could in the first generation, but without real success in the subsequent generations. Their experience conforms to the assertion of scholars and Muslim community leaders that in the midst of the moral conflict between the first generation immigrant Muslims and the host society, the second and the subsequent generations become lost into the American dominant culture. (Elkholy 1966, Haddad & Smith, 1994)

The pre-1965 American environment was highly challenging for Muslims in terms of maintaining their religious identity while seeking to adapt and assimilate into the mainstream society. The intense Anglo-centric notion<sup>18</sup> of the host society and the insignificant number of Muslim people in the country rendered Muslim immigrants incapable of establishing Islamic religious or social institutions to promote community or group identity. Thus, the identity of Muslim Americans was at stake.

The situation of the Kader family in Provo represents the above phenomenon. Moses and Ayesha came as Muslims and lived as such but privately. In all their lives in Provo from 1920 to 1994, they performed their religious duties and rituals mostly at home and sometimes on the shoulder of a highway. On the other hand, the Mormon Church and people were relentlessly active and dynamic in both church and social

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<sup>18</sup> The theory of cultural pluralism in America emerged early in the last century, but it had not become a viable theory that explains American social, cultural and ethnic notion until after the repeal of immigration law in 1965 that resulted in the migration of ethnic groups from all over the world that really gave birth to the real presence of the multicultural phenomenon within the immigrant communities in America. Now multiculturalism or cultural diversity is the most realistic theory of Americanism. As such cultural pluralism means to maintain group differences (Newman, 1973) and it is an alternative to melting pot, as it is characterized by mutual appreciation and respect between two or more cultures (Bennett ,1994)

environments, including the public school system, promoting the Mormon faith and values through the evangelization and hopeful conversion of nonMormons to Mormonism. These acts were upheld by the dominant immigration model in American of the melting pot and its adaptation in Utah as Anglo-Mormon conformity.

The Kader parents on the other hand were very open minded, sociable and religiously liberal, especially towards Mormonism. They had a positive view towards Mormonism and the Mormon people, seeking to socialize as opposed to being isolated. The interaction of the Kader family with the Mormon society and church became intense. As the children grew older they also became friendly with their Mormon peers, hence marriage and conversion.

Moses and Ayesha never converted to Mormonism. The parents lived long enough to observe their children fully assimilated into American mainstream, abandoning Islamic faith and identifying themselves with Mormonism. For the Kader parents, living in the melting pot of assimilation, it was simply not possible to teach their children enough about Islamic faith and culture and guide them in maintaining their own traditions. The notion of cultural pluralism did not become an active ideology until after 1965 (Gordon, 1964).

The Kader family experience is an example of the plight of Muslim immigrants to America in the early immigrant period who came and made America their adopted home away from home (Yang 1998). As demonstrated by Elkholy in his study of Muslim communities in Detroit, Michigan and Toledo, Ohio Arab Muslim immigrants in the early last century faced a challenge of identity crisis (Elkholy, 1966). At that time, Muslims were left with very limited choices. They could assimilate fully, convert to

American religions, and change their names, behaviors and church going to that of other American people. Alternatively, they could go back to their home countries where the economic and political situations were often difficult. Many of them did go back after spending decades of isolated life in America (Elkholy, 1966) including members of the Kader family, Darwish, his wife Zahra and daughter Maryam and even Ismael, the younger brother of Moses.

### III. DUALITY OF IDENTITY: DARWISH AND ISMAEL KADER

“Tell me whom you love, I'll tell you who you are”

#### **Introduction**

This chapter is a continuation of the previous chapter focusing on the other members of the Kader family, Darwish and Ismael, who came to America as economic migrants and lived in America for decades, 1913-1947. They refused to assimilate, as that would amount to running the risk of losing their original Islamic identity and finally, refused to adopt America as their home. They eventually returned to Jerusalem.

Reportedly their main fear was about the future of their children and their inability to raise them as Muslims, marrying them to Muslim spouses, educating them about Islam. They found it difficult to practice basic rituals such as daily and weekly congregational prayers and eating of *halal* food, etc. The study demonstrates that the children of Darwish and Ismael Kader who were raised in Jerusalem as Muslims (unlike the children of Moses Kader discussed in the previous chapter) eventually successfully migrated to America later in the 1960s and 1970s, became American citizens and live here as Muslims to this day. They were able to do so, I argue, because of the immigration policy change in 1965 as well as the change of cultural norms in America as a result of lifting the ban on

foreigners to form cultural and social organizations on October 9, 1981. By the time the children of Darwish immigrated to America, the country's political, religious and cultural attitudes had already begun to change to allow non-European and non-Christian immigrants including Muslims to form organizations and build mosques and centers. This gave birth to ethnic and religious diversity and to a cultural pluralism that benefited Muslims immensely.

### **Views Over Muslims Who First Came to America**

Most scholars of Muslims in America believe that Muslims from Africa were the first to bring Islam to North America (Lincoln, Jackson) and that they came during the period from the 19<sup>th</sup> century to the end of World War II (Abu-Laban, Qureshi & Waugh, 1991). Others believe that there was a Muslim presence in the Americas centuries prior to the discovery of America by Columbus in 1492 (Quick, 1996).<sup>19</sup>

It has also been argued that 15 to 40 % of West Africans brought to the Americas as slaves were Muslims. Almost none of them, with some exception, were allowed to practice their faith (Bukhari, 2004). With some exceptions, most of those Muslim slaves lost their identity and social standing (Ernst, 2003) to the forces of the slave masters, were tortured and were even killed for refusing to convert to the religion of their masters (Ba-Yunis, 1977; Haddad, 1991; Lincoln, 1973; Nyang, 1999; Smith, 1999; Waugh &

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<sup>19</sup> See Abdullah Hakim Quick, *Deeper Roots: Muslims in the Americas and the Caribbean From Before Columbus to the Present*, London: Ta-ha Publishers Ltd., 1996. Scholars are raising questions whether people like Elvis Presley, Booker T. Washington, Fredrick Douglas and the wife of Abraham Lincoln have Muslim ancestors. Quick illustrates the facts that support the view that Muslims had lived in the Americas since long before Columbus to the present in the Americas. Quick also reveals how Muslims fought for freedom during the Trans-Atlantic slave trade and how even today, Islam's roots can be seen in the names and ancestry of people living in America and the Caribbean. However, Quick's book has not been able to attract attention from the American academia and publishers. The book is not available in the libraries, except for the Muslim bookstores and mosques. It is an 80 page book with a good bibliography and references from the classical scholars of early American non-European immigrants.

Abu-Laban, 1983). The questions that arise from these studies demonstrate the history of the Muslim presence in America and the issues of Muslim identity and assimilation into American society that require in-depth study.

The Muslim immigrants of postslavery America came with enthusiasm and high hopes of having a better life and prosperity without necessarily realizing the potential difficulties and danger of losing their own identity to the dominant society, especially with regard to their second generation. Through this study of the Kader family in Provo, Utah we see that the intense and often torturous decisions made under the social/religious forces of assimilation had a similar effect to that of slavery resulting, for instance, in the pressured conversion of second generation Muslims to Mormonism or in total flight back to the homeland for purpose of cultural religious freedom.

Muslims who resisted giving in to the demands of the dominant culture failed to assimilate and fit in as part of the mainstream society. Some felt they had to leave America for their native home after several decades of floundering around in the American Diaspora.

This chapter will demonstrate this pattern in the life experience of Darwish and Ismael Kader in America from 1913 to 1946 and from 1923 to 1947. In this pattern the early immigrant Muslims, because they could not adapt to and assimilate into the Americanization process, eventually returned to their home countries to save their faith, values, tradition and culture.

As such, I will first describe the life of Darwish Kader followed by Ismael Kader as examples of immigrant Muslims' life experience in pre-1965 America. I will then demonstrate the impact of their commitment and dedication to retain their Arab-Islamic

identity that both undermined and led them to refuse the pursuit of their American dream. Both families honored and respected their original identity even as they desired to become American citizens. But the prevailing American norm of Anglo-Mormon conformity in Utah was too strong. Their Arab-Islamic culture could not simply be promoted and coexist.

I will also demonstrate the fact that their children eventually immigrated to America in the 1960s and 1970s, became American citizens and have lived as Arab-American Muslims ever since. The main factors, I argue, are the changes in American immigration, social and cultural policies that led to a change of the notion of Americanism and American attitudes.

Key factors in this change are the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 and the law of October 9, 1981 allowing foreigners to form their cultural and social organizations in this country irrespective of their status as foreign students, immigrants and citizens. This movement from cultural melting pot to cultural pluralism extended the notion of America towards the so called “other people,” especially the Arab-Muslims. The second generation of these two branches of the Kader family found America and the notion of the American dream different from the notion of America and the American dream that their parents encountered when they considered making America their adopted home in vain.

Like the Kaders many other immigrant Muslim individuals and families went back to their home countries to preserve their cultural and religious identity. Some sent their teenagers back to the home country for education, marriages and cultural benefits. They were afraid if they lived here permanently and raised their children in the given

environment they would lose them in the wilderness of the American dream and the Americanization process, a process that was very powerful, self-righteous and Anglo-Mormon-Eurocentric.

According to most studies the early Arab-Muslim immigrants were mostly uneducated working class who were best suited for peddling, farming and street selling (Elkholy 1966; Haddad et al., 1990 present). My finding about the first generation Kaders also conforms to the same assertion. These Kaders indeed began their lives in the American diaspora as peddlers, street sellers and farmers. The only difference between them and others is that they failed to assimilate, integrate and fit into the society and remained sojourners until eventually they went back to their home countries.

According to *Daily Herald Provo* Darwish arrived New York in 1913 where he spent 2 years selling clothes from a trunk on the streets of the main cities. He decided to move to Provo, Utah in 1915. Given the nature of the new place, less populated and cheap land, he had a different strategy for making his money. There he would buy a piece of land to build a house, a barn, an orchard and live as a farmer. He had a good background in farming while in his village, Shufat. In fact, for a Palestinian man Provo was almost like his own village in Jerusalem which was also very suitable for farming, irrigation and raising cattle. After his arrival in Provo, he purchased 30-50 acres of farmland and finally settled.

Darwish found that he could easily establish an agricultural and dairy farm to produce pears, cherries, grapes and dairy products which he did quite successfully. His farmland was in the “west of Rock Canyon below where the Provo LDS Temple stands”

(*The Herald Provo*, December 21, 1975). His choice of location was also a well thought about decision.

Darwish was already married but left his young wife, Zahra, behind in Jerusalem. Although the life in the streets of America was very busy and stressful, Darwish never forgot his wife who was living all by herself, with or without her children, in Jerusalem.

After establishing his business Darwish built a house in Provo then went back to visit his family in Jerusalem at least 10 years after he left home in 1910 or 1913. That was a long time for a Muslim man to stay away from his family, yet they were routinely doing that, as we found Moses also parted from his newlywed wife for 10 years. The difficulties of traveling across oceans, availability of resources and the savings that one would like to secure before traveling were the main factors for such a long gap between visits with families. Darwish, however, went with the intent of bringing his wife Zahra along with him to live together in their new home in Provo.

The *Daily Herald Provo* reports that initially Zahra had difficulty conceiving, but eventually she gave birth to a daughter, Maryam Kader, who was born in Provo, Utah in 1933.<sup>20</sup> The arrival of the baby girl was a joyous event for Darwish and his wife. Raising a Muslim daughter and giving her in marriage to a Muslim groom was a challenge that Darwish and Zahra were foreseeing in every moment of their lives in Provo, a small and remote city with no trace of a Muslim living in the area, let alone a mosque and/or a Muslim organization of any kind. Culturally Muslim parents are more meticulous in

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<sup>20</sup> Another source says that Darwish and his wife had three children who were born prior to his departure from home. Unfortunately, all three of their children died of plague while Darwish was living in America. They probably died of this contagious disease without treatment, since the father was not home and mother was short of means to treat her ailing children. Losing her children, Zahra was extremely depressed and emotionally disturbed. Since Darwish had no prior knowledge about the death of his children, to find his wife all by herself with none of the children alive shocked him deeply and he decided to take Zahra with him to his adopted home of America.

raising their daughters and marrying them to the right groom is very important, more so than their sons.

Of course, sons also need serious parental guidance and support, but girls deserve and get the most of it. It would be the question in the minds of parents as to how and in which culture a daughter, Maryam, should have been raised and to whom they should eventually marry her. These were the type of concerns that eventually prompted them to go back home to Shuffat, Jerusalem for good in 1946.<sup>21</sup>

### **Moral Dilemma: Assimilation Into the Melting Pot**

*Daily Herald Provo* reports that Darwish faced a moral dilemma of adaptation and assimilation into their new home, especially with regard to their second generation. Maryam was growing older and needed to learn and understand that although born in America, America was not her real country. Its culture and values were foreign to her, not in a real sense but in the context. America was neither a Muslim country nor was it willing to welcome the presence of Muslims and their cultural and moral values.

While these senses were fostered by the parents, how she would regard such perspectives of her parents after growing to her maturity was yet to be experienced by the parents. Darwish and Zahra did not want to wait and see what might happen to them and their child. They wanted to take a precautionary measure before it would be too late.

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<sup>21</sup> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shuafat>: Shu'fat (Arabic: شُعْفَاط) also *Shuafat* is an Arabic neighborhood of East Jerusalem, forming part of northeastern Jerusalem.<sup>[1]</sup> Located on the old Jerusalem-Ramallah road about 3 miles north of the Old City, Shuafat has a population of 35,000 residents. The Shuafat refugee camp, established in 1966, is located on the traditional lands of the town of Shuafat. Known to the Canaanites and Crusaders as *Dersophath*; the present-day town of Shuafat is also thought to be the site of ancient Gebim, a village in north Jerusalem whose inhabitants fled the approaching Assyrian army, according to the Book of Isaiah. Shuafat has been the site of intermittent habitation since at least 2000 BCE and a number of ancient artifacts have been discovered there, including the remains of a Crusader structure in the center of the village that was possibly a church (includes map of the city).

In those days of pre-1965 America the question of how a second generation male or female would adapt and assimilate into the American melting pot culture was a serious matter for some Muslims and less than that for some others. For Darwish and Zahra, the social and public aspects of Islamic religion were more than serious, they were inflexible and uncompromising. Yet it was not possible to pursue in that given time and place in the American diaspora their Islamic commitment in raising children. Darwish literally failed to resolve this question in his mind.

Darwish's main concern about Islamic identity was shifting from himself and his wife to the next generation, his only daughter. He was particularly concerned with bringing up his daughter in a proper Islamic way, educating her about Islamic religious tradition, ensuring her marriage to a Muslim man who would guide her and allow her to practice Islam and to raise her offspring according to Islamic tradition.<sup>22</sup> He wanted to be sure that he was doing a good job as a Muslim father of a daughter.

It may be useful to mention the important place of a daughter from a perspective of an Islamic civil society. She symbolizes and will be charged with the role of woman in Islamic tradition and culture. On the daughter depends the successful upbringing of the next generation of Islamic motherhood. Children grow with much closer relationship with the mother than the father. As a logical consequence, children in most cases grow representing the values learned from the mother. Technically, therefore, the mother would not be able to play such a crucial role if she were not under the leadership of a

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<sup>22</sup> According to Islamic principles a Muslim female cannot be married to a non-Muslim man because of the complexities such marriage would cause in the family both religiously and socially. The Islamic policy towards a male to marry a non-Muslim female is much more flexible. A Muslim male is allowed to marry a non-Muslim female as long as she is from among the 'People of the Book,' Christian or Jew, considering certain circumstances that must precede.

Muslim husband, because Islam decrees the wife to be obedient to her husband, especially on the issues of religion.

Darwish was determined to give his daughter in marriage to a good Muslim man. As Elkholy and other scholars of early Muslim immigrants in America demonstrate, this dedicated father of a daughter must have learned about the plight of many Muslim parents who lost their girls in marriage out of Islamic faith in Detroit, Michigan and Toledo, Ohio areas (Elkholy, 1966).

Provo at that time was not a place where devout Muslims could observe their Islamic rituals, especially the social and collective aspects of Islamic practices. Providing their children with the cultural and religious education they needed in order to raise children with Muslim values was not easy. The situation in a small city like Provo was even more precarious, especially where Mormons were aggressively active in converting people out of other faiths into Mormonism. Darwish might have even observed the children of Moses, another member of the same family. They were already under the influence of Mormonism from their free interaction with their neighbors and their neighbors' churches. Darwish realized that the time was running out for him. Although the other unit of the same family, Moses and his wife Ayesha, were there and their children were also of Maryam's age, they did not seem to have been closely involved with each other's families. While Moses remained in Provo, Darwish relocated to Chicago.

Considering the time, place and the magnitude of the issues, it indeed was a difficult decision for Darwish to decide what to do to salvage his next generation from the Americanization process under assimilation process of Anglo-Mormon conformity.

Should he stay in Provo or relocate to a larger city where his family would receive some exposure to Muslim people and community activities, including Qoranic School, etc., just the way it works with Bible and Catholic schools? Perhaps he thought that his relocation to Chicago would alleviate his situation and the upbringing of his daughter, Maryam, hence the possibility of settling in America permanently.

### **Darwish Moves to Chicago**

Looking for an alternative where he could feel like home and lead a culturally safer life like home, Darwish after living 28 years in Provo decided to sell his property and move to Chicago, Illinois in 1943. Eventually he sold everything, his house, orchards and barns, for some \$16,000 and moved to Chicago in 1943 (*DHP*, 12/21/1975, 27). By then Chicago had attracted a good number of immigrant Muslims, apart from the members of the Nation of Islam. They were mainly from the Middle East and South Asia. With the growing community came a better environment that was potentially the best place to raise his daughter.

This traditional minded Palestinian conservative Muslim was not only moving from place to place, he was also changing his career from selling clothes to farming and back again to selling clothes, although this time on a larger scale. With the amount of money he received from the sale of his property and all other belongings in Provo, Darwish was able to begin a new business that he knew he would do better in. *Daily Herald Provo* reports that soon Darwish purchased a clothing store in a good shopping area of Chicago and did very well, although no detailed information is available about the exact location. Despite this success in the business and community support system, he did

not want to stay any longer even in Chicago. The future of his daughter had always been in his mind no matter where he lived. America was not suitable for his daughter. By then Maryam became 13, a teenager.

Perhaps the parents had been observing the mannerisms and attitude of their daughter at home and outside in the society. Thus, in his mind, Darwish remained skeptical as to whether he should stay in America and continue successfully inflating his financial savings, or go back to his native home in Jerusalem where he would begin a new life in the culture and society he believed his children must belong. He probably realized that while in America under the influence of the dominant culture it was almost impossible to inspire and guide their daughter. In this context it is relevant to quote what the father of sociology, Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406), once stated:

The vanquished always want to imitate the victor in his distinctive characteristics, his dress, his occupation and all his other conditions and customs. The reason for this is that the soul always sees perfection in the person who is superior to it and to whom it is subservient. It considers him perfect, either because it is impressed by the respect it has for him, or because it erroneously assumes that its own subservience to him is not due to the nature of defeat but to the perfection of the victor. (Rosenthal, 1978, 116)

Darwish may have intuitively recognized that should he live in America, American culture and values would be the victors and not so if he would return home. He refused to accept Western culture as beneficial for him and his offspring by leaving the land altogether.

The *Daily Herald Provo* also reports that Darwish had another plan in his mind, a plan that could not be executed in America because of social and legal factors. He was not at all at peace having no son who could inherit him. Culturally Arabs prefer to have a male heir not only inherit their wealth and property, but also their name. He could

address his situation by marrying again which could only be done back at home in Jerusalem. So, while his first wife, Zahra, could not bear a son, he wanted to have a second wife who hopefully would be able to bear a son for him. His first wife never conceived again after Maryam. Understandably, the couple was limited by the civil law and the notion of culture in America where polygamy is not permissible. Thus his desire to return back home was intensified.

Although the financial opportunities were appreciated, Darwish failed to adapt to and compromise with American culture. In Darwish's mind it was the right time for the family to resettle in the home country. After less than 3 years in Chicago, Darwish and Zahra came to the decision to leave America for Palestine. Accordingly Darwish sold his store and property, as he had done earlier in Provo and after 31 years of living in America prepared for his final departure and made his way back to Jerusalem.

He had profit from the business in Chicago. His net capital increased from \$16,000 in 1943 to \$50,000 in 3 years time. At that time \$50,000 was a lot of money to establish a business anywhere in the Middle East. Upon his return, Darwish almost immediately got married to his second wife and was soon blessed with a son, Mansur Kader, in 1948. His next project was to establish a real-estate business in his village town, Shufat, which he did successfully. He built an apartment block and rented out for business.

Everything went very well in his personal and business life until he decided to include one of his brothers in the business with him. The brother eventually betrayed him and then attempted to deprive his children from inheriting their father's property. Darwish did not clearly specify the terms of the agreement on which his brother would be

helping him. That ambiguity in this business relationship eventually haunted him and his son, Mansour, in later years, especially after Darwish's sudden death in 1954, when Mansour was 6 years old and Maryam was 24 years old and presumably already married. Consequently, the brother took control of the business and denied Mansour his rights to assume the ownership of his father's business and property. Years later, however, this conflict was resolved with Mansour regaining full ownership of his father's rental property.

*Daily Herald Provo* reports that with the sudden death of the father, Mansour was left with two mothers who loved him dearly. Until her death in 1970 when he was 22 years old Zahra fed him continually with good stories from her American experience about Provo in particular and America in general. Mansour fell in love with Provo where his father had a property, orchard, barn and a house. He became curious about all these places and decided to visit Provo one day in the future (*Daily Herald Provo*, 1975).

### **Mansour Discovered his Father's Memories<sup>23</sup>**

In 1975 Mansour came to America to visit Provo and spent 2 weeks there as a family guest of Moses Kader. Mansour is reported to have said: "I grew up with the impression that Provo was the most beautiful city in the world with the nicest people anywhere I remember" (*Daily Herald Provo*, December 21, 1975). But he remained ever convinced that for him and his children it was still better to live in Jerusalem than in America. His parents had impressed upon him their belief that Islamic identity and the American dream cannot coexist. He was happily married, had a good business and a

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<sup>23</sup> An article with this title was published in *Daily Herald*, Provo on December 21, 1975, page 27.

family of three children who were happy living in Jerusalem. He did not immigrate to America.

During his stay in Provo Mansour visited his father's orchard, barn and house which now belonged to somebody else. "He spent hours roaming over his father's land, scanning the rump remains of the orchards, marveling at the exactness of his father's descriptions and at his own memory" (*Ibid.*). He also visited some of his father's friends and other places that he had learned about from his parents. One such native of Provo was Stan Robert. Stan used to help his father in the farm with the water supply. He also kept some of the household goods that he had bought from Darwish and showed them to Mansour. One such object was an ornate tablecloth that Stan presented to Mansour as a gift. Mansour was very fortunate to have been able to take such a gift back with him to his family in Jerusalem, one that had actually once belonged to his father. (*Ibid.*). This was Mansour's first and last visit to Provo. Within a few years after the visit he died of an untimely heart attack. We do not have any information regarding the exact dates and times of his death. His children have not yet made any attempt to immigrate to America. They are still reportedly living in Jerusalem.

However, his half sister, Maryam, who was American by birth and spent all her childhood in Provo, came back with her husband and four children in 1962/1963. They settled in Baltimore, Maryland and then in 1986 moved to Tampa, Florida where their children are still living. Maryam and her husband passed away in 2003 and 2004.

I had an interesting interaction with the second generation Maryam Abukhdair family in Tampa where I was working as the principal of the Universal Academy of Florida, a K-12 grade Muslim school. One of Maryam's daughters, Amena Abukhdair,

was the K-4 teacher. All her children were also going to the same school. She was a dedicated Muslim teacher who maintained Islamic dress code including *hijab*. Usually the staff of the Muslim school, both male and female, are perceived to be missionary oriented people who work in these places to render their service in the cause of God, a special commitment. Sister Amena was a very committed Muslim and so were her children.

Although I was not able to personally interview Sister Amena and her children for this research project, I had a telephone interview with her brother Zaki Abukhdair, one of Maryam's sons, whom I found well adjusted with both Islamic and American culture as Muslim American.

The American born Maryam, mother of Amena, Zaki, Jamila and Zakaria, lived the early part of her life for 16 years between 1930 and 1946 in America and another 16 years in Palestine between 1946 and 1962 before she finally moved back and settled in America with her husband and four children born in Palestine. This experience in her early life gave Maryam a good understanding of both the East and West to help her strike a balance between the two cultures. For mainstream Muslim people to be Westernized without losing their original Islamic identity has clearly been a dilemma. As a Muslim who is exposed to both cultures, Eastern and Western, Maryam was better equipped to adjust to American culture while retaining her Islamic identity. She became a cultural bridge builder especially for the second generation Muslims as is evidenced in the subsequent generation of Abukhdair family, the other part of the Kaders.

## **Ismael Came and Went Back as a Bachelor**

Like Darwish, discussed above, the second and third generation family of Ismael bears an example of a success story in maintaining their dual identities: Muslim Americans. Ismael was the youngest of Kader brothers, who followed his siblings to America. He lived in America for approximately 24 years and then went back to Jerusalem. During his stay in America he followed the model of his stepbrother, Darwish, instead of his real brother, Moses, in terms of preserving his Islamic identity vis-à-vis assimilating into the American mainstream society. Like Darwish, he remained isolated from the mainstream American culture. He came as a bachelor and remained so until he went back to Jerusalem in 1947.

Ismael was born in Shufat, Jerusalem in 1900. In 1919, Ismael left Jerusalem to join his brother Moses who may actually still have been in Europe after fighting the German forces on the frontier of France. Ismael as a Middle Eastern Muslim person had difficulty entering America directly. He first sailed to Cuba where he landed and stayed for about 6 years. In the meantime Darwish was joined by Ismael's brother, Moses, after he came back from the war front in France. Ismael came to join both Darwish and Moses in 1925. As such three members of Kader family were now living in Provo. By the time Ismael came, Moses had already gone to Jerusalem, got married to Ayesha, the first cousin and returned alone to Provo in 1923. Among them Darwish had his wife, Zahra, with him. Moses' wife would join him 10 years after in 1933.

The brothers had not seen each other in the years from 1915 until Ismael came to Provo to join Moses in 1925. In the initial few years Ismael lived with his brother, Moses, until he relocated and established his own business, a men's clothing store, first in Provo,

Utah and finally in Chicago, Illinois. His relocation to Chicago must have been prompted by number of social, religious and cultural factors.

Ismael did not appear to follow the Arab-Islamic cultural model of family ties and relationships in the American diaspora as Darwish and Moses had. They had purchased land in the same suburban area of Provo and built their houses, barn and orchard, living as a close extended family, yet independently insuring Islamic privacy and modesty of social relationship. They had remained together until Darwish's concerns as a father overrode the bond.

Ismael had no children with worries about them as Darwish worried about his daughter. We do not know the details of the reasons he decided to leave Provo and relocate in Chicago, but the most important factors appear to be business prospect and the existence a mosque in a bigger city with well established Muslim families, communities, Quranic school and Islamic organizations.

According to Abdul Malik Mujahid the first mosque was established in the Chicago area in 1893 (Mujahid, 2005). In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century a place like Chicago would have been a center of attraction for immigrant Muslims living anywhere in the country. Ismael must have known about the prospects of Chicago from Darwish, his stepbrother or nephew and many others from his own acquaintance and friends. Ismael soon moved to Chicago and lived there until deciding to return home to Jerusalem in 1947.

Although never married, Ismael was successful in his business. We do not have enough information about the amount of money he took with him when he returned to Jerusalem. However, with that money he was able to establish a real-estate business

there. He lived the life of a wealthy and respected man by the people of the town, so much so he was elected the Mayor of his town. It may be useful to note that in the Eastern culture one has to have a good reputation through wealth, influence and good family background. One must as well be articulate to impress people and to be a political social leader.

Upon returning to Jerusalem Ismael married and had six children: four boys and two girls. Ismael died in 1979 leaving his six children behind. The eldest son, Fahmi, came to America for higher education, later became an American citizen and settled in the Atlanta, Georgia area.

Fahmi has five children who all maintain their Arab-Islamic and American identities. They are assimilated into American mainstream society as Muslim Americans who maintain both identities. They are the natural citizens of multicultural America with good ties with their relatives living in the occupied territories of Shufat, Jerusalem. Fahmi's eldest daughter, Kefa, married a Palestinian groom from within their distant relations. He came to Marietta, Georgia for several years, until the couple decided to go back to Jerusalem where they now reside.

Recently one of Fahmi's three sons who graduated from Georgia Tech in Engineering went back to Jerusalem and got married to a bride from there, also from within their distant family. Thus they are now Muslim Americans and at the same time fully in touch with their original ancestry in Jerusalem. In this they are unlike their cousins from the other side of the family who were the product of pre-1965 America and who were Americanized under the influence of Anglo-Mormon conformity which did not

allow them to maintain their multicultural identity as Muslim Americans, although they do recognize their identity as Arab Americans.

I also had the opportunity to meet Ismael's youngest son, Ahmad and his family. Ahmad was actively involved as a parent and member of the Board of the Universal Academy of Florida in Tampa where all his children attended. His wife, Sister May, was serving as the head of three sections: preKindergarten, Elementary and Middle School. She was another example, like Sr. Amena Abukhdair (daughter of Maryam Abukhdair), of a very committed Muslim sister, mother and wife. She is now serving as the Principal of the same school.

This second family of the second generation of Ismael Kader are Muslim Americans who are effectively maintaining their dual identity in the multicultural America. The remaining children of Ismael, who are also living in America now in different cities and states, are also successfully maintaining their dual identities of Muslims and Americans.

Before 1965 all American immigrants of various cultures were expected to dissolve those cultures in the great American melting pot. With the liberalization of immigration policies towards non-Europeans in 1965 followed by the law of October 9, 1981 that allowed foreigners, citizens and noncitizens to form their cultural and social organizations, the American people, politicians and society in general have agreed to promote a new vision of pluralism. This vision has allowed many immigrants, in this case Muslim immigrants, to develop the sense of belonging as American citizens and as Muslims.

### **Hassan: Came and Died as a Bachelor**

The Kader family in Provo was also joined by a third member of the family in the 1940s. Hassan Kader was the younger brother of Moses' wife, Ayesha Kader. Hassan came to America during the Second World War. Almost immediately after his arrival he joined the US military and was deployed in the French frontier. Soon after he joined the military the war in Europe ended and Hassan returned to Provo to stay with the family of his sister, Ayesha. He was the last member of the first generation Kaders to immigrate to the pre-1965 America.

Hassan, however, did not live long. He was diagnosed with cancer and passed away in 1955. He was buried with the honors of war veterans in Provo where later on his brother-in-law, Moses Kader, was also buried in 1976. Had he lived longer, Hassan would probably have stayed close to his sister and her family and likewise Americanized in the way Moses Kader and his subsequent generations did living within the unicultural identity of Anglo-Mormon Americans.

### **Conclusion**

Both Darwish and Ismael Kader faced the challenge of either assimilating or not assimilating into the host society, without any option to choose a compromised approach of salvaging their Muslim identity, while pursuing the new identity of American dream simultaneously. They understood that it was impossible to salvage their Islamic identity along with their adopted American identity because of the prevailing notion of Anglo-Mormon conformity in Utah, a uniculturalism against any model of cultural pluralism. As such they opted for an isolated lifestyle. They tried to relocate to a more conducive place

like Chicago with the hope of being able to practice and promote their Islamic identity along with their identity as Americans. Both of them lost hope of any possibility of salvaging their Muslim identity even in a larger society where mosques were available and a community support system was in place. The prevailing unicultural notion of the American mainstream was intolerant of cultural pluralism. These Kaders, therefore, felt hesitant to make this country their permanent home, especially in raising the next generations.

These Kaders eventually, after trial and error for decades, went back to their homeland and began a new life there. As the time passed and their children grew, one of Darwish's children, the American born Maryam and all of Ismael's Palestinian born children came back to America to pursue higher education. They became citizens and successful professionals and maintained their dual identity as Muslims and Americans.

The Kader family biography which spans almost a century involving three generations shows the complex tensions faced by early Muslim immigrants that split into two groups: one assimilated and the other dissimilated returning to the homeland. For quite a long period of time all Kaders lived together in Provo as a family and yet one made America his adopted home and the other two, Darwish and Ismael, did not and went back home to the Middle East.

In Utah Muslims who came before the liberalization of immigration policy in 1965 found the only way to fit in was to melt in and assimilate into American society on the expense of Arab-Islamic identity. This phenomenon, where some family members assimilated fully into American dream while others did not, illustrates the impact of the dominant culture's social norms and political leadership on immigrant families. It was

simply not possible to pursue the American dream and not melt into the American unicultural pot of Anglo-Mormon conformity.

The returning children of Darwish and Ismael are able to retain their dual identity. This appears to have two sources: the compelling efforts of the Kader elders to preserve their Arab-Islamic identity by returning to their homeland on one hand; on other hand, the change of immigration policies of 1965 and the socio-cultural notion of the American mainstream that resulted from or gave birth to the law of 1981. That law facilitated the emergence of cultural pluralism and paved the way for Muslims to promote their identity as Muslim Americans.

PART TWO:

FROM UNITY TO PLURALISM: THE POST-1965 ERA

## IV. MUSLIM ADAPTABILITY TO AMERICAN SOCIETY

“Tell Me Who Your Friends Are and I Will Tell You Who You Are”

### **Introduction**

In the process of establishing religious institutions, the new group of Muslim immigrants began seeking to maintain their religious and ethnic identities in community by way of selective structural adaptation to the prevailing American models of religious and cultural values. Like Chinese, Koreans, Vietnamese, Japanese, Buddhists, Sikhs and Hindus, Muslims adapted to American norms and values structurally. The Palestinian Muslims in the previous chapters changed some aspects of their lives while retaining others. This chapter focuses on the religious, organizational and social aspects of adaptation and change. It demonstrates the structural adaptation of Muslim community in the Salt Lake Valley area in Utah. It examines their strong desire to become part of mainstream American society while maintaining their original religious identities, adapting to the American norms, albeit selectively, while maintaining their Islamic and American identities simultaneously.

## Concept of the Community in Islamic Faith

The concept of community or الأمة *Ummah* in Arabic is similar to the concept of a nation state in the Western sense. The controversy between modern day ideologies, such as secularism, democracy, socialism, communism and capitalism, etc., is about the place of Godly authority in civil society. In Islam civil society's legal, moral and ethical norms are extracted from the infinite authority of God that allows input from the finite human being. Community and civil leadership emanate from this equitable representation of divine and human authority.

The divine book of Islam, the Qu'ran, characterizes the term *Ummah* as people who believe and submit to the will of God in all aspects of their lives and others who do not and who follow their own whims and egoistic view (Qu'ran 2:213; 7: 159,181). Because of this, communities are always involved in internal and external conflicts, (Nieuwenhuijze, 1959).<sup>24</sup> Muslims experience conflict within the *Ummah* between factions, sects and ethnic groups and outside the *Ummah* with external forces, such as the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India or the historical East-West conflict.

The divine source of Islam in the Qu'ran delineates about accommodation of differences between the fellow Muslims in terms of brotherhood (Qu'ran 49:10); as it also teaches about maintaining good relationship with others in terms of neighborhood members of civil society (Qu'ran 4:36). If in any given society human rights are honored, justice upheld and freedom of choice is guaranteed, Muslims are religiously duty bound to abide by the law and order of the society. Generally speaking, universally accepted human rights are almost consistent with Islamic principles and when founded in societal

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<sup>24</sup> C.A.O. van. Nieuwenhuijze, "The Ummah – An Analytic Approach." *Studia Islamica*, 10 (1959) 5–22.

civil codes are known in Islamic terms as العرف *'urf* or valid custom,<sup>25</sup> and are legally binding. Human behavior and values that are not compatible with Islamic values must not be accepted or overlooked. On the contrary, those opposing views and behaviors must be addressed in a proactive legal and professional way.

## **Muslim Community and Structural Adaptation**

In this chapter, I will demonstrate aspects of structural adaptation in the Muslim community of Salt Lake Valley (henceforth Valley) area with a focus on the organization, leadership formation, the role of imam in the mosque congregation, Islamic religious education for children and the role of women in the community. In Islamic tradition, Muslims are allowed to be flexible and to accommodate aspects of different societies as long as those aspects do not threaten the basic principles of faith.<sup>26</sup> These principles include the right to worship and right to choose that which is permissible from that which is prohibited.<sup>27</sup>

Muslims are not allowed to over burden, or to impose their own preferences and biases on others (Qu'ran 2:256). Scholars of Islam state that "Islam is adequate for all time and place" to provide its adherents with the means of "selective adaptation" and assimilation in a predominantly non-Muslim society (Abusharaf, 1998, p. 251). The sense of community and adaptability is deeply rooted in the Islamic tradition and culture.

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<sup>25</sup> See in Arabic: Wahba Az-ZaHili: <http://www.balagh.com/mosoa/feqh/d11e190a.htm>

<sup>26</sup> The essentials of faith: the Oneness of God, the truth of divine books especially the Quran, the final seal of Prophethood in Muhammad, the Day of Judgment, the existence of angels, destiny (good and bad, here and in the hereafter) and the life after death.

<sup>27</sup> The basic principle states that all that is not prohibited is permissible. Among the prohibited are illicit relationships between and within sexes, alcoholism, meat of an animal that has not been blessed by the name of God at slaughtering and usury. Other prohibited areas are quite common and observed by all people religiously or secularly, e.g., stealing, cheating, robbing, etc.)

Recent studies of Muslim communities in urban America reconfirm that assertion (Warner & Wittner, 1998).

This section will focus on two significant aspects of structural adaptation in the Muslim Community of the Valley area. One is the progressive growth of membership from a handful of worshipers, to hundreds and then to thousands of worshipers who observed daily and weekly congregational prayers, including the bi-annual Eid celebration. The other includes aspects of community activities such as the governance, employment of imam, the treatment of women and the observance of social, cultural and religious events of the year.

The findings in this dissertation suggest that although the community has introduced principles of structural adaptation to its religious institutions and activities in the American diaspora, it maintains its theological integrity, avoiding the introduction of theological change that creates any alternative to its basic creeds like a “reformed Islam” in order to fit into the new phenomenon of American life style. It can be said of the community, “for all its congregants throughout the year, it has been the paradigmatic religious and cultural home away from home.” (Abusharaf, 1998, p. 236).

### **Collective Worship on Campus and Adaptation**

The Muslim community in the Valley since its inception in the 1960s has evolved and adapted to the new situation and norms of the host society including introducing structural changes that accommodate the basic tenets of Islamic religion and the norm of their new home. One structural adaptation has been the arrangement of daily and Friday weekly services on the University of Utah campus. Such arrangements of prayers and

places of prayer have no parallel in the history of religiosity of Muslims in their home countries.

The changes occurred as a gradual process involving several steps. The first step was the occasional meeting for worship once or twice a day, afternoon and late afternoon, for the daily prayers which are five times a day. Initially two to five people, mostly the students at the University of Utah, would gather in a reserved room to perform the prayer in a time that would be appointed by the students themselves and consistent with the range determined by religious tradition. In their home countries, university campuses have mosques much like chapels here in the West, or students go to the neighborhood mosques for the prayers.

The students adapted readily to the new environment of no mosque, reserved a room and set up an agreed upon schedule to address the issue of the daily prescribed prayers on campus. A second adaptation occurred with the coming of off campus worshipers to perform their daily or weekly prayers at a university. This is unheard of in Muslim countries of origin.

### **Expansion of Services on Campus**

In the early 1960s Muslim students also gradually began organizing Friday Services in the same way. Almost simultaneously, they introduced a Quranic study circle program, much like a Bible study class, once a week on Friday evenings. This again is an example of adopting a new way of learning about the Islamic religion. Again, in countries of origin this kind of adult gathering on weekends to study about Islam is unprecedented,

with some exception. Muslim community leaders soon adopted this system in their mosques including the Valley area. This Quranic study class continues to this day.

The next step the students took was the introduction of weekend Islamic School for the children of the graduate students at the University of Utah. The Islamic School taught them the basics of Islam and Arabic language, the language of the Quran. In the Muslim countries the Quranic school system is usually mosque based; it is daily and takes place early in the morning, e.g., 7:00 am, before the regular school time which is around 10:00 am. The Quranic school system at the University of Utah right from its inception adapted to the Sunday school system in America that Christian churches developed to teach their children.

Within a few years the community on campus outgrew the small conference rooms at the Student Center. They took a third step expanding to use of the Community Center which was within the University campus at the Married Student Housing facility, University Village. As the community continued to grow further, they rented an apartment building which they used as an all purpose *Musalla* (prayer facility), community center and as weekend school. With this facility available, Muslims were now able to extend socializing by gathering occasionally, by bringing their children for Quranic education and by celebrating their ethnic and religious events. Through all of this, a new Muslim community was created in the Valley area.

With continued growth they took a further step and rented a house facility with an extended yard attached to use as a playground for children on Sundays. The introduction of a playground at a mosque premises is a very rare experience in Muslim societies. The use of a house with playground for the children in a residential neighborhood was

temporary. The community began to assess the benefits of either land purchase or the purchase of an old church in order to establish a regular mosque facility in the area.

### **The Community Organization**

The 1980s were years of dramatic change in the American mainstream notion of assimilation. The 1939 law which banned foreigners from organizing associations and promoting their ethnic, cultural and religious activities and identities was repealed by the law of October 9, 1981 (Devine & Waters, 2004). Today one can hardly imagine an American norm enforced by law that neither allowed non-Europeans to immigrate, nor socialize in an organized manner.

The Muslim leadership, most of whom were the graduate students at the University of Utah, played pioneering roles in initiating all the activities on the campus that gradually attracted their fellow Muslims from the community who were not in a position of shouldering such initiatives themselves. In 1981, the growing Muslim community decided to form a community organization called Islamic Society of Salt Lake City – ISSLC (Koopmans & Statham 2000; Kastoryano, 2001; Qureshi & Sells, 2003).

In 1985, the Islamic Society of Salt Lake City– ISSLC purchased an old church building and property converting it to a regular endowed mosque facility. This first mosque, located at 700 South and 740 East in the downtown Salt Lake City area and the west of the University of Utah campus, was later given the name, Noor Masjid. Following the establishment of the Noor Masjid a new era of community leadership composed of nonstudents emerged.

Scholars of Muslims in America have alluded to four interconnected factors for Muslim adaptability to the society of the American diaspora. First, North American people and societies rate high in religiosity. Thus, Muslims find themselves at home away from home under almost no intimidation and hostility. Second, Islam shares an Abrahamic origin with the Christian and Jewish faiths in which Muslims are counted as third in the equation, similar in faith, tradition and ideology. Third, the socio-politico-religious norm of cultural pluralism in America now provides room for Muslims to promote their own culture and identity, like any other immigrant community in the country. Finally, the secular ideology of religious indifference in the United States does not allow a person to be identified with an organized religion but through professional skills and achievement (Waugh, 1991). This final norm of the host society makes the immigrant life much easier for immigrant professionals who prefer to maintain the privacy of their religious identities. They are professional while interacting with the mainstream Americans as well as active Muslims within their own communities.

Muslims in the Valley area were making structural adjustments like their fellow Muslims across the country. The seeds of Muslim community first germinated on university campuses all across North America (Haddad, 1991). Campuses accommodated the most qualified, educated and capable of the new Muslim immigrants, graduate students almost all of whom were pursuing their Ph.D. degrees in the fields of science, engineering, medicine, social sciences and economics.

## **Student and Nonstudent in Promoting Islamic Identity**

Between 1963 and 1981, the Muslim Student Association (MSA) represented the Muslim Community in the Valley area in almost all activities, be it on campus or off campus. MSA was legally registered with the University system. Although it was a campus organization, nonstudent immigrant Muslims were involved as volunteers for financial and physical management of all MSA programs: religious, social and cultural.

When students and nonstudents alike living within a 25 to 50 mile radius joined the venture of forming the nucleus of the Community in the Valley area they became quite active in reaching out to all area Muslims through the publication of newsletters and visitation.

These highly educated, professional, upper middle class and financially well off (Haddad, 2004) Muslims secured jobs, became professionals and settled everywhere in the country where they either formed new organizations or joined the existing one in which they frequently became involved in leadership of their education and status. In Mormon Utah the birth of Muslim community took place at an institution of higher learning, the University of Utah, instead of downtown Salt Lake City, a process that worked with Muslims all over the American diaspora, a new phenomenon and a new model of community construction.

As mentioned earlier, the first Muslim immigrant community organization in the Valley area was formed in 1981, under the name of the Islamic Society of Salt Lake City – ISSLC—leaving MSA on campus to represent Muslim students on behalf of Islamic Society of North America nationally and Muslim community locally. The formation of ISSLC was a significant step forward to institutionalize Muslim religious activities

encompassing as it did Muslims from all ethnic, cultural, racial and professional backgrounds. As such, all Muslims were members of the ISSLC while students were dual members of both MSA and ISSLC. They coordinated activities jointly when needed and independently on a day-to-day basis. This evolving process, from MSA to ISSLC, is an evidence of structural adaptation of new immigrant Muslims in the Salt Lake Valley area of the American diaspora.

### **Neighborhood Mosque and Congregational Services**

Another aspect of Muslim community adaptation to the American religious, social and cultural landscape was the expansion of the function of the mosque from solely a center of worship to a center for socio-religious activities as well. A mosque in a Muslim country is a place only of worship. There are neighborhood mosques which are small and dedicated for daily worship five times of the day.<sup>28</sup> There are also congregational mosques, called *Jame'* mosques, which are dedicated for larger accommodation of people from the extended neighborhood. Thus, a mosque in America has its own attributes, distinguished from mosques in Muslim countries. Here each mosque commands the status of regular prayer mosque and Friday congregational mosque or *jame'* mosque, at the same time without maintaining any distinction between them. Having a party or eating inside the mosque is quite inappropriate in majority Muslim countries, but here in the United States the act of ritual prayers and social activities go hand in hand inside the mosque.

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<sup>28</sup> Here are the tentative time table of Muslims prayers five times a day: *Fajr* from dawn to sunrise, *Zuhr* from afternoon to late afternoon, *Asr* from late afternoon to the sunset, *Maghrib* from the sunset to prelate night and *Isha*, from pre-late night to midnight.

The experimental process of adaptation in socializing at the mosque has had different manifestations in almost all Muslim communities in North America including the Valley area. For instance, in the 1960s and 1970s Muslims would have parties with both dance and music as entertainment and even alcohol served in the basement of the mosque. These activities have for the most part stopped and are no longer a practice to be observed at the mosque (Abraham & Shryock, 2000). However, regarding the Valley area, I did not find any trace of such behavior even in the early period. The pioneers of Muslims communities in the post-1965 era, some of whom are still living in the community, did not indulge in the mixed manners of socialization at the mosque premises involving dance and alcohol, but instead followed Islamic traditions strictly. They maintained the traditional image of congregationalism, in part because the members and the leaders of the community were mostly educated and committed Muslims who would not indulge or condone such behaviors.

Like most communities in North America, the mosques in the Valley area do not have extra space with facilities for offices, school, playground and auditorium, but were designed exactly like mosques in the home countries. But the mosque congregants in the Valley have adopted new ways of doing business, fully committed to enlarge and improve the mosque facility to accommodate extra worship activities within the facility. While the oldest mosque, Noor Masjid, was too small for the growing size of the community, the newer Khadija Islamic Center in the West Valley area was large enough to accommodate most worshipers in the community. Dedicated in 1998 the Center soon purchased adjacent land for the purposes of erecting an additional center that would accommodate both school and gym for Islamic education, physical activities and

entertainment, a model that is nonexistent in the home countries. This is how Muslims in North America and Europe are redesigning the structural usage of mosque and activities as Muslims.

I did not find any opposition to these structural changes being introduced in the business of the mosque and in the organization. In fact, Muslims in the area were more inclined towards the newly erected Khadija Islamic Center than the old Noor Mosque, established in 1985. The old mosque is still an active mosque with worship and Sunday school activities, but the number of participants has reduced significantly since the dedication of the new Khadija Islamic Center in 1998.

### **Election and Appointment of the Community Leadership**

Another aspect of Muslim community adaptation to the American model of religiosity was the process of electing leaders of the community and the appointment of an imam of the mosque. Since the early days in the late 1960s, a formal or informal election process was used to elect for a 2 years term limit a leader, president or Ameer along with other members of the Executive Committee and the Board of Directors. One informant, a senior member said: “Every year we used to have a little election to elect the president and other members of the Executive Committee.” That was in the initial years, between the 1960s and 1980s. Following the establishment of the regular mosque, Noor Masjid, in 1985 the community began to follow a more formal and legal structure of leadership.

In 1997, the community changed the name of the organization to “Islamic Society of Greater Salt Lake” and incorporated extended areas beyond the downtown and suburban

areas within the Valley. They created a central leadership and under it planned for numerous neighborhood mosque communities as the number of mosques had already begun to grow. With the growth of the neighborhood communities sectarian and ethnic based communities of Muslims in the Valley area also grew, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this chapter and will be addressed in the next chapter.

### **Nonprofit Organization Status of the Mosque**

Another aspect of the structural adaptation of Muslim community was its categorization under United States law as a nonprofit, 501(C3), organization and its registration under the umbrella organization of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), main office in Indianapolis, Indiana. Thus, the ISSLC and later ISGSL received from the State of Utah and the United States federal government the nonprofit organization status and from ISNA any legal protection that might be required.

In the home countries of immigrants, there is no concept of a mosque being a not-for profit organization, or of a national community umbrella organization needed for legal protection. The Valley Community soon adapted to this new American system regarding religious organizations in the country, making the necessary structural changes, forming at least two boards: a Board of Directors and a Board of Trustees, as well as executive committees.

### **The Democratic System of Election of Muslim Leaders**

The management of mosques in many home countries, as I experienced in Bangladesh and in Libya, is different. Usually there is a family known to be the custodian

of the mosque management. The person who is formally responsible from within the family is known as the *Mutualli* or custodian who commands the honor and bears the burden of maintenance of the mosque house of God. In each Muslim country, there are tens of thousands of mosque communities and many new mosques are being constructed without any such nonprofit status. They even do not know what such nonprofit status should mean to the benefit of the mosque and its affiliated community. Here in America, on the other hand, Muslims make sure, like other organizations, that they have this status approved by the state.

The system of electing a president, members of executive committee and board of directors and board of trustees is too much to follow in the rural communities of Muslim countries. The maximum they do, for instance in Bangladesh in the inner cities, is to have a committee to keep the facility in proper order and clean. Since serving in the mosque committees is a noble and voluntary job in all cultures, Muslims in the home countries usually shy away from seeking any position. The *Mutawalli* will kindly ask specific worshipers for help in a certain capacity and the person graciously accepts it. This way they avoid seeking any position and the tension that accompanies the process of election.

Here in North America, Muslim community leadership is produced democratically. President, members of boards, all are sought and elected by vote. President and the members of the board of executive committee are elected for 2 years and the Executive Committee – EC- is in charge of all decisions pertaining to community affairs, including finances, religious instruction and the hiring of employees (By-law, V:5).

The Board of Directors determines how the membership is defined in the community, especially the right to vote. Formal membership in a mosque community is

absolutely alien to the Muslim mind in the home countries, but here they had to quickly adapt a policy of membership, not only for reference purposes, but also for real life participation in the mosque activities, electing the office bearers and managing finance.

In the home countries the neighborhood people are automatically the members of the mosque congregation. Their membership means coming to the mosque to worship and to send their children in the morning to learn about Islamic rituals. In the Valley area community, one has to be a registered member, which entails the payment of either one time or monthly fees. In the Muslim countries, most mosques are neighborhood institutions used only for worship purposes without socialization and politicization as explained by one of the leading scholars of Muslims in North America:

In Muslim countries, the local mosque might well be no more than a convenient place to pray with one's neighbors. One of the most crucial reasons for this is doctrinal: Islam accepts no mediating or authoritative role for a religious institution between Allah and the believer. Thus there is no role for an official priesthood in Islam, no need for an institutional body within which those officials may act on behalf of the believers and no need for membership. (Abusharaf 1998, pp. 252- 253)

Thus, it is evident that “mosques in Muslim societies are led in a fundamentally different way from those in the United States.”

The findings of this dissertation research suggest that the immigrant Muslim mosque congregation in the Valley area has had from its inception to conform to the norm of the host society regarding community and mosque organization. They adjusted without any stress or confusion, impelled by their strong desire to become part of American society.

With its principles of selectivity and moral validity Islamic faith and values provide room for adaptation to the new environment and the adoption of new ideas and norms. Muslims are very much aware of the saying, الإسلام صالح لكل زمان و مكان *al-Islam*

*saleh li kulli jaman wa makan* (Islam is adequately capable of providing guidance in all time and place), although this adequacy is not without limit. The Islamic way of life for the immigrant Muslims was extremely strained in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century when the American notion of assimilation was strictly Eurocentric and Christocentric.

### **Professional Versus Volunteer Imam and Leaders**

The appointment of professional and salaried imam has also been an aspect of Muslim structural adaptation. For years, ever since the arrival of new immigrant Muslims in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the community functioned without a professional imam. It is not a theological requirement to have an imam before establishing a mosque congregation in a neighborhood. Muslims can ask a person from among the worshipers to lead the prayer. The increase in the number of worshipers and with that the social responsibilities, impelled the appointment of the first part time imam in 1990, 5 years after the establishment of the first mosque, the Noor Islamic Center.

For Friday services, an imam needs to have extended knowledge in the religious text and the communication skills to deliver the sermon called *Khutba*. There are few who are well qualified even among the highly educated to lead Friday service but, upon request, they would volunteer. A sharp difference was observed in the role of the imam as an employee contrasted with the informal imam who just leads the worship. In the American context, an imam does play a role beyond just leading the worship rite. The first part time salaried imam explained his job in these words:

I come for prayers: *fazr*, *zuhr* and others. But people know my telephone number. They call me for learning about different rules and regulations [of

Islam]. They don't study for themselves. So they know that the Imam knows about these. [So] they call. [People] also call from out of state, both Muslims and non-Muslims. [Non-Muslims] sometime ask me to visit [their] schools and church to give lecture about Islam. You don't see [these of my activities] because these are not in the Community agenda. [My] role is not only [within] the Muslim community but also with non-Muslim communities. It happens two to three times a month. So, the imam should be employed full time and supported for that. (Emphasis added).

In the home countries, worshipers do come to the imam with different religious and social problems. An Imam's service is needed at the marriage, divorce and funeral to perform the rituals. However, the above job description goes far beyond the usual job of an imam in Muslim countries who do not have to engage in extra religious and social activities. The need and demand for an imam in the United States is also much stronger than in home countries.

The job description of an imam in America includes the representation of the community to other faith groups, media and organizations. An imam here must be well educated and bilingual with a good command of the Arabic and English languages.

Muslims do not have the theological structure of professional mosque leadership in the way a church ministry might have. The religious and social role of an imam is very limited, and so is the economic return for their services. They are not the elites with divine status of any kind other than that they are supposedly knowledgeable in Islamic text and ritual practices (Abusharaf, 1998).

Islamic principles, in general, discourage charging money for religious services (2:174). A Sudanese national who has served as imam in a neighborhood mosque in Khartoum, Sudan, explains the traditional position of an imam in a Muslim country. He says:

The mosque has always been a big part of Muslim's religious and social activity. The imam is usually a volunteer. Especially because the majority

of mosques are built by local financial assistance of local communities and philanthropists, the imams are chosen from the same communities. Imams volunteer to lead prayers, deliver sermons during Friday, or [lead] Eid prayers. They are usually highly honorable and respected people who do not expect any financial gains in return *to* their religious service. They expect only reward in heaven. (Abusharaf 1998, 253)

A description of an imam from Bangladesh, however, may bring a different set of traditional experiences about the role and job of an imam. For instance, in the capital city of Dhaka with 12 million inhabitants there are over 2,000 neighborhood mosques with professional imams employed by the government under the Dhaka metropolitan city administration. They receive an inadequate government salary that is subsidized by the mosque administration. Significantly, most of these imams are from other parts of the country because very few of the local people in Dhaka are trained for the job by special schools and *madrasas*. On the other hand, there are a number of remote and rural areas in the country where people receive training as an imam. They migrate to the capital and its vicinity to obtain an imam position. In the rural areas the position of imam is mostly voluntary and honorary without much financial benefit and similar to the settings in Sudan.

The function of an imam in the United States may be compared with the imam of urban settings in countries like Bangladesh, except that there imams have very little or no interaction with non-Muslim people or communities and they communicate in the language of the native people only.

The findings of this research also suggest, contrary to the contention of Abusharaf, that a significant segment of the community preferred to keep the position of imam voluntary, a tradition that had been established there for several decades in which they depended heavily on volunteers to serve as imam, Quranic school administrator and

teachers. In this context, a senior member of the community who has been part of the community as volunteer imam and teacher of Islam for children has this to say about the paid imam.

I think that school is more important than the salaried Imam and priority should be given to our children and future of Islam in America. We don't have too much money to spend without serious calculation and prioritization. That is why I don't support the salaried Imam.

The American society, to which the immigrants were adapting, supported both the concept of paid and professional clergy as well as volunteers. Volunteerism is a significant norm of American culture. School students are often required to do certain hours of voluntary service before graduating from high school, or admittance to college, or on scholarship applications and even for job searching. Many retired people render a significant number of voluntary services to the community, hospitals and other social sectors. Volunteerism is part of the social norm in the North American context. Like the imam quoted above, a number of community members, especially those who had served the community since its inception as volunteers, did not support the idea of salaried imam.

On the other hand, evidence suggests that the community leadership believed in the benefit of a professional and paid imam, because the imam will not only lead the prayers and attend other religious rituals, but will also represent the Community to other faith groups, media and organizations. This will earn for the community a better understanding between them and the host society (Abusharaf, 1998). When the community finds itself capable of paying for an imam, the appointment of an imam in a mosque community is indeed a sign of growth and development that reflects a well established, organized, professional and resourceful community.

This is exactly what happened to the Community in the Valley area. They found a qualified person for imam and the community just seized the opportunity and offered him the job and subsequently did the same with other imams.

### **Mosque Location: No Neighborhood Community**

Unlike in Muslim majority countries, the American mosques are neither neighborhood institutions nor family endowed properties, but property purchased by the community from the donations of its members as well as outside donors. In some cases Muslims do relocate close to the mosque and gradually develop a neighborhood around the mosque, as in the case of Muslim Community Center of Chicago, IL, a large community I observed in 1995 through 1996.

The Valley area developed differently. There are now five mosques within the Valley, none of which has Muslims living within the neighborhood. Around the mosque are the neighborhoods of the host communities. The Muslim community began its growth with a single mosque, which is close to the downtown and the University. Khadija Islamic Center in the West Valley is a brand new mosque with Islamic architectural design, but in a commercial area. The Utah Islamic Center is also in another commercial area, in the middle of a shopping center. Other mosques such as Rasul Islamic Center, Bosniak Islamic Center, Orem Islamic Center and Layton Islamic Center do not as yet have neighborhoods of their own. Muslims are all scattered in the valley area drive a long distance to attend the mosque.

This makes the mosque culture in America quite unique compared to the home countries where each neighborhood has a mosque, both in urban and rural settings. The

number of American mosques is on the rise from 10s to hundreds and now to thousands (Ihsan Bagby, 1998). These American mosques and professional imams have clearly taken a new ideological and theological direction in order to adapt to the norm of the American host society. The extension of the mosque center to include school, social gathering, even gym matches the standard model that Catholic and Jewish communities are following in terms of their community centers. Abusharaf (1998) states:

The mosque now is a place where members carry out their individual and communal religious duties, hold social occasions pertaining to nonmosque business, conduct marriage ceremonies, perform funeral services and teach Sunday religious school-none of which happens in mosques in Muslim societies. (254)

The mosque culture has been adapted to the reality of life in the American diaspora.

### **Reverse Adaptation: Religious and Cultural Tradition**

The findings of this research also suggest that while Muslim community growth has taken the direction of selective adaptation to the American socio-religious structure, it is also becoming increasingly selective in reviving some of the traditional views of Muslim values and culture at the same time.

For instance, in the early years Muslims here used to hold parties in the American way at the mosque basements in which they would indulge in dance, alcohol and mixing between genders. Those activities at the mosque or centers are examples of how much immigrant Muslims were willing to Americanize their culture and behavior. With the arrival of new immigrants in the post-1965 era, Muslim communities soon corrected party behavior by not allowing dance and alcohol any more, a reverse adaptation from

Americanization to Islamic traditionalism, or another form of selective adaptation in American Muslim communities.

The chosen language of the Friday sermon is another example of reverse adaptation in the Valley area. For decades, since the beginning of the second half of the last century, the Friday sermons were delivered in the language of the land, English, the common language for all Muslims of diverse backgrounds, unless some *Khateeb*, the speaker only spoke Arabic, in which case the sermon will be delivered in Arabic.

Since the late 1990s, especially with the appointment of new imam, S.D, a second-generation immigrant Muslim who is fluent in English, the language of *Khutba* has changed to Arabic only. His reason is very clear and simple. Muslims must follow in the footsteps of Prophet Muhammad, his teaching, his example and his tradition. The Prophet is the only role model and always delivered his sermon or *Khutba* in Arabic. An additional reason offered is that the *khutba* is part of the prayer and prayer must be performed in Arabic as well.

The majority of the community people do not think that the *Khutba* should be given in Arabic, because it defeats the purpose of the sermon, which is to communicate the message to the audience in a language people understand. The sermon should rather be in English with Arabic quotations from the verses of the Quran and sayings of the Prophet as the topic of the sermon dictates. With the strict introduction of sermon *Khutba* in Arabic, a number of members lost their interest in coming to the Friday prayers.

Among them was a University of Utah professor originally from India who insists that:

In Eid prayer, for instance, Muslims come from all walks of life. Among them are teenagers, boys and girls, who do not know any other language than English. Yet the sermon is given in Arabic, which eighty % of the people do not understand. This is a great opportunity to convey the message of Allah

and the Prophet, which is wasted. The argument is given that this was the language of the Prophet. I am appalled at this kind of fanaticism.

The second salaried imam in the Noor Mosque, however, delivers his sermon in English and does not follow the view of the other imam. All the volunteer imams within the community who still deliver *Khutba*, also do it in English. They recite verses from the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet in Arabic with an English explanation. Imams in both mosques are salaried, yet independent in their choice of the language of the sermon, *Khutba*.

The process of Muslim and Islamic theological adaptability in North America has in some respect been reversing to the traditional model of home country. The Friday sermons, *Khutbas*, in the non-Arab Muslim countries, with some exception, are always in Arabic in which neither the imam nor the audience really understand what the *Khutba* is all about. For them the *Khutba* is not necessarily something to learn or to understand. Imams there simply memorize the Arabic *Khutba* and recite it ritualistically as worship of God without knowing the meanings because Arabic is not their language. They make enough effort to learn it because they have, in most cases, the bare minimum of Islamic education. It is a taboo and heretical to be independent minded in the theology of Islam by introducing and teaching any innovation of one's own. Some traditionalist Muslims do follow their tradition blindly. But in general in North America there is an emerging new tradition of Islam different from the old tradition in the Muslim world.

The Friday sermon, *Khutba*, has a special meaning to Muslims in North America who are educated, professional and take the teachings of Islam rationally and intellectually as much as they take it spiritually. People look forward to Friday sermon and learn from it, as if the Friday sermon is an academic lecture for the worshipers. This

is a significant difference between Friday prayers here in America and thenonArabic Muslim countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia where the sermon, *Khutba*, is delivered in Arabic which no one understands.

Friday service has been a major occasion, once a week, for my ethnographic research in order to understand the cultural and theological direction the American Muslim community is taking. The main objective of the sermon has always been the promotion of God consciousness called *التقوى* (*at-taqwa*) by way of educating the worshipers about Islamic faith, values and behavior. Although in principle all scholars will agree on the main purpose of the sermon, they may and in most cases do, agree and disagree with each other about the way of promoting it, the God consciousness and principles and attributes of *taqwa* itself. Thus, almost each of the imams has his own conviction that he stresses in pursuing his duty as imam and in guiding the community spiritually. Their teachings reflect their personal biases as they do their best.

Some of them are Sufis, or traditional, or modernists. Others are Salafi or Wahhabi. With so much ideological difference, Muslims in North America may eventually emerge as a house divided, an identical replica of the phenomenon prevailing in the Muslim world itself. This may well be a good sign of the promotion of Islamic intellectual individualism, tolerance and dignity, matching well with the American norm of individualism and freedom of speech, a social norm that is not in any way foreign to the Islamic principles of individual right and responsibility as a social and civilized being.

The Friday communal prayer is one of the most effective roles that the mosque plays in the North American context (Abusharaf, 1998). As such, it is likely that a regular mosque going Muslim in North America will emerge as knowledgeable in the

basics of Islam, independent minded Muslims perhaps more capable of promoting the mission of Islam in their new home than their Muslim counterparts in the home countries.

### **Weekend Quranic/Islamic School System**

The adaptability of Islamic traditions and even rituals to a new and foreign environment is manifested through the structure of weekend Quranic School on Sunday instead of Friday. For Muslims Friday is the day of blessings and community learning, not because they cannot or do not work on that day, but because they participate in a congregational worship and hope to receive extra reward and forgiveness emanating from this worship. In the home countries they have daily Quranic school early in the morning prior to going to the regular public school. Therefore, it is not even an issue for them whether they should have Friday school or Sunday school. In some cases there is also an option of evening school including private tutoring of children in Quranic learning, but they do not have the concept of weekend school as Muslims have developed it in the United States. Sunday is the day of weekend in which other faith communities are holding their Sunday school. Muslims have almost by default chosen Sunday for 2 hours of Quranic School to educate their children about Islamic religion and culture.

Muslims in the Valley have adapted very well with the option of Sunday for Quranic School for the children. Religiously, all that the practicing Muslim needs is a break during the lunchtime on Friday for about an hour and a half to attend the service after which they go back to work. Other than the congregational prayers, Muslims have replaced Friday for Sunday for all other weekend activities and socialization, which in the

home countries they usually do on Fridays. Even the most conservative Muslims are not making any fuss about this particular aspect of adaptation to the American way.

However, I would disagree with the assertion that Muslims in America regard Sunday “as an important day for religious activities” (Warner, 1998, p. 256) because for Muslims there is only one religious activity on the weekend and that is the congregational prayer performed on Friday. This adjustment of Muslim Friday schedule with Sunday may be called “noticeable calendrical adjustments that immigrants” have undertaken across the continent, but not as a religious alternative, but a social and cultural adjustment (Abusharaf, 1998; Warner 1994). Other activities, such as Sunday school, are not necessarily religious in status, if at all, for Muslims all days of the week are equally valuable, except that on Friday they have special congregational prayer, which is different from the concept of Saturday and Sunday in other faith systems.

In the home countries, on the other hand, Friday is the holiday for all including Muslim, Hindus, Christians, Jews and Buddhists. For non-Muslims there, the holiday issue is also addressed in the same way as Muslims do it here and it is working. The Muslim social and governance system and their non-Muslims citizens adapt to each other’s values in a similar manner as it is working here in the West. For instance, while for Hindus the day of the weekend is not a large issue, for Christians and Jews it is. The system in the Muslim majority society will have to relax and accommodate their religious demand of relevant days, Sunday and Saturday, in addition to the regular day off on Friday. Some sacrifice is needed as well as some accommodation in order for the system to function smoothly and to the benefit of all.

In North America Muslims are experiencing a social, cultural and theological adjustment. Muslim children in the weekend school are expected to learn about the basics of Islam and the Arabic language. The Muslim community, like so many other immigrant communities, is striving to “sustain Muslim identities” in the American diaspora and for that the priority issue over the day of the week matters less. Warner (1998a) argues:

as religion becomes less taken for granted under the conditions prevailing in the US adherents become more conscious of their traditions and many become more determined about its transmission. Religious identities that had been a scriptive form birth may become objects of active conversion, in order to counter actual or potential losses by defection. (p.13)

The objective of Sunday Islamic school is to transmit both the revealed and cultural knowledge of Islam to the new generation of American Muslims in which the “educators spare no effort in promoting the moral, spiritual and cultural foundations of conceptions of accountability to God and the community in which they live at an early age” (Abusharaf 1998, p. 257). Quranic education offers skills of Quranic recitation, memorization and the understanding of the basics of Islamic theology, which Abusharaf terms as “memorizable truth” that passes from one generation to another.

Thus, the community is providing the most needed knowledge, skills and understanding to the new generation so that they find their way of discovering their identity as American citizens. Without this educational system, the younger generation could easily be lost under the dramatic influences of the mainstream society. In fact, many of the younger generations of the pioneer immigrants such as the Kader family in Provo, Utah lost their family’s original religion and culture in their full assimilation into the host society.

## **Curriculum Objectives of the Quranic School**

In the Valley the Islamic weekend schoolteachers and administrators are mostly a group of University of Utah students who are conservatively religious focusing on dress code, segregating boys and girls and most importantly supervising the curriculum contents. The dress code receives the most attention, including parents' dress code and interactions while in the school, especially if the school is on the mosque premises.

The curriculum objectives of the school are not only to teach the religious content but also Islamic etiquette and to instill in the students the essence of Islamic personality. Within the community, there are also those liberal Muslims who do not want their children to learn about traditional Islam. They are quite uncomfortable with the traditional dress code and segregation of girls and boys, etc. The conservatives, on the other hand, are quite particular about those issues. They feel obligated to teach and train all children in the traditional Islamic values and manners.

These conflicting perspectives over the issues of educational contents, dress code and segregation often cause conflict and tension between school administration, teachers, parents and leaders. Thus, children often are a bit confused and caught in between, especially when they see parents at home do not observe Islamic rituals and prayers, food choices and dress code etc. In the public school system, it is a totally different experience of life for their children: openness, free mixing that leads to romantic relationship between boys and girls, immodest dress and so on. For them life at home and at public school is a little different, but not radically different.

Although children do understand that they are pursuing religious education in a religious environment, they find some of the rules too radical and too rigid to follow

compared with the society of their daily life. They complain to their parents, who in response agree with their children's preferences and begin complaining and reacting against the school administration, even to the extent of withdrawing their children from the school.

One such incident took place with the children of an informant who is a research professor of Pathology at the University of Utah, Professor F.M. In the 1980s, himself a Sunday school teacher, he sent his two children to Sunday school but eventually withdrew them out of discontent. Neither he nor his children felt comfortable with the school rules regarding dress code and the segregation boys from girls. He reports it in this manner.

I have two kids who used to go to the Sunday school. The brother who was running the school imposed segregation of boys from girls calling it an Islamic practice. There is a religious message in it, which is all right, but he was so abrasive that he alienated most of the students, particularly the girls. Even my own daughter asked me a blatant question. She asked, "Dad, how hypocritical you can be? We go to public school during the whole week and one day a week you segregate boys from girls for one hour. You do so very arrogantly." Yes, the issue is valid and Islamically we have to follow certain etiquette, but they do it in a very abrupt and crude way. They have the right message, but wrong way of doing it. This is the situation. (Interview FM)

"I got disenchanted," said the professor. One may find in the above quotation a subtle defiance against a way of treating the children in Sunday Islamic school and that neither the children nor the parent are rejecting the Islamic etiquette in principle, but find it difficult to accept how it is implemented. Regardless, a problem remains unresolved and the process of structural adaptation in Muslim weekend school continues to adapt.

### **A Mosque Is a Community Center, Only in Diaspora**

Nowhere in the Muslim majority society can you find a mosque which also is a community center, but you do in North America. Almost all mosques in the United States are designed as both mosque and community center. This is unique and American

indeed. As the European Americans designed their democracy at the wake of the independence, different from their European counterparts, American Muslims also designed, centuries later, their Islamic structure of mosque, organization and socio-religious activities differently than their fellow Muslims in home countries, not drastically, but selectively.

In America, an imam has an office, in some cases a secretary or administrative assistant, like an officer has in any other business or social organization. The job description of imam is inclusive of social and community service, which transcends the mere performance of prayer, marriage and funeral services. He does not only lead the five daily prayers and teach children, but also maintains an office hour for people who would seek counseling on issues of religious, familial and social affairs. People have direct access to the imam all the time.

Traditionally in the home countries mosques are open all the time, nonstop, especially in the rural areas and there are worshipers in the mosque all the time. In the home culture, a mosque will have within it some copies of the Quran and other religious literature so that worshipers can do some recitation of the Quran and read those books as part of worship while at the mosque. However, here in America where the mosque has an office, computer, library and other valuables, mosques are not always open for worship, but only in the appointed time because of the fear of vandalism.

Thus, Muslims have made a significant adjustment with the American pattern of mosque and community activities, quite similar to the American church pattern and

different from the traditional view towards mosque and its role in the society. This in itself represents an adaptation to the new challenges of the American context.

### **Women and the Community**

The role of Muslim women in the American diaspora is another example of Muslim structural adaptation to their new home country. Here Muslim women are reportedly highly educated, professional and active participants in the community affairs, religious as well as social. Muslim women participate in the mosque activities attending daily and weekly congregational prayers, teaching in the Sunday school and involved in other activities such as study circle, religious celebrations at the community level and so on. That means women are present in the mosque activities side by side with their male counterparts. This is a manifestation of structural adaptation of Muslim religious behavior in America.

In the home countries, no mosque, with some rare exceptions in the urban settings, will experience women frequenting it to participate in the prayers or events. Paradoxically, in some Muslim societies, women go out to the field to help their husbands in farm activities, but never to the mosque for worship. A Muslim woman working side by side with her husband in the fields could live all her life without experiencing how it feels to be inside a mosque to worship God there as a man does. They are also at peace with the notion that women are not required to visit the mosque because it is for men. If at all, they will perform their prayers at home and in private. Therefore, whether a woman is religious or not, visiting a mosque for prayer in congregation is not what the Muslim tradition teaches.

Women of modernized and secular family background have broken with the traditional and conservative Islam. They are either not caring for religion as they find it irrelevant to their life style, or are worshiping in private and in *hijab* in public. Unless they are educated and do extra study personally, they know very little about Islamic text, the Quran, Hadith and the *fiqh* jurisprudence or the code of civil law other than what the tradition dictates. That is to say, those women do not recognize Islam as it does not recognize them as normal and equal partners of human society. Even the most religious among them would agree that women are deprived of the equitable right and responsibility, not by Islam but by male chauvinist champions of Islam.

Therefore, Muslim women across the globe seem to have been divided into two extreme groups, ultratraditional and ultraliberal, out of which a third category of modernized, educated and professional Muslim women activists has emerged. They are religious, but not in the traditional way. They know their rights and duties very well. While the first two categories of Muslims coexisted for generations, the third category of Muslim women, which has emerged since the 1970s, believe that Islam came to liberate and give women their equitable position in the human society. Thus, women can and should contribute to the civil society following the Quranic guidance. They have discovered the concept of Muslim womanhood in societies, both back at home as well as in the diaspora. They are out in the community but within the Islamic prescribed rules of conduct that include the dress code and the mode of communication and interaction with the opposite gender of the community both in the mosque and in public squares. They are

visible on campuses, market places and offices. They could be clearly identified as wanting to be participant Muslim women.<sup>29</sup>

The religious Muslim women in America represent the third category described above. Those women in some cases are more religiously conscious than their husbands who in almost all cases support their wives in their involvement with the mosque congregation. In fact, the entire family, husband, wife and children are involved in the mosque-based activities of prayers, Sunday school and ethno-religious events.

Depending on the size of the community and the location of the mosque, women are attending the mosque even for the daily prayers, especially the afternoon and late afternoon prayers when some women stop by the mosque and perform the prayer before reaching home, especially if they do not have younger children to attend. In the Valley women are also organized in the study circle for which they meet in the evening in the women's section of the mosque building. On each Friday, they have a topic and a speaker followed by a session of questions and answers to the benefit of the all of the audience. At times, they also invite guest speakers, both men and women, to discuss specific topics such as the rights of women in Islam, etc.

Sunday school in the community has two main sections: one for the boys taught by the male teachers and the other for girls taught by the female teachers. The girls' section is also headed by a woman who both teaches and administers the section. The Principal of the school who is responsible for both sections has regular staff meetings

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<sup>29</sup> A significant number of Muslim women, other than ultratraditionalists and conservatives, are now working both at home and in offices, just like here in the West, not as much low paid laborers but as professionals. They are medical doctors, university professors, engineers and school teachers. The percentage of them is not similar to the men, but women's participation in the work force is on the rise across the globe.

inclusive of male and female teachers as usual, except that the sitting arrangements are segregated, male on one side and female on the other and so far, it is working.

While segregation is in place in the school system, male and female are both participating in the election process to elect the president and board members. It is true that women's participation in the election is much less than the men, but good enough that female presence is recognized as part of educational and learning activities. The leadership of the community also nominates or selects women for different subcommittees. It has been the unwritten policy of the Community to ensure women's participation in the community leadership. Women who are involved and active are from Pakistan and Bangladesh. Women from these two countries are also mostly educated and professionals. Female members are active in the community which marks another example of the structural adaptation of Muslim women's roles in religious and social activities.

In the countries of origin the question of woman's participation at the mosque congregational activities is not yet an issue even to discuss, but in America it has become part of Muslim religious community structure.

## **Conclusion**

This social history of the Valley community provides an excellent example of how community structures are adapted to the overall context of the ethnic and majority relationship in the process of assimilation in a pluralistic model. The Islamic community has given Muslim immigrants an opportunity to rearticulate their faith through distinctive adaptations to the dominant culture, while still struggling to maintain the essentials of

their faith and the desirable attributes of their own culture. Throughout this ongoing effort, immigrants stress their determination to retain their culture and way of life even as they rework some roles and adopt some new ones. The Valley community, like other Muslim communities in North America, adopted native organizational structures that parallel those of churches and synagogues. The fine line between adaptation and assimilation is important for immigrants who have “learned that much of their impact and effectiveness depends on [their group’s] effective leadership and organization” (Abul Fadl, 1991, p. 59).

What is interesting about the Community is that the more modifications and adjustments the Muslim immigrants introduced, the more aware they became of their distinctive identity and more capable of making the selection of adaptive measures. Their adaptation therefore is not a linear progression toward Americanization or an incidence of cultural assimilation, but rather as demonstrated by Abusharaf in 1998 a modification and a renegotiation of roles.

## V. SECTARIANISM AT LAST: THE SHIA CENTER

“Tell me whom you love, I'll tell you who you are”

### **Introduction**

Chapter IV is concerned with the dynamics of the internal relationship between two main Islamic sects, the Sunnis and Shias, within the Islamic Society of Salt Lake City –ISSLC. It demonstrates that in the 1960s when the size of the community was small the relationship between these two sects was good and the sense of tolerance and unity was strong within the Society. However, the dynamics of relationship have changed since the 1990s when the size of the community grew larger from the influx of refugees from Bosnia, Somalia and Iraq. A sense of sectarian identity and a new dynamic of sectarian relationship emerged as the Shii sect began to introduce ideas of having their own Center separate from the mainstream Sunni Society and the mosque based congregation.

This section also illustrates the Society's efforts to adjust to the new situation of rapid growth in its membership by introducing amendments to the constitution and by initiating a development project which included expansion of the facility. These plans to keep the Society together were unsuccessful as the sense of sectarianism and separatism grew within the Shia community, in conjunction with the renewal of traditional sectarian group identity in both sects with the rise of population. In the late 1990s, the Shias, primarily Iraqi refugees, separated and established the Shia Al-Rasul Islamic Center.

Then the Iranian Shias joined the Shia center in the post 9/11 era in which American suspicion of Muslims was focused more on the Sunni American Muslims and less on the Iranian Shias.

This study argues that previous relationship of unity between the members of these two sects was essentially artificial serving their mutual interest, whereas the actual conditions of theological, cultural and social differences remained and resurfaced with the growth of Muslim populations and changes in the political climate.

### **The Relationship Between the Sects in the Post-1965 Era**

The Islamic Society of Salt Lake City was formed in 1981 and the first mosque in the entire Valley area was established in 1985. During that period, until the turn of the century, both Shias and Sunnis were members of the Society, maintained unity with each other and worshiped in the same mosque. Most members were students at the universities and colleges in the area. A few of them were professionals. Together they began to promote their Islamic religious, social and cultural identities religious activities including congregational prayers, religious festivals and parties.

As the evidence indicates, increasing numbers of immigrant Muslims began arriving in Utah in the late 1950s and the immigration increased after the repeal of the previous restriction on the immigration of Asians and Muslims in 1965. In order to maintain the unity and solidarity among themselves in the face of prejudicial treatment by elements of the mainstream Valley people both sects, Sunnis and Shias and in particular the Iranian Shias, managed to suppress their sectarian agendas. Scholars have explained

this phenomenon of temporary and artificial relationship between these two major sects of Islam living in the diaspora as a minority faith-group in the following terms.

Because of their small numbers in an already minority-faith community, Shia Muslims usually join Sunni mosques when they lack their own center. As Yvonne Haddad and Jane Smith observed in *Muslim Communities in North America*, when the numbers of people who share a particular orientation grew, the propensity to establish separate centers increased. In this regard, the Shia Muslims are no exception. Abdo El-kholy in *The Arab Moslem in the United States* and Linda Walbridge, in *Without Forgetting the Imam*, traced this tendency in the Shia community to 1949, thirty years before the Iranian revolution, when the first Shia mosques in the United States began to form in Dearborn, Michigan. (Nimer, 2002, p. 48)

The findings of this study of Muslims in the Valley area conform to these earlier conclusions about Muslim sectarian relationship in the American diaspora. As such, these sects in the former situation suppressed their differences for the sake of unity and solidarity while at the same time cherished a sense of self versus other identity. When the smaller group increased in number in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, they gained the confidence of safety and strength to promote their own sectarian group identity.

This process has been at work with them for over the period of almost half a century, from the late 1950s to the dawn of the 21st century. The dynamics of relationship began to change at this point in time due to demographic growth followed by the Islamic Society's organizational change, the resurfacing of historical tensions between the sects and finally the establishment of Shia Center in downtown Salt Lake City in 1997 that separated Shias from the Sunni society.

## **The Center Stands Despite the Reluctance of the Iranians**

Iranians could have been the first to emerge in the Valley area as a mainstream Shia Muslim community had they been an active mosque oriented group. They were among the first arrivals of Muslims in a significant number, living in the Valley area since the establishment of the Middle East Center at the University of Utah in 1959, if not earlier (interview J.B).<sup>30</sup> They are now well established professionally and financially (Dana, 2007).

The Shah of Iran made a great contribution in financing the Middle East Center as well as the Middle East section of the main Library of the University of Utah, which is the fifth largest Middle East Studies library in the country.<sup>31</sup> The support of the Shah for the Center and Library followed by the cultural exchange program of students and scholars between the University of Utah and the University of Tehran opened the door of Iranian emigration to the region. Students and scholars would come and gracefully settle there with good jobs and business opportunities until the demise of the Shah in the wake of the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979.

According to one source, there were 10 to 12 professors of Iranian origin who were teaching at the University of Utah in the 1970s (interview J.B). Some of them are still teaching while others retired. Moreover, many Iranian students and scholars are now living in the area. One such Iranian who came to pursue his higher studies at the University of Utah in the early 1970s and lived in the Valley area is well known as one of

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<sup>30</sup> It was mentioned that Iranians like to live here because of its weather and landscape, which is similar to that of Tehran. Although significant in number, they did not take any initiative to establish any religious community organization or build a mosque in the area mainly because they are mostly irreligious. Instead, they opted for the culture activities of secularism in the Americanization path. For some of them, religion meant both personal practice of spiritualism and the constant remembrance of the martyrdom of Imam Husain, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Imam, in the year 682, by the warriors of Sunni Caleph, Yazid B. Muwayia (interview).

<sup>31</sup> See for detail < <http://hum.utah.edu/?pageId=250>>

the wealthiest men in the state of Utah. After graduation, he worked for several years as a chemical engineer for a company. Then he established his own company and made a fortune out of it. Although he was interviewed twice, I was not able to get the exact information about his wealth, but he is suspected to be a billionaire, the only non-LDS and Muslim “wealthiest person” in Utah.<sup>32</sup>

Although living in Utah for more than half a century now, Iranians have neither organized themselves as a religious community nor established any mosque for worship in the area yet. Why did Iranian Shia shadow themselves subsequently under the mainstream Sunni Muslims until the turn of the century, then under the Shias from Iraq, Pakistani, Indian and African background until now? Despite their significant numbers and strong socio-economic status, why did Iranians not emerge as a viable religious community in the Valley area?

The possible reasons may be that the Shia Muslims do not have the same sense of urgency about the mosque-based congregation as the Sunnis do. Theologically, Friday prayer that is obligatory for the Sunnis is not even recommended for Shias especially if the leader of the society and country is unjust. Friday congregational prayer is contingent upon the availability of the just leader or just ruler.<sup>33</sup> Obviously, the criteria for a just leader depends on who is evaluating him, which could lead and often does lead to a never resolving phenomenon both in the home country and abroad. The just leader

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<sup>32</sup> <http://www.muslim-forum.org/semnani.html>

<sup>33</sup> All it takes is for them to decide, collectively or individually, that they are not led by a “just leader,” hence performing Friday worship and building a mosque for it is only optional. This is the rationale for not having a Shia mosque in the Valley yet, although it has been prescribed by the Quran. That is why, one may argue that, out of 5,000 Iranians living in the Valley area none felt obligated to build a mosque and only a handful of them practice religion, maybe only 1% of all, but without a mosque of their own. The rest, 99% of them, consider their religiosity not much more than chanting and grieving from time to time for the killing of their 3<sup>rd</sup> Imam while awaiting the guidance from the awaited and hidden Imam known as *Mahdi al-Muntazir*. They consider themselves Muslims side by side with their secular life style.

would be only relevant in a predominantly Muslim country. In the American context, the dialogue about the just leader is moot since the country represents itself as founded on Judeo-Christian principles.

In the classical Shia tradition performing daily and weekly ritual prayers is not really required, but optional, since the last Imam al-Mahdi has not reappeared yet to teach and guide them. It may be justified to assert that fundamentally the Islamic religious functions are suspended until the 12<sup>th</sup> Imam, *Mahdi al-Muntazir*, arrives who will then provide the final version of Shia Islamic faith and he may be coming at any time, a concept that is similar to the concept of messiah in Christianity (Bakhtiar, 1996).<sup>34</sup>

Another reason is that Iranians as Twelver Shias prefer not to pray behind an imam unless he is properly ordained by the authority in Iran. That appointment has not happened to them in the Valley area yet. That means they will have to have an ordained imam for them before they would consider building a mosque for worship. Such activities of establishing a mosque will then become obligatory for them. The imam will have to be ordained by a highly stratified hierarchical system called the *marji'* residing in the home country (Takim, 2009). This is “an exercise of authority not very different from that of the relationship between the Vatican and the world’s Catholic clergy” (Nimer, 2002, p. 48). “For example, while in postrevolutionary Iran Shia mosques hold prayers in congregation, mosques in the United States and Canada follow the classical Shia position that the practice should be deferred until the return of Imam al-Mahdi”. (Nimer, 2002, p.

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<sup>34</sup> Like the Christian awaiting the upcoming of the Masaya, the Shias are also awaiting for the upcoming of the Mahdi, the synonym of Christian Masaya. It could be Jesus himself who would appear as Muslim and the follower of the Quran and Muhammad. Shia Imam al-Mahdi could also be the Imam who would work to create the ground and pave the way for the real Masaya to appear. In the meantime, Shias look at some of the ritual worships such as Friday service as optional, not obligatory in the absence of just leader.

42). That is why, according to sources, Iranians were not organizing Friday service since the revolution (interview, M.H).

For Shia Muslims, America is a foreign land where they are a tiny minority. Therefore, it is more than acceptable that they continue following the classical Shia tradition of deferring all ritual prayers and building mosques until the return of *al-Mahdi*, or an imam is ordained in due time in order to organize Friday service in the American diaspora like the Sunni or like the way Jews do on Saturday and Christians on Sunday. Alternatively, they build Shia Centers known as Hussainiyya which they build with an almost similar sense of urgency the Sunnis have for building a mosque. They established one such center also in the Valley area in 1997.

The Shia Center, however, is not an equivalent to a mosque but a memorial called Husainiya, as mentioned earlier, to commemorate the martyrdom of their 3<sup>rd</sup> Imam, Hussain ibn Ali. Imam Husain, grand son of Prophet Muhammad, was massacred along with his 70 other followers including children, women and elderly people in the year 682 at the battle of Karbala in Iraq (Soltanian, 2008). Shias prefer to establish a Husainiya to commemorate and mourn the martyrdom of Imam Husain. This is the essence of Shia religious devotion and the Shia mourning for the killing of their 3<sup>rd</sup> Imam takes precedence over almost all other aspects of their religious essentials.

Even those religiously devout Iranians, a very small size indeed, were not driven by the zeal of their original identity such as Iranian Shia Muslim. They did not make any noticeable effort to promote their group-identity in the same manner that their Sunni counterparts did, although they had more resources to do so than the Sunnis. Without an interest in establishing a mosque of their own or incentive to promote religious identity

Iranian immigrant identity took on other forms in the American diaspora. They grew as Iranian Americans, as one may put it, instead of Muslim Iranian Americans.

For approximately 50 years both Iranian Shias and mulitethnic Sunnis lived in the Valley area in almost equal numbers. Sunnis from all cultures and ethnicities were united and in so doing established their first mosque in 1985. They now have five mosques within the Valley area while the Shias have none, except the Shia Center, mentioned earlier.

### **Population Growth and Community Organizations**

In over 3 decades between 1960s and 1990s the society grew at a normal pace. However, with the dramatic increase in population from 5,000 to 15,000 between the 1990s and 2000 resulting from the influx of refugees from Bosnia, Iraq and Somalia, the inner dynamics of the Society changed quickly and dramatically.

The Society, as a result, began to experience new tensions of in-group identities arising from sectarianism, ethnicity and factionalism. The tension of sectarianism existed before the increase of population growth, but with that increase, it became sharper, especially between the Sunnis and Shias. Factional tension had always been part of the internal power politics since the establishment of the organization, Islamic Society of Salt Lake City –ISSLC- (henceforth Society), in 1981. Before the increase of new immigrants in the 1990s this tension typically subsided following the election of the Executive Committee and the Board of Directors.

Ethnic tension was almost nonexistent in the early period as the size of the Society was small and fragile. The internal condition of the community was not strong

enough to defend itself in the face of any prejudicial or hate attack. With the influx of new immigrant populations, the leaders of the Society realized that there was an urgent need for the expansion of the facility to accommodate the new arrivals. Thus, they aggressively introduced an organizational change and an expansion plan of the facility. The plan also included a vision of consolidating its leadership over all Muslims settling in the area. However, the plan and vision fell short of addressing the new challenges emanating from the sudden demographic growth in the Society. All stakeholders, new and old, tried to accommodate each other and adapt to the new situation, until they began to fall apart.

The leadership of the community wished to take the Society in a certain direction, but in reality, the Society created its own direction and followed it independently. The leaders wanted to create a Society large and strong under which there would be numerous other satellite mosque congregations united under one leadership. In reality, the community became diverse, divided and disunited, moving as one person said, “from the unity of Muslim identity, to the disunity of group identity.”

Without really understanding the impact of such population growth, or the difficulty in managing under a single leadership a relatively huge and diverse Society, the leadership’s plan failed to hold the Society together. With that, the community’s hope to establish a single and central leadership was not realized. Consequently, the Society adapted itself to a new situation of diversity and group identity that emerged quite naturally along the lines of sectarianism, ethnicity and factionalism.

The American experience of Muslims without a mosque in the 3 decades between 1950s and 1980s is symbolic of the Americanization of Islam. To have a mosque is not a

prerequisite of Islamic faith and socialization, although in principle it is preferred to have a mosque established as soon as the community can afford to build one. Unlike in the home countries, the mosques in the United States are not the neighborhood mosques. They are rather nonneighborhood zonal types of mosques to which people would drive from a radius of 25 to 50 miles distance. Muslims, who are scattered everywhere primarily due to job location, are managing well with this American phenomenon of mosque culture. Most Muslims are highly educated middle class professionals who do not find it difficult to drive such distances to come to the mosque, at least once a week, on Fridays (Haddad, 2004). For Muslims in the Valley area, the suitable time to build a mosque was the year 1985, almost 3 decades after the arrival of the first group of Muslims in the area and over 7 decades after Darwish Kader immigrated to Provo.

During the Gulf-War I era in the early 1990s, some 1,500 Iraqi Shia refugees migrated and settled in the Valley area. This rise in the religious Shia population was followed by the emergence of sectarian groupings and identity construction of Shia Muslims. The civil wars in Bosnia and Somalia in the second half of the 1990s then caused a growth in the Sunni population to several times that of Shia population in the area. An estimated number of 7,000 to 8,000 Sunni Muslim refugees immigrated and settled in the Valley area making the total estimate of the Muslim population in the Valley area reaching to 25,000 (*Salt Lake Tribune* 2009). The actual number, however, may be a bit less as borne out by the breakdown in Table I.

Table 1: Muslim Population in the Valley Area

Iranians	4,000 <sup>35</sup>
Iraqis	1,500
Somalis	4,000
Bosnians	4,000
Pakistanis	500
Bangladeshis	50
Arabs	200
Continental Indians and others	100
Total estimate	14, 350

As the chart suggests, among all the ethnic groups Iranians, Bosnians and Somalis constitute the largest groups within the mainstream Valley Islamic Society. However, these numbers do not reflect the actual leadership percentages in the Valley Islamic Society. Pakistanis are not that large in number but they are religiously active with an estimate of 300-400 active members involved both in worship and leadership out of a total membership of 500. They hold and control the leadership of the Society. The Somalis like the Pakistanis, are also quite visible in the community both as worshipers and leaders. On the other hand, less than 50 from the 4,000 Iranians participate in any kind of religious worship or leadership. Thus, a small number dominate the community leadership with a large number of members not visible.

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<sup>35</sup> Although Iranians as a single ethnic and sectarian community claim to be quite large, they are not seen to be practicing Islam and visiting mosque for worship and/or socialization. They do not show up in numbers in the yearly Islamic festivals, *Eid al-Fitr* and *Eid al-adhha* either.

## **Demographic Growth and the Change of Internal Dynamism**

The community organization, Islamic Society of Salt Lake City, (henceforth ISSLC) was established in 1981. Within 4 years, the members decided to establish a mosque in a place that would be close to the University of Utah and downtown Salt Lake City. Eventually they found an old Church called “Miracle Walk Church” for sale, which they purchased and converted to a mosque called “Masjid” meaning mosque at 740 South and 700 East in 1985. Later on in 1998 the mosque was renamed Masjid Noor. The total population of the community at the time was only several hundred, but that grew to several thousand by the mid-1990s because of the influx of Muslim refugees in the Valley area from Bosnia, Somalia and finally from Iraq.

The community welcomed its new members by using the limited space available at the mosque, by planning for expansion of the existing mosque, by amending the by-laws/constitution and by establishing a second mosque in the West Valley area. In the process, they conducted a number of community surveys to solicit opinions and suggestions as to how the community should address the new situation of overcrowdedness.

As the reality of the situation was unfolding, the ISGSL considered expanding the existing Noor Masjid in the mid-1990s. They tried to purchase properties in the adjacent neighborhood with a plan to remodel those houses and use them for Friday worships and weekend school for children. That plan stalled due to two main reasons. One, on one hand the owners of those properties raised the price too high and, on the other hand, one of the owners did not want to sell his property yet. However, eventually, years after, they managed to purchase one of those houses for \$155,000 in 2005. According to the critics,

the price of the house was far above the market value which some community members said should have been only \$55,000. They needed to buy at least two more houses, which they could not. They eventually abandoned the idea of expansion of Noor Masjid.

Two major structural adaptations were introduced between 1997 and 1998. One was the constitutional amendment to change the name of the organization to “Islamic Society of Greater Salt Lake” (henceforth ISGSL) with a plan to have several satellite mosques within the Valley area under the umbrella leadership of ISGSL. The Society also undertook a new project to establish a second mosque, Khadija Islamic Center, at 1019 West Parkway Avenue, West Valley area. The mosque design was modeled from traditional Islamic architecture with a high-rise minaret. It cost the community over \$2.5 million and was dedicated in October 1998. Political, religious and government dignitaries along with the news media were invited to the celebration. The ISGSL was now the guardian of two mosques with the hope of having a few more under its leadership as soon as they could plan and budget the funds. (Newby, 2004)

Despite the initiative of expansion, in less than 10 years, the Society began to fall apart and numerous independent communities began to emerge along the lines of sectarianism, ethnicity and factionalism. Thus, structurally the community of Muslims in the Valley changed from a diverse but united community to diverse and divided communities manifesting in the birth of the Al-Rasul Islamic Center of Shias in 1997, the Islamic Society of Bosniaks in March 2007, the Utah Islamic Center in June 2007 and Al-Huda Mosque (of Somalis) in September 2008.

## Diversity of Sectarianism: Divided Sunnis - Undivided Shias

The relationship between these two sects is theologically, socially and politically antagonistic although in the context of the early American diaspora both sects made efforts to maintain unity among themselves. Since the Shias were a small minority in America, they stressed their Islamic, rather than sectarian identity, particularly during the Iranian crisis time. (Takim, 2009).

Religiously they do not accept each other's views, socially they do not interact often and politically they act in opposition of each other. In the world today out of 1.82 billion<sup>36</sup> Muslims an estimate of 300 million are Shias and the rest are Sunnis. Among the Shia populations Iran is the largest and strongest Shia Muslim country in the world, while countries like Iraq, Bahrain, Lebanon, Azarbizan, Pakistan and some other Muslim countries have Shia population but in a smaller percentage.

The official Sunni position about the legitimacy of Shia theology, supported by the declaration of the Fatwa, edict, by the Sheikh of Al-Azhar in 1959 has been relatively more positive than the Shias towards them. The *fatwa* accepted the Shia sect as part of mainstream Muslim world,<sup>37</sup> recognizing Shiism as one of the five theological schools of thought. This liberal gesture of the Sunni institution was somewhat reciprocated by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 by asking Shias to maintain unity and good social and religious relationship with the Sunnis. This reciprocal good will gesture had some positive impact on both sides, but not to the extent of removing the original strains from

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<sup>36</sup> <http://www.islamicpopulation.com/> (retrieved on August 3, 2010)

<sup>37</sup> There are four schools of thought concerning Islamic Jurisprudence or the system of law and order that encompass all aspects of human life including religious and secular as per the Sunni mainstream. Those schools of thoughts are Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali. There is also one school of thought of the same stature as the Shia mainstream. Historically these two main streams rejected the validity of one-another until as recent as 1959 following the verdict of the chief Mufti of Al-Azhar validating the Shia school of thought as the fifth school in the Islamic tradition of jurisprudence.

either sides. Iran continues demonizing the Saudi Kingdom as being idealists of Wahhabism who are historically, since the sack of Najaf and Karbala in 1801, anti-Shia. The Saudi ulemas, on the other hand, published another *fatwa* in 1991 declaring Shias as heretic. This last fatwa about schism is equally weighty to that of 1959 by Al-Azhar (Roy, 1996). We find a similar nature of relationship reflected in these two sects living in the Valley area as well.

Sunnis and Shias have lived in the Valley area since the 1960s. Those few Iranian Shias, approximately 10 families, who used to come to the mosque maintained clear pacifist attitudes as far as leadership was concerned. As observed, they did not compete in any way to participate in any leadership position of the Society or lead any religious or social activities. It was, therefore, a peaceful relationship between these two sects. It was not clear to anyone how much they really tolerated each other on religious and social issues until later when it became apparent that the historical negativity and mistrust between the sects was still present.

In the mid-1970s Muslims were literally struggling to manage their religious lives without a mosque to organize their daily and weekly congregational worships. The community also did not yet have an imam to lead the service.<sup>38</sup> Everybody volunteered in different capacities including the coordination of the daily and Friday congregational worships. Evidence suggests that in those early years of Muslim immigration Shia imams were allowed to give a sermon and lead the Friday prayers in Sunni mosques in different

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<sup>38</sup> It should be noted that according to the *Fiqh* ruling, it is permissible to perform daily prayers at any place and both collectively and individually whether at the mosque or at home or any other places, other than Friday service, which has to be performed at the mosque and in congregation. However, the preference is placed on praying at the mosque and collectively if possible for more reward and blessings. In addition, an imam is required for the Friday prayer. For other prayers it will depend on number of worshipers. For instance, if praying alone there is no need of imam, but if there is more than one person then one of them has to lead the service as imam. However, if more than one person, one will have to act as an imam for the next person to follow his lead.

cities within North America. One such example would be of Imam Yasin al-Jabouri, a Shia imam at the Islamic Center of Atlanta, who many times led the Friday service of MSA on campuses in Atlanta area in the 1970s, although later on the Sunni authorities barred him from leading their prayers (Takim, 2009).

The Friday prayer is a formal congregational worship that begins with a sermon that takes about half an hour followed by the ritual worship. The sermon amounts to a reminder about God consciousness and the way to increase such God consciousness in fellow Muslims. The imam or *Khateeb* has to be knowledgeable in the Quran, Arabic language and *Fiqh* or *Sharia* (the science of Islamic jurisprudence). The speaker is also expected to be an experienced and eloquent speaker. Therefore, it is a task delegated to selected worshipers who are proven to be capable of delivering the sermon. Before there was an imam the religious or cultural secretary of the Society managed the list of worshipers who on a routine basis rendered this service. Out of an innocent mind and the absence of sensitivity, the Secretary made a controversial choice of a *Khateeb* that generated some tension within the fragile community.

A *Khateeb* of Indian origin who was a research professor at the University of Utah and a member of the community was approached. He regretted not being available to lead the service due to some personal reasons. He recommended to the coordinator a graduate student at the University of Utah, who was a Shia from Iran. The student *Khateeb* came well prepared and stood up to deliver the sermon. The topic was ‘the concept of التقوى *al-taqwa*, piety, in Islam, a very neutral topic of Islamic spirituality.

Unfortunately, he was not able to deliver his sermon without experiencing a quiet but alarming opposition from a group of worshipers in the audience. Immediately after

the *Khateeb* stood up to deliver the sermon a group of five or six worshipers walked out of the service hall, went to another room and performed the prayer separately. One of them led the service. This was an embarrassing incident for the *Khateeb*, for the Secretary, for the professor and the rest of the worshipers in the hall. This came as a surprise to all of them, because nobody from the congregation knew what was happening. The *Khateeb* completed the service and maintained a silent gesture over the incident.

This incident shocked many and angered some both from the Shia and Sunni groups including the professor who had recommended the *Khateeb*. It, however, proved a case. Out of an estimate of 50 worshipers most went along with the new *Khateeb* and about 10 to 12 % of them actively opposed him on ground of sectarian issues. Therefore, it may be concluded that in the context of American diaspora an overwhelming majority of Muslims are tolerant of each other and willing to ignore the sectarian differences. While tolerant, the two groups, however, eventually separated as the size of the community of both sides grew larger.

I interviewed number of senior members of the Society who were present at the time of this incident and found that liberal and nonsectarian minded Sunni members are still emotional about it, although almost a quarter of a century has passed since the incident took place. The Iranians did not seem to be disturbed by this incident, perhaps because it was never in their mind to begin with that they had to participate in the religious leadership of the mainstream Society. Living in America in a situation where the relationship between America and Iran had been so unfriendly, perhaps they just wanted to get by unharmed continuing their business as usual with the Society.

Another incident took place in the early 1980s. Muslims were aspiring to establish their first mosque in the area. It was, however, a challenging project for them because most of them were new immigrants or students, or young professionals. As such, they lacked both experience and resources. Some students knew one of the Iranian professors who was the Director of the Middle East Center at the University of Utah. The professor had a good connection with many wealthy Iranians here in the Valley area and in Iran, including the Shah of Iran.

The students decided to seek his assistance in raising funds to build a mosque. When he was approached he responded positively. Unfortunately, the rumor spread, especially through sectarian Sunnis from the Gulf States, that a group of students were secretly collecting donations to build the mosque with money to be raised from the Shia sources and that the Iranian professor was approached towards that goal. The Iranian professor was nonpracticing and a Westernized Shia Muslim. They regarded it abominable to accept donation to build a mosque from Shia sources, especially from one who was known for his Westernized life style including indulging in alcohol. The rumor reached the professor and that was the end of it. He never made any further gesture to do anything with the Muslim community again until his premature death in the mid 1980s.

This incident offended a number of the community leaders some of whom were students and professors at the University of Utah. Disappointed and disgruntled, they became inactive and indifferent about their position as Muslims in the traditional sense. I interviewed two of them who have not been able to forgive the promoters of the antagonistic rumor against the Iranian professor (Interview, F.M).<sup>39</sup> One of them has not

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<sup>39</sup> He argued, for instance, without giving any specific name or indication, that among the people who vehemently opposed receiving donations from the Shia professor were now actively seeking donations

only stopped going to the mosque or participating in any mosque based community activities; he actually began to question the very fundamental claim of the Islamic religion that it is the only truth. According to him, other religions, such as Judaism and Christianity, also possess the legitimacy of religious truth and one is equally righteous as long as they follow the teachings of their religions. In other words, one does not have to be a Muslim in its traditional sense to attain piety and blessings of paradise in the After Life.

The Iranian Shias took silent note of the incident mentioned above without making an issue out of it, but the situation appears to have signaled the end of the special relationship between these two sects of Islam in the Valley area. Iranians in post-1979 America did not feel it safe to play alone and promote their self-identity, which could have antagonized their Sunni counterparts whom they needed for support. A third point in appreciating the attitudes of Iranian Shias towards the Sunnis and how they view the Sunni world is illustrated in the following narration.

The following incident is an example of the religious perception of mainstream Iranian Shias toward the Sunni mainstream Muslims. An Iranian Shia student reported in the late 1980s to have mentioned the term “Sunni” instead of Muslim or Sunni Muslim. The student was new on campus and was trying to find someone from the Eastern culture, preferably a Shia Muslim. Someone directed him to a Muslim professor whom he knew in the Engineering Department at the University of Utah. The student met the professor in his office and eventually, in the course of conversation asked the professor if he was Muslim, meaning Shia Muslim, or Sunni. The professor was, as he stated to me, stunned

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from an Iranian Shia wealthy person in order to build the Khadijah Mosque and received exactly \$2 million and no one from the Community or outside people objected to this. This is a big change in their attitudes towards the Shia people.

by the question. He felt the student did not recognize a Sunni person as Muslim. He, however, dealt with the student, as he was a visitor, with much extra caution and politeness. He stated that this was the first time he experienced a Shia Muslim's attitude towards Sunni Muslims. It must be pointed out here that many partisan Sunnis also think exactly the same way about the Shias. While conversing, the professor replied that he was a Muslim of neither kind and that he did not recognize any brand of sectarianism. The student visitor thus realized that he was out of line in his thought and conversation concerning Shia-Sunni identity.

This example illustrates a typical historical attitude in the way Shia and Sunni Muslim view each other, condemning each other subconsciously and privately with full vigor and without benefit of doubt. In the American experience, the Shia-Sunni sectarian tension is much less than the tension in the home countries. Perhaps the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution contributed to ease the tension between these two sects, specifically those who are living in the Valley area. However, neither the Sunnis nor the Shias fully abandoned their prejudices against each other.

Not until the arrival of the Iraqi Shias in the 1990s and the tragedy of 9/11 were the Iranian Shias convinced to move toward separation from the Sunni mainstream. The situation of 9/11 redirected the American antagonism from Iranians to the non-Iranian Sunni Muslims. The Iraqi Shias independently went ahead and established the first Shia center in downtown Salt Lake City. The Iranians gradually became part of that center. Relieved of the pressure and negative prejudices they had experienced since 1979, they were free to pursue their independent identity as Shia.

## **The Post 9/11 American Attention Towards Shias and Sunnis**

Neither the government nor the people of Iran were involved in the 9/11 attack on American soil. As such, their position in post-9/11 America became similar to the position of Iranian Jews in post-1979 America. During that time, the American views were such that Iranian Muslims were bad, but not the Iranian Jews (Feher, 1998). In post-9/11 America Sunni Muslims are bad, not Iranian Shia Muslims.

Iranians in particular and the Shias in general were not the direct targets of security surveillance following the Patriot Act in post 9/11 America for the same reason the Iranian Jews were not targeted in post-1979 America. The 9/11 Commission Report (Commission 2004, 241) stated that Iranian Shias were not involved in any way in the 9/11 tragedy. That declaration gave the Iranian Muslims a sense of moral relief after so many years since the 1979 revolution. The Iranians were no longer in need of shadowing with the Sunnis, nor would they feel insecure being identified as Iranian Shias. They quietly stopped coming to the mosque and began to promote social and religious unity among the Shias of all ethnic and geographical backgrounds such as Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, India and other parts of the world under the banner of Al-Rasul Islamic Center which had been established in 1997. Understandably, the Iranians did not affiliate themselves with Al-Rasul Islamic Center until after the 9/11 crisis. Thus the 9/11 tragedy marked the end of the Shia-Sunni brotherhood and the beginning of the self-identity of Shia Muslims in the context of the Valley area, if not all of America.

## **Conclusion**

From the above study, we conclude that the Shia-Sunni sectarianism is almost an inherent part of Islamic tradition. There are religious and socio-cultural issues between the sects, yet they were capable of living together as Muslim and Islamic under one single organizational leadership, especially when their number was small in a majority society. They, in such a situation, were more concerned about their coexistence and their mutual identity survival collectively as a symbol of strength and unity. Thus, they lived under one name and organization for about 4 decades.

However, while they maintained a good relationship and remained united, they continued fostering their hidden issues and differences. The issues of conflict were suppressed, but not forgotten. Once the minority group, the Shias, got enough membership and capacity to promote their sectarian identity and interests independently, they began to separate and promote their own identity and group interests. It is, however, important to note that there was not any serious incidence of conflict between these two sects, Shias and Sunnis, in this period of peace or *détente*, until they separated. When Sunnis were in control of the united Society, some elements from the group did cause some controllable commotion. There was only one incident involving a newly arrived Iranian graduate student to the University of Utah. His prejudice against the Sunni Muslims represented the mainstream Iranian Shia perception towards their Sunni counterparts, attributing them as Sunnis, instead of Sunni Muslims or Muslims. His expression was almost natural and subconscious. One may argue that the nature of sectarian prejudice never goes away unless the people in authority consciously make

efforts to change such negativism and replace it with more positive and proactive concepts.

This section has also illustrated efforts of the Society's leadership to adjust to the new situation of rapid and diverse demographic growth. Its membership grew by the thousands from roughly 5,000 to 15,000 Muslims. By introducing new constitutional amendments to maintain the new American unity and by initiating a development and expansion project they hoped to address the stresses that the crowded community was experiencing. The projects made the life of the Society somewhat better, but did not address the real problem of keeping the Society's sectarian, ethnic and geographical diversity under one central leadership.

The zeal of the Shia leadership, for their sectarian identity and interests became their fundamental focus, giving birth to Shia community organization and the Al-Rasul Islamic Center in 1997. While the Iraqi Shias undertook this project, the Iranian Shias gradually joined them with increasing numbers after the tragic destruction of the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001. That is to say that after this tragic incident, the suspicion of American authority, people and anti-Muslim activists turned from the Shia Iranians and with acutely focused attention toward the Sunni Muslims, especially following the enactment of the Patriot Act of 2001.

## VI. RISE OF PLURALITY: THE MOSQUE CONGREGATIONS

**“Tell me who your friends are and I will tell you who you are”**

### **Introduction**

This chapter is concerned about the inner dynamics of Muslim community relationship in the Valley area. It focuses on the development of factional conflict within the elite subgroups of the community leadership. Using the interpretive model of factional conflict, I have categorized the factional rivalries as nondisruptive and disruptive in the context of Muslim Society in the Valley area. The study demonstrates how disruptive factional conflicts took the Society to the brink of division and disunity because such conflicts are unruly, unconstitutional and often irreligious. Aggressive and harsh attacks on the rival individuals and groups in the context of factional conflict fail to produce what is constructive for human society.

### **Factionalism: A Perspective**

Factional conflict is a universal phenomenon in both religious and social movements ever since the origins of human society (Ash & Zald, 1966). Factional

conflicts are chaotic, disruptive, detrimental and divisive in nature (Beals & Siegel, 1966). Both internal strains and external forces contribute to the emergence of factional subgroups leading to chaos, division and secession in the organization (Beals & Siegel, 1960). The factors in factionalism are both overt and covert factors, depending on the nature and stage of the conflict created against the other. The impulse of factional rivalry is intense and designed to crush the opposition subgroup in any way possible. Factional elites and leaders make secret preparation against their rival groups and strike in surprise, as if they are fighting a war against their archenemies precipitating a new crisis in the community (Nathan, 1973). Such conflicts are characterized as schismatic and pervasive, as they divide the community and render it disorderly and backward. However, studies on factionalism received little attention from sociologists (Ash & Zald, 1966), let alone factionalism within the Muslim communities in the context of America.

Richard Gillespie and Michael Waller contend that factionalism is an active process that elites pursue in the initial stage of community settlement. It does not continue as a norm of society or group politics in all stages with an exception of Italian party politics (1995), probably because factionalism settled into part of the system and continued without any plan for the system to mature otherwise. But as the community completes its growth, it often reduces the possibility of factional diversity and conflict.

In 2005, a group of social scientists from Europe and North America conducted studies on the in-and-out group relationship within societies and found that people identify themselves with their in-group while they devalue the out-group leading to the factional communication problems. They also assert that in communities “conflict may stem, for example, from competition for material resources, including economic ones ...

or symbolic resources, such as political strength” or power politics, etc. (Brief, Burrows, Butz, Dietz, Scholten, & Umphress, 2005, p. 830). Thus, factionalism is a group conflict that emanates from mutual competition for gaining power and privileges that naturally causes tension leading to further conflict and division, a phenomenon that conform the nature and characteristics of factionalism in the Valley area.

Factionalism, however, represents internal division and infighting resulting, in most cases, in the weakening and loss of privileges, prestige and progress of the community like we see now with the Palestinian people and with Indian people during the British colonial rule in the 18<sup>th</sup> through 20<sup>th</sup> century. Factionalism existed within the Nazi regime in Europe (Morris, 2001) as well as among the religious, ethnic and cultural minorities of German, Jews, Protestants, Catholics and Freethinkers in the American context (Bodnar, 1987). In the context of American diaspora, the role of factionalism within Muslim communities is no exception.

### **Categories of Factional Conflict**

According to Alan R. Beals and Bernard Joseph Siegel conflicts are divided into two categories. One is pseudo or nondisruptive beneficial conflict that stems from individual competition and team play. Such conflict dies out as it surfaces, without much consequence on the organization. The other factional conflict, characterized as disruptive or divisive, is detrimental to the social and organizational progress.

Within this subgroup, there are those who maintain logical and rational argument and use means that may be called party conflict. In this process, tensions increase for some time, but eventually cool down and people return to business as usual. However

there is potential for another element of this factionalist subgroup to act irrationally with unregulated, unexpected and uncontrollable behavior resulting in factional rivalries that exert intensive pressure on others and are strict and uncompromising (1966). This crushing rivalry eventually cripples the option of negotiation leading to division illustrated by Alan R. Beals and Bernard Joseph Siegel in *Divisiveness and social conflict: An anthropological approach* that explains well the phenomenon of factional conflict and intensity of rivalry within the Muslim Society of the Valley area (1966).

According to this theory, factional disputes are divided into nondisruptive and disruptive or detrimental. The former is usually considered as pseudoconflict and beneficial as they are mostly stemming from individual competition and taken care of by the team play activities, hence beneficial to the community. The later conflict is divisive detrimental. Such conflicts hold the community behind, hence fail to grow and progress in a reasonable pace and often split the community into pieces. Although within this divisive conflict exists some elements of normal and regulated dispute, but in effect it is the unregulated rivalry that eventually overwhelm the community towards its final damages, the notion that I found quite relevant in explaining the factional dispute and its consequences within the Muslim communities in the Salt Lake Valley area.

### **Focus of the Chapter**

The focus of this chapter is the conflicting relationship between factions within the Islamic Society of Greater Salt Lake. The Society has two mosques, old and new and each mosque represents factional conflict involving the elites of both mosque congregations. Although both mosques are under one organization of ISGSL, an elite

group emerged from both mosque neighborhoods, hence factional competition between and within the mosque congregations. This study analyzes the phenomenon of factionalism involving two mosque congregations under the Society.

### **Factionalism Takes Over the Unity**

Since the beginning of the Islamic Society of Salt Lake City in the 1960s to the period of rapid growth of Muslim population in the 1990s, the factional groupings were small and less disruptive, probably because they were not involved in power politics of the Society. They were mostly ideological. One such factional elite was composed of those who believed in Islam as a Theo-political system, whereas the others were traditional, mystic or spiritual.

The Theo-political faction believed in Islam as a way of life and attributed all activities that combine the rituals and civil duties of life to acts of worship of God, as long as they abided by the divine principles. This faction was relatively small and enjoyed little support from fellow members of the Society. The traditionalist faction was ideologically apolitical. They believed that the religion of Islam has nothing to do with politics that follow a Machiavellian ideology of political power game. They believed religion does not condone such ideology, nor does a true follower of Islamic religion; hence a good Muslim does not get into politics. This subgroup of apolitical Islam was much more revered than the faction of political Islam. The secularist group, who believed that religion is personal, civil rules are social and state and church are separate was in harmony with the traditional ideology of Islam.

The *Tabligh Jama'a* (a group that conveys the message of Islam) was another organized and active group within the community. They were also in alliance with the traditionalism of Islam. This group is well known for being antipolitical and antimissionary to non-Muslims. According to them, Muslims should not be politically motivated, nor should they try to convert non-Muslims to Islam. Non-Muslims should be converted by the good example of Muslims through the process of *Tabligh* movement.

Another subgroup was affiliated with Sufism, the Arabic term for mysticism which is also in harmony with the traditional Islam. They were not that big in number, but were present and occasionally participated in argumentation with those who belong to the subgroup of political Islam.

In summary, these subgroups of factionalism existed in the Society and participated in a pseudoconflict that from time to time generated mild argument and competition. Among these ideological factions, only the faction of political Islam was at odds within the Society. The rest remained more or less in harmony with each other. However, in the 1990s a disruptive kind of factionalism began to surface between the elites of the Society's management teams. That factionalism would eventually divide the Society into number of pieces.

### **Disruptive and Divisive Factionalism**

Scholars of socio-anthropology have characterized disruptive factionalism as divisive. Although some factionalism is normal and generates argument and party competition, other forms are abnormal and generate factional disputes leading to either or both schismatic and pervasive factional rivalry (Alan R. Beals, Bernard Joseph Siegel,

1966, 21). While the schismatic factionalism results in the division and split, the pervasive factionalism results in the proliferation of subgroups of religious, social and organizational status.

The nature and the consequence of factional feuds in the Valley area Muslim Society conformed to both patterns of factionalism discussed above. With the rapid growth of the Society's membership in the Valley, there rose an intensity of factional conflicts which revealed itself in power politics, control and domination. For instance, while two factions were involved in fierce fighting, other members of congregation found themselves subscribing to one of these two subgroups because of their sense of obligation to help in a crisis.

Some remained neutral and active in arbitration, while another subgroup took a nonalliance position with no effort to help the tensions be reconciled. They instead wanted these factions, who once fought against them, to now fight among themselves towards their own destruction. Thus, they pretended to be neutral, but actually were not wishing well for any groups involved. From among those bystanders there were also those who eventually took part in the conflict to appease the situation.

### **Normal and Regulated Factional Conflict**

As the conflict of power politics among the elites became relentless, at least three factional groups became apparently active contributors to the factional conflict. One such subgroup emerged within the old Noor Masjid in the downtown Salt Lake area. The other two subgroups emerged from within the new mosque, the Khadija Islamic Center, in the West Valley area. Within these subgroups, there are divisions, but they act together when

they find issues that affect their common interests. Thus, these elites are always involved in competition and fighting for their vested objectives in the Society's leadership.

### **Impact of Demographic Growth**

As mentioned elsewhere, the Society in the pre-1990s period was relatively small with less internal problem of any kind. It all changed with the demographic increase of its members, especially with the influx of refugees from Bosnia, Somalia and Iraq in the 1990s. The size increased from approximately 2,000 to over 15,000 Muslims. As the size of the Society's population grew, so did the factional tension.

### **Factionalism of Power Politics**

In the initial years of the Society the size of the population was small, and so was the disruptive factional tension and power politics. Among the elites, there were highly educated and very articulate individuals who were hungry for power and domination and who promoted in-group and out-group tension. This aspect of factional conflict and rivalry began to surface following the establishment of the new mosque, Khadija Islamic Center, in October 1998.

With this second mosque in place, the worshipers of the Society were free to worship in any mosque preferred or convenient. The old mosque had a neighborhood environment because it was in a residential area close to the downtown. The new mosque did not, because it was in an industrial area, although gradually Muslims began to settle within the closest area possible. Most of Society's leaders were living in areas away from

both new and old mosques. For them it really did not make much difference in terms of distance and convenience.

Before, the elites who did not see eye to eye with each other worshiped in the same mosque. Now, they were able to keep a distance from each other by becoming the members of one mosque while the rivals of another in a mosque based disruptive factional rivalry.

### **Mosque Based Factional Rivalry**

Most of the elites, such as the president of the Executive Committee, Chair of Board of Directors and the Board of Trustees were going only to the new mosque. The new mosque by default became the center of attention and symbol of the leadership of the Society. The choice of mosque for worship coupled with the change of base for management activities, meetings, etc., caused suspicion and competition within the elites' group. Now, the meetings were held at the new mosque, home for the dominant management subgroup. At times, this caused the out-group of the new mosque to experience feelings of being subordinate which led to irritation and frustration, an emerging tension between these factional groups.

Before the establishment of the new mosque, all had to go to the old mosque for worship and other social and organizational meetings. They would come to the same mosque, meet, argue, compromise, love and hate, etc. Now, having two mosques, one had a window of choice to avoid interaction with the rival out-group on a daily basis. More honor and superiority were added to the already attractive new mosque by the appointment of a new Imam and Sunday Islamic School there in 1999.

The new phenomenon of dual mosque congregations did reduce the interaction between the factional in-group and out-group, but it did not minimize the negative feeling of one group against the other. On the contrary, the subgroup that resolved to worship in the old mosque began to feel alienated as members of the community and as members of the management teams. The subgroup at the old mosque began to feel intimidated and degraded by the dominant faction at the new mosque, without being able to do anything about it. One of congregants in the old mosque said that the “big boss,” as they would tease, “is sitting there in the new mosque with his fellow associates making decisions to serve their stake against us.” A tension of rivalry was progressing and communication between these two mosque based subgroups continued to worsen over time.

In the absence of real working relationship, these two subgroups almost stopped seeing each other eye to eye. They had difficulty sitting together in a meeting to discuss and decide issues. A pattern emerged where the newmosque group initiated, decided and implemented, while the out-group in the old mosque increased in frustration and boredom. At one point, the faction in the old mosque considered seceding from the ISGSL and establishing a new management team of their own. That idea of secession, however, did not go forward because of technical limitations and the lack of confidence on the part of the secessionists.

### **Noor Masjid Versus Khadija Mosque Rivalry**

Both subgroups of new and old mosques finally collided on the question of an expansion project using the existing fund for the expenses of the project. The new mosque group did not want to introduce any expansion and development project in the

old mosque. They were even ready to abandon it because it was small without much space for expansion, unlike the new mosque that had the potential for expansion. The subgroup in the old mosque, on the other hand, wanted just the opposite: the new mosque was large enough and it did not need an immediate expansion project, while the old mosque was small and needed to expand through the purchase of properties in the adjacent neighborhood. Neither group agreed to accept the other's position. The feelings of each subgroup were intense and tension on the issue increased.

Thus, the two factions clearly identified themselves with their relevant interests and were ready to complete for them. Pursuing the interest was easy for the new mosque subgroup via committee resolution, because they had enough voting voices for any resolution, while the old mosque factional elites found themselves without sufficient voice.

Finally, in the summer of 2004 the underprivileged subgroup of the old mosque made a desperate move to defy the dominant group's resolution about using the fund to purchase a piece of new land adjacent to the new mosque. The Treasurer (A.A.M) of the Society's Executive Committee had complete authority over the fund. He, with support from his fellow factional elites, made the move not to release the fund in defiance of the constitutional resolution passed by the committees. Instead, the Treasurer and his in-group elites were making their own decisions to spend the fund towards the development of projects for the old mosque contrary to the Society's committee resolutions. The Treasurer refused to release the fund except for the expansion project of his mosque. A significant standoff between these two factions occurred.

As the news broke out in the community, people were shocked to learn about the stalemate, but hoped that it will soon be resolved. Interestingly, however, general members of the Society stayed away from the conflict mainly because the elites of the old mosque subgroup had much good reputation, especially the Treasurer. The masses of the Society remained neutral until the end of the conflict, although some senior members of the Society personally tried to convince the Treasurer and his associates to release the fund following the constitutional binding, but without success.

Eventually, the stalemate ended as a result of an intervention by a wealthy member of the Society who had been the main donor towards building and expansion projects. The new mosque was erected virtually with his donation of \$2 million out of \$2.5 million required in 1997/1998. Significantly enough, while the conflict over the fund was going on, the same donor donated towards the end of 2004 an additional \$60,000 to the Treasurer knowing that he was fighting his adversaries unconstitutionally. The position of the Treasurer became even stronger in his defiance of the demands of the rival faction as it became obvious to everybody in the Society that the donor wanted the expansion project introduced in the old mosque, not in the new one.

In the Society's special account, the Treasurer had now approximately \$160,000, an amount good enough to purchase a property on sale at an apparently over inflated price. The owner of the property, a small house built in the 1950s, was the real beneficiary of the Society's recurrent factionalism. The house that was worth \$55,000 was purchased by the old mosque for \$155,000 in early 2005. Many expressed the opinion that this over inflated price was directly connected to the owner's knowledge that the mosque was going to buy his property no matter how high he raised the price.

The two mosques congregations, old and new, Noor Masjid and Khadija Islamic Center, have managed to remain united under the auspices of ISGSL through this. Factional rivalry never died away, but it did change its direction adopting a new issue during the subsequent years between 2005 and 2007.

### **Attack on the Imam That Tore the Society Apart**

The new direction of factional chaos involved the Imam of the new mosque. Although he did not clearly belong to any faction, out of two subgroups within the new mosque elites, one subgroup was by default on his side, mainly because the other subgroup was against him. He was appointed as Imam in August 1999. His first 6 years of service passed without any major problem, but in the 7<sup>th</sup> year difficulties began to arise.

The Imam's power was based on his knowledge of Islam in American society and culture and his ability to communicate with people of many language bases: English, Arabic, Urdu and other language groups of the Indian subcontinent. While he was born and educated in America, he also received Islamic education from institutions of Islamic higher learning in England and Pakistan. He was young, motivated and capable of relating with the elderly, young and people across cultures.

Members of the Society, especially those worshipers who frequent the mosque regularly, were not happy with what they observed in the behaviors of the political leaders of the Society, especially because of their power politics and their involvement in internal rivalry. People were more comfortable looking up to the Imam who was seen as

the real leader, both spiritually and socially, because the Imam is usually knowledgeable and morally upright.

As observed, one of the leaders often made negative comments about the Imam, especially for his growing public role. He commented that the Imam should not be allowed exposure to the media because his job is spiritual, leading the prayers and providing religious guidance to the members of the Society through the Friday sermons and as approached.<sup>40</sup> The media and other outreach activities should be kept within the Executive Committee, meaning the President of the Executive Committee and the Chairman of Board of Directors. On one hand the Imam was becoming popular and, on other hand, the antiImam rivalry within the dominant faction was becoming intense. It became worst when the Imam began to criticize some of the leaders publicly for their financial and “organizational mismanagement” (Jessica Ravitz, *The Salt Lake Tribune*, July 9, 2007), some of which was found to be unsubstantiated.

### **The Life of the Imam at Home**

Reportedly, the Imam did not have a successful family life with any of the three wives he married, one after divorcing the other. This is quite unusual and rare as far as a religious leader or imam is concerned. By the time he turned 27 years of age he was already divorced two times. Each of those divorces was quite painful. The third divorce happened at age 35.

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<sup>40</sup> There are some constitutional grounds on such observation, because the constitution does give the EC the sole authority on the media and public statements. However, the constitution is also silent about the role of an Imam, especially when the Imam is fully capable of communication on behalf of the Society and knowledgeable both in Islamic religion and American culture, especially when there is so much demand internally and externally to learn about Islam and Muslims from an authoritative figure. The Imam indeed became an authoritative figure in the Society.

On January 2, 2007, the Imam allegedly punched his wife on her face, kicked on her back in front of their 6-year-old child and pushed her against the refrigerator. The Imam confessed to these charges. The wife also filed other charges that involved throwing a knife at her and threatening to kill her. The Imam rejected these charges as falsified with the help of his rivals. The Imam stated:

His wife, ... filed a police report on Jan. 13, claiming that 11 days earlier her husband kicked her, slammed her head into a refrigerator and the next day threatened her life. But ... complaint says his wife, who speaks Urdu and not English, was pressured to file charges, had translators who trumped-up her words and against her wishes was kept away from her husband. (Jessica Ravitz, *The Salt Lake Tribune*, July 9, 2007)

A plea bargain occurred because “the wife's 11 day delay in reporting the attacks to police created a potential "evidentiary problem," which prompted prosecutors to resolve the case as they did” (Stephen Hunt, *The Salt Lake Tribune*, April 19, 2007).

Although a soft spoken and quiet person, the Imam at times became uncontrollably angry, especially when frustrations accumulated. His rival group grabbed the opportunity of his family incident, used it fiercely to fire him, to take his wife and family away from him, to drive him out of the city, to file criminal charges against him and finally to have him arrested and jailed (Jason Bergreen, *The Salt Lake Tribune*, February 14, 2007).

The Society's management subgroup secretly got involved via their wives with Imam's wife, but details of the episode are still a secret. They revealed their involvement to the Imam on January 11,<sup>th</sup> 9 days after the incident happened on January 2, 2007.<sup>41</sup> The

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<sup>41</sup>The Imam's wife was acting quite normally during the 9 day period January 2-11, as if she did not have much grievance against her husband to the point that the Imam thought that the problem subsided. He had no clue to understand that while his wife was acting normally, while she actually was preparing for divorce and filing charges against her husband with help and guidance from his adversaries. It was easy for them to avoid the Imam while meeting his wife in his house secretly and regularly during the time when the Imam would not be home. In the language of the Imam they were following his prayer and work schedules during

Imam was shocked to learn that his life was in the hands of his powerful rival group who would not want anything less than to destroy him, his career, reputation and his spiritual life (Jessica Ravitz, *The Salt Lake Tribune*, July 9, 2007). He became confused and genuinely scared, because he knew he was at fault and on the wrong side. He knew that he could not expect a fair and just arbitration by this group to settle the problem between him and his wife. He accepted his responsibility for abusing his wife, but not the way it was portrayed by his adversaries.

The Imam's rival group pretended to be his wellwisher to save him from being arrested and jailed. As a strategy, they appointed a special envoy who would treat the Imam as if he was his true wellwisher. That person took him away from his family and kept him in his residence for 2 days until he was able to persuade the Imam to leave the town and his family behind. He eventually drove him to the airport on the morning of January 13, 2007. The Imam flew back to his hometown, Chicago, IL. This act of manipulation itself was quite strange and also may be rendered illegal, because of the acting in a double role with the defendant and the legal system. On one hand, they filed criminal charges against the Imam and, on the other, they guided and facilitated the escape of the defendant to evade the possible arrest and jail time. It is difficult to conclude, however, whether this was a good will gesture or a deliberate deception on the part of this management subgroup. As far as the Imam and his sister were concerned, this was not a goodwill gesture; it was an act of malice and vengeance. They believed the Imam was the victim of a conspiracy by his adversaries in management who used the

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which time he would not be home: "Hiding behind a skirt. Hiding behind a skirt. Hiding behind a skirt," said the Imam (Jason Bergreen, *The Salt Lake Tribune*, February 6, 2007).

incidence of his domestic violence to indulge in their vested conspiracy against the Imam “because they were out to get him” (*Salt Lake Tribune*, July 9, 2007).

The Imam, however, did not leave the country giving his adversaries a free reign to manipulate the stakeholders of the Society any further. He returned within weeks to face the reality of legal consequence prepared by his adversaries with some hope of cooperation from them in resolving the problem with his wife and to enjoy the sympathies already demonstrated by his supporters in the Society. Upon his return the situation began to deteriorate.

What is interesting to note here is that the entire community was shocked to learn what happened in the Imam’s family. They, however, passed over it quickly because it was felt that family matters are private and things happen out of frustration and states of emotional distress between husband and wife. People, on the other hand, became much more shocked, even enraged at the Society’s management subgroup for punishing the Imam maliciously and disproportionately. People quickly suspected the Society’s management’s motives in punishing the Imam because of the management’s history of power politics which in their last conflict with the old mosque subgroup almost took the Society to the verge of splitting.

They played down the incident of Imam’s family problem. They instead vehemently protested against the management subgroup’s wrong doings with regard the Imam and his family. The subgroup virtually confiscated the wife and the children and kept them isolated from the Imam and rest of the community so that the wife could not be persuaded to change her mind against her husband. Neither did they make any effort to

mediate nor did they allow anybody to make any effort to do so. One of the subgroup associates had this response to the charges advanced by the pro-Imam surge:

I have no desire in interfering in anyone's personal problems. Yet, when someone comes to me for help I cannot turn my shoulder. You may have been taught that beating your wife physically and mentally abusing her is normal, but it is not. (email, 2/8/2007)

The cause of helping a helpless victim in effect became the act of wrongdoing in the eyes of opposition faction that included the incumbent President of the Society, the Imam's supporters and many neutral members of the Society.

The anti-Imam management subgroup was overwhelmed by the pressure through emails, as well as in the General Body meeting held on March 3, 2007, although the group did not give in to the pressure. No pressure and no other means were able to stop the rival management faction from their actions against the Imam. The lawsuit that was filed by the Imam on Friday, July 6, 2007 was eventually tossed out by the court. However in the court of public opinion, the anti-Imam subgroup remained unforgivable; hence, an alternative plan to secede from the Society was in place. In the end, the Society's anti-Imam management group lost the war, with the emergence of a new factional mosque, Utah Islamic Center by the pro-Imam group by June 2007.

People were extremely disappointed by the fact that in the pretext of helping a victim of domestic violence, the factions involved in in-group and out-group rivalry eventually destroyed a family and the unity of the growing Muslim Society without any remorse.

## **Diversity of Factionalism in the Wake of the Crisis**

The incumbent President (N.A.) represented a small and politically powerless faction, in-group, within the mainstream Society's new mosque, Khadija Islamic Center, as opposed to the other out-group, which was powerful but less popular partly because of the innateness of their power politics and manipulation of the Society's leadership. Because of his personal independence and good relationship with the in-group faction, especially the President of the Executive Committee, the Imam became an easy target of the out-group, the management subgroup with its power politics. The strike on the Imam was so harsh that it touched almost all members of the Society, especially those who would otherwise care less about what was going on between factions because they adjusted to the presence of factional strife over the last years.

The populous response to the factional attack this time was different from the usual reactions because people were quite deeply involved with the Imam through the congregational worship and learning about Islam. General members always looked up to Imam with spiritual gratitude and profound respect for his leadership style. Therefore, the person and symbolism of Imam meant a lot to them. When they learned about the family incident of the Imam, they were quite disappointed without exception. They probably would not mind if the group had dealt with the matter objectively and professionally. Unfortunately, these two main principles were missing in the actions of the rival management subgroup.

This intense and aggressive factional conflict was chaotic, disruptive and destructive. This schismatic factionalism contributed only to the emergence and proliferation of a pervasive factionalism from which emanated new factional groupings.

## **The Development of Factionalism in a Time of Crisis**

The Society, divided by one dominant and the other dominated factions, witnessed the rise of numerous other value factions in the wake of factional rivalry: First, those who supported the action of the management subgroup against the Imam. Second, those who did not support and questioned the intent of the management subgroup and its manner of dealing with the Imam's family issue. Third, those who remained neutral, yet actively pursued a peace process. Fourth, those who remained neutral and refused to support or oppose any of the rival groups, the Imam and his adversaries, because in the past they jointly acted together against them, especially during the conflict between the new and old mosque. Fifth, those who had personal grievance against the Imam, yet rejected the actions of the subgroup as malicious and vengeful. Sixth, an individual recognized as knowledgeable in Islamic text who took a position to support the management subgroup on grounds of Islamic principles of peace and cooperation with the authority, without realizing that the authority was only the management subgroup representing only a part of the actual authority.

## **Petition Against the Dominant Subgroup**

Following the announcement of firing the Imam on January 19, 2007 the community began to experience numerous kinds of reactions through their emails and websites. The management subgroup was on the defensive, but rigid. The pro-Imam campaign, on the other hand, was getting louder. As the Society became divided, the online mudslinging, albeit hiding behind the internet system, revealed via email exchanges the diversity of positions the members took in the process.

The pro-Imam subgroup initiated the venture asking the recipients, if they wanted to keep the Society united, to join the online petition demanding the management subgroup resign due to their actions which had caused tremendous chaos in the Society.

We want to avoid any further misunderstandings, distrust and *fitnah* [chaos] by asking that all brothers involved in the decision-making process to fire Imam . . . , resign immediately. . . . It is simply for the better of the Islamic Society in the Salt Lake City area to put an end to the *fitnah*. (petition, retrieved on May 22, 2010)

Although the language of the petition seemed polite, the underlying message was clear that they were not going to tolerate the continuous justification of their action that was resulting in the creation of unrest and mistrust in the Society.

Besides the petition, they also formed an online organization called “Utah Muslims for Imam . . . [K.S.D]”. Through this organization they established a discourse between them and the management subgroup. The group clearly indicated that if the individuals involved in the Imam-firing subgroup did not resign the community would break away from the Society’s mosque.

We want to reunite the community but only respectable, trustworthy leaders will be accepted. Otherwise, people will drop away, stop donating and form their own masjids. . . . This is about the "leadership" or lack thereof. We cannot trust our leaders who do not follow our religion and our own constitution. We simply want to ask them to politely and quietly resign. (email, retrieved on 2/3/2007)

It became a campaign and counter campaign with continuous mudslinging from January 25 to March 12, 2007 until the week after the failed General Body meeting on March 3, 2007.

The rhetoric of the management subgroup in responding to the anonymous emails stated that they were not going to resign under any circumstance. Some of their internal communications reflected a view that put the blame on the Imam for trying to recruit

supporters from the members of the Society, while they were trying to keep the community united. The President elect who later became the incumbent President of Executive Committee (T.N.) talked about keeping the community united. He stated:

My goal as President is to do my best to keep our Society united by observing and practicing the teachings of our faith. One of those teachings is to keep hidden the shortcomings of a Muslim. We have been doing so to the best of our ability. (email, retrieved on 2/8/2007)

He obviously was out of touch about the reality of the stakes involved in the conflict. The community had become sharply divided over the allegation of wrong doing, the perceived uncompromising attitude with the Imam and the total disregard of the public uproar which eventually led the Society into clear chaos. As he talked about keeping the community united, the situation went out of control.

Amid the smear campaign and threat to divide the Society, there emerged a group in the middle ground, who made some effort to meet both parties and convince them to talk each other and negotiate. One member sent the following email urging people on both sides toward patience and understanding.

I strongly believe that, if both sides are sincere in their attitude (and I believe that they are), then the issues can be resolved amicably [between] both groups. ...[W]e do not have an alternative. When legal action is involved, everybody loses and the community will be further divided. This is a big problem for all of us. Please give us little time and see if we can resolve this conflict. (email, retrieved on 2/28/2007)

Taking the affairs of the Society by its elite factions into to the attention of the legal system was quite unexpected and shameful to the community, but neither party was able to listen to his cry.

People continued to give their suggestions as to how the management subgroup could be stopped amicably from taking further actions against the Imam, especially after they had him arrested and jailed for one night. One such email stated:

Imam's lawyer or anybody else, for that matter, should try to contact Imam's wife in order to understand, first-hand, of her actual position and attitudes to find out if she would like to drop the charges against the Imam, if not as her husband, at least, as the father of her children.

This suggestion is the reflection of a desperate feeling from the neutral faction of the Society to end the embarrassment from further occurring and came after the failure of a number of attempts to persuade the wife of the Imam to drop charges against her husband, but with no success.

While nothing positive was happening, a new approach emerged in an email link that was to give the dissenters an Islamic jurisprudential perspective of the conflict concerning the divorce issue. That perspective suggested if the Imam had already divorced the wife then what is the point of trying to reunite them? The email states:

I am not in favor of *fitnah* [disorder]. There has been a *Fatwa* [edict] sent through a BOT member's office stating the situation and Br. ... (a member of BOT) looked and approved the contents of the *fatwa* and added what he wanted and has been faxed to *shariah* [code of Islamic law] board in Chicago of the Hanafi school of thought. I am pretty sure that they will respond. So, I advise everyone to stay out of the *fitnah* and ignore any email if it was sent to the people.

Some found no relevance between the issue of Imam's divorce and their demand that the subgroup resign. This, however, was another effort made by an individual to contain the uprising. However, as the factional rivalry was intense, it became irrational, immoral, illegal and unconstitutional. As such, no effort of negotiation could work.<sup>42</sup> Therefore,

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<sup>42</sup> There was some unconfirmed rumor that the Imam had already divorced his wife religiously during the time when he was allegedly abusing her between January 2 and January 11, 2007. The Imam stated this was not so. The clerical position and advice quoted here was a gesture made with an authoritarian

there was nothing, really, to reconsider on the reunification of the marriage, as it was purposely used to crush the rival Imam.

Realistically, in the given situation, the firing of the Imam was inevitable and had it been done in an objective and fair way the element of vengeance and arrogance would not have been attached to the process. However, it was personal and vengeful right from the onset because of the preexisting rivalry between the faction supportive of the Imam and the faction of the management subgroup that was in control of the Society's leadership. It was the choice of the latter faction to crush one element of the opposition group, the Imam. He was an employee and he trapped himself for them by abusing his wife who, in response, sought help and received help for revenge from her husband's opposition group. It was felt that both his wife and his rival subgroup from the Society's leadership successfully exacted that revenge on him.

From a legal, conventional and Islamic point of view, the leaders are like judges who must not misuse their positions and powers for personal or collective gain or to pursue their grudges and vengeance over others. However, leaders or elites who are involved in factional rivalry do not or cannot follow these principles, because their urges to win over the factional rivals are egotistic and very intense. Only an authority capable of taking disciplinary actions against individuals and groups involved in inappropriate activities could have controlled such urges. Unfortunately, there simply was not a system in place to discipline or control factionalism and the individual elites involved.

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overtone from a religiously knowledgeable person probably with a hope that it may contribute to the containment of the uprising of the dissenters. However, this also did not do any good. Their main position was that the Imam had actually divorced his wife religiously at the final moments of his abuse of her. To confirm that they sent the testimony of the divorce as they learned about it from the Imam himself and his wife to the religious or Sharia Board in Chicago which according to them came back positively.

Consequently the factional hostility between the Imam and the management subgroup, not to mention the alliance between the wife of this Imam and management subgroup, was allowed to flourish.

The Imam for many years acted both at home and at the mosque in violation of rules and limits that applied to him in the employee and employer relationship. The intense frustration in the rival management subgroup coincided rather unfortunately with the victimization of his wife. All the affected parties were looking for an opportunity to get back at him, to strike him as hard as possible, which they did.

The rival management subgroup also crossed the limit in taking revenge against him. They failed to realize the potential repercussions of their aggression on the Imam. The Imam was not as helpless as a normal employee, as they might have assumed. He enjoyed support from a faction of the elites which included the incumbent President himself. He also enjoyed support from a huge number of bystanders and neutral minded worshipers, especially after they learned that the subgroup transgressed the limit in punishing the Imam for his mistake at home and disgraced the entire community in the process by aggressively pursuing their vengeance. They became outraged about the wrongful punishment of their Imam by the subgroup who were well known for their power politics in the Society. This time around, they went too far too quickly for the members to accept their actions.

The resultant outcome of this factional rivalry and crushing attack on the rival Imam cost the Society dearly. It lost its geographical and demographical claim of greater Salt Lake limiting its domain to the old and new mosques, while three other new and independent mosques were established within a year or so. Out of the two mosques, Utah

Islamic Center and the Islamic Society of Bosniaks were established within 2 months of this factional conflict, the former in June and the latter in March 2007. Within a few months time the Somali community established their ethnic mosque, Al-Huda Mosque.

The ethnic Bosnian Muslims found it difficult to adjust with Muslims from non-European cultural background. The Somalis found it difficult to work with the current leadership, the same faction that had conflict with the Imam. They asked for a place where they could hold an Islamic education program for their children independently. According to the mosque leadership, the ISGSL turned down their request for a space and asked them to send their children to the regular Islamic school with other children, which was exactly what they were trying to avoid. Finally, they decided to establish an independent mosque and children's school system on their own. Soon they began to rent places for Islamic school and eventually, within several months, in September 2008, they purchased a facility to create a mosque and school for their children, separating from the mainstream Society under the dominance of management subgroup. There are now in the Greater Salt Lake Valley mosques of factional, ethnic and mainstream Muslim communities, beside the sectarian mosque of Al-Rasul Islamic center.

Early Muslim immigrants to the United States faced unique challenges of cultural and religious isolation as they entered the American immigration experience. As Muslims from diverse sects and cultures immigrated to the United States in increasing numbers after the expansion of the immigration laws they banded together and created uniquely American mosque congregations which mirrored the American experience of assimilation and diversity. As the process of assimilation in the American culture became more stable Muslim Americans in the Greater Salt Lake Valley began to integrate both

the strengths and prejudices of their unique cultural and religious heritages. This and the inevitable individual human need for power and control caused the growth of factionalism. In the Greater Salt Lake Valley the unique experience of the American mosque with its intra-Muslim assimilation and diversity has been challenged if not sacrificed.

## CONCLUSIONS

In summary using qualitative ethnographic research and grounded theory analysis this study has demonstrated the effects of American law and American cultural self identity on the adaptation and assimilation of Muslim immigrant populations in the Salt Lake Valley of Utah. The Immigration Act of 1965, the law of October 9, 1981 and the ongoing development in the 20<sup>th</sup> century of theories of cultural pluralism have deeply altered the American immigrant experience.

In Part One the study explored the experience of early Muslim immigrants, the Kader family, a Palestinian Muslim family who settled in Provo, a city at the southern end of the Salt Lake Valley. There were a total of four units of the same family who came, one following the other and living there for decades. Out them one died of cancer (1944-1955), one settled there permanently and other two moved out of the city and lived in Chicago for few years until they finally went back to their home country in Jerusalem (1915-1946 & 1925-1947). This study examined the experience of three units of the same Kader family and synthesized the motivating factors for one unit to settle in Provo permanently, assimilate, Mormonize and Americanize, while the others failed to assimilate into the mainstream society and returned to their homelands desiring to maintain their Muslim identity. The American society was not yet ready to accommodate

cultural pluralism and the immigrant's strongly held aspiration for the dual identity of Muslim American.

I hope to be clear that the pursuit of American dream for a Muslim individual and family was indeed a threat to the loss of their original identity, particularly in the pre-1965 era. As such, many Muslims refused to come to America at that time as demonstrated by Elkholy in 1966. Those who came, as a result of deep held aspiration to pursue American dream, either fully assimilated or at best they kept their Islamic identity with hardship but their children were fully Americanized by changing their names, religion and behaviors. They did all these only to be accepted by the mainstream culture. There were others as well, may be small in number, who held deep conviction for their Islamic identity side by side the American dream, who could not pursue their aspiration. Thus, they left the land of opportunities to go back to their homelands and salvage their original identity only, instead of shooting for what was impossible in the uniculture of American's melting pot - the Muslim-American identity.

There were those who tried their best to achieve that dual identity like Darwish and Ismael, but in the end they opted to salvage their Islamic heritage. Coincidentally, however, most of their children later came back to America as adult learners. They came and stayed. They did not have to go back for fear of identity loss like their parents did, because by their time American cultural attitudes and perspectives had already changed to accommodate other cultures and religions in the spirit of multiculturalism.

They were also inspired by the rapid growth of Muslim communities in almost all major cities in the country made possible by the Immigration Act of 1965's abolishment of the immigrant quota system. They were encouraged by the development of Muslim

organizations designed to construct and preserve their Muslim American identities and which were made possible by the law of Oct 9, 1981 establishment of the legal right of foreigners to create such organizations. Among those organizations are The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), The Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) and the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR). They began to feel secure and strong, as their parents never did, in maintaining their own culture and faith.

The experience of the Kader family in America exemplifies this history. The children and grandchildren of Moses and Ayesha Kader are now fully Americanized. Most of them have relinquished their original Islamic faith and now self identify as Mormon, Catholic, or Evangelical Christian. On the other hand, the children and grandchildren of Darwish and Ismael Kader who returned to their homeland are also living in America now but as active Muslim Americans scattered in different cities of America such as Atlanta, Georgia and Tampa, Florida. Even their names reflect the different Americanization processes. The fully assimilated family of Moses Kader, acculturated in the time of the melting pot's uniculture, bears the Americanized family name, Kader. Those children and grandchildren of Darwich and Ismael Kader immigrating to America after 1965 bear the pure version of the same family name which has not been Americanized - Abukhdair.

In Part Two, the study examined the post-1965 phenomenon of Muslim American identity resulting from the influx of new immigrant Muslims on one hand and the internal changes of American immigration law as well as American cultural redefinition. America opened the door to new and broader groups of immigrants including Muslims in 1965. This was followed by another policy change in 1981 allowing foreigners to form their

own cultural, religious and ethnic organizations. This last cultural policy change in America enabled the “new immigrant Muslims” to form their religious organizations including mosque congregations in the Salt Lake Valley area. Thus, the Islamic Society of Salt Lake City was born in 1981 followed by the birth of the first mosque in the region in 1985.

This new horizon of Muslim American identity also opened its door within the Muslim community to a spirit of unity and solidarity that lasted throughout the entire period of initial development when the size of the community was small and too weak to face the challenges of culture conflict with vigor and determination. These new Muslim immigrants were still learning about their surroundings. Later on, as the size of the community grew larger and stronger demographically and culturally they began experiencing the rise of group interests within the community to the extent of in-group and out-group politics and conflict. This led to the emergence of diversity within the community and gave birth to a number of pluralistic subsocieties in the Valley area.

That emergence of pluralism within Muslim society occurred on the ruin of the unity and solidarity of the initial years of its history, almost a mirror of the host country which had itself just moved from cultural unity in the spirit of melting pot to cultural diversity in the spirit of pluralism. As a result, the original organization, the Islamic Society of Salt Lake City, which later on in 1997 changed to Islamic Society of Greater Salt Lake, lost its position of unified leadership and four satellite or subsocieties came into existence. Apparently, no longer motivated by a sense of external threat that formerly united them, they developed many agendas and concerns that disunited them. The research found those agendas to be of sectarian, ethnic and factional significance.

They appear to keep the Muslim community in the Valley area, like other places in the country, engaged in internal rivalries which may continue for quite some time until they decide it is to their benefit to consolidate their positions in the community internally and externally.

Four different aspects of Muslim adaptation and assimilation experiences have been examined throughout the chapters of the dissertation. In the first aspect preserving Muslim identity simultaneously with the American identity was difficult to achieve and often led to failure. As a result during those years of pre-1965 America it was difficult to form Muslim mosque congregations because those few immigrant Muslims soon changed through the Americanization process of complete assimilation instead of preserving their original Muslim identity. And, those others who were not prepared to sacrifice their original Muslim identities in favor of American dream and identity could not fit in or assimilate and eventually went back to their home countries to resettle there.

The second aspect of Muslim immigrant experience concerned the environmental circumstances in the post-1965 America followed by subsequent policy changes according to which the ban that was placed in 1939 from forming organizations by foreigners was lifted in 1981. Like other immigrant communities, Muslims benefitted from these policy changes. They were able to form religious organizations, build mosques and weekend schools in America that their predecessors of pre-1965 era were not able to do. Muslims formed their congregations, made structural changes in them to better adapt to their new home and became Americanized without necessarily losing their own identities and honors.

The third aspect developed concerns the challenge of adaptation incurred by the rapid demographic growth within the community resulting from the influx of refugees and the emerging reality of internal sectarian, factional and ethnic conflicts after years of unity. In the difficult early days of Muslim identity preservation of the two sects, Shias and Sunnis, held together. Now historical factors influenced by rapid growth led to their falling apart.

The fourth aspect of Muslim American identity experience involved the actual dynamics of internal conflicts along the line of factional rivalries and ethnic differences. While ethnic differences were found to be less of an issue for hatred and hostility, the factional rivalries eventually, led Muslims to engage in divisive conflicts that split them permanently. The factors that led the community subgroups from the elites into factional rivalry eventually gave birth to the factional mosque congregation of Utah Islamic Center. Inspired from this experience, emerged almost subsequently the ethnic congregations of the Islamic Society of Bosniaks, the Al-Huda Mosque of Somalis, beside the Shia sectarian mosque of Al-Rasul Islamic Center leaving the original mosque, that once represented all Muslim people, standing as if deserted.

By using a qualitative ethnographic research method and grounded theory approach the data produced a theory regarding the crisis of immigrant Muslim identity development at the time of the American melting pot uniculture. It has also generated a theory, which suggests that Muslims were able to construct their dual identity in America at the time when the cultural notion of America changed to diversity and pluralism in the post-1965 era.

This study's data also produced a theory that suggests that the internal relationships of unity and solidarity within the Muslim community existed as long as they remained an insignificant minority community within the larger community. When they became a large and significant minority community in the region, no longer afraid about selective assimilation and identity management, they soon lost their original unity and solidarity. They found themselves fully energized to pursue their group interests based on the original differences, the differences that they had suppressed during the difficult time of their adjustment to their new American life.

The logical outcome of this study suggests that subsequent research projects concerning adaptation and assimilation of early pre and post-1965 Muslim immigrants and their descendants in the area of identity maintenance, or the development or failure of development of dual identities as Muslim Americans, would yield significant information that would be of benefit to Muslim communities and new immigrants. These immigrant experiences are a direct result of a recently expanded American self-definition in a move from uniculture to pluralism. This is a unique opportunity to test these notions and ideas against the actuality, the reality of pluralism at work in the individual, community and national life.

The Muslim American identity is more than a hyphen. Something new happens. Unity is experienced, if only for a time, between historical foes. New models of congregation, of Islamic school and mosque are developed. The American dream is a great motivator. When a people integrate into that dream and claim it for their own, they add to the national depth the richness of their culture and wisdom, its vitality and vision. If America is written in the stories of its immigrant peoples as Gordon suggests, then the

lives, dreams, values and struggles of these Muslim individuals, families and communities are significant. These experiences of the students at the University of Utah, the members of the original Islamic Society, the new immigrant refugees and the Kader family, these interwoven stories of 95 years of Muslim immigration in Utah, are important to American history and are part of America's ongoing vitality.

## APPENDIX

### BIOGRAPHY OF COMMUNITY MEMBERS INTERVIEWED

The following brief biographies are of the individual members of the Muslim community whom I interviewed for my research.

#### **1. Tariq Kergaye**

Tariq Kergaye is from Northern Iraq known as Kurdistan. He is a Sunni Muslim by origin. He is one of the senior members of Muslim Community in the Valley area. He came to the United States in September 1958 as student and graduated as an engineer from Utah State University in Logan in 1962. Upon finishing his education, Mr. Kergaye moved to Salt Lake City in 1962. Since then he has lived here in the East Valley area. He is married to an Utahan and has four children, three sons and one daughter. His wife, Sandra Kergaye, was not Muslim at the time of their marriage. A few years after the marriage, she converted to Islam. Not only has Mr. Kergaye's family life been very cordial and never had problem, his relationship with his in-laws has also been excellent. Mr. Kergaye commands respect especially for his successful upbringing of his children as Muslims.

#### **2. Khosrow B. Semnani**

Khosrow Semnani, an Iranian Shia by origin, came to Salt Lake City as an undergraduate student at Westminster College in 1972. He left Iran for England in 1966 and studied there for 2 years. Then he left England for Montreal, Canada and finally arrived in Salt Lake City. Consequently, he finished his double BS in Physics and Chemistry from the Westminster College in 1975 and Master's Degree from the University of Utah in 1977. He then began working for a company called Kennecott Utah Copper. In less than a decade he became the founder and owner of a chemical cleaning industry, Envirocare, which soon became a big industry worth over half a billion dollars. He is one of the main donors in the community and well known for his generous donation of \$2 million towards the cost of building the second mosque called Khadija Islamic Center in 1997.

#### **3. Amanullah Kudiya**

Amanullah Kudiya, a Pakistani Sunni, came to the US in 1977. He is a certified accountant. He came straight to Salt Lake City and since then he has been here and working for the

State of Utah. His main contribution to the community has been his service as the internal auditor of the Society.

#### **4. Mohammad Basha**

Mohammad Basha is an Indian Sunni Muslim by birth. He came to Salt Lake City as graduate student in 1970 when there were very few Muslim families in the city. He has been working for the State of Utah since he graduated in 1972.

#### **5. Mohammad Ashraf Raza**

Mohammad Ashraf Raza, a Pakistani Sunni, came to Salt Lake City in 1975. He holds a Master's degree in geology. The Department of Utah Geological Survey brought him here. He was a geologist for 2 years. Then he resigned from this position and got into business. He held a senior position in the department. He worked in Pakistan as a geologist for 8 years.

#### **6. Ghulam Husain Patel**

Ghulam Patel is originally from Pakistan. He is a mechanical engineer. He came to Salt Lake City in February 1980. Since his arrival, Mr. Patel was actively involved with community activities. His main contributions, besides serving the Society in various capacities such as president, chair of BOD and BOT, include pioneering the weekend Islamic school and serving in the capacity of Principal for about 13 years until he retired from the position. He has also served since he came to this community as the custodian of Muslim burial service. He has also been serving as a member of an interfaith organization in the Valley.

#### **7. Nadeem Ahmad**

Nadeem Ahmad is a Pakistani by birth. He came to the United States in 1977 and lived in different states from California to Idaho, to New Jersey, to New York and finally to Utah in 1984. He served as the President of the Executive Committee of the Islamic Society of Salt Lake City / Islamic Society of Greater Salt Lake and in other capacities several times.

#### **8. Mohammad Omar Mollakhail**

Mohammad Omar Mollakhail is from Afghanistan. He came to the United States, particularly to Utah, in 1973 as a student. He studied in and graduated from BYU in Provo, Utah. Ever since he has been living in Salt Lake City.

#### **9. Dr. Fazal Mohammad**

Dr. Fazal Mohammad, originally from India, came to the United States as a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of North Carolina in 1972 and then to University of Utah as Assistant Professor of Pathology in 1979. Since then he has been an active member of the Muslim community in Salt Lake City and served the community as an educator and Friday service leader.

### **10. Mahmud Isa**

Mahmud Abdur Rahim Isa is originally from Palestine. He came to the US in 1979 to pursue his undergraduate studies at Snow College in Ephraim, Utah. He then moved to Utah State University to complete his degree in medical technology. Upon finishing his degree he secured a job at the University of Utah and moved to Salt Lake City in 1983. Ever since he has lived here.

### **11. Mohammad Hussain**

Mohammad Hussain, an Iranian Shia, came to Salt Lake City in the 1970s to pursue his higher studies in engineering at the University of Utah. Upon finishing the degree he decided to settle in Salt Lake City. He is working as adjunct faculty at the Salt Lake Community College, Redwood Campus. He also has couple of small businesses in the Valley area.

### **12. Dr. Reaz A. Chaudhuri**

Reaz A. Chaudhuri is originally from India. He came to Salt Lake at the end of 1983. He teaches as Associate Professor of Engineering at the University of Utah. He did his Ph.D. at UCLA. Since his arrival in the community, Dr. Chaudhuri has been actively involved in the mosque and community activities including serving in the capacity of President of the Executive Committee and chair of the Board of Directors.

### **13. Said Murtazawi**

Said Murtazawi is an Iranian Shia by birth. He lived in Salt Lake City as a graduate student in mechanical Engineering for 8 years from 1990 to 1998. He is one of the Shia Muslims who goes to Sunni mosque on Friday to participate in the service along with the Sunnis.

### **14. Mohammad Ali**

Mohammad Ali is a Somali refugee. He came to Salt Lake City in December 1997 and has lived here ever since. He is a university graduate from Somalia.

### **15. Othman Ahmad**

Othman Ahmad is also a Somali refugee who moved to the Salt Lake City in 1995. First he lived in Logan then moved to Salt Lake City. He was born in Mogadishu in 1961 July 10 and grew up in the Mogadishu area. He did his elementary and high school studies in the Mogadishu area. He went to Somali National University in 1982 and graduated in January 1987. Then, the Government in the Ministry of National Planning and Jubgali automatically employed him where he was working in social structure as a Junior Officer until he left the country in the middle of civil war in the mid-1990s.

### **16. Murtaza**

Murtaza, an Iranian by birth, came to the United States 14 years ago in 1984 to study. He received his BS degree from the University of California. He lived in California for 2 years and worked as an engineer. He came to the University of Utah in 1984 to pursue his Master's degree leading to Ph.D. studies, which he decided not to continue after 2 years as he received a job.

**17. Jamal Barakat**

Jamal Barakat is an Iraqi by birth, but he also lived in Iran an almost equal amount of time prior to his arrival to the United States in 1986 to pursue graduate studies at the U of U. Now he works as a counselor as well as a therapist in a mental hospital in Salt Lake City. He maintains almost an equal amount of contact with both the Arab and Iranian community.

**18. Masudul Hassan**

Masudul Hassan, a Pakistani Sunni Muslim, came to Salt Lake City in 1985. He works as a medical technician at the LDS Hospital. He has been involved in community leadership and served in various capacities including president, vice president, member of the Board of Directors. He also served as chairman and member of the Board of Trustees for several terms.

**19. Dr. A.H.M. Abdul Qadir**

Dr. A.H.M. Abdul Qadir, a Bangladeshi Sunni scholar, came to Salt Lake City to pursue his graduate studies at the University of Utah in 1988. His religious educational background and past experience contributed to his becoming the first Imam of the community at the Noor Mosque of 700 East 740 South in 1990 and he served in this capacity until he left for another state in 1998.

**20. Aga Shujat Ali**

He is a Pakistani Sunni, came to the United State in 1987. He worked in Pakistan as senior broadcasting engineer. Then he lived in Nigeria for 8 years before finally coming to America. Presently he is running an Indo Pakistani grocery store, Eastern Grocery store, at 3500 South Redwood Road that supplies especially indigenous groceries for the people of South Asia. The Store carries Middle Eastern, Indian and Pakistani grocery items. He is married with 4 kids: one boy and three girls. All his life here for over 15 years he lived in Kaysville.

**21. Dr. Shah Khan**

Dr. Shah Khan, a Pakistani Sunni Muslim, came to the United States in 1969. He was sponsored by Pakistani Government to pursue his higher studies in civil engineering under the scholarship called Central overseas training scholarship, to study at Utah State University, Logan, Utah. He finished his MS degree in civil engineering in 1972 and Ph.D. in 1975. He is retired and living with his family in Birmingham, Alabama.

**22. Syed Khalid Qadri**

Mr. Qadri came to Salt Lake City in 1981. At that time, there were few Muslim families. Like other pioneers, he also served one term as the President of the Executive Committee of the Community in the late 1980s.

**23. Noor Ahmad**

Mr. Noor Ahmad, a Pakistani Sunni Muslim, came to the United States and settled in the Salt Lake City in 1982. He was retired military personnel in Pakistan prior to migrating to the United States. He is one of the unprofessional Muslims, yet a very active and influential member of the Society.

**24. Amir Turkanovic**

Amir Turkanovic is from Bosnia. He migrated to the United States as a refugee in 1995 following the civil war of 1992-1995, the war of ethnic cleansing launched by the Serbian authority in order to wipe out Muslims from Bosnia. Amir Turkanovic was in the Yugoslavian army prior to the civil war of 1990s at the age of 18-19. He is now working for a company. He is married and has one child.

**25. Dr. Sheikh Safiullah**

Came to Salt Lake city in December 1985 as a graduate student to pursue his Ph.D. degree at the Middle East Center specializing in the Modern Middle Eastern History. He is Bangladeshi by birth and was educated in Bangladesh, Libya, Canada and the United States. He works full time as a Librarian in the Salt Lake Public Library system and teaches world history and Islamic history as an adjunct Assistant Professor of History in the Department History, University of Utah. His wife, Shaheen Safiullah, earned her Master's degree in public health from the University of Utah in 1992 and ever since has worked for the OSHA, State of Utah, as an Industrial Hygienist. Dr. Safiullah has 3 children, 2 sons (19 and 11) and one daughter. She is 14.

**Kader and Abukhdair Family** (Besides the above individuals, I have also interviewed the following members of the Kader/Abukhdair families.)

1. Jamila/Jean Kader Hyer (house wife)
2. Eric Hyer (husband of Jamila)
3. Jihad Hyer (Jean and Eric's only son)
4. Omar Moses Kader
5. Ghazi Moses Kader
6. Ayub Moses Kader
7. Dean Moses Kader
8. Fahmi Ismael AbuKhdair
9. Najah Abukhdair (wife of Fahmi Abukhdair)
10. Hisham Fahmi Abukhdair (Fahmi and Najah's son)
11. Nadia Fahmi Abukhdair (Fahmi and Najah's daughter)
12. Zaki Maryam Abukhdair (Maryam Darwish Abukhdair's son)
13. Kefa Fahmi Abukhdair (Fahmi and Naja's daughter).

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