CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN TURKEY: THE CHANGING PATTERNS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN PROTEST, 1945-2007

by

Masaki Kakizaki

A dissertation submitted to the faculty of
The University of Utah
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

The University of Utah

August 2015

The University of Utah Graduate School

STATEMENT OF DISSERTATION APPROVAL

The dissertation of **Masaki Kakizaki**

has been approved by the following supervisory committee members:

M. Hakan Yavuz	, Chair	**12/11/2014** Date Approved
Howard Lehman	, Member	**12/11/2014** Date Approved
Yanqi Tong	, Member	**12/11/2014** Date Approved
Samuel Handlin	, Member	**12/11/2014** Date Approved
Wesley Makoto Sasaki-Uemura	, Member	**12/11/2014** Date Approved

and by **Mark Button** , Chair/Dean of

the Department/College/School of **Political Science**

and by David B. Kieda, Dean of The Graduate School.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation analyzes popular participation in contentious politics such as protests, demonstrations, and other forms of disruptive actions in Turkey. It seeks to explain how and when the patterns of popular engagement in protest have changed during the last six decades by quantitatively and systematically examining various data on protest events in the public space.

This dissertation seeks to answer the following three central questions. First, how have the patterns of protest participation evolved over time in Turkey? Second, is Turkey moving toward a "social movement society" in which protest becomes a conventional mode of politics? Third, how do age-related variables including life cycle, political generation, and period affect individuals' propensity to join protest?

To answer these questions, I used a variety of data. The first source is the information compiled in the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* that presents a set of cross-national aggregate data of protest events and state control in the world. The second source is my original data set that covers more than 1,000 protest events through the coding of a Turkish national newspaper, *Cumhuriyet*. Third, I used the Turkish components of the World Values Survey that were carried out in 1990, 1998, 2001, and 2007.

Analyzing the interactions between protest participation and political and socio-economic factors in Turkey, this dissertation argues that we should integrate protest behavior and state control into an interactional framework. I demonstrate that the rise and fall of protest politics between the late 1940s and the late 1970s was significantly affected by the state's ability to sanction political dissidents. It also quantitatively presents the change and continuity of protest participation in the post-1980 military coup period.

At the individual level, this dissertation finds that protest is not diffusing to various sectors of the population. Furthermore, it shows that protest potential among Turkish citizens is influenced by lifecycle and period effects rather than a generational effect.

Dedicated to My Family

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation could not have been written without the friendship and encouragement of Professor M. Hakan Yavuz, the chair of my dissertation committee. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Yavuz.

I also would like to thank other committee members: Howard P. Lehman, Yanqi Tong, Samuel Handlin, and Wesley Makoto Sasaki-Uemura for their patience and careful reading of my dissertation. I really enjoyed my oral defense with all of you.

I express my appreciation to Mary Ann Underwood, the Graduate Program Coordinator, for her wonderful support since the very first day of my life in the Department of Political Science.

In Japan, I would like to thank Professor Tadaaki Takasugi and Professor Masami Arai for their support. Without their help, I would not have come this far and my future would be very different.

Many thanks are due to my friends in Utah who spent a great amount of time together in cafes, brew pubs, and libraries: Serhun Al, Huzeyfe Alkan, Douglas Byrd, Hakan Erdagöz, Şaban Kardaş, Akiko Kurata, Ramazan Hakkı Öztan, and Ali Tekkoyun.

When I was finishing this dissertation, Kaori, my wife, successfuly gave birth to our beautiful baby girl, Mika. I dedicate this dissertation to them.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 General Problems

Citizens can participate in politics by voting on representatives or performing contentious politics on the street in order to affect what politicians decide. While political participation through elections is a form of political action that is institutionalized and legitimized by authorities and is considered conventional political behavior in democracies, participation in contentious actions such as protests, demonstrations, and political violence often take place without considering legitimacy and legality set by the state. Examples of the unconventional form of political participation include disruptive actions such as mass demonstrations, rallies, sit-in, hunger strikes, land occupation, and violence.

This dissertation seeks to contribute to our understanding of this unconventional form of political participation by examining how ordinary citizens attempt to influence politics in contemporary Turkey. When do they join protests? What are their goals, claims, and targets of protest? How do economic and political conditions play into the interaction between the state and society? In this dissertation, I will answer these driving questions by using a variety of primary and secondary data that record and catalogue a wide variety of contentious political actions in the public sphere.

My focus on popular contentious actions is in sharp contrast with the conventional approach to Turkish politics. Politics in Turkey has been studied with elite-centric and state-centric approaches that emphasize the dominant role of the established state elites and institutionalized political actors such as the military, elected officials, and political parties.[1] The exclusive focus on elite behavior in the study of Turkish politics has been justified for two reasons. First, because it was the state that became the driving force of a series of modernization reforms since the late Ottoman period, one of the most important questions for the students of Turkish politics has been related to political ideology and culture of state elites, state power, and mechanisms of managing and regulating national politics by state officials. Second, although Turkish politics suffered from military interventions four times (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997) in the recent past, it has also enjoyed competitive multiparty politics since 1950. Being the only predominantly Muslim country with a secular parliamentary democracy in the Middle East, Turkey has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention on political parties and elections.[2]

The political landscape of modern Turkey, however, has never been dominated by political elites alone. Social movements and spontaneous popular mobilization have also

---

[1] For classical works, see for instance, Leslie L. Roos and Noralou P. Roos, *Managers of Modernization: Organizations and Elites in Turkey, 1950-1969* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Beverley, North Humberside: Eothen Press, 1985); Walter F. Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961: Aspects of Military Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1963); Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965).

[2] Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer, *Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002); Ali Çarkoğlu, "Macro Economic Determinants of Electoral Support for Incumbents in Turkey, 1950-1995," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 17, (1997); Yılmaz Esmer, "Parties and the Electorate: A Comparative Analysis of Voter Profiles of Turkish Political Parties," in *Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s*, ed. Çiğdem Bağlam et al. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995).

characterized national and local politics and pressured the authorities from below. In some instances, these movements were highly successful in mobilizing a large number of citizens and making their claims significant and visible in the public sphere. In other instances, they were intimidated and repressed by security forces. In fact, the state elites and security authority in Turkey have long recognized the power of protests, demonstrations, and political violence. Recent researchers certainly recognize social resistance and protest as important factors that affected and shaped the Turkish state formation experience during the formative years of the Turkish Republic. For instance, Hunt and Tokluoğlu reinterpret the state-building process of Turkey as interactions between state elites led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and a variety of ideological, ethnic, and religious social opposition forces. They argue that state-formation in Turkey should be understood not as a unidirectional process in which the strong state imposed its will on weak civil society but as an interactive one in which both state and society influenced one another.[3] Throughout the one-party period Atatürk and Republican elites known as Kemalist elites ruled the country on behalf of the people. Atatürk's revolution achieved the creation of a centralized and secular republican state by effectively containing and suppressing social resistance and rebellions that took place in the periphery.

Turkish politics witnessed the emergence of radical politics in the 1960s as was the case in Western societies such as the United States and France. A variety of political and socio-economic factors were responsible for the intensification of popular participation in protests, demonstrations, and political violence. The transition to multi-

[3] Ceylan Tokluoğlu, "The Impact of Resistance on the State-Building Process in Turkey," *Asian and African Studies* 9, no. 1 (2000); Alan Hunt and Ceylan Tokluoğlu, "State Formation from Below: The Turkish Case," *Social Science Journal* 39, no. 4 (2002).

party politics and political liberalization in the 1950s, and Turkey's participation in the Western alliance system prepared preconditions for the opening of political opportunities that allowed greater popular mobilization and participation in contentious politics. The 1961 Constitution, which the 1960 military intervention gave birth to, further empowered contentious citizens by granting autonomy to the universities and extending political and civil rights of individuals. In addition to these institutional rearrangements, the diffusion of leftist ideologies and the spread of ultranationalist and religious ideologies challenging the Left also contributed to the escalation of political activism.

Although Turkish politics experienced political decay three times in 1960, 1971, and 1980 in the post-WWII period, Turkish citizens were never totally intimidated by the military interventions and human rights abuses. National and local elections became institutionalized political modes of participation in Turkey. Nonelectoral political behavior such as public meetings, boycotts, petitions, demonstrations, and strikes became legitimate and indispensable forms of political participation.

Since the late 1980s, civil society in Turkey has quantitatively and qualitatively developed due to the process of democratic transition. In fact, a number of civil society associations, social movement organizations, NGOs, and other voluntary groups for a variety of purposes have flourished. Although participation in voluntary associations is generally low in Turkey, political party membership in Turkey outnumbers many of European countries.[4] Political demands delivered by civil society organizations have diversified as well.

---

[4] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Civil Society in Turkey: Continuity or Change?," in *Turkish Transformation: New Century New Challenges*, ed. Brian W. Beeley (Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 2002), 62-63.

The institutionalization of nonelectoral political activities in the Turkish civil society does not mean that the authorities similarly perceive protests and demonstrations as legitimate and democratic forms of political engagement. For many years and even today protests and demonstrations are perceived as a threat to state security rather than an ordinary mode of political participation by the authorities in Turkey.[5]

Few serious attempts have been made to empirically and systematically study the development of social movement sectors in Turkey. In particular, there is a paucity of research of one important aspect of popular participation in contentious politics: protest. Therefore, my research is aimed at filling this gap in the literature by going beyond elite politics and institutionalized political participation. This dissertation brings the actions of ordinary people back into the central focus of the study of Turkish politics.

1.2 Focus of the Study and Research Questions

Why do we need to study protest in the public space rather than other forms of political participation? There are at least three reasons why the concept of protest merits further systematic attention. First, the recent study on political dissent has found that protests are one outcome of citizens' rational calculation for achieving specifically defined goals.[6] Rucht and Ohlemarcher claim that the most important external and observable activity of contending citizens is protest that can be seen "as the outcome of a

---

[5] Ayşen Uysal, "Riot Police and Policing Protest in Turkey," in *Policing and Prisons in the Middle East*, ed. Laleh Khalili and Jillian Schwedler (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 194.

[6] William A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest*, Second ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1990).

complex internal or semi-internal process in which collective identities have to be formed, organizations and networks created and people persuaded and mobilized for action."[7] Thus, protest is a purposive mode of political action rather than an irrational or deviant one, and it is one of the most useful objects of social inquiry for those who want to understand how people actually challenge political authorities and make their voices heard in politics in a nonelectoral manner.

Second, by looking at the modes of protest activities we can understand the culture of political struggle and trace changes in political culture and the patterns of the interaction between the state and society. It is necessary to investigate what type of action forms protesters utilize against the authorities and why they change one form of action with another over time.[8] Tarrow claims that "We shall study protest—rather than changes in attitudes, ideology, or culture—because it is the major indicator of the level of mobilization to the population and the elite."[9] In other words, protest contains a great deal of information about the strength, dynamism, and potential of civil society actors.

Lastly, as numerous scholars have pointed out, protest indirectly promotes democracy rather than ruins it. Obviously the spread of protest causes instability and disrupts public order in the short run, but protest can transform state-society relations and create a new opportunity for political participation. According to Tarrow, "democracy

---

[7] Dieter Rucht and Thomas Ohlemacher, "Protest Event Data: Collection, Uses and Perspectives," in *Studying Collective Action*, ed. Mario Diani and Pon Eyerman (London: Sage, 1992), 76.

[8] Charles Tilly, *Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834* (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 1995).

[9] Sidney Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder : Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965-1975* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 9.

expands, not because elites concede reform or repress dissent, but because of the insistent expansion of participation that occurs with cycles of protest."[10] Similarly, Foweraker and Landman demonstrate in their comparative study on protests in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Spain that social mobilization for protest plays a crucial role to regime liberalization and democratization and catalyzes greater political participation.[11] Offe and Tourain also argue that protest movements for values, identity, and representation can democratize both the public and private spheres.[12]

Rucht and Ohlemacher best summarize the significance of protest for understanding social movements and state-society relations.

> For social movements, protest is their most important medium and decisive for their existence, identity, and outcome. Protest is certainly a key aspect for researchers interested in social movements. The study of social movement protest can tell us a lot about features such as the concern of the people protesting, their capabilities for mobilization, their forms of action, the social characteristics of activists, the spatial and temporal distribution of protest etc.[13]

Accordingly, my dissertation exclusively focuses on protests and demonstrations, the least studied feature of political participation in the field of Turkish politics. In this research, I analyze protest politics at two different levels. First, I treat collective protest events as my unit of analysis in Chapter 3 and 4 in order to answer the following research questions. How did the patterns of popular participation in protest change over time in

---

[10] Ibid., 347-348.

[11] Joe Foweraker and Todd Landman, *Citizenship Rights and Social Movements : A Comparative and Statistical Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

[12] Claus Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics," *Social Research* 52, no. 4 (1985); Alain Touraine, "Triumph or Downfall of Civil Society," in *Humanities in Review*, ed. David Reiff (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

[13] Rucht and Ohlemacher, 77.

Turkey? How did the relationship between protest and repression evolve and how did it affect political stability? Second, I turn to the individual level of analysis in order to examine "protest potential," one's willingness to join protest events in Chapter 5 and 6. These chapters try to answer the following questions. To what extent did protest activities become institutionalized and acceptable practices of political engagement in Turkey? How is protest potential determined by age-related factors including lifecycle, political generation, and period effects?

1.3 Data and Methods

In order to understand how the patterns of political participation in protests and demonstrations have changed over time in Turkey, I use quantitative data derived from a variety of sources. First, my analysis on the interaction between state control and political protest (Chapter 3) relies on the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* prepared by Charles Lewis Taylor and his colleagues.[14] This dataset contains aggregate data relevant to analyze how and when people organized protest events and how the state imposed negative sanctions to suppress political opposition. Second, I created my own original dataset that maps political protests in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s from a Turkish national newspaper, *Cumhuriyet*. I recorded a variety of characteristics of contentious collective actions including the number of participants, claims, targets, forms of protest, and other attributes of more than 1,000 protest events. My analysis on the patterns of contentious politics between 1981 and 1999 (Chapter 4) relies on this dataset.

---

[14] Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972); Charles Lewis Taylor and David A. Jodice, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 3rd ed., vol. II (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983).

Third, I used the Turkish component of World Values Surveys in order to understand individual factors affecting popular participation in protest. The data taken from World Values Survey help us examine how the patterns of protest participation change over time at the individual level and identify who are more likely to protest and why (Chapter 5 and 6).

I use a large-N method throughout the subsequent analyses because my primary purpose of this research is to contribute to our understanding of the broad macrolevel patterns behind protest participation and the factors which are responsible for protests. Although there are numerous case studies on specific social movements and mobilization in Turkey, we cannot see how the general and longitudinal patterns of protest and state sanctions have changed over time by reading and aggregating the research results of these idiographic studies.

1.4 Significance of the Study

I believe that this study is not only theoretically significant but also relevant to a contemporary debate on the development and nature of civil society in Turkey. First, the systematic study of protest participation in the Turkish case may contribute to widening and refining the scope of the literature on contentious politics. In contrast to Western societies from which most of the literature on contentious politics is derived, Turkey is a predominantly Muslim society although it has established a secular political system. Furthermore, Turkish politics has long been associated with a strong state and a weak civil society. Its path to consolidated democracy has experienced several setbacks. Despite these differences, if we can find the common factors affecting protest

participation and the similar patterns of protest activities in Turkey and in the West, it would be a strong confirmation of the existing theories. If we cannot, Turkey should be an opportunity to refine our theories for making them more widely applicable.

Second, because empirically rigorous research on unconventional political participation in Turkey is largely absent, my dissertation will provide a substantive contribution for our understanding on various characteristics of protest activities in the public sphere. Although the literature on Turkish social movements has been growing in recent years, we do not have adequate data to systematically analyze who, when, how, and why protesters step on to the streets. Thus, my dissertation will offer a rare empirical data of protest activities that I drew from a variety of sources. Particularly my protest event data that I created from Turkish newspaper, *Cumhuriyet*, is a unique dataset that records various aspects of more than 1,000 protest events that had occurred in the 1980s and 1990s.

Third, this study will directly address an ongoing debate on the development of civil society in Turkey and political activism among Turkish citizens. The subsequent analyses will help us understand if Turkey's civil society is becoming more politically active on the streets as a whole or which sector of civil society is increasing its political activism. Reflecting the mushrooming of civil society associations since the 1980s, many case studies have been produced in the study of Turkish politics. My research which relies on large-N studies will shed new light on broader general patterns of protest participation in contemporary Turkey.

1.5 Plan of the Dissertation

The structure of this dissertation is as follows. In Chapter 2, I will review the literature on contentious politics in Turkey in order to define my research goals. In particular, I will discuss how the existing literature conceptualizes the state-society relations in Turkey and how researchers have studied popular participation in protests, demonstrations, and more disruptive forms of contentious politics.

Chapter 3 and 4 attend to the modes of protest participation between 1945 and 1999. Chapter 3 reveals the interactive relations between protest activities against the state and negative sanctions imposed by the state. It is argued that the Turkish military intervened in 1980 not only because political protests and violence intensified on the streets but also the civilian governments became unable to effectively deal with the intensified political activities. Chapter 4 analyzes the ways in which social and political movements re-emerged in the post-1980 military coup period using my original dataset on protest events. It seeks to understand how the patterns, claims, targets, and forms of protest changed over time and how these factors were related to one another.

While the unit of analysis in Chapter 3 and 4 is a disruptive collective action organized by citizens, I turn to individuals themselves in Chapter 5 and 6 in order to examine who is more likely to participate in protests and demonstrations using the data drawn from World Values Survey. In Chapter 5, I test the social movement society thesis—the hypothesis that protest has become more frequent and institutionalized in democracies. My analysis shows that it is premature to conclude that Turkey was transitioning to a social movement society in the 1990s and the early 2000s although the

existing literature on Turkish protest politics suggested the diffusion of protest participation among various sectors of society.

In Chapter 6, I turn to the question of the impact of age and time on protest participation in Turkey. Turkey witnessed the emergence of protest activism in the late 1960s and 1970s, but it went through the period of depoliticization of youth after the 1980 military coup. Both social scientists and laypeople in Turkey have claimed that the decline of protest was due to a generational change. By analyzing data from the four waves of World Values Survey, I assess the impact of political generation along with lifecycle and a historical period, all of which are related to age, on protest potential.

Chapter 7 will conclude and summarize this dissertation and discuss their contribution to our understanding of protest politics in Turkey.

CHAPTER 2

THE LITERATURE ON CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN TURKEY

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses major works on state-society relations and contentious politics in Turkey in order to define the aim and focus of my dissertation. The study of state-society relations in Turkey has produced a rich body of literature, which can be divided into three groups. The first group of the literature is the study of state tradition in Turkey, which emphasizes the coercive character and the strength of the state. The second group attends to Turkey's civil society and its weaknesses as well as its potential. The third group considers contentious politics, which is the interactions between the state and society and includes a vast literature on social movements and political activism. The subsequent sections review the major works in each group of the literature.

2.2 A Strong State Thesis in Turkish Politics

In the literature on state-society relations in Turkey, most scholars of Turkish politics have used a strong state thesis in order to explain why civil society is weak and why the political system is designed to ensure uniformity rather than diversity. The strong state tradition in contemporary Turkey was inherited from the political structures of the Ottoman Empire, in which political power had been centered on the central state and

societal groups had not been granted autonomy from state control. In order to maintain order and stability in a religiously, ethnically, and culturally heterogeneous empire, the Ottoman elites believed that the central state should be strong enough to impose its will on society and autonomous from distinct and particular interests of diverse social forces. In the late 19th century, the state, civil bureaucracy in particular, played a central role in the process of modernizing reforms of the Empire in order to catch up with the West.

Similarly, the Republican state established after the War of Liberation (1919-1923) put emphasis on a strong central state as a means to radically transform society and promote the creation of the Turkish nation-state. The political revolution led by Mustafa Kemal was carried out by state elites without mass participation. Ordinary people joined the War of Liberation as soldiers and sacrificed themselves to defend the country, but they did not affect political decisions that state elites made regarding the establishment of a modern Turkish state.

This line of argument considers the state as an independent variable in explaining social formation in Turkey. For instance, in her seminal work on sociological theories on a "revolution from above," Ellen Kay Trimberger argues that the Turkish state is relatively autonomous from social classes and define general interests independently of parochial societal interests.[15]

As Heper, Mardin, and others suggest, Turkish state elites comprising of the civil bureaucracy and the military have long considered themselves as the central actor in public policy decision-making and believed that only the state elites could appropriately

---

[15] Ellen Kay Trimberger, *Revolution from Above : Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978).

define national interests because the public masses were "uncivilized."[16] According to this understanding, the state is not an instrument used by social groups to influence political decisions made by the government. In other words, the state in Turkey is not a political arena in which interest groups, social movements, and business corporations compete to force decisions in their favor. Thus, "the involvement of non-state social groups in the public policy-making process have traditionally been limited."[17] The Kemalist state elites were convinced that the state should be kept isolated from society as much as possible because social and economic interests of diverse popular groups would threaten the unity of the nation. They also assumed that the state should lead the modernization program on behalf of the people which they considered "uneducated and ignorant." Hence, the state viewed civil society associations and interest groups that are autonomous from state surveillance with deep suspicion.[18] The state in particular perceives Islamic and Kurdish movements and organizations as a major internal threat to

[16] Heper; Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?," *Daedalus*, no. 102 (1973); Ergun Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics : Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000); İlter Turan, "Policymakers' Assumptions About Peasant Society: Myth or Reality?," *Policy Studies Review* 4, no. 1 (1984); İlkay Sunar, *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey's Development* (Ankara: Ankara University Faculty of Political Science Publication, 1974).

[17] Hayriye Özen and Şükrü Özen, "Public Policies and Social Movements: The Influences of Protest Movements on Mining Policy in Turkey," *Review of Public Administration* 43, no. 2 (2010): 40.

[18] Kalaycıoğlu, 68.

the fundamental principles of the official ideology including secularism and Turkish nationalism.[19]

This perception that social groupings are dangerous to state autonomy and social stability is still widely held by the state apparatus. Uysal reveals that distrust in protests and demonstrations has been reproduced through the training and education in the Policy Academy. The security authorities define collective action as both "clandestine activity based on specific strategy and programme" and "an irrational and emotional gathering."[20]

As argued above, Turkish politics have been characterized by the strong state tradition that emphasizes the supremacy of the public interest defined by state elite over social interests emerging within civil society. The strong state tradition, however, does not automatically mean that Turkey has a strong state. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu defines a strong state as a sovereign organization "which can mobilize human capital resources, and demonstrate high levels of regulatory and distributive capability over the population that inhabits the territory under its jurisdiction."[21] Kalaycıoğlu's definition of the strength of the state emphasizes its ability to effectively govern the population by extracting resources, redistributing them in society, and implementing rule of law. This conceptualization of a strong state significantly differs from the strong state tradition thesis that highlights coercive and authoritarian features of a state. Kalaycıoğlu measures the state's capabilities using statistics prepared by the World Bank, and he finds that "the

---

[19] M. Hakan Yavuz, "The Assassination of Collective Memory: The Case of Turkey," *The Muslim World* 89, no. 3-4 (1999); Henri J. Barkey, "The Struggles of a 'Strong' State," *Journal of International Affairs* 54, no. 1 (2000).

[20] Uysal, 198.

[21] Kalaycıoğlu, 69-70.

overall state strength for Turkey turns out to be relatively weak."[22] Then, this weakness of the state makes state elites feel vulnerable to social opposition. Hence, it leads to the coercive and authoritarian behavior of the state.

2.3 Civil Society

Civil society became one of the most important ideas in Turkish politics from the late 1980s onward mainly because both intellectuals and political activists began to employ the discourse on civil society as an effective tool to constrain military influence in politics and to achieve democratization. In Turkey like the rest of the world at large, civil society has been generally understood as an autonomous sphere from state control, where citizens can work together through nongovernmental associations to promote their visions and interests. This liberal approach to civil society assumes that civil society becomes a driving force of resistance to state power and for democratization. Many scholars in Turkey who hold this liberal perspective have expected the growth of civil society to contribute to the development of pluralism and the dissemination of democratic norms and values. For instance, Göle, in her very influential article on civil society, wrote that the most significant change in the post-1980 coup Turkey is "the autonomization of civil society" from the grip of the powerful state.[23] Similarly, Arat argued in 1994 that women's movements in Turkey in the late-1980s emerged independently of and in opposition to the state, which had perpetuated the patriarchal division of labor in

---

[22] Ibid.

[23] Nilüfer Göle, "Toward an Autonomization of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey," in *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).

society.[24]

According to these scholars, civil society is a political arena in which ordinary citizens can freely interact with one another and associate themselves to resist the state, protest public policies, and make their voices heard in public. In fact, the period from the 1980s onward is marked by the appearance of a number of civil society organizations and diversification of their activities and goals. The Third Sector Foundation of Turkey reported in 2011 that the number of associations increased from around 50,000 in 1981 to more than 152,000 in 2001.[25]

We can point out at least three interrelated factors or processes that contributed to the development of civil society in Turkey since the late-1980s onward. First, the late-1980s and the 1990s are characterized by the introduction of economic liberalization to Turkish society, which resulted in the emergence of new economic elites who wanted to limit the power of traditional state elites.[26] Economic liberalization also promoted the privatization and diversification of mass media. New actors including liberal, religious, and conservative groups started to set up their own publishing houses, print newspapers and magazines, and establish TV stations for influencing public debates.

This period was also marked by the legitimacy crises of the strong state tradition

---

[24] Yesim Arat, "Toward a Democratic Society: The Women's Movement in Turkey in the 1980s," *Women's Studies International Forum* 17, no. 2/3 (1994).

[25] Daniella Kuzmanovic, *Refractions of Civil Society in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 8.

[26] M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 82; Binnaz Toprak, "Civil Society in Turkey," in *Civil Society in the Middle East*, ed. Augustus Richard Norton (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996).

in Turkey.[27] For many decades, both political elites and citizens of Turkey had assumed that the strong state was the main agent of modernization and development of the country. The failure of the state-led economic development in the 1970s, the accelerated economic liberalization program, and some other incidents that had collectively demonstrated the weakness and inability of the state to provide for the well-being of its citizens persuaded many Turks to become agents of social and political change.

Third, Turkey's relations with international institutions have played an important role in the development of civil society. Turkey's application for EU membership has produced a number of legal settings in support of political reforms toward democracy.[28] The European Union has empowered a range of civil society organizations through financial and technical assistance. Other international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the United Nations have also helped Turkish civil society become influential and effective forces of political transformation. Turkish civil society actors are not only empowered by these international institutions but actively use international norms to promote their own goals and demand political reforms.

Some other scholars challenge the liberal approach to civil society. Based on Antonio Gramsci's concept of civil society as a "function of the state," these scholars reconsider the role of civil society within power relations in politics and the distinction between state and society. According to the Gramscian approach, civil society is where

---

[27] Kuzmanovic, 13; E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet Icduygu, "Globalization, Civil Society and Citizenship in Turkey: Actors, Boundaries and Discourses," *Citizenship Studies* 7, no. 2 (2003).

[28] Thomas Diez, Apostolos Agnantopoulos, and Alper Kaliber, "File: Turkey, Europeanization and Civil Society: Introduction," *South European Society and Politics* 10, no. 1 (2005).

the dominant force can produce and reproduce among citizens a certain mode of life and values congruent with its own interests through social organizations such as schools, trade unions, the family, the church, the media, and other cultural associations. The cultural congruence between the dominant class and the dominated is necessary to generate popular consent about political legitimacy of the former. According to Gramsci, civil society "becomes part of an extended state, utilized by the ruling class to form and maintain its hegemony by *transformismo*, or cooptation, through which the ruling class assimilates ideas that it sees as potentially dangerous, and thus creates cultural and political consensus."[29]

Civil society, however, can also generate counter-hegemony from below. The marginalized and oppressed groups, led by intellectuals, would form a broad coalition that Gramsci calls a "historic bloc." In the processes of establishing counter-hegemony in society, the social networks embedded in various associations and organizations play an important role in uniting different groups and creating consciousness among them. Thus, for Gramsci, a counter-hegemonic struggle begins in society and exercises force or persuasion to achieve the emancipation of the oppressed from the state that governs them.

Thus, Gramsci argues that civil society has two different roles in power relations between the ruling class and the ruled: preservation of the status quo and transformation of the existing order. First, civil society enables the state to produce and reproduce hegemony by fabricating the consent of the ruled by using social and political institutions in civil society. Second, ordinary people can use civil society to challenge and change the status quo by building a new counter-hegemony. Because civil society is the realm in

---

[29] Hagai Katz, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and Global Civil Society Networks," *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 17, no. 4 (2006): 335.

which these two forces interact with one another, the clear distinction between state and civil society withers away in the Gramscian approach.

Several political scientists apply Gramsci's approach to challenge the liberal approach to civil society in Turkey. Necmi Erdoğan analyzes how secular Kemalist organizations used social relations in civil society to defend Kemalism in the 1990s. During this period, Kemalist associations began to flourish as a result of the rise of political Islam in Turkey. Secular sectors of Turkish civil society found official Kemalism in need of civic initiatives for protection and promotion, and they attempted to generate "popular consent for the project of Kemalist restoration along the lines of 'Kemalist nationalism,' 'modernity,' and 'laicism'."[30]

Nicholas Monceau's analysis of the 75th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey reveals the collaboration between the state and Kemalist organizations to project this event as primarily organized by citizens rather than imposed by the state. Monceau observes that while the celebrations of the 10th and 50th anniversaries of the Republic were official events organized by the state, the 75th anniversary was a celebration by civil society organizations including various secular Kemalist associations.[31] The 75th anniversary was designed to strengthen the relationship between society and the Kemalist state which many secular groups believed was under Islamic threat.

---

[30] Necmi Erdoğan, "Kemalist Non-Governmental Organizations: Troubled Elites in Defence of S Sacred Heritage," in *Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism: Studies on Political Culture in Contemporary Turkey*, ed. Stefanos Yerasimos, Günter Seufert, and Karin Vorhoff (Istanbul: Orient-Institut, 2000), 252.

[31] Nicolas Monceau, "The 75th Anniversary of the Republic of Turkey and the 700th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Ottoman Empire: Celebrating Past and Present Modernity," in *Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism*, ed. Stefanos Yerasimos, Günter Seufert, and Karin Vorhoff (Istanbul: Orient-Institut, 2000).

Tocco looks at how a political journal contributed to disseminate the Kemalist regime's ideology and establish its hegemony in the 1940s. Tocco examines the feminist journal Kadin Gazetesi published in 1947 and 1948. Her finding suggests that Kadin Gazetesi played a role of propagating republican values on behalf of the state. It defined the ideal type of femininity congruent with Kemalist ideology that promoted Western, modern, and socially active women.

Furthermore, in line with Gramsci's understanding of civil society, Aydin demonstrates in his study on environmental activism of Turkey that the state arbitrarily treats civil society organizations.[32] The state encourages those organizations that support the Kemalist project and punishes those that are critical of it. Dikici-Bilgin claims that the ruling elite in Turkey used the combination of coercion and consent for the consolidation of their hegemony.[33] Both studies suggest that civil society is not autonomous from state intervention.

Although the liberal approach and the Gramscian approach have different assumptions about the role of civil society and the relationship between state and society, both recognize that we have to pay close attention to the interaction between state and society. As Gramsci argues, the state may use civil society organizations to disseminate its ideology in society. Yet, it is undeniable that the state prepares a legal framework that encourages or discourages civil society activism. As Hazama demonstrates in his analysis

---

[32] Zülküf Aydın, "The State, Civil Society, and Environmentalism," in *Environmentalism in Turkey: Between Democracy and Development?*, ed. Fikret Adaman and Murat Arsel (Aldershot, Hants, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005).

[33] Hasret Dikici-Bilgin, "Civil Society and State in Turkey: A Gramscian Perspective," in *Gramsci and Global Politics : Hegemony and Resistance*, ed. Mark McNally and John Schwarzmantel (London: Routledge, 2009).

on the relationship between the state and civil society in the post-WWII Turkey, the historical development of civil society organizations has been a product of "cyclical state regulation and deregulation."[34] Civil society organizations flourished when the government removed restrictions on political activities as a process of democratization. On the other hand, when the government tightened its control over political participation of citizens, the level of civil society activities declined.

2.4 Contentious Politics

Protests, demonstrations, and other forms of disruptive collective actions have been a part of democratic politics across the Western world. Similarly, the use of protests, demonstrations, and sometimes violence have been an integral element of political participation in Turkey. However, while these modes of political participation have been widely reported in the mass media and influenced the state-society relations since the late Ottoman period, systematic investigation has been largely absent until recently in Turkey.

The Turkish literature on protests, demonstrations, and political violence received its impetus from the student movements and radical politics of the Left and the Right during the 1960s. We have various autobiographies written by political activists who played an important role in organizing demonstrations and mobilizing hundreds of students into their political movement.[35] Although we can learn a lot about anecdotes and first-hand observations of student riots from these works, most of them do not help us

[34] Yasushi Hazama, "Civil Society in Turkey," in *Aspects of Democratization in Turkey*, ed. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, Ruşen Keleş, and Yasushi Hazama (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies Japan External Trade Organization, 1999), 91.

[35] For instance, see Harun Karadeniz, *Olaylı Yıllar Ve Gençlik* (İstanbul: May Yayınları, 1975); Gün Zileli, *Yarılma (1954-1972)* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002).

systematically analyze the causes of protests and state response to protesters. Furthermore, these memoires written by the activists tend to overemphasize their roles and exalt their movements, failing to situating their movements in wider political and social contexts and relating them to other social groups.

There is some empirical understanding of the social and psychological factors of popular participation in contentious politics in Turkish history. For instance, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı analyzed student participation in urban riots using survey research.[36] Keleş and Ünsal investigated political terrorism that had spread in Turkey in the late 1970s and emphasized socio-demographic change such as urbanization as a main cause of violence.[37] These earlier works were informative research that shed some light on youth participation in collective action, but they only paid attention to political violence such as riots and terrorism. My dissertation, in contrast, attends to a wide range of collective action including collective petitions, peaceful demonstrations, and more disruptive actions in order to understand how overall patterns of protest rather than a particular form of political violence has changed over time in Turkey.

More recently, several political scientists have begun to analyze popular participation in contentious politics by situating their research within the social movement literature or the political participation literature. For instance, Emin Alper examines the protest cycle between 1968 and 1971, the years characterized by the rise of

---

[36] Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, "Siyasal Tutumlarda Kuşak Ve Cinsiyet Etkenleri," *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 31, no. 1 (1976); Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, *Öğrenci Ayaklanmaları* (Ankara: Bilgi, 1974).

[37] Ruşen Keleş and Artun Ünsal, *Kent Ve Siyasal Şiddet* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi S.B.F. Basın ve Yayın Yüksek Okulu Basımevi, 1982).

social protests carried out by students, workers, peasants, and teachers.[38] Alper challenges an economic approach to the massive mobilization of this period that emphasizes the deteriorating economic conditions of the population as the major cause of protest participation. He argues that the political process model of contentious politics, which stresses the increasing organizational powers of protest groups, political opportunities, and power struggle among political elites, can better account for the protest cycle of 1968-1971.

Şimşek scrutinizes the transformations of Islamic, Feminist, Alevi, and Kurdish social movements, which have all become significant actors in civil society since 1980. Arguing that "new social movements theory, rather than resource mobilization theory, is more apt to explain the case of Turkey," Şimşek analyzes to what extent each social movement has become "new social movements."[39]

Turkey in the early 21st century has witnessed the resurgence and revitalization of nationalist organizations that challenges the Turkish government's pro-American foreign policy through protests and demonstrations in the public sphere. By analyzing the massive mobilization of anti-Iraq War protests between 2002 and 2003, Kakizaki argues that anti-Americanism has united ultranationalists and radical lefts, traditionally antagonistic camps, into a new collective movement for the defense of the nation-state.[40]

---

[38] Emin Alper, "Reconsidering Social Movements in Turkey: The Case of the 1968-71 Protest Cycle," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 43 (2010).

[39] Sefa Şimşek, "New Social Movements in Turkey since 1980," *Turkish Studies* 5, no. 2 (2004): 120.

[40] Masaki Kakizaki, "Anti-Iraq War Protests in Turkey: Global Networks, Coalitions, and Context," *Middle Eastern Studies* 47, no. 1 (2011).

He also notes the significance of "framing" of issues for effective mobilization and facilitation of cross-ideological alliances.[41]

In addition to the U.S. intervention in the Islamic world, globalization has been considered a major external factor that led to the emergence of new forms of contentious politics in Turkey. Baykan and Lelandais analyzes how global antiliberalization movements have reshaped Turkish antiglobalization movements at local and national levels and point out that the spread of world social forums has helped to create transnational networks between Turkish and international social movements.[42] Similarly, Gümrükçü traces the diffusion ideas across borders contributes the emergence of anti-globalization movements in Turkey.[43] She demonstrates how Turkish social movement sectors, which were traditionally isolated from transnational movements, have transformed their movement strategies through the diffusion process and concludes that the action forms of antiglobalization movements in Turkey and in other Western countries have become identical.

These recent research outcomes have contributed to enrich our knowledge about a variety of social movements and political activism in contemporary Turkey.

---

[41] For anti-Americanism in contemporary Turkey, see also Füsun Türkmen, "Anti-Americanism as a Default Ideology of Opposition: Turkey as a Case Study," *Turkish Studies* 11, (2010); Aylin Güney, "Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present," *Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no. 3 (2008); Melih Çoban, "Rising Anti-Americanism in Turkey," *Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies* 4, (2004); Nur Bilge Criss, "A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case," *The Journal of American History* 89, no. 2 (2002).

[42] Barış Gençer Baykan and Gülçin Erdi Lelandais, "Cross-Readings of the Anti-Globalisation Movement in Turkey and Beyond. Political Culture in the Making," *International Social Science Journal* 56, no. 182 (2004).

[43] Selin Bengi Gümrükçü, "The Rise of a Social Movement: The Emergence of Anti-Globalization Movements in Turkey," *Turkish Studies* 11, no. 2 (2010).

Nevertheless, most of these studies are case studies that are unable to draw generalizable conclusions with respect to causal explanations of protest participation. Furthermore, the unit of analysis in these studies is protest groups or social movement organizations rather than individuals. Thus, although we know something about political orientations and institutional characteristics of these collectivities in Turkey, we know very little about individual factors that explain why and when people do join protest.

Kalaycıoğlu is the political scientist who has written the most on protest participation at individual level. Using the Turkish component of World Values Surveys, he examined the conditions under which protest potential—one's propensity to protest—develops in Turkey and finds that education, religiosity, political interest, and membership in voluntary associations are the most important variables affecting the level of protest potential. His statistical analyses further suggest that education and political interest increase protest potential, whereas religiosity and membership in voluntary associations decrease it. He suggests that Islam tends to discourage Turkish citizens from attending collective actions that challenge governments because of its religious call for obedience to political authority.[44] Kalaycıoğlu reconfirms the negative impact of Islam on protest potential more recently using a national survey conducted in 2002, challenging the view that Islam has an inherent proclivity to political violence and fosters political terrorism.[45]

---

[44] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Unconventional Political Participation in Turkey and Europe: Comparative Perspectives," *Il Politico* 59, no. 3 (1994).

[45] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Religiosity and Protest Behaviour: The Case of Turkey in Comparative Perspective," *Journal of Southern Europe & the Balkans* 9, no. 3 (2007). See also Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Democracy Today : Elections, Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society* (London: I.B Tauris, 2007).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter attempts to analyze the literature on the strong state tradition, the rise of civil society, and the nature of contentious politics in Turkey. The literature review suggests that we can enrich our analysis of political participation in Turkey by synthesizing the state-centered approach and the society-centered approach. The state has played the most important role in determining the relations among people, society, and state in Turkish history. For many decades, state elites suspicious of autonomous societal groups had limited the rights of citizen to participate in politics through civil society activities. This state-centered approach, however, tends to downplay the strength and resilience of civil society organizations in Turkey. The literature on civil society, on the other hand, helps us understand how the process of political liberalization since the 1980s contributed to the emergence of a variety of civil society organizations through which Turkish citizens acquired some influence over the government. Although civil society can be also exploited by the state to consolidate its hegemony in the population as the Gramscian view suggests, it also empowers ordinary people by facilitating their coordination of collective protest actions through social networks embedded in civil society.

The recent literature on the state-society relations in Turkey begins to take contentious politics more seriously. There is an emerging academic industry on the interactions and conflicts between state authority and citizens, which results from the development and diversification of civil society organizations and social movements in contemporary Turkey. The majority of these studies, however, do not systematically examine the long-term transformation of the political interaction between the state and

society.

In this dissertation, I will describe and explain how contentious politics in Turkey has evolved between the late 1940s and the 2000s based on a series of quantitative analyses. The next chapter will present how the state's attempt to control social forces had affected the intensity of popular protests between 1945 and 1980. I will demonstrate that it is crucial for us to understand the evolution of contentious politics in relations with the variation in the level of state control over society.

CHAPTER 3

THE EVOLUTION OF CONTENTIOUS POLITICS (1945-1980)

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the changing nature of the state-society relationship in Turkey in the post-World War II period (1945-1980) with a particular emphasis on contestation between the state and contentious citizens. It is argued that the political crisis that Turkey experienced in the late 1970s was attributable to a combination of the declining capability of the Turkish state to control societal challenges and the increasing intensity of political protest. I empirically demonstrate how the scale of state repression against protest groups and the scale of societal challenges against the state evolved over time using the data drawn from the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* compiled by Taylor and his colleagues.[46]

Turkish politics during this period witnessed the development of a wide range of political and social protests inspired by different ideologies and political visions including socialism, Islamism, and nationalism. These movements not only worked with existing political parties representing or sympathetic to each political persuasion, but also carried out rallies, demonstrations, boycotts, hunger-strikes, and more violent collective

[46] Taylor and Hudson; Taylor and Jodice.

actions in the public sphere. The state responded by imposing state sanctions against these challenging acts in order to maintain order and preempt the escalation of political violence. In turn, the protesters were either intimidated into silence or further infuriated into more disruptive actions. Thus, the relationships between the Turkish state and societal groups were one of interaction rather than direction, where the governments and opposition made strategic decisions regarding how to challenge one another.

There is an abundance of empirical evidence on how contentious citizens challenged the governments and how the state officials dealt with them.[47] These studies, however, usually focus on only one side of contentious politics, i.e., either on how citizens protest against the state or how the state suppresses protests, failing to systematically analyze the dynamic interaction between them. In order to explain the repression-protest interaction in Turkey, I employ an empirical model that Kurita proposed to study the changing parameters of the state-society relations in Poland between 1948 and 1977.[48] This model helps us better understand how the nature of political contestation between the state and political dissents altered in post-WWII Turkey. The application of this model is expected to contribute to the existing literature on Turkish politics by fully integrating two actors, the state and protest groups, into one

---

[47] Alper, "Reconsidering Social Movements in Turkey: The Case of the 1968-71 Protest Cycle."; İhsan Bal and Sedat Laçiner, "The Challenge of Revolutionary Terrorism to Turkish Democracy 1960-80," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 4 (2001); Clement H. Dodd, "The Containment of Terrorism: Violence in Turkish Politics 1965-1980," in *Terrorism, Ideology, and Revolution*, ed. Noel O'Sullivan (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986); Dietrich Orlow, "Political Violence in Pre-Coup Turkey," *Terrorism: An International Journal* 6, no. 1 (1982); Sabri Sayarı, "Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976-1980: A Retrospective Analysis," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 2 (2010).

[48] Nobuyoshi Kurita, *Shakai Undo No Keiryo Shakaigakuteki Bunseki [Quantitative Sociological Analysis of Social Movements]* (Tokyo: Nihonhyoronsha, 1993).

analytical framework in order to demonstrate how the interaction between them influenced the scale of political contentiousness.

Many scholars have written about radical politics in Turkey. They have attributed the radicalization of protest politics to psychological, ideological, and structural factors.[49] More recently, several scholars have paid attention to political processes to explain protest cycles and labor insurgency.[50] These studies help us understand factors that affect the rise and fall of protest movements, but they fail to capture the repression-protest interaction because they do not adequately integrate the role of state sanction into the analysis.

In this chapter, I will quantitatively and systematically reveal the changing parameters of the state-society interactions by applying Kurita's empirical model. I will argue that contentious politics in Turkey in the post-WWII period had experienced variations both in terms of the magnitude of political protest and the magnitude of social control that the state imposed on society. By taking these protest and state control factors into consideration, I demonstrate how the level of contentiousness between state and society had shifted between the late 1940s and the late 1970s and suggest that Turkey went through different phases of contentious politics in which the state overwhelmed

---

[49] For instance, see Keleş and Ünsal; Jacob M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974); Jacob M. Landau, "Radicalism in Turkish Domestic Politics," in *Die Turkische Krise : Beitrage Eines Expertengesprachs Der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 24.-26. September 1980*, ed. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1981); David Barchard, "The Intellectual Background to Radical Protest in Turkey in the 1960s," in *Aspects of Modern Turkey*, ed. William Hale (London: Bowker, 1976).

[50] Brian Mello, "Political Process and the Development of Labor Insurgency in Turkey, 1945-80," *Social Movement Studies* 6, no. 3 (2007).

protesters at one time, protesters radicalized against the state at other times, and both the state and protesters confronted each other head on at yet other times.

In the next section, I will discuss my analytical framework and show Kurita's empirical model that helps us simplify the interactions among three key concepts for this analysis: protest, civil society, and social control. The data and method will then be described in section 3, followed by the empirical analysis in section 4. Section 5 concludes the chapter.

3.2 Modeling the State-Society Relations in Contentious Politics

Turkish politics during this period witnessed the development of a wide range of political and social protests inspired by different ideologies and political visions including socialism, Islamism, and nationalism. These movements not only worked with political parties representing or sympathetic to each ideological current, but also carried out rallies, demonstrations, propaganda campaigns, hunger-strikes, and more violent collective actions in the public sphere.[51] The state responded by imposing state sanctions against those challenging acts in order to maintain order and preempt the escalation of violence.

Political and social protests have constituted one of the few means of ordinary citizens in Turkey to make their voice heard in politics and to make a difference, however small it is, in an outcome of political decisions. Although Turkish politics since the foundation of the Republic in 1923 has been associated with a "strong state" tradition and a weak or polarized civil society, it does not mean that Turkish politics has been free

[51] Volkan Yaraşır, *Sokakta Politika* (İstanbul: Gendaş, 2002); Cem Akaş, *Guarding the State: Collective Political Action in Turkey, 1950-1980* (Istanbul: g yayın grubu, 2004).

from popular challenges against political authority.[52] In fact, contentious collective actions and more organized social movements carried out by civil society associations and professional organizations have played an important role in publicizing particular agendas that the state failed to address and questioning the legitimacy of the state.

Protests are coordinated by a variety of collective actors such as students, workers, peasants, religious groups, and urban community residents. The success of their mobilization for protest is related to the thickness of social network and solidarity between activists and potential participants.[53] What unites individuals into protest actions in civil society could be a shared sense of injustice, deprivation, and inequality. Financial and human resources that organizers possess also affect their chances of successfully mobilizing a number of individuals.[54]

Despite these differences in terms of factors influencing how and why people join protest, there is one thing that permeates this diversity: the potential of civil society. Conceptually, civil society is a relatively autonomous sphere from state intervention where ordinary citizens can freely organize and network among themselves.[55] Social

---

[52] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "State and Civil Society in Turkey: Democracy, Development and Protest " in *Civil Society in the Muslim World: Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Amyn B. Sajoo (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2002); Heper.

[53] Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA; London: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

[54] Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization," in *The Blackwell Companion of Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004); J. D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology* 82, no. 6 (1977).

[55] Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, "The Paradox of Civil Society," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 3 (1996).

solidarity and social networks, two crucial factors for protest coordination, are embedded in civil society. People pursue autonomy from the state and when they perceive that political or state elites are not doing what the people want, civil society associations begin to emerge as challenging groups to influence what the state decides.

The other important political actor in contentious politics is the state, which applies a variety of sanctions in an effort to impose social control, restore order, and maintain its hegemony. Davenport identifies two different forms of political repression that states frequently employ to counter domestic threats.[56] First, states use nonviolent negative sanctions such as censorship, restrictions on civil liberties, mass imprisonment, and martial law. Second, states employ state terror such as torture, mass executions, and disappearances in order to intimidate protesters and compel them to obey rulers. These state actions vary in terms of the scale of violence and legality, but all of them are used by the states for the same purpose: to control dissidents, facilitate the continuity of the regime, and regulate the state-society relations from above.

If we take a strategic perspective on the confrontation between the state and protesters, we recognize that both of these actors are mutually influencing one another. The rise of large-scale, nation-wide protest campaigns may increase the costs of state sanctions, which may compel the state to make a compromise and to concede to the demands put forth by the protesters. Alternatively, if the state escalates social control, it will increase the costs of protesting, which will discourage people to challenge the state authority.

---

[56] Christian Davenport, "Introduction," in *Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious Politics*, ed. Christian Davenport (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).

In an antagonistic relationship between political elites and societal groups, the state attempts to maintain the normal functioning of political systems by exercising coercive social control. A number of studies on political instability and regime breakdown have shown that how state authorities respond to political violence such as protest and more disruptive actions including internal war and rebellions affects subsequent relationships between a state and its people.[57] For the maintenance of political stability, state elites can construct "ideological hegemony" with which a large segment of society comes to embrace the ideology of their leaders and accept it as "common sense." When the majority of the population and political elites share a certain ideology that defines overall rules and principles of governance, the state can maintain political stability without coercion because citizens are more willing to obey political authority. In contrast, when there are vocal challenging groups that cast a serious doubt about the legitimacy of state ideology and are not willing to be governed, the state resorts to social sanction to impose its control over the population.

We can understand contentious politics as a strategic interaction affected by the magnitude of protest and the magnitude of social sanctions. By combining the magnitude of protest and the magnitude of state sanctions, Kurita proposes four distinct situations of contentious politics as shown in Figure 3.1.[58] This figure schematizes a two-dimensional space defined by variations in protest and state sanction. The space is divided into four phases of the contentious state-society relations including confrontation, repression, dual

---

[57] Sabine C. Carey, "The Dynamic Relationship between Protest and Repression," *Political Science Quarterly* 59, no. 1 (2006).

[58] Kurita, 117.

power, and stability. Depending on the combination of the intensity of protest organized by civil society associations and the intensity of social control by the state, we can indicate how the state-society relations can be described.

The parameter of the state-society relations moves from one phase to another due to the variations of social control and protest actions. When both the state and civil society are inactive, there is a *stable* state-society relationship. Society does not organize protest actions, and the state does not impose sanctions on the society. When the state imposes sanctions on political protest and civil society does not challenge the state, there emerges a *suppressed* civil society. Citizens are intimidated into silence by the coercive state behavior. If civil society starts to organize protest actions to challenge the state, the state can either punish the protesters or tolerate them. If the state chooses to employ harsh measures to suppress protesters, we will see the emergence of a *confrontational* situation in which society organizes many protests and the state reacts by imposing many sanctions. This is where contentious society and the repressive state collide. Alternatively, if the state chooses to tolerate the protesting groups or is unable to impose sanctions on them for some reason, a *dual power* structure will develop in society where the state is overwhelmed by the intensified protest movements, which become too contentious in the absence of the functional or governable state system.[59] In this case, civil society emerges

[59] Dual power was a concept originally proposed by Lenin to analyze a unique situation of the February Revolution in which two sovereign entities, the Provisional Government of the bourgeoisie and the Soviets known as workers' councils coexisted and confronted one another over the seizure of state power. The dual power situation is considered unstable, unusual, and temporal because two sovereign entities cannot coexist for long, and either side has to be defeated. This concept of dual power was applied to analyze political revolutions in numerous countries, but the most prominent case was Arato's analysis of the democratic transition of Poland in the 1980s. He points out how Polish workers and reformers (Solidarity) who had challenged the socialist regime used dual

as if it gains autonomy from the tight grip of the state, and the state is losing its control over society. As the subsequent sections demonstrate, in the case of Turkey, the state-society relations moved from a nonconfrontational phase to a suppressed civil society phase, and from the suppressed phase to a dual-power phase through a confrontational phase in the 1970s.

3.3 Data

In order to examine how the Turkish government and protest groups had interacted in post-WWII period, the subsequent analysis relies on social indicators of political protest and social control prepared by Charles L. Taylor and his colleagues. Taylor's *World Handbook of Political Social Indicators* collected a vast amount of data on a variety of protest actions such as demonstrations, political strikes, and riots, as well as state coercive behavior intended to maintain law and order by repressing protesters around the world.[60]

The *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* provides a useful dataset to analyze the cross-temporal change of the power relationship between the state and civil society, and many scholars have produced important findings using the data.[61] The *World*

---

power as a strategy to create new forms for political change including institutions and modes of thinking to counter the existing hegemony. See Andrew Arato, "Civil Society against the State: Poland 1980-1981," *Telos* 47, (1981). In this study, dual power is used as metaphor to refer to a situation where civil society becomes powerful enough to threaten the existing state authorities and grows as if it is autonomous from state control.

[60] Taylor and Hudson; Taylor and Jodice.

[61] For example, see Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti, "Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment," *European Economic Review* 40, no. 6 (1996); Robert W. Jackman, *Power without Force: The Political Capacity of Nation-States* (Ann Arbor, MI:

Handbook is particularly important for scholars who investigate the interactions between the state and society because it includes not only protest actions leveled against the state but also governmental sanctions to control protests organized by civil society actors. Combining these two actions in a single dataset, the *World Handbook* helps us understand how the state reacted to antistate collective actions and how the state's response influenced civil society activities thereafter. Considering that empirical research on political protest in Turkey tends to focus only on the rise and decline of protest activities without relating it to governmental response with empirical data, the *World Handbook* can contribute to produce a more comprehensive picture about the state-society relationship by illustrating the interaction between government and protesters.

Admittedly, citizens can express their grievances and resist political authority without taking overtly explicit forms of protest such as demonstrations. As James Scott demonstrates in his anthropological study on the subaltern people's strategy of resistance, peasants may use subtle, less visible, but powerful forms of everyday resistance.[62] However, in the strategic environment where the state and protesters lack perfect information regarding the intention of the other, both actors have to rely on each other's explicit and observable behavior as a clue as to what action should be taken . Thus,

---

University of Michigan Press, 1993); Aymo Brunetti, "Political Variables in Cross-Country Growth Analysis," *Journal of Economic Surveys* 11, no. 2 (1997); David L. Banks, "New Patterns of Oppression: An Updated Analysis of Human Rights Data," in *Human Rights and Statistics: Getting the Record Straight*, ed. Thomas B. Jabine and Richard Pierre Claude (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991); Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, "Revolutionary Dreams and Terrorist Violence in the Developed World: Explaining Country Variation," *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 5 (2009); Demet Yalcin Mousseau, "Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?," *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 5 (2001).

[62] James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Heaven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985).

although I do not deny the significance of implicit forms or resistance of ordinary citizens against political authority, I argue that explicit protest actions in the public space collected in the *World Handbook* should function as an important indicator with which policy-makers in government can estimate the dissenters' willingness either to challenge or accommodate their rule.

Unfortunately, the *World Handbook* covers the period between 1948 and 1977 only. Therefore, we have to stop our investigation in 1977, but it is expected that this dataset will empirically demonstrate the sequence or development of the contentious relationship between state and society in Turkey.

3.4 Indicators of Political Protest and Social Control

In this chapter, protest events refer to four forms of protest including political demonstrations, political strikes, riots, and armed attacks. Taylor and his colleagues define a political demonstration as a "nonviolent gathering of people organized for the announced purpose of protesting against a regime or government or one or more of its leaders; or against its ideology, policy, intended policy, or lack of policy; or against its previous action or intended action."[63] Based on this definition, protest demonstrations include marches, hunger strikes, sit-ins, boycotts, the open letter, political suicide, and self-immolation. A riot is defined as a demonstration or disturbance whose main characteristic involves violence. A political strike is defined as a "work stoppage by a body of industrial or service workers or a stoppage of normal academic life by students to

[63] Taylor and Jodice, 19.

protest a regime and its leaders' policies or actions."[64] A riot is a violent protest action that is spontaneous, unplanned, and lacks prior organization.[65] An armed attack is an act of political violence against persons or property, but this form of protest is different from a riot in that the former is planned and organized by instigators whereas the latter is a spontaneous, unplanned act of violence. More specifically, an armed attack is an "act of violent political conflict carried out by (or on behalf of) an organized group with the object of weakening or destroying the power exercised by another organized group."[66] Armed attacks are characterized by bloodshed, physical struggle, and the destruction of property. Taylor and his colleagues counted the frequency of these protest events for numerous countries, which helps us see the rise and fall of political protest over time.

Taylor's *World Handbook* also includes the data on state sanction implemented by the state against civil society. A governmental sanction is defined as an "action taken by the authorities to neutralize, suppress, or eliminate a perceived threat to the security of the government, the regime, or the state itself."[67] State sanctions range from censorship, the declaration of martial law and a curfew to limit civil rights, the dispatching of troops for domestic security, political arrest of individuals for demonstrating opposition, and other coercive actions that limit civil liberty. Taylor aggregated all of these events to construct the indicator of state coercive behavior.

---

[64] Ibid., 21.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid., 29.

[67] Ibid., 62.

Table 3.1 shows the frequencies of protest demonstrations, political strikes, riots, armed attacks, and governmental sanctions in Turkey between 1948 and 1977 as reported in the *World Handbook*. We can immediately confirm that political protest and governmental sanctions were quite rare in the late 1940s and the first half of the 1950s, but they started to intensify in the 1960s.

In order to make each category comparable, I converted the frequencies into standard scores. First, the frequencies of political demonstrations, political strikes, riots, and armed attacks were combined to create an additive score that indicates the intensity of political protest. Then, this additive score was standardized (Mean = 100; Standard Deviation = 20), which we call the index of the protest magnitude. Finally, I created the index of the social control magnitude by standardizing the frequency of governmental sanctions (M = 100; SD = 20).[68] Table 3.2. presents the standardized indices of the protest magnitude and the social control magnitude, which shows how the intensity of protest and sanction fluctuated between 1948 and 1977. Because the mean value of each index is set as 100, if the magnitude of, for instance, political protest is below 100 in a particular year, it indicates that the level of protest was below the overall mean whereas if it is above 100, it means the level of protest surpassed the overall mean. The same logic also applies to the index of social control.

Figure 3.2 helps us visually compare the magnitude of protest organized by citizens and that of social control imposed by the state. It displays some interesting trends regarding the interaction between protest and social control. First, the intensity of social control against citizens was consistently greater than the intensity of political protest

[68] See Kurita.

against the state between 1948 and 1964 except for 1955. Although Turkish citizens gradually escalated protest actions against the incumbent government that become increasingly authoritarian in the 1950s, the social control against opposition generally surpassed the level of protest. The military, which carried out the 1960 coup d'état, also imposed a variety of sanctions to restore order in society. Second, since the mid-1960s, a new political situation emerged in which the protest magnitude surpassed the social control magnitude, indicating that political authority was losing the ability to sanction opposition.

3.5 Four Phases of Contentious Politics in Turkish Politics

I divide the post-World War II era into four intervals based on the occurrences of important political events in Turkish history. The first period is between 1948 and 1949. This short period was between the end of the Second World War and Turkey's transition from the single party system to a multiparty system in 1950.[69] The second period was between 1950 and 1959. During this period, Turkey was ruled by the Democratic Party (Democrat Partisi, DP) of Adnan Menderes. Menderes came to power in 1950 by defeating the Kemalist Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) by popular vote, but he became increasingly authoritarian in the late 1950s, causing political unrest in society. The third period is between 1960 and 1970. In 1960, the Democratic Party government was overthrown by a military coup led by young officers. The military junta drafted a new liberal constitution that allowed greater political participation and returned to barracks in 1961. During the 1960s political polarization between the left and

[69] Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959).

the right deepened, and the military was compelled to suspend civilian politics again in 1971. The fourth period refers to the last seven years between 1971 and 1977 in which Turkish politics was preoccupied with the emergence of political violence and the failure of civilian politicians to restore social order.

Contentious politics in Turkey between 1948 and 1977 experienced all of the four distinct phases of contentious politics including nonconfrontation, suppressed civil society, confrontation, and dual power. For each period, I calculated the average indices of both protest magnitude and social control magnitude as shown in Table 3.3. In the first period, both the protest magnitude and the social control magnitude were below the overall average, indicating that neither civil society associations nor the state was assertive. In the second period, while the protest magnitude remained below the average, the social control magnitude went beyond the average. Thus, civil society was suppressed by the repressive state during the 1950. Turkish society went into a confrontational phase of the state-society relations in the third period as both protest and social control intensified. In the last period, civil society seemed to overwhelm the state as protest further escalated but the state failed to adequately repress opposition. This situation is similar to a “dual power” situation.

The subsequent sections attempt to contextualize these different phases of contentious politics based on the secondary literature on the relationship between the state and society in Turkey.

3.5.1 Period I (1948-1949): Nonconfrontation

In the first period between 1948 and 1949, Turkish politics appeared to be stable and nonconfrontational as both the protest magnitude and the social control magnitude were below the overall mean for the entire period spanning from 1948 and 1977. This period was associated with Turkey's transition from the single-party regime to a multi-party one and the lead-up to the peaceful transfer of power from the CHP to the DP in the 1950 general elections.

The first multiparty elections in Turkey's political history were held in July 1946. The elections gave the CHP 395 seats and the DP 64 seats. The 1946 elections were believed to be conducted in an "atmosphere of fear and repression" as Ahmad notes.[70] The members and supporters of the DP argued that the elections were manipulated and rigged because all local and provincial administrators responsible for ballots were CHP party members.[71] Thus, the 1946 elections were far from perfect.

Nevertheless, the holding of the competitive multiparty elections significantly affected the relationship between political parties and Turkish citizens. Prior to 1946, the CHP was the sole political actor that elucidated national goals, identified policy alternatives, and made final decisions. Public opinion was assumed to follow political leaders rather than directing them. As the 1946 elections approached, the CHP became aware that public opinion would be a major factor in Turkish politics and it had to attend to the wishes of its constituents in order to survive political competition against the DP, which was far more popular than the CHP among the public who had been discontented

---

[70] Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, The Making of the Middle East Series (London: Routledge, 1993), 107.

[71] Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 3rd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 212.

with the authoritarianism of the CHP-dominated single party regime. Consequently, the CHP introduced several measures of political liberalization. The restrictions on the media were partially removed. Universities were granted relative autonomy from state control. After the 1946 elections, the CHP tried to appease the public by allowing religious education in public schools, reforming the Village Institutes, which had been depicted by the DP as sources of communist propaganda, and ending martial law that had been imposed since 1940. For the first time in Turkish politics, public opinion became an indispensable factor, empowering dissident groups in society.

In the mid-1940s, contentious politics in Turkey was largely played out between the CHP and the DP rather than between the government and civil society. University students, who would play an important role in protest mobilization in the 1950s, did not have a strong incentive to challenge the state because they saw the CHP, the party of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, as their ultimate leader. Turkish youth were expected to be guardians of the Turkish Republic, and young, secular, educated people were central to the Kemalist project of making a new Turkish nation. Thus, there were several student associations such as the National Turkish Student Union (Milli Türk Telebe Birliği), and they did support government policies to disseminate Kemalist ideology in society.[72]

The main target of state repression during this period was the Turkish Left. Socialism and communism entered Turkey during the late Ottoman period. The leftist ideology appealed to a small circle of intellectuals, but never succeeded in attracting a significant popular support. By taking advantage of the relative political freedom after

---

[72] Leyla Neyzi, "Object or Subject? The Paradox of Youth in Turkey," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33, no. 03 (2002): 418.

World War II, the Turkish Left founded several leftist political parties. They were all closed down by the CHP government which equated the leftist ideology with treason and threat to the Republic. There was no strong popular protest against the government that summarily banned the leftist parties.[73] State control over the Left became more repressive in the late-1940s as the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union began to be reflected in Turkish domestic politics. In April 1948, the socialist novelist and journalist Sabahattin Ali was murdered by a man who was believed to be connected with the government intelligence organization that was cracking down on the Left.

Fear of communism also affected universities. In 1947, four professors in Ankara University were expelled because they were accused of engaging in communist propaganda. “Red witch hunting” on campus led to protests by the leftist students who criticized the decision of the minister of education who suspended the professors without direct proof that they disseminated communism through teaching. The rightist and conservative students responded in kind.[74] Right-wing student associations began to resist communism through a variety of campaigns, which were widely hailed as signs of patriotism to the Turkish nation.

Despite the growing tension between the leftists and the rightists on campus, contentious politics was limited to the educated young people. Before the 1950s, political protests did not boil over into other sectors of society. For instance, trade unionism was limited by laws related to public order and associations. Trade unions and professional organizations were considered threat to a “classless, unified society” envisioned by the

---

[73] George S. Harris, "The Left in Turkey," *Problems of Communism* 29, (1980): 28.

[74] Karpat, 372-373.

Kemalist regime. The CHP government decided to introduce a new Unions Law in 1947 in order to win popular support before the upcoming general elections and to preempt the development of spontaneous organizations by the working class.[75] Thus, workers were granted the right to organize in 1947, but they were forbidden to strike and engage in political activity.

Overall, in the late 1940s, aside from small-scale protests by university students and anticommunist groups, civil society did not pose any direct threat to the regime. Popular discontent with the authoritarian political system and the war-torn economy definitely existed but submerged in society. Thus, the state did not have to impose harsh sanctions upon the society. Thus, I characterize the late 1940s as a period of non-confrontation.

3.5.2 Period II (1950-1959): Suppressed Civil Society

In the 1950 general elections the DP emerged as the genuine popular party, representing diverse interests of private businesses and peasants who had accumulated fear and despair against the authoritarian single-party rule by the CHP. The DP won 408 seats while the CHP won only 69 seats. İsmet İnönü, the leader of the CHP, decided to accede to the popular will that chose the opposition DP as the new governing party, and he stepped down. The peaceful transfer of power in the 1950 elections was one of the most important turning points in the history of Turkey's path toward democracy .

The transition to multiparty politics in Turkey was not caused by popular movements from below demanding democratization. There were social groups supporting

[75] Ronnie Margulies and Ergin Yildizoglu, "Trade Unions and Turkey's Working Class," *MERIP Reports* 121, (1984): 16.

the CHP or the DP as the 1950 elections approached, but civil society associations were not organizing political protest against the state or demanding political liberalization during this period. In the absence of oppositional movements, the state did not have to impose sanctions against society.

The DP came into power through the first democratic election of 1950, and its triumph brought about great hope and the prospect for democratic politics. The Democrats declared that they would start political liberalization and achieve economic modernization. The Turkish economy was growing rapidly, because of the increasing demand for Turkish goods in Europe, favorable weather conditions for agriculture, the Korean War boom, and the massive inflow of foreign aid through the Marshall Plan.

Social opposition against the DP government in the early 1950s came from religious groups, anticommunists, and leftist activists. After the 1950 elections, activists of the *Ticani* dervish order started to vandalize busts of Atatürk. The DP government arrested their leader and introduced a new law against defaming Atatürk's memory in 1951. The Ministry of Interior in 1951 ordered all provincial governors to take strict measures to protect Atatürk's statues from Islamists' vandalism and opened investigations against Islamist journals which were charged with the political use of religion.[76] Although the DP government implemented some pro-Islamic policies to address the popular opposition to militant secularism espoused by the CHP, it did not concede to the Islamists who directly challenged secular republicanism of the Turkish state.

---

[76] Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), 367.

In addition to these minor disruptive actions by Islamists, student demonstrations on ideological grounds appeared on campus. In March 1951, leftist students marched to denounce "reactionary" media outlets. Furthermore, the government's decision to send troops to the Korean War led socialist intellectuals such as Behice Boran found an antiwar association in 1950.[77] Boran and other antiwar activists distributed handbills with antiwar messages. The police immediately detained Boran and other members of the association.

Other than these small-scale vandalism and nonviolent demonstrations, there was no serious antigovernmental disruptive action on the street in the early 1950s. The government could easily disperse demonstrators and take measures to prevent the actions from escalating into large-scale demonstrations.

Although the DP won the 1950 elections calling for democracy, the DP government became increasingly authoritarian in the mid-1950s. The landslide victory of the 1950 elections led the Democrats believe "majoritarian democracy," which meant for them that the governing party could literally do anything it wanted. Despite the fact that they promised to liberalize political systems, the DP government did not intend to reform the remnants of the single party politics of the CHP.

In the 1954 elections, the DP once again won the majority in parliament, defeating the CHP. While voters in rural areas and the private business sector continued to support the DP, the urban intelligentsia, students, and professionals became critical of

---

[77] Kakizaki, "Anti-Iraq War Protests in Turkey: Global Networks, Coalitions, and Context," 82.

the DP's lack of interest in political reforms, shifting their support to the CHP.[78] In addition, the economic boom that was the main source of the DP's popularity in the first half of the 1950s turned into recession. The cost of living rose by 150 percent between 1953 and 1958. Inflation affected workers, civil servants, teachers, and military officers.

Understanding that his popularity was waning and the opposition CHP was regaining popular support from a variety of constituencies that were disillusioned by the DP's failure in political liberalization and economic management, Prime Minister Menderes began using authoritarian measures to repress rival political parties and harass the mass media critical of the DP. Various scholars point out that the DP's authoritarian tendency became increasingly apparent from 1953 onward. In response to a rising wave of antigovernment opposition, the DP government tightened its measures against higher education, the media, the bureaucracy, and the CHP. In 1953, university professors were banned from engaging in political activity because of their noticeable tendency to move away from the DP to the CHP.[79] Turhan Feyzioğlu, Dean of the Political Science Faculty of Ankara University, was suspended by government order for challenging the government's decision not to promote a faculty member who criticized government policy. The dismissal of Feyzioğlu sparked off a campus demonstration in which about 300 students walked out of classes to protest the government.[80] This incident was the first

---

[78] Sabri Sayarı, "Adnan Menderes: Between Democratic and Authoritarian Populism," in *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 72; Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 112.

[79] Weiker, 10.

[80] Leslie L. Jr Roos, Noralou P. Roos, and Gary E. Field, "Students and Politics in Turkey," *Daedalus* 97, (1968): 190.

direct intervention by the government in higher education. In March 1954, the DP government passed a new law prescribing severe penalty for journalists who wrote "harmful articles" against the political and financial prestige of the state. In 1956, additional amendments were made to this law, which resulted in the imprisonment of hundreds of news reporters and the substantial curtailment of freedom of the press. The bureaucracy also became a target of the DP government because the DP deputies believed that the civil servants including judges and professors were still loyal to İsmet İnönü, the revered leader of the CHP. In 1954, a new law was passed giving the government the authority to force civil servants to retire without the right to appeal, enabling the DP to put the bureaucracy and the courts under its influence.[81] In parliament, the government enacted a law that confiscated the assets of the CHP by state treasury on the ground that they had been inappropriately acquired during the single party period.

Prior to the 1957 general elections, a new election law was introduced in order to prohibit opposition parties from using a mixed list in order to preempt electoral cooperation between them. The opposition parties were further harassed by the government's decision not to allow them to use the state radio for electoral campaigns although the DP continued to use it.[82] Another newly enacted law banned political parties from holding political gatherings in public except during an electoral campaign period.[83]

---

[81] Aryeh Shmuelevitz, "Adnan Menderes," in *Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa: A Biographical Dictionary*, ed. Bernard Reich (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 337.

[82] Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975*, 53.

[83] Zürcher, 231.

In the late 1950s, the DP government began to be more repressive against the opposition, which led to a rise of antigovernment protests by students. Student riots became part of everyday life, which involved frequent clashes between protesters and security forces.

Thus, this period between 1950 and 1959 can be categorized as a repressive phase of contentious politics in which contentious civil society actors and opposition parties were frequently harassed, threatened, and intimidated by the government increasingly resorting to social sanctions. As Table 3.3 demonstrates, the level of social control was significantly higher than that of protest. Although the DP won the 1957 elections, the opposition CHP increased its share of votes and seats in parliament, indicating the growing unpopularity of the DP government.

3.5.3 Period III (1960-1970): Confrontation

The climax of antigovernment protest movements was the student riots in Istanbul and Ankara in April 1960. On April 28, over 10,000 students in Istanbul University with banners and portraits of Atatürk demonstrated against the DP's decision to set up an investigative committee against the CHP. The police tried to disperse the students with tear-gas bombs, and finally opened fire with pistols. The government sent tanks and cavalry to help the police although the troops did not interfere with the students' march. According to the Ministry of Interior, one student was killed and 31 people were injured including 15 police officers. The number of students arrested reached 1,000.[84]

[84] *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, vol. 12, p. 17502, 1959/60.

In Ankara, 4,000 students of Law and Political Science faculties marched the next day. The media was forbidden to report these antigovernment demonstrations. Four opposition newspapers and two weekly magazines were suppressed by the government because they reported these disturbances. The universities were closed down for a month, and martial law was declared in major cities. Students, however, continued to incite demonstrations in Istanbul and Ankara every night, demanding the resignation of Menderes. The demonstrations further spread to other cities such as Izmir and Iskenderun.[85]

On May 14, about 5,000 students carried out a huge demonstration in Ankara. The police used tear-gas to break up the demonstration. Prime Minister Menderes never showed a conciliatory sign against the demonstrations and refused to resign. Unable to effectively halt student protests, the government decided to use the army to crack down, but the arbitrary use of the army to suppress student demonstrations resulted in a large silent march by some hundreds of cadets of the War Academy in Ankara in uniform on May 21. Encouraged by the march of the cadets who refused to obey the order to disperse students, thousands of ordinary citizens staged their own antigovernment demonstrations, against which the police used tear-gas.

The military takeover took place in the morning of 27 May 1960, banning all political activities and dissolving Parliament. The DP was banned, 4,000 of its leading figures were tried, and Prime Minister Menderes along with two other DP leaders were hanged in 1961. A constituent assembly drafted a new liberal constitution that introduced bicameralism, the system of checks and balances, and social rights into Turkey. The

[85] Ibid; Roos et al., "Students and Politics in Turkey," 191.

constitution was more liberal than the previous constitution of 1924, tolerating leftist and rightist ideologies, which led to the emergence of radical politics in subsequent years. The military established a "National Unity Committee" headed by a military general to oversee civilian politics and advise the government on important policy issues. When the new constitution was approved in the national referendum, the military returned to its barracks, lifting the ban on political activity in early 1961.[86]

The military regime took harsh measures against "counter-revolutionary" activities. Local governors were empowered to take into custody those endangering the order, security, or safety of the state in order to suppress the counter-revolutionary activities. From late June to early August, more than 200 people were arrested for organizing opposition demonstrations or disseminating information harmful to the government.[87] Special revolutionary tribunals were established in August to try anti-government dissenters. In March 1961, 27 people including intellectuals and professionals were found guilty of planning to overthrow the government and set free Menderes and other members of the DP from jails. The government also announced that DP supporters who were plotting sabotage a power station in Istanbul and causing social chaos in Ankara were arrested. A religious group that had gathered in Istanbul for the funeral of a former DP politician organized a demonstration in which they chanted Islamic hymns in defiance of the law prohibiting public religious demonstration. Nineteen people were arrested.[88] Government crackdowns on subversive activities

---

[86] Weiker.

[87] *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, vol. 12, p. 17608, 1959/60.

[88] *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, vol. 13, p. 18028, 1961.

against the new regime continued even after the military handed over power to a newly elected civilian government in 1961. Newspapers reported in the summer of 1961 that police arrested a number of citizens who allegedly plotted to overthrow the government or incite a public disturbance.[89]

Overall, the period between 1958 and 1962 is characterized by the confrontational phase of contentious politics. Social groups organized a large number of demonstrations against either the DP government or the military government. Their activities sometimes escalated to spontaneous riots and armed attacks on property and rival groups. The state authorities (both the DP government and the military government) took repressive measures to intimidate the opposition.

The next two years between 1963 and 1965 comprised a relatively stable, non-confrontational period. The intensity of protest activities was lower than that of the previous period. The intensity of social control imposed by the state on societal groups also marked a significant decline because of the redemocratization in 1961. Although students continued to organize street demonstrations in major cities, the number of more disruptive activities such as riots and armed attacks decreased in the mid-1960s (Table 3.3). Civilian governments, in turn, did not have to impose sanctions on society because of the relative tranquility on the street.

In the 1965 general elections, the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP), which was the heir to the DP, won a landslide victory, gaining an absolute majority in Parliament. Süleyman Demirel, the leader of the AP, became prime minister and he would govern the country for the next five years. Although leftist students sporadically organized

---

[89] *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, vol. 13, p. 18649, 1961.

demonstrations and public rallies against the AP government and they demanded the government to improve the quality of higher education, thanks to economic growth and the rise of real incomes, Demirel enjoyed public support nationwide.

The mid-1960s, however, were the calm before the storm. On the surface, Turkish politics seemed to regain stability and tranquility during this period under the AP government, but the seeds of radical politics among the youth were implanted in the mid-1960s.[90] On the one hand, new intellectual periodicals, debate clubs, and student associations on the left flourished in the 1960s. The Workers' Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, TİP), founded in 1961 by trade unionists, became the first legal socialist party. The TİP won 3 percent of the votes in the 1965 general elections and received 15 seats in Parliament. On the other hand, Alpaslan Türkeş began to mobilize the ultranationalist youth around his own party with strong anti-communist slogans.[91] Leftist and nationalist students frequently organized public meetings, silent marches, and rallies in big cities, some of which resulted in skirmishes.

International politics also encouraged students to demonstrate on the street in this period. First, when the intercommunal dispute between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots intensified in Cyprus in 1963, thousands of university students organized demonstrations, urging the Turkish government to take measures to support the Turkish

---

[90] One major threat to the regime came from radicals in the army led by Colonel Talat Aydemir. Opposing any return to civilian politics, Aydemir carried out two unsuccessful military coups in 1962 and 1963. In 1962, he was pardoned, but in 1963 he was executed. The unrest caused by this abortive coup in 1963 led to the declaration of martial law in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. The martial law remained in effect until July 1964. See George S. Harris, "Military Coups and Turkish Democracy, 1960–1980," *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 2 (2011): 205.

[91] Jacob M. Landau, "The Nationalist Action Party in Turkey," *Journal of Contemporary History* 17, no. 4 (1982).

community in Cyprus. Second, the effect of the Cold War and the rivalry between the two superpowers began to be felt on the street. The arrival of the U.S. 6th Fleet in Istanbul in 1967 and the official visit of Alexey Kosigin to Turkey in 1966 became the primary targets of antiimperialist and anticommunist demonstrations.

Despite these numerous demonstrations, marches, and sit-ins that acquired ideological aspects more clearly in the mid-1960s, they did not escalate into full-fledged violent clashes. The 1961 constitution, which provided the media and higher education with relative autonomy from state control, constrained the civilian governments from taking tough measures against popular demonstrations.

In the late 1960s, Turkish politics entered a period of highly contentious politics in which political protest became very intense and violent. As radical political ideologies on both the left and the right infiltrated into Turkish society, students and workers became increasingly politicized. Universities and high schools became ideological battlegrounds for political radicalism where student groups clashed along ideological lines. Leftist students attacked both nationalists and religious groups, and they furiously challenged Turkey's alliance with the United States and NATO. In industrial factories, trade unionism began to radicalize its movement, organizing strikes, boycotts, and work stoppage. The rise of socialist movements in Turkey led to the development of the counter-mobilization of the youth on the right that was driven by anti-communism.[92] In order to more effectively deal with political protest and other forms of disruptive actions, the Turkish government set up Community Police known as *Toplum Polisi* in Turkish.[93]

---

[92] Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*.

[93] Uysal, 192.

The years 1969 and 1970 marked the peak of contentious politics before an indirect military intervention that took place in 1971. What differentiated protest actions during this period from the previous one was the increase of riots and armed physical attacks, which caused a series of social disorders. Leftist extremists, who were deeply disappointed by the electoral failure of the TİP in the 1969 general elections, abandoned the idea of achieving a socialist revolution through democratic means. The leftist militants supported student clashes on the street to create sufficient social chaos to provoke a military intervention. It was expected that a coalition of progressive military officers and leftist intellectuals would set up a government to implement social reforms on behalf of workers and peasants.[94] Heavy clashes between the leftist and ultranationalist groups on campus as well as clashes between students and the security forces persuaded school administrators to close down their schools. Students' radical collective actions quickly spread out from major cities into provincial towns.

In February 1969, upon the arrival of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in Istanbul, 30,000 protesters organized a mass meeting in Taksim Square shouting anti-American slogans. The leftist demonstrators were attacked by a religious group of counter-protesters, leaving two students dead and at least 200 people wounded. In June 1970, more than 100,000 workers organized spontaneous demonstrations in Istanbul and the Marmara region to show their opposition to the amended law strengthening a progovernment labor confederation and limiting collective bargaining. The huge demonstrations of workers turned into rampage,

---

[94] Ahmet Samin, "The Tragedy of the Turkish Left," *New Left Review*, no. 126 (1981).

damaging hundreds of workplaces. The government only could put them down with tanks and troops.

Furthermore, some elements of the leftist groups had begun to use violent and terrorist tactics such simultaneous robberies, bombings, kidnappings, and murders by the end of 1970. Influenced and trained by Al-Fatah, the Palestinian Arab guerrilla movement in Syria, Turkish al-Fatah members brought revolutionary rhetoric into Turkish student movements.[95] These radicals played an important role in the People's Liberation Army of Turkey (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu, THKO), which carried out guerrilla activities to overthrow the existing political and socio-economic structures and support the Kurdish struggle in the eastern region. The THKO kidnapped four American airmen on March 4, 1971, demanded the payment of 400,000 dollars by the U.S. government for the release of the kidnapped and the publicity for their manifesto.

The Demirel government's decision to impose an austerity program infuriated organized workers. DISK (the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey) organized a labor demonstration in Istanbul in June, 1970 to protest the government which wanted to limit collective bargaining and weaken trade unions through legislation. More than 100,000 workers and students joined a violent protest to which tanks and paratroops were sent.

3.5.4 Period IV (1971-1977): Dual Power

Prime Minister Demirel could not effectively tackle the political violence, labor unrest, and stagnation of economy when the situation was approaching a state of chaos in

[95] Robert W. Olson, "Al-Fatah in Turkey: Its Influence on the March 12 Coup," *Middle Eastern Studies* 9, no. 2 (1973).

early 1971. He was complaining that the liberal 1961 Constitution obstructed effective governmental control of political radicalism. Under the 1961 constitution, university campuses were off limits to police. In addition, his power within the AP was collapsing as various factions left the party to form splinter parties. He attempted to curtail the influence of interest groups and civil society organizations through legislative and administrative reforms in Parliament, but he failed to pass the amendments because of his declining leadership in the AP and the opposition of the judicial bureaucracy which was a close ally of the CHP.

On March 1971, the military intervened for the second time by presenting a memorandum demanding the resignation of Demirel in order to form a new technocratic cabinet, which would be credible, strong, and nonpartisan enough to restore law and order. The priority of the military intervention of 1971 was to depoliticize society by limiting freedom guaranteed by the 1961 Constitution, which had expanded autonomy and influence of a variety of actors ranging from universities to labor unions. The state authority declared martial law in eleven provinces including Ankara, Istanbul, and the southeast region, the Kurdish nationalist stronghold. The leftist movement became a major target of political sanctions. According to Sayarı, about 4,000 political activists were arrested in 1971.[96] The 1961 Constitution was amended to restrict rights and freedoms.

The military intervention of 1971 failed to depoliticize civil society and contain political violence. The period between 1973 and 1977 saw a series of unstable, short-

[96] Sabri Sayarı, "Patterns of Political Terrorism in Turkey," *TVI Journal* 6, no. 1 (1985): 40-41.

lived coalitions in power. The CHP and the AP could never win an absolute majority in Parliament to form a stable single party government. The polarized parliament and partisanship significantly reduced the capacity of the government to effectively tackle domestic disturbance. The effect of the 1971 military intervention, which imprisoned thousands of political activists, was "ruined by an amnesty granted in 1974 after the return to an elected government, much to the chagrin of the military."[97] Political violence had largely occurred within the universities in the 1960s, but it moved to all corners of public life in the 1970s. Thus, in this period the dual power situation of contentious politics emerged in which civil society associations further escalated their anti-government activities while the unstable coalitional governments were ineffective in containing political violence.

Sabri Sayarı finds that there were two cycles of political violence in the 1960s and the 1970s in Turkey.[98] The first cycle started in 1968 and ended in 1972. The second cycle ranged from 1975 to 1980. Although the cycles were similar to each other in the fact that each cycle started with student violence on the university campuses, escalated in the middle of the cycle, and eventually crushed by military interventions (1971 and 1980), Sayarı argues that the second cycle differed from the first cycle with respect to the scale of violence. For instance, nearly 50 people were killed in political violence between 1970 and 1972. The number of causality between 1975 and 1980, however, was about 4,500. The annual death tolls of this period were as follows: 37 in 1975; 108 in 1976; 319 in

---

[97] Dodd, 138.

[98] Sayarı, "Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976-1980: A Retrospective Analysis."

1977; 1,096 in 1978; 1,362 in 1979; and 1,928 in the first nine months of 1980.[99] The nature of the violent tactics also changed in this period. Political kidnapping had been the main tactic of political terrorists in the previous cycle; the most popular tactics in the 1970s were bombings, armed attacks, and assassinations. Furthermore, selective kidnappings and assassinations were replaced with indiscriminate ones.

Although the indices of social control and protest activities that I have created based on the *World Handbook* do not tap on the years from 1978 to 1980, we can reasonably speculate that the protest magnitude further increased in the last three years of the 1970s whereas the social control magnitude remained low. In fact, Sayarı notes that "there was a partial collapse of the state's authority in various parts of the county" where political extremists both on the left and the right controlled neighborhoods in the late 1970s.[100] Similarly, Altunışık and Tur write,

> Neighborhoods were divided in a left-right polarization and each group created what was termed as 'liberated zones' (*kurtarilmis bolgeler*) for their activities. Street violence became a common theme between the radicals on both sides. Assassinations of prominent intellectuals, professors, journalists and former MPs further contributed to a feeling of terror and led to a declaration of martial law in thirteen provinces.[101]

As riots, armed attacks, bank robberies, and communal strife escalated around the country, the military asked the government to give more resources to them in order to more effectively deal with political terrorism. From the viewpoint of the military, the

---

[99] See also Lucille W. Pevsner, *Turkey's Political Crisis: Background, Perspectives, Prospects* (New York: Praeger, 1984), 68.

[100] Sabri Sayarı, *Generational Changes in Terrorist Movements: The Turkish Case* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1985), 42.

[101] Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür, *Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 41.

civilian governments were unwilling and unable to restore order, shore up the economy, and save the country. In fact, civilian leaders were reluctant to empower the military and suppress their own supporters who were conducting disruptive political actions. For instance, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, the party chairman of the CHP in the 1970s, refused to declare martial law because he believed that martial law would allow the military authority to gain an upper hand over his civilian government and arrest a large number of leftist activists who had supported the CHP.[102]

It was as if the state was decaying and radical leftists and ultranationalists were establishing their own holds in the country, pushing Turkey into a state of civil war. According to the minister of the interior, in the first eight months of 1977 there were 184 killed in political strife, compared to 34 in 1975 and 90 in 1976. During the same period in 1977 there were 521 bomb attacks, compared to 9 in 1975 and 176 in 1976.[103] The May Day rally of 1977, known as the Bloody Sunday of Istanbul, was the most significant occasion of political violence in which forty demonstrators were killed and hundreds were injured. A new aspect of political violence in the mid-1970s was the increase of political assassination targeting intellectuals, journalists, and politicians. In addition, the development of intercommunal violence between the Sunnis, the Alevis, and the Kurds also contributed to social insecurity. In December 1978, ultranationalist militants attacked Alevi Kurdish residents of Kahramanmaras, a south central Anatolian town, and more than 100 were killed. This massacre led to the imposition of martial law

---

[102] Masaki Kakizaki, "The Republican People's Party and the Military in 1970s Turkey," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 19, no. 1-2 (2013): 64.

[103] Pevsner, 68.

in the affected region and the arrest of 800 suspects, but intercommunal violence did not stop.[104]

Bal and Laçiner emphasize the political cause of political terrorism that Turkey witnessed in the 1970s.[105] First, weak coalition governments that took office between 1973 and 1980 failed to implement efficient and effective measures that were necessary to discourage political dissenters from employing violent tactics. Second, both Ecevit's CHP and Demirel's AP were pulled further to the extreme ends of political spectrum. Demirel moved to the right because of his partnership with other nationalist and Islamist parties. Ecevit was pulled to the left by the radical socialist groups within his party. The third political factor contributing to political terrorism was the politicization of the civil service including the police department. Bal and Laçiner note that "Changes of governments were followed by extensive purges in all ministries, including not only the top echelons but also many middle and lower-rank civil servants."[106] The hijacking of the civil service, police in particular, led to an arbitrary response and intervention to political protest, damaging its legitimacy.

Thus, the military, which concluded that civilian politicians would never be able to reestablish law and order in society and suppress political violence against the state,

---

[104] For the number of terrorist activities including bombing and armed robbery between 1974 and 1980, see Bal and Laçiner, "The Challenge of Revolutionary Terrorism to Turkish Democracy 1960-80," 108.

[105] Ibid. For other theoretical explanations of political terrorism during this period, see Orlow, "Political Violence in Pre-Coup Turkey."; Bilge Criss, "Mercenaries of Ideology: Turkey's Terrorism War," in *Terrorism and Politics*, ed. Barry Rubin (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); Serif Mardin, "Youth and Violence in Turkey," *European Journal of Sociology* 19, no. 2 (1978).

[106] Bal and Laçiner, "The Challenge of Revolutionary Terrorism to Turkish Democracy 1960-80," 108.

carried out Turkey's most brutal intervention in Turkish history in September 1980, banning all political parties, prohibiting all political activity of civil society associations and groups, and arresting more than 10,000 citizens in the first six weeks. The antiterrorist campaign by the military junta successfully ended political terrorism in the country at the cost of a number of human rights violations and torture. In fact, the 1980 military coup was far more repressive and brutal than the previous interventions of 1960 and 1971.

The military leaders presented their actions as a temporary suspension of civilian politics in an effort to improve public order, promising not to stay in power for long. The leaders clearly sensed that the political circumstance of the late 1970s was different from that of the late 1960s although both periods similarly faced the rise of violence; the difference was the capacity of the governments to impose negative sanctions against radical protesters. Weak coalition governments, partisanship, and the politicization of the state agencies significantly incapacitated civilian leaders from taking effective measures on terrorism in the 1970s, which pushed the state-society relationship to a stage of dual power politics.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter illustrates how the dynamics of political repression and protest changed over time in post-WWII Turkey and demonstrates the usefulness of the interactive model that combines the repression intensity and the protest intensity into analysis. This model helps us understand under what condition the state-society relations shift from one phase to another. The change in the nature of contentious politics is

determined by the interaction between state sanctions and protests. Depending on this interactional effect, the state-society relationship may reflect four different phases including nonconfrontation, suppressed civil society, confrontation, and dual power.

Applying this model, I examined the relationship between domestic threats and political repression in Turkey between 1948 and 1977. The analysis produces two important findings. First, the nature of contentious politics shifted from nonconfrontation (1948-1949), to suppression (1950-1959), confrontation (1960-1970), and dual power (1971-1977). By integrating the scale of protest and the scale of social control, we can more meaningfully analyze the changing state-society relations. Thus, my analysis in this chapter contributes to the existing literature on Turkish contentious politics which tends to focus only on the protest dimension of state-society relations.

Second, this chapter finds that the political environment in the 1970s was far more threatening to the regime in the previous periods not only because political violence escalated but also because the governments failed to impose sanctions enough to contain political terrorism. The dual power situation of the 1971-1977 period refers to a situation in which the state was losing control over political dissent and opposition groups became too powerful, achieving relative autonomy from state control. In other words, in this dual power phase of contentious politics the country simply became ungovernable.

Thus, the main cause of the 1980 military intervention, the most brutal and comprehensive coup d'état in Turkish history, was the erosion of a balance between political participation and political control. In his seminal work on political development, Samuel Huntington suggested that political decay often happens when social mobilization

outpaces political institutionalization.[107] As long as political institutions have the ability to make a variety of social forces work together toward common interests, modernization will result in political development. In contrast, political decay is likely to happen if rapid social change and rapid social mobilization of new social forces are not followed by the development of political institutions. What we witnessed in 1970s Turkey was the process of political decay in which the aspiration of new social groups for social mobility and political participation were not adequately addressed by state elites. Furthermore, a series of unstable and short-lived coalition governments contributed to the failure of the state to govern society and restore authority of government institutions. The government lost its control over society, and protest groups gained more autonomy from state control. To conclude, I argue that the 1980 military intervention was not simply caused by the rise of political violence but by the emergence of this dual power situation.

[107] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).



Figure 3.1 Four Phases of Contentious Politics



Figure 3.2 Scale of Protest and Social Control in Turkey (1948-1977)

Table 3.1

Frequencies of Protest Demonstrations, Riots, Armed Attacks, and Government Sanctions in Turkey between 1948 and 1977

	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Demonstration	0	0	0	0	0	0
Riot	0	0	0	0	0	0
Armed Attack	0	0	0	0	0	0
Government Sanction	6	3	1	9	3	9

	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Demonstration	0	0	1	0	1	7
Riot	0	10	0	7	1	3
Armed Attack	0	0	0	0	2	3
Government Sanction	12	14	23	21	20	27

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Demonstration	23	1	2	6	0	0
Riot	7	4	1	1	0	1
Armed Attack	0	0	3	0	0	0
Government Sanction	56	23	12	16	11	0

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Demonstration	2	6	4	8	3	1
Riot	3	3	1	8	6	2
Armed Attack	4	1	1	5	8	12
Government Sanction	7	2	1	6	5	24

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Demonstration	1	0	3	5	0	2
Riot	0	0	1	8	8	4
Armed Attack	12	4	0	6	3	15
Government Sanction	15	12	9	6	7	6

Source: Taylor and Hudson (1972) and Taylor and Jodice (1983).

Table 3.2

Indices of Protest Magnitude and Social Control

	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Protest	80	80	80	80	80	80
Social Control	89	83	80	94	83	94

	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Protest	80	106	83	98	90	113
Social Control	100	103	120	116	114	127

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Protest	157	93	95	98	80	83
Social Control	180	120	100	107	98	78

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Protest	103	106	95	134	124	119
Social Control	91	81	80	89	87	121

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Protest	113	90	90	129	108	134
Social Control	105	100	94	89	91	89

Table 3.3

Parameters of Contentious Politics in Turkey

Period	Protest	Social Control	Contention
I (1948-49)	80	86	Non-confrontational
II (1950-59)	81	103	Suppressed civil society
III (1960-70)	106	101	Confrontational
IV (1971-77)	112	98	Dual power

CHAPTER 4

PROTEST EVENT ANALYSIS (1980-1999)

4.1 Introduction

The last two decades of the 20th century were a particularly significant period for contentious politics in Turkey. First, the structure of political opportunities significantly changed during the 1980s as Turkey experienced the 1980 military intervention, the transition to a civilian regime in 1983, and economic and political liberalization. In other words, changing political opportunities affected political milieu and increased or decreased incentives for political action among potential protesters. Second, this period witnessed the growth and diversification of civil society associations as political opportunities opened for a variety of actors in the 1990s. As many observers have claimed, civil society associations became a new political actor that acquired greater influence on politics during this period. Kramer wrote that

> As a consequence of the economic and social modernization that started in the 1980s, a civil society has developed. The people, accustomed to a ready-made state tradition, have begun to organize to protect their rights against economic and political power and have taken first steps for a transformation of society from bottom to top in contradiction to the established practice of top-down social engineering by the state.[108]

[108] Heinz Kramer, *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 18.

As a result of these transformations of the environment for protest politics, protest itself should have altered its frequency, intensity, and other attributes during this period.

However, the existing literature on social movement in Turkey provides no empirical data that quantitatively records political protests that ordinary men and women carried out in the public sphere. Therefore, I created my original dataset that catalogues more than 1,000 protest events that took place during the 1980s and 1990s using a Turkish newspaper. My protest event catalogue helps us understand how the patterns and characteristics of contentious political actions have changed over time in Turkey.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the next section, I will discuss methodological advantages and disadvantages of protest event analysis, a quantitative method for studying the patterns of protest events in the public sphere. This will be followed by the presentation of the data used for this analysis and the explanation of data collection. Then I will discuss the development of civil society in Turkey after the 1980 military intervention. The subsequent section is devoted to the examination of the protest event catalog and the analysis of the major characteristics of protest actions that the people organized during the 1980s and the 1990s.

4.2 Protest Event Analysis

In this section, I will discuss how we can study the historical transformation of protest actions in a systematic way. The immediate answer to this question is that we use protest event analysis. Protest event analysis is a research method developed "to systematically map, analyze, and interpret the occurrence and properties of large numbers of protests by means of content analysis, using sources such as newspaper reports and

police records."[109] Similarly, Rucht claimed that protest event analysis is a powerful method for "establishing the patterns behind protests and the structural conditions which are responsible for them."[110] Protest event analysis makes it possible and easier for researchers to observe changes in the dimensions of collective action, such as its frequency, location, action form, mobilization size, claim, target, and so on.[111]

Protest event analysis is particularly useful to this study for several reasons. First, this method allows me to empirically observe protest cycles in which protests increase and decrease with tactical innovation. Second, protest event analysis allows me to see geographic concentration and dispersion of protest activities and changes in protesters' claims and targets. Finally, protest event analysis enables me to relate protest cycles, locations, claims, and targets in order to examine the interactions of these factors. Thus, I believe that protest event analysis is an appropriate analytical tool to answer my primary research goal in this chapter: to understand the long-term variation of contentious

---

[109] Ruud Koopmans and Dieter Rucht, "Protest Event Analysis," in *Methods of Social Movement Research*, ed. Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg (Minneapolis, MN; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 231.

[110] Dieter Rucht, "On the Sociology of Protest Marches," in *The Street as Stage: Protest Marches and Public Rallies since the Nineteenth Century*, ed. Matthias Reiss (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 49.

[111] For the study of contentious political action through protest event analysis, see, for example, Tarrow; Dieter Rucht, Ruud Koopmans, and Friedhelm Neidhardt, eds., *Acts of Dissent: New Developments in the Study of Protest* (Lanham, MD: 1999); Tilly, *Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834*; Christopher Rootes, ed. *Environmental Protest in Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Herbert P. Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies," *British Journal of Political Science* 16, no. 1 (1986); Maria Kousis, "Environmental Protest Cases: The City, the Countryside, and the Grassroots in Southern Europe," *Mobilization: An International Journal* 4, no. 2 (1999).

collective actions in Turkey between 1980 and 1999. Since this study of protest actions is exploratory, I use protest event analysis for descriptive purposes.[112]

Protest event analysis is less frequently used in the field of social movement studies compared to other methods such as participant observation, discourse analysis, historical analysis, and small-N studies. However, protest event analysis has established itself as a variant of content analysis of news reports on protest activities. Political scientists and sociologists who are interested in protests, civil strife, rebellion, and violence have use protest event analysis since the 1960s. The path-breaking studies in this tradition include the quantitative study of riots, macrohistorical studies on labor strikes and political violence. Other scholars also began to employ protest event analysis to study social movements. For instance, McAdam's work on civil rights protests in the United States, which relied on protest stories contained in the annual indices of the New York Times, became a harbinger of the political process model of social movements.[113] Sidney Tarrow traced protest cycles in Italy between 1966 and 1989 collecting protest data from Italian national newspapers.[114]

Since the 1990s, protest event data have been widely applied to various collective action in non-Western societies. Examples include Olzak and Olivier's research on civil rights movements in South Africa, White's study on peasants' uprisings in early modern Japan, Beissinger's protest analysis in the former Soviet Union, and Ekiert and Kubik's

---

[112] I analyzed the anti-Iraq war protests in Turkey using protest event analysis. See Kakizaki, "Anti-Iraq War Protests in Turkey: Global Networks, Coalitions, and Context."

[113] Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

[114] Tarrow.

study on collective protests in Eastern Europe.[115] More recently, Uba analyzed the impact of popular protests on the Indian government's privatization program.[116] Wada investigated the relationship between economic liberalization and the transformation of popular protest in Mexico.[117]

Although protest event analysis has become one of the most widely used methods to systematically and quantitatively analyze social movements across time and space, we must recognize the weaknesses and shortcomings of this method. First, because protest event analysis is based on media reports of protest events rather than events themselves, the database does not represent the universe of protest events actually taking place. Instead, what the data drawn from news coverage of protest display is the visibility of protest events in the public sphere through the media. Thus, protest event data produce a "constructed reality" according to Koopmans and Rucht. They argue that

---

[115] S. Olzak, "Ethnic Protest in Core and Periphery States," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21, no. 2 (1998); James W. White, *Ikki : Social Conflict and Political Protest in Early Modern Japan* (Ithaca ; London: Cornell University Press, 1995); M. R. Beissinger, "Nationalist Violence and the State - Political Authority and Contentious Repertoires in the Former Ussr," *Comparative Politics* 30, no. 4 (1998); Mark R. Beissinger, "Event Analysis in Transitional Societies: Protest Mobilization in the Former Soviet Union," in *Acts of Dissent: New Developments in the Study of Protest*, ed. Dieter Rucht, Ruud Koopmans, and Friedhelm Neidhardt (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999); G. Ekiert and J. Kubik, "Contentious Politics in New Democracies - East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, 1989-93," *World Politics* 50, no. 4 (1998).

[116] Katrin Uba, "Political Protest and Policy Change: The Direct Impacts of Indian Anti-Privatization Mobilizations, 1990-2003," *Mobilization* 10, no. 3 (2005).

[117] Takeshi Wada, "Who Are the Active and Central Actors in the 'Rising Civil Society' in Mexico?," *Social Movement Studies* 13, no. 1 (2014); Takeshi Wada, "Claim Network Analysis: How Are Social Protests Transformed into Political Protest in Mexico?," in *Latin American Social Movements: Globalization, Democratization, and Transnational Networks*, ed. Hank Johnston and Paul Almeida (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Little Field, 2006); Takeshi Wada, "Civil Society in Mexico: Popular Protest Amid Economic and Political Liberalization," *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 25, no. 1/2 (2005).

> This constructed reality … is of extreme importance for both policymakers and the wider public. We observe our social and political world mainly through the mass media. In a certain sense, protests and other events that remain unreported are simply "non-existent" … for most people.[118]

Scholars using protest event analysis are aware of the role of the mass media that constructs the reality regarding protest politics. According to McCarthy, McPhail, Smith, and Crishock, once protest events are covered by the media, they become public knowledge.[119] Certainly some citizens directly observe protest events or hear about them through networks of personal communication. Most of citizens as well as political elites, however, come to know about them through the mass media. What they observe through the media constitutes the perceived reality about protest politics although it does not represent the universe of protest events. Tarrow emphasizes the effect of reported protest events on policy outcome. He claims that it is only visible, observable, and reported protest events that would influence political decision-makers, the primary target of protesters.[120]

The second weakness of protest event analysis is associated with description bias of the mass media. Each newspaper has its own ideology and political orientation. Leftist papers are more likely to report protest events organized by trade unions, socialists, and students. They also describe these protests with sympathy and they even give strong

---

[118] Koopmans and Rucht, 252.

[119] John D. McCarthy et al., "Electronic and Print Media Representation of Washington D.C. Demonstrations, 1982 and 1991: A Demography of Description Bias," in *Acts of Dissent: New Developments in the Study of Protest*, ed. Dieter Rucht, Ruud Koopmans, and Friedhelm Neidhardt (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).

[120] Tarrow, 28.

support to them. Conservative, nationalist newspapers, in contrast, are less likely to report political protests or they may fiercely criticize them.[121]

Obviously, researchers cannot control description bias inherent in the media industry. We can, however, keep description bias constant over a period of time by consistently using the same newspaper whose political orientation remains the same. As I explain in the next section, I use *Cumhuriyet*, a major Turkish newspaper with secular and leftist orientations as a main source of data. Because the ideological position of this paper did not change during the 1980s and 1990s, the use of *Cumhuriyet* does ensure the systematicity of description bias.

4.3 Data

I used a Turkish national newspaper, *Cumhuriyet*, to create a catalogue of protest events that took place in Turkey between 1981 and 1999. For mapping popular protests, national newspapers are the most easily accessible resource that report protest events across regions and over time. In fact, national newspapers are the most often used source for empirical analysis of contentious politics among scholars utilizing protest event analysis. Although we cannot totally escape from selection bias and description bias of newspapers in collecting protest event episodes, the use of national newspapers as a main data source can be justified for two main reasons. First, researchers use newspapers as the

[121] Olivier Fillieule and Manuel Jimenez, "Appendix A: The Methodology of Protest Event Analysis and the Media Politics of Reporting Environmental Protests," in *Environmental Protest in Western Europe*, ed. Christopher Rootes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 268-269.

"least bad" resource for observing a great number of protests.[122] Thus, according to Koopmans, the popularity of protest event analysis among researchers is "the result of a negative choice."[123] Nevertheless, in terms of consistency, availability, and scope of news coverage, newspapers stand out from other sources such as government statistics, police records, and underground leaflets and magazines of challenging groups.

Second, ordinary citizens, protesters, and political elites get informed about protest activities happening on the streets through reading newspapers. Thus, media coverage of protest is crucial for these actors in the public sphere. As Rucht and Ohlemarcher argue, "at least for the broader public, protest activities exist only to the extent that they are reported by mass media. Therefore, protest groups usually devote much energy to agenda-building and media coverage, although these attempts are not or only successful in many cases."[124] Eisinger similarly claimed that, despite the fact that the media is far from neutral in reporting protest events, news coverage of protest activities is important for activists who attempt to deliver their messages to the public sphere and for citizens who acquire information about social movements through news reports.[125]

---

[122] Ruud Koopmans, "The Use of Protest Event Data in Comparative Research: Cross-National Comparability, Sampling Methods and Robustness," in *Acts of Dissent: New Developments in the Study of Protest*, ed. Dieter Rucht, Ruud Koopmans, and Friedhelm Neidhardt (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).

[123] Ruud Koopmans, *Democracy from Below : New Social Movements and the Political System in West Germany* (Boulder, CO; Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), 253.

[124] Rucht and Ohlemacher, 101, note 3.

[125] Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," *The American Political Science Review* 67, no. 1 (1973).

In this present study, I used *Cumhuriyet* to construct my original dataset of protest events that Turkish citizens carried out in the 1980s and 1990s. *Cumhuriyet* is a center-left and secularist newspaper founded in 1924 by a prominent Turkish journalist Yunus Nadi.[126] Although the *Cumhuriyet* newspaper has the relatively smaller circulation in Turkey, it has been widely read by political elites and intellectuals with secular-leftist persuasion.[127] Due to its ideological sympathy for leftist orientations, *Cumhuriyet* frequently covers protest activities, labor strikes, and other contentious forms of political participation. In addition, *Cumhuriyet* closely follows Islamic political movements because of its staunch support for secularism. Lastly, I chose *Cumhuriyet* for a logistic reason; I have easy access to microfilms of the *Cumhuriyet* newspaper through Interlibrary Loan Service at the Marriot Library of the University of Utah.

For retrieving relevant news articles on protest events, I read sections on domestic politics and economy in addition to front pages every four days between 1981 and 1999. After locating relevant news reports on protests, I scanned and printed them out for coding. I coded various properties of protest events including timing, locations, actors, targets, claims, the number of participants, participating organizations, state response,

---

[126] Şahin Alpay, "Two Faces of the Press in Turkey: The Role of the Media in Turkey's Modernisation and Democracy," in *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem, and Philip Robins (Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 372.

[127] For the role of journalists and the press in Turkey's democracy, see Asli Tunç, "Faustian Acts in Turkish Style: Structural Change in National Newspapers as an Obstacle to Quality Journalism in 1990-2003," in *Quality Press in Southeast Europe*, ed. Orlin Spassov (Sofia: Southeast European Media Center (SOEMZ), 2004); Şahin Alpay, "Journalists: Cautious Democrats," in *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities*, ed. Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü, and Heinz Kramer (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993); Metin Heper and Tanel Demirel, "The Press and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey," in *Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics*, ed. Sylvia Kedourie (London: Routledge, 1998).

and disruptiveness. One newspaper article may report multiple events. Multiple articles may report the same event. In this study, the unit of analysis is each protest event rather than newspaper reports.

For being coded as a protest event for this study, a group of at least two individuals should perform protest collectively. Eisinger used this cutoff of two participants for his study on urban protests in the United States.[128] Tarrow included protest events in which more than 20 people attended.[129] Gurr used a high cutoff of 100 participants in his study on civil disturbance.[130]

Second, protest events must take place in publicly accessible space such as streets, squares, public facilities, and school campus. However, hunger strikes and riots in prisons are exceptional cases. Although prisons are not publicly accessible, I included prison riots and hunger strikes in the protest dataset because of their disruptive impacts on national politics.

The next section briefly discusses civil society and the transformation of state-society relations in the 1980s and 1990s. This analysis is followed by the illustration of my protest event catalogue that demonstrates how the major patterns of popular contention such as frequencies, actors, targets, issues, and action forms in protest actions changed during this period.

---

[128] Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities."

[129] Tarrow.

[130] Ted Robert Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using News Indices," *American Political Science Review* 62, (1968).

4.4 Civil Society in Turkey after the 1980 Military Intervention

As we have examined in the previous chapter, the Turkish political system broke down in 1980 as a result of two combined factors. First, Turkish contentious politics became excessively violent, targeting not only state institutions but also ordinary citizens on the streets in the late 1970s. Second, the Turkish civilian governments failed to adequately address social and economic issues that the popular protests had raised in the public sphere through their disruptive actions and could not effectively contain political violence. In other words, social mobilization and political participation outpaced the development of effective and governable political institutions. This gap between social change and political development was the most important factor contributing to Turkey's political decay in 1980.

Civil liberties were seriously curtailed by the military junta that attempted to end the political, economic, and social crises. The 1982 Constitution prepared by the military was designed to restrict political rights and freedoms of individuals and increased the power of the executive vis-à-vis the legislature. The 1982 Constitution limited political activities of civil society organizations and trade unions as well.[131] Community Police, established in 1965 to deal with disruptive collective action, was abolished and replaced by Rapid Intervention Forces (Çevik Kuvvet) in 1982.[132] Thus, the period between 1980 and 1983 is remembered in Turkey as a dark period for Turkish civil society.

Civil society has started to emerge as a new factor affecting Turkey's political development since the late 1980s. The military returned power to civilian politicians in

---

[131] Özbudun, 57-60.

[132] Uysal, 192.

1983. The balance of power between civilian governments and the military changed in favor of the former under the leadership of Prime Minister Turgul Özal, who would become President in 1989. The power of the bureaucracy in public and economic policy-making was reduced since Turkey decided to replace import substitution industrialization with a free market economy as advised by IMF. The shift toward a free market economy empowered private businesses and societal actors from various segments of society.[133]

Furthermore, because Turkish citizens lost confidence in the existing political parties that were accused of being corrupt and incompetent, civil society associations and NGOs now emerged as new powerful political actors that represented public opinion. The collusion between the state and organized crimes was also exposed to the public eye in 1996.[134] The decline of trust in the Turkish state facilitated the rise of Turkish civil society.[135] The 1995 constitutional amendments repealed some provisions that limited the activities of civil society associations such as trade unions, professional associations, and charity foundations. Last but not least, Turkey's bid to join the European Union induced political liberalization and the expansion of civil society. Combined, these factors contributed to the development of civil society associations in the 1990s.

Thus, the recent literature on Turkish state-society relations seems to agree that civil society in Turkey had expanded in the 1990s as demonstrated by several studies that

---

[133] Ömer Çaha, "The Inevitable Coexistence of Civil Society and Liberalism: The Case of Turkey," *Journal of Economic & Social Research* 3, no. 2 (2001); Yavuz.

[134] James H. Meyer, "Politics as Usual: Ciller, Refah and Susurluk: Turkey's Troubled Democracy," *East European Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (1998).

[135] Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, *Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political Culture and the European Union* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 51-53.

empirically observed the increased number of nongovernmental organizations as well as the diversification of civil society activities.[136]

There has been, however, a debate among scholars on Turkish politics regarding the emergence of political activism in the public space. Some scholars argue that the emergence of a vibrant civil society was followed by the development of political activism.[137] Others claim that, in spite of the development of civil society, Turkish citizens remained inactive in protest politics because they still remembered the suppression imposed by the military junta in the 1980 coup.[138]

In fact, civil society organizations have a variety of strategies to influence what politicians decide and make their voice heard in the public sphere. They may use lobby campaigns, contact their representatives directly, offer electoral contributions to candidates, and even rely on backdoor politics. Protest is just one out of numerous strategies that civil society actors can use to influence politics. Thus, we cannot assume that there is a necessary correlation between the expansion of civil society and the emergence of protest activism. More importantly, the literature on the expansion of civil society in Turkey does not tell us anything about how the modes of unconventional political participation changed in the 1980s and the 1990s. The subsequent sections

---

[136] For example, see Yukiko Hirai and Yutaka Tsujinaga, "The Structure of Civil Society in Turkey: Profile and Behaviour of Turkish Civil Society Organization," *Journal of Modern Cultures and Public Policies* 7, (2007); Stefanos Yerasimos, Günter Seufert, and Karin Vorhoff, eds., *Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism: Studies on Political Culture in Contemporary Turkey* (Istanbul: Orient-Institute, 2000).

[137] For instance, Watts analyzes the rise of Kurdish political activism since the early 1990s. See Nicole F. Watts, "Activists in Office: Pro-Kurdish Contentious Politics in Turkey," *Ethnopolitics* 5, no. 2 (2006).

[138] Neyzi, "Object or Subject? The Paradox of Youth in Turkey."

examine whether participation in protest actions increased during this period and how the nature of protest politics transformed across time using the protest event dataset that I created.

4.5 Protest Events in Turkey between 1981 and 1999

4.5.1 The Cycle of Protest

Figure 4.1 illustrates changes in the incidence of collective protest events from 1981 to 1999. Altogether the total number of protest events was 1,331 during this period. On average, 70 protest events a year were reported, but there was a great amount of variation from year to year. When looking at the frequency of protest over time, we observe that the number of protest events changed significantly. It is apparent that there were three peaks of contentious politics during this period. The number of protest events gradually increased in the second half of the 1980s and peaked in 1989. In 1989, there were 195 incidents of protest events reported in the printed editions of *Cumhuriyet*. The second peak was marked in 1993 after the number of protest events had marked relative decline in the early 1990s. The third peak was recorded in 1999 in which Turkish protesters organized 134 protest gatherings nationwide. Although the existing literature on Turkish contentious politics has suggested the steady increase of social movements since the de-democratization process had started in the late 1980s, my data display a nonlinear pattern of mobilization.

Let us now explain the development of protest mobilization between 1981 and 1999 in some detail. The first four years witnessed almost no protest events reported in *Cumhuriyet*. The lowest level of mobilization in these years was not surprising at all. The military junta that had carried out the military intervention in September 1980

depoliticized the population in order to protect the integrity of the country. Parliament was dissolved, political party leaders were arrested, their parties were banned, and trade unions were suspended. Martial law was declared in all around the country. The military leaders detained and tortured thousands of political activists on both the Left and the Right. According to one estimate, more than 10,000 people were arrested just in the first six weeks and 122,600 people were arrested within a year after the intervention.[139] The military's suppression and serious human rights violations were criticized in the West, but repression continued for the next three years because the military was supported both by a large segment of the Turkish population who believed that the intervention was inevitable for ending political terrorism and the United States and its Western allies which valued Turkey's strategic significance.[140]

The military's campaign to hunt political radicals significantly reduced the number of violent political protests in the first two years of the 1980s. In one sense, ordinary citizens regained the tranquility of society that the military leaders had promised in September 1980. Thirty-eight months of military rule, however, produced one significant negative consequence on Turkish democracy. A series of brutal sanctions traumatized the general public because not only political terrorists but also ordinary citizens including university students, workers, unionists, professionals, and journalists who had not engaged in violence but only expressed dissenting opinions in the 1970s were targeted, harassed, and tortured by the state authority. The Law on Higher

---

[139] Zürcher, 279.

[140] Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003), 151.

Education passed in November 1981 was designed to depoliticize higher education institutions by expelling professors and assistants supportive of socialism and tightening state control over university administration. In fact, numerous scholars and observers of Turkish politics have claimed that young people who spent their formative years during this period showed a strong tendency to be indifferent to politics and withdraw from political participation.[141]

Another goal of the military intervention was to restructure political systems that would prevent political turbulence in the future. Accordingly, the military leaders drafted a new constitution that strengthened the president and the National Security Council. It also curtailed political and civil rights such as the freedom of association, the freedom of speech, and individual liberties. Although these rights were written into the document, individuals were allowed to enjoy these human rights only if their exercise of the rights would not "threaten" national interests as well as public safety. In November 1982, the new constitution was "approved" by a "yes" vote of 91.4 percent in a national referendum as the military leaders had expected. The approval of the new constitution was not surprising because voting was compulsory and any criticism of the draft constitution in the public sphere was prohibited by a decree.

The military junta decided to transfer power to civilian politicians in 1983 after completing the restructuring of the political system under the 1982 constitution. The center-right Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) led by Özal won the 1983 general elections by gaining 45 percent of the votes. The Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi), which the military leaders had founded, was defeated with

---

[141] Demet Lüküslü, *Türkiye'de "Gençlik Miti": 1980 Sonrası Türkiye Gençliği* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009).

only 23 percent of the votes, indicating that the public did not want to remain subject to the military's tutelage.

The 1983 general election was the beginning of gradual liberalization in politics and economy. Politically, Prime Minister Özal was determined to consolidate civilian politics against the military generals.[142] Contrary to some speculation, Özal's new cabinet included no independent members of parliament close to the military.[143] Similarly, the position of the speaker of parliament was not given to a politician who was a former navy commander. The 1987 national referendum allowed the old political leaders such as Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit, who had been barred from politics by the military after the intervention, to return to politics. The return of these old political leaders and their participation in the 1987 general elections became another important step toward democratic consolidation in Turkey. Thus, the second half of the1980s witnessed the transition to civilian politics under Prime Minister Özal, and this process contributed to the remobilization of social movements.

The Özal government also facilitated the resurgence of political activism by creating new "opportunity spaces" through economic liberalization and by helping the "autonomization" of civil society.[144] Prime Minister Özal took over the economic

---

[142] Sabri Sayarı, "Turgut Ozal," in *Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa: A Biographical Dictionary*, ed. Bernard Reich (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 399-401.

[143] Ergun Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations," in *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Ergun Özbudun (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaaşı, 1988), 25.

[144] M. Hakan Yavuz, "Opportunity Spaces, Identity, and Islamic Meaning in Turkey," in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, ed. Quintan Wiktrowicz (Bloomington, IN: Indianapolis University Press, 2004); Göle; Yavuz.

liberalization program that had been introduced before the 1980 coup. His export-oriented economic policies along with the expansion of new infrastructures such as communication technology and highways empowered a variety of groups who had been disadvantaged under the previous statist economy. The development of market economy played a crucial role in emancipating the marginalized sectors of society from the tight grip of the centrist and authoritarian state in Turkey.

The sharp increase of the protest events between 1984 and 1989 displayed in Figure 4.1 gives empirical support to the arguments made by Yavuz and Göle who claimed that popular participation in civic activism intensified when the political structure changed in favor of civil society.[145] In particular, the number of protests more than doubled between 1988 and 1989. The gradual liberalization of political processes and the return to civilian politics brought about new political activism among citizens. In particular, public servants and workers in the public sector became active in the late 1980s participating in mass meetings and rallies organized by TÜRK-İŞ (The Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions).[146]

There were three waves of protest during the 1990s. The first wave of protests occurred in 1993, which reflected growing social and political tensions in Turkey. In April, President Özal unexpectedly died of a supposed heart attack, which shocked the Turkish public. Although Özal was tarred with the unpopularity of his economic policies and corruption scandals in the late eighties, he was a president with courage, leadership,

---

[145] Göle; Yavuz, "Opportunity Spaces, Identity, and Islamic Meaning in Turkey."

[146] Yıldırım Koç, *Workers and Trade Unions in Türkiye* (Ankara: Confederation of Trade Unions of Turkey, 1999), 63-64.

and decisiveness in decision-making. After the sudden death of Özal, Turkey entered a new period characterized by unstable coalitions, distrust, and corruption.[147] In addition to political instability, Turkey faced the escalation of ideological polarization between secularists and Islamists. In January, Turkey's most famous investigative journalist, Uğur Mumcu, was killed by a car bomb. He was known for his extensive work on Islamic fundamentalism, Kurdish movements, and drug smuggling. As a staunch secularist journalist, his assassination was related to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey. The polarization also increased between the Sunni majority and the Alevi minority in the early 1990s. In Sivas in July 1993, 36 Alevi writers and singers were killed by local Salafists who burned the hotel where the Alevi intellectuals had gathered to attend a conference. Among the participants was a leftist novelist Aziz Nesin who was involved in the translation of Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* into Turkish. Thousands of Sunni local residents were incited after Friday prayers and walked to the hotel and set the buildings alight. The year of 1993 was full of public gatherings that protested these murders and religious fanaticism.

The second wave of protests in the 1990s was observed in 1996. Many of the protest events that took place in 1996 were related to the rise of the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) in politics. The RP became the largest party in the general elections of 24 December 1995, and the RP leader Necmettin Erbakan became Turkey's first Islamist prime minister in June 1996 by setting up a coalition government with the

---

[147] For the determinants of popular confidence in government institutions in Turkey, see Masaki Kakizaki, "Determinants of Political Confidence in a Time of Political Realignment: Religion, Economy, and Politics in Turkey," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (2012); Aylin Aydın and Cerem I. Cenker, "Public Confidence in Government: Empirical Implications from a Developing Democracy," *International Political Science Review* 33, no. 2 (2011).

center-right True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) of Tansu Çiller. Erbakan's religiously inspired radical discourse resulted in a number of protests organized by secular sectors of the population who called for the defense of secularism and the fight for religious fundamentalism.

Some other important protest actions that occurred in 1996 were hunger strikes of leftist prisoners.[148] Most of the hunger strikers in prisons were radical youth who were accused of belonging to illegal leftist organizations and of supporting the PKK. They started the hunger strikes at more than 40 jails around the country in early 1996 demanding the end of the abusive treatment of prisoners and protesting against the government's proposal to transfer political prisoners from dormitory prisons to new maximum security solitary cells. Twelve prisoners died, and many others were left physically and mentally disabled from the hunger strike. The prison struggle of 1996 once again revealed the repressive nature of the Turkish government and thousands of urban youth in working class districts organized street protests to demonstrate their solidarity with the hunger strikers and to criticize state violence in prisons.

The third wave of protests in the 1990s took place in 1999. The year 1999 was one of political and social turbulence. For Turkey, 1999 was a year of social and political turbulence. First, the country was hit by two huge earthquakes in August and November (7.4 on the Richter scale and 7.2 on the Richter scale, respectively), killing more than 15,000 people and leaving half a million homeless. The rescue operation poorly coordinated by the government infuriated the public who lost a great deal of trust in politics. Second, the Ecevit government formed after the 1999 general elections was

[148] Joe Beynon, "Hunger Strikes in Turkish Prisons," *Lancet* 348, no. 9029 (1996).

negotiating with the IMF for loans to save the national economy badly hit by the 1998 Russian financial crisis. Ecevit decided to implement economic reform programs as recommended by the IMF and the World Bank including a cut in government spending and privatization in exchange for loans. Labor unions protested against the neoliberal economic program by creating the Labor Platform in which more than 15 labor unions and civic associations participated. The Labor Platform became an informal network to coordinate labor protest actions, public meetings, and rallies to resist economic liberalization and privatization.

The number of protest events I collected from *Cumhuriyet* is undeniably limited. There must have been numerous protest gatherings that took place on the streets that were not being reported in the newspapers. We should not, however, reject the data entirely because the media coverage amplified the impact of these protest events in the public sphere. Newspapers such as *Cumhuriyet* selected these protest incidents, which were politically important and relevant. Being reported by a national newspaper, social movements can increase their resources for mobilization and their presence in public debate on governmental policies. Both general readers and political elites recognize these protests largely by reading the newspaper and understanding that there should be a greater number of similar but unreported protests in the country.

4.5.2 The Rhythm and Size of Protest

Figure 4.2 shows the existence of protest seasons or the rhythm of protest in the space of a year.[149] Here we can identify three seasons of protest politics in Turkey. From February to April the number of protest events goes up. Then, after the decline of protest in May and June the number of protest jumps again through July before declining from August to September. Finally, protest incidents increase to the highest level throughout a year in November before declining sharply in December. In Ankara and Istanbul, the largest cities in Turkey, similar seasonal patterns are observed: the number of protest goes up in in the spring (March and April), in the early summer, and in November.

Information on numbers of protest participants was not available for many of the reported protest events, and even if it was available, the media offered only very rough estimates of the size of protests. Using the information available from *Cumhuriyet*, what I can reasonably estimate regarding the size of protest actions in the case of Turkey is that many of popular protests were small in size with fewer than 100 participants (Figure 4.3). About 44 percent of the reported protests had fewer than 100 participants. By contrast, large scale protests with more than 10,000 participants were rare in Turkey, accounting for only 5 percent of the protests. There were some minor changes over time in terms of the size of popular protests, but contentious politics in Turkey since 1980 can be considered as an aggregate of small-scale collective action.

---

[149] For the rhythm of protest, see Olivier Fillieule, "'Plus Ça Change, Moins Ça Change.' Demonstrations in France During the Nineteen-Eighties," in *Acts of Dissent: New Developments in the Study of Protest*, ed. Dieter Rucht, Ruud Koopmans, and Friedhelm Neidhardt (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).

4.5.3 The Spatial Distribution of Protest

The spatial distribution of reported political protests is influenced by several factors. First, *Cumhuriyet* is more likely to report protest events taking place in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir because it is an Istanbul-based national newspaper with two additional offices in Ankara and Izmir. Although *Cumhuriyet* has local correspondents nationwide, the paper is essentially an urban-based media outlet. Second, protest events in these three major cities might be more frequently reported than in other regions because they are political and economic centers in the country. Ankara, the capital city of Turkey, is a city of politics where students and civil servants have traditionally constituted the most politically active sectors of the population. In contrast, Istanbul is a center of trade and business, and it is Turkey's largest and most dynamic city. Izmir is the third largest industrial port city on the Aegean Sea.

The pattern shown in Table 4.1 is, thus, not unexpected. Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir together account for 70.6 percent of all reported protests between 1980 and 1999. Although Ankara is the city of national politics, it experienced fewer protest events than Istanbul: Ankara accounts for 16.9 percent of the reported protests whereas Istanbul accounts for 46.1 percent. In other words, about half of all protest events of which the location was reported took place in Istanbul. Izmir, despite its economic significance to Turkish economy, forms only a small fraction (7.6 percent) of the reported protests. This general pattern of the geographical distribution of protest did not significantly change over time during the 1980s and 1990s.

As shown in Table 4.2, the most overrepresented location was Istanbul (12.9 percent of the Turkish population, but 46.1 percent of reported protests). I calculated the

"index of representation" by dividing the number of protests by the number of protests expected from the ratio of the total number of events to total population, and Istanbul has a score of 3.56.[150] Ankara, which contains about 5.7 percent of the population and 16.9 percent of reported protest events, is the second overrepresented city with 2.95 of the index of representation. Izmir comes next, accounting for 4.8 percent of the population and 7.6 percent of the protest events. It is interesting to note that protest events were more overrepresented in Istanbul, the center of business, than Ankara, the center of politics, suggesting that there were more economically related protests than political protests in the 1980s and 1990s.

As we expected, protest events that were mobilized in other rural Anatolian regions were underrepresented. In particular, the central Anatolian region, the eastern Anatolian region, and the Black Sea Region were significantly underrepresented. The central Anatolian region excluding Ankara accounts for 11.9 percent of the population, but it accounts for only 2.8 percent of the reported protest events. Similarly, the Black Sea region was significantly underrepresented as 14.4 percent of the Turkish population was located in this region, compared with just over 4.1 percent of the reported protest events.

Overall, it is demonstrated that the geographical distribution of reported protests was skewed toward Istanbul, Ankara, and to lesser extent, Izmir. This skewedness of protest reporting, however, is not necessarily a result of *Cumhuriyet*'s selective bias. Numerous scholars have suggested that social networks necessary for popular

---

[150] For the index of protest representation, see Christopher Rootes, "Britain," in *Environment Protest in Western Europe*, ed. Christopher Rootes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 27-28.

mobilization are concentrated in urban sectors of the country.[151] Because contentious collective actions require the density of social groups and the richness of mobilization resources, large cities are more likely to have protest events than rural areas.

In addition, Turkish protesters living in rural areas know that their contentious actions are more likely to be reported by newspapers if they organize protest events in Istanbul and Ankara. Thus, it is highly plausible that rural residents intentionally organize their protests in the cities such as Ankara and Istanbul rather than in their hometowns. In fact, *Cumhuriyet* often reported popular protests in which rural residents flocked into Ankara to organize demonstrations and rallies to make their voice heard in national politics. Social movement organizations and civil society associations play a crucial role in arranging transportation such as busses to facilitate protest mobilization. For instance, the Confederation of Public Workers' Unions (KESK) organized mass rallies in Ankara to demand the right to strike and collective bargaining for public workers in January 1998. KESK in cooperation with other labor unions and leftist political parties coordinated a large number of busses to bring thousands of workers from all the corner of the country to Ankara.[152]

The pattern of the geographical distribution of reported protests reveals that contentious citizens are well aware of the significance of media coverage of their protest actions to achieve their goals. Protesters strategically pursue a "space of public

---

[151] McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory."

[152] *Cumhuriyet*, January 25, 1998.

representation" by exploiting the media selection process.[153] In a country like Turkey where national politics and economy are highly centralized in particular cities, protesters organize protests in locations where the media is more likely to cover their actions. For this reason, it can be argued that the skewed distribution of reported protests toward Ankara and Istanbul is not far from the reality.

4.5.4 The Protest Actors

Table 4.3 shows the distribution of protest events associated with particular groups by year in Turkey and helps us find the principal actors in protest politics. It is apparent that there were four important groups of citizens who organized or attended protests. Overall, between 1981 and 1999, workers led 40.2 percent of reported protests; urban popular groups led 25.5 percent; students played the leading role in 13.6 percent; and prisoners initiated 12 percent of the protests in prisons. All of these groups except prisoners were generally located in urban areas in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. The actor groups that account for less than 3 percent of protest events are excluded from the subsequent analysis.

Workers constituted the most important and active groups in popular protests throughout the years surveyed, but it is noticeable that they were particularly contentious between 1989 and 1995. During this period, half of reported protests were carried out by workers. The central role of workers in the protest movements in the late 1980s and the early 1990s can be explained in terms of the process of neoliberal economic transformation. Özal's ANAP came into power in 1983 and implemented the neoliberal

---

[153] Alberto Melucci, *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 220..

economic program. The neoliberal reform threatened the working class in Turkey through the privatization of huge state enterprises. Economic liberalization caused higher unemployment and worsened unequal distribution of income. Higher inflation resulted in a considerable decline of purchasing power, which further hit the living conditions of wage earners.[154] Another spike in the workers' protests in 1998 and 1999 is due to the fact that three major confederations of labor unions decided to more closely cooperate to fight for workers' rights, overcoming ideological differences that had divided the labor movement in Turkey for decades. This so-called "Labor Platform" formally established in 1999 became an important organizer of labor protests against privatization as well as a proposed social security reform.[155]

The workers also organized and took part in a variety of political protests against the government. First, labor unions in cooperation with other secular civil society organizations, business associations, and the mass media coordinated mass rallies and protest marches in 1996 and 1997 to demonstrate their frustration with and opposition to the coalition government led by the Islamist RP under the leadership of Erbakan. The government's Islamist agenda brought about fierce opposition and resentment both from civil society organizations including labor unions and the military, and the government eventually collapsed in June 1997. Second, labor unions led a series of public gatherings to protest corruption widespread in the state institutions and among politicians. Third, anti-IMF protest meetings were prepared by labor unions in major cities during the 1990s. Labor unionists claimed that the IMF's imposition of a neoliberal economic program on

---

[154] Surhan Cam, "Neo-Liberalism and Labour within the Context of an 'Emerging Market' Economy--Turkey," *Capital & Class*, no. 77 (2002).

[155] Koç, 77-78.

Turkey caused problems of democratic deficit and the Turkish nation was losing national sovereignty to international organizations.

It is interesting to note that students, who used to be the most active group during the 1960s and 1970s, did not organize protest events as much as workers did. There was a brief period (1986-88) in which students emerged as the most active protesting group surpassing workers and other groups, but the number of reported protests organized by students declined in subsequent years. During the whole period under study, students accounted for only 13.6 percent of reported protests despite the fact that the number of enrolled university students jumped over the years in Turkey. The frequency of protests organized by university students peaked in 1987 and 1987 and began to decline in the subsequent years. One possible explanation of the low intensity of student activism in the 1980s and 1990s is that the 1980 military coup effectively depoliticized university youth and suppressed student activism with state sanctions. Kenan Evren, the leader of the military coup, believed that educational institutions, especially universities, should be controlled by the state in order to preempt student movements harmful for the country's order and stability. Thus, academic autonomy guaranteed by the University Law of 1946 and the 1961 Constitution was abated by the military government in the early 1980s. It is reported that thousands of professors and academics were dismissed from teaching by the Martial Law imposed by the military and a large number of university students and assistants left the country voluntarily or were sent into exile.

This new youth is known as the "Özal youth" or the "1980 generation." These young people spent their formative years in the 1980s where civil and political rights were significantly limited and the parents who had experienced repression due to their

political affiliation with oppositional forces in the previous decade discouraged their children against getting involved in political activism. They were also exposed to consumerism and individualism that Özal's economic liberalism had disseminated in Turkey. Thus, this young generation is characterized as apolitical, selfish, and individualistic, implying the lack of interest in social and political affairs.[156] In contrast, the youth in the previous generation who were raised in the 1960s and 1970s were associated with greater concerns for political, economic, and social issues that the country had faced.

The depoliticization of the youth in the post-1980 military coup period did not necessarily mean that this generation totally withdrew from civic engagement. In the early 1990s, due to the gradual political liberalization and Turkey's EU accession process, there emerged a new political opportunity that gave incentives for popular collective action among the population. The dramatic growth of civil society associations in the 1990s showed that people were willing to participate in politics to affect what the government decides. However, the renewed civic activism among youth during the 1990s was largely nonconfrontational and nonpolitical, focusing on cultural, environmental, and

---

[156] Leyla Neyzi, "The Construction of "Youth" in Public Discourse in Turkey: A Generational Approach," in *Youth and Youth Culture in the Contemporary Middle East*, ed. Jorgen Slmonsen (Arhus: Arhus University Press, 2005); Neyzi, "Object or Subject? The Paradox of Youth in Turkey."; Lüküslü; G. Demet Lüküslü, "Constructors and Constructed: Youth as a Political Actor in Modernising Turkey," in *Revisiting Youth Political Participation: Challenges for Research and Democratic Practice in Europe*, ed. Joerg Forbrig (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2005).

recreational activities. Depoliticized youth were encouraged to enter a "non-critical ream"[157] but their activism was not allowed to directly involve in political contestation.[158]

Urban popular groups occupy a significant weight in the protest event data, accounting for 25.5 percent of reported events. These groups include associations and organizations coordinated by middle-class local residents in urban areas, but there are many causes in which local residents seemed to set up ad-hoc, noninstitutionalized organizations to deal with their immediate local issues.

The number of protest events organized by the urban popular groups particularly increased in the 1990s, surpassing the number of protest events carried out by students. We can argue that urban older adults were more active in civil society than younger university students during the neoliberal period in Turkey. I assume that urban popular actors who were socialized during the 1960s and 1970s had accumulated and maintained sufficient social networks, protest experience, and political efficacy for political participation compared to student youth who grew up during the repressive period after 1980.

Political prisoners have played a significant role in Turkey's contentious politics since the 1960s. Usually these political prisoners belonged to radical leftist groups and Kurdish movements, and they were detained, tortured, and imprisoned for allegedly threatening the state. They employed hunger strikes and death fasts by refusıng food and

---

[157] On the concept of a noncritical realm, Yanqi Tong, "State, Society, and Political Change in China and Hungary," *Comparative Politics* 26, no. 3 (1994).

[158] For instance, see Fahriye Hazer Sancar and Yücel Can Severcan, "In Search of Agency: Participation in a Youth Organisation in Turkey," in *A Handbook of Children and Young People's Participation: Perspectives from Theory and Practice*, ed. Barry Percy-Smith and Nigel Thomas (London: Routledge, 2010).

medıcal treatment as the last resort to protest inhumane prison conditions, human rights violations, and to strengthen solidarity with fellow activists.[159] For instance, more than 2,000 prisoners started hunger strikes in 52 prisons in April 1996 to protest against the ill-treatment of prisoners and 12 prisoners died.[160] Hunger strike was primarily used by the political prisoners, but their families, relatives, friends, and supporters outside the prison sometimes joined the hunger strikes as well.

Political hunger strikes by prisoners are highly likely to be covered by the mass media because of their newsworthiness. Riots and violence in prisons are dramatic and politically salient. For prisoners who have no other means to communicate with the public masses and send political message beyond prison walls, these unconventional actions constitute the only available and useful means to influence politics. Furthermore, hunger strikes reveal serious human rights violations in prisons, and the international media, international human rights NGOs, and foreign governments pay particular attention to the claims of the hunger strikers. In fact, major international newspapers

---

[159] Murat Sevinç, "Hunger Strikes in Turkey," *Human Rights Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (2008); Murat Sevinç, "Bir İnsan Halkarı Sorunu Olarak: Açlık Revleri," *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 57, no. 1 (2002); Gürcan Koçan and Ahmet Öncü, "From the Morality of Living to the Morality of Dying: Hunger Strikes in Turkish Prisons," *Citizenship Studies* 10, no. 3 (2006).

[160] Joe Beynon, "Hunger Strike in Turkish Prisons," *Lancet* 348, no. 9029 (1996). For the most deadly and determined hunger strike campaign that began in October 2000 and ended with the “Back to Life” operation of the government killing 30 prisoners, see Patrick Anderson, "'To Lie Down to Death for Days': The Turkish Hunger Strike, 2000-2003," *Cultural Studies* 18, no. 6 (2004).

including the *New York Times*, *Guardian*, and *Christian Science Monitor* closely followed the development of Turkish hunger strikes in the 1990s.[161]

4.5.5 The Claims of Protest

Protesters delivered diverse claims against political authority. This study classifies reported protest events into three broad categories related to the grievances and demands raised by citizens. It is important to understand the issues of protest because those issues demanded by protesters in the public sphere are more likely to become public knowledge through the media coverage. Both decision-makers in public office and ordinary citizens recognize the existence of various claims and demands in society only when they are publicly articulated through contentious political participation.

I categorize the issues raised by protests in Turkey into three broad issue domains. The first category is related to economic issues including wages, working conditions, economic public policies, and privatization programs pursued by the government. This category has subcategories including concrete economic issues, economic issues, labor, and privatization. Concrete economic issues are those that have immediate significance to material well-being of those who protest. In contrast, economic issues such as demands for equal distribution of wealth and opposition to tax policies correspond to those demands that might affect not only the protesters but also the general public.

The second category is related to civil and political rights including freedom of thought, corruption, repression, minorities, human rights, democratic processes,

---

[161] For instance, see Alan Cowell, "Hunger Strike in Turkish Jails Reveals Nation's Divisions," *New York Times*, July 28, 1996; Jonathan Ewing, "Long Hunger Strike in Turkey Speeds Prison Reforms," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 30, 1996; John Hooper, "Struggle to Save Dying Jail Fasters," *Guardian*, July 29, 1996.

secularism/Islam, and peace/imperialism. Protesters raise these issues in the public sphere either to make the government accountable, to oppose harsh state control on civil liberties, or to criticize human rights violations by governments. The civil-political issue also includes contentious claims related to conflicts between secularists and political Islamists as well as ideological challenges posed by peace activists and socialists.

The third category corresponds to social rights. It includes claims about education and the administration of universities, environmental problems, land ownership, and social participation. The social participation issue requires some elaboration. This sub-category puts together popular demands for democratic management and internal democratization in civil society organizations such as labor unions, NGOs, and foundations. For instance, complaints about nondemocratic leadership, the lack of tolerance toward internal dissent, and corruption of leaders are classified as social participation issues.

Among the three categories of claims, the economic claims and the civil-political claims account for about 80 to 90 percent of reported protests. In contrast, the claims related to social rights were the least frequent. Table 4.4 demonstrates that while the frequency of protests demanding social rights was low and relatively stable at 15 percent of protests over time, both the frequencies of the protests for economic issues and the protests for civil-political rights went through temporal fluctuations. Between the mid-1980s and the first half of the 1990s, the economic issues played the most important role in mobilizing protesters in Turkey. In the second half of the 1990s, however, the impact of the economic issues on protest mobilization relatively declined and the civil-political claims emerged as the most significant category of protests.

The rise of fall of the economic and civil-political claims in the 1980s and 1990s are related to the transformation of economic and political conditions of the country. On the one hand, a great amount of public attention and criticism was directed toward the economic consequences brought about by the neoliberal economic reforms implemented by Turgul Özal in the 1980s. In addition to the restructuring of economy, real wages had been declining since 1979. In 1989, the accumulated discontent of the unionized workers led to the nation-wide workers' mass movement named the "1989 Spring Strikes."[162] Workers used a variety of innovative tactics to criticize the government's economic policies such as hunger strikes, stop working to visit industrial physicians collectively, marching barefoot on the streets, and so on. Initially, the Spring Strikes started in private businesses situated around Istanbul, but later public employees of state enterprises joined the protest wave. These employees did not have the right to strike. Thus, they used other forms of protests for solidarity.[163]

Within the economic grievance category, concrete economic demands, which directly affect material well-being of the protesters and their organizations such as wage increase demand, were the most frequent, followed by economic demands and labor-related issues. The economic demands refer to opposition or requests for economic policies that would affect not only the protesters themselves but also the mass public. Labor issues are related to working conditions, limitations on the activities of labor unions, and employer-employee relations. Opposition to privatization became a

---

[162] Peride Kaleağasi Blind, "A New Actor in Turkish Democratization: Labor Unions," *Turkish Studies* 8, no. 2 (2007).

[163] Mustafa G. Dogan, "When Neoliberalism Confronts the Moral Economy of Workers: The Final Spring of Turkish Labor Unions," *European Journal of Turkish Studies* 11, (2010).

significant issue in the 1980s, but protest events related to privatization began to appear only in the 1990s. Probably this is due to the fact that I coded only the most salient demand raised by each protest event although protests often encompassed more than one grievance. In fact, there were many protests that were concerned with privatization and other economic grievances in the late 1980s.

While the economic grievances were the main claim raised by the protests in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the civil-political grievances were also constantly expressed through the years. This category includes a wide array of grievances and issues, but the most important grievance in this category was the popular challenge to state repression. In other words, people were defending their civil and political rights that the Turkish government after the 1980 military intervention significantly violated. In early 1997, anticorruption protests suddenly erupted throughout the country after a car crash in November 1996 unveiled the close relationship between the government, the military, and organized crime. The passengers of the car included a police chief, a Member of Parliament, and the leader of the Ultranationalist Grey Wolves. All of them were found dead. Pistols with silencers as well as fake passports were also discovered in the car. In addition, there were ideologically driven protests supporting secularism or challenging political Islam. In parallel with the rise of Islamist political movements in the 1990s, the number of protest events organized by both secularist groups and Islamist groups increased. Lastly, as restrictions on political activism were gradually lifted in the 1990s, political protests by leftist organizations returned to the public sphere and their demands were related to peace, antimilitarism, and anti-imperialism. Though these movements

were small in number, but they demonstrated that leftist movements did not totally disappear after the severe repression by the military regime in the early 1980s.

The issues related to social rights such as education, the environment, land ownership, and social participation were less salient compared to the economic and political-civil rights claims. While students' protests challenging the Council of Higher Education that curtailed freedom on campus spread out in the country in 1986 and 1987, the student protests directly addressing the problems of education per se began to decline in the 1990s. This relative decline, however, does not mean that the students' grievances were fully addressed by the government. Instead, protesters began to embed their educational grievances in a greater framework of civil-political rights related to freedom of thought and freedom from state repression. Thus, popular protests that raised the issues of both freedom of thought and education were categorized as protests related to civil-political rights in my protest event catalog.

Popular actions on the environment-related issues seemed to have a very low level of public visibility—a modest 3-5 percent during the 1980s and 1990s. Turkish citizens became increasingly aware of the environmental issues and *Cumhuriyet* published many articles on the environmental social movements, but the great majority of these environmental actions were noncontentious, using seminars, conferences, and other educational forms of actions.

Lastly, protest events on land and social participation were the least visible throughout the years of study. The impact of these protests on contentious politics was negligible, accounting only for 1 to 2 percent of reported protests.

4.5.6 The Forms of Protest

In general, there was no major change in the forms of protest actions during the 1980s and 1990s. Demonstrations remained the most frequently employed form of protest actions throughout the years, and the relative incidence of demonstrations increased gradually in the 1990s. Demonstrations were followed by boycotts, signature campaigns (petitions), and procedural actions. It is also noticeable that hunger strikes predominated the confrontational forms of protests although its relative frequency decreased in the late 1990s.

Figure 4.5 shows the relative frequency of nine major forms of protest activity between 1981 and 1999. What we can discern from the data is that demonstrative actions remained the most important form of protest in Turkey, outnumbering conventional forms and more disruptive and violent forms. Although there were some ebbs and flows of the frequencies of each category, the overall pattern of the action forms remained unchanged. Unlike the protests in the 1970s that we examined in the previous chapter, protest activities that used violence against the security forces, rival groups, and property were very rare, indicating the moderation of contentious politics after the 1980 military intervention.

Hunger strikes constituted the most frequently reported disruptive form of protest.[164] Hunger strikes reached a high point in 1986-1988, subsequently declined in 1989, and increased again in the early 1990s. Political prisoners who were imprisoned during the military regime in the early 1980s carried out hunger strikes in various prisons

---

[164] For an overview of hunger strikes in Turkey, see Ahmet Takşın, "Ceza İnfaz Kurumlarında Açlık Grevleri," *Adalet Dergisi* 93, no. 11 (2002); Koçan and Öncü, "From the Morality of Living to the Morality of Dying: Hunger Strikes in Turkish Prisons."

such as the Metris penitentiary in Istanbul. Political prisoners who joined hunger strikes demanded the end of torture and the right to wear civilian clothes in prisons. In the 1990s, hunger strikes were carried out to oppose the government's plan to introduce so-called F-type prisons, officially known as F-type High Security Closed Institutions for the Execution of Sentences. F-type prisons are a prison system of cells that accommodate only one to three prisoners. Before the introduction of F-type prisons, prisoners in the country served their terms in dormitories with 50 or more prisoners. The hunger strikers claimed that the shift from the dormitory system to the cell system would make prisoners more vulnerable to torture because they were to be isolated in small solitary confinement.

4.5.7 Associations between Claims and Forms of Protest

Are particular forms of protest actions associated with different issue categories? In order to answer this question, I cross-tabulated broad issue categories and forms of protest reported. Protest forms were recoded into four broad categories including conventional, demonstrative, confrontational, and violent forms of action.[165]

Table 4.6 shows that each issue category is linked to different levels of disruptiveness of protest activity. Although demonstrative protest predominated for all issues, the distribution of forms of protest varies across the issue categories significantly. The most confrontational and violent protest form was linked with protest concerning civil-political rights such as human rights abuses, freedom of thought, and corruption. Given that civil-political issues were often raised by ideologically committed young

[165] The conventional form includes procedural actions, petitions, and boycotts. The demonstrative form includes demonstrations. The confrontational form includes occupation, and hunger strike. The violent form includes vandalism, violence, and riots.

radicals, this suggests a disruptive nature of political protests. In Turkey, the government is less likely to provide radical youth with legitimate access to political participation. Therefore, young activists claiming political freedom and democratization end up with unconventional forms of protest to make their voices heard on the street. In contrast, protests pertaining to economic rights such as wages, labor issues, and land were associated with conventional forms of protest, suggesting the institutionalization of economic protests organized by labor unions. Protests concerning social rights such as education, environment, and social participation were more disruptive than economic protests but less confrontational than political protests. By and large, the evidence suggests that there is moderate association between disruptiveness of protest activity and issue categories.

4.5.8 The Targets of Protest

The targets of the protest events include state institutions, international actors, private actors, and civil society associations. Table 4.7 displays the evolution of the targets of protests from 1981 to 1999 in Turkey and we can discern four important changes in relation to the direction of protests. First, although the national government was the predominant object of the protests through the years, it became even an increasingly more popular target in the 1990s. For instance, more than 70 percent of protests were directed at the national government in 1996, 1997, and 1999. In contrast, local governments gradually declined as targets of protest after 1994.

Second, employers were the second most popular target of protests, accounting for 11.5 percent of protest events. Nevertheless, the popularity of employers as the

objects of protest had a lot of ups and downs between 1981 and 1999. Employers were frequently challenged by their workers who demanded higher wages and protested against working conditions in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, but workers' protests against their employers decreased after the mid-1990s.

Third, protest movements in Turkey were predominantly directed at domestic targets rather than international targets. Only 5.3 percent of protest events were addressed to foreign governments or organized outside embassies of foreign countries such as the United States and Israel. Protests against international organizations were almost non-existent in Turkey. Combined, foreign governments and international organizations accounted only for 5.7 percent of the protest events reported by *Cumhuriyet*. Therefore, we can conclude that the internationalization or transnationalization of protest events did not occur during the 1980s and 1990s in the case of Turkey.

Fourth, the overall pattern of popular protests during this period was characterized by its strong association with state actors with executive power including the national government and local governments. People rarely targeted the judiciary (0.7 percent) or the legislature (0.2 percent). Similarly, they did not consider nonstate actors such as political parties (1.8 percent), businesses (1.2 percent), and other civic associations as useful targets of protest to achieve their goals.

4.5.9 Associations between Issues and Targets of Protest

How were the issues of protest associated with the targets of protest? Table 4.8 presents a cross-tabulation between issue categories raised by protest actions and targets of protest. As expected, the executives in governments including the national government,

local governments, and police were the most important targets for all of the issues categories. The majority of economic, political, and social protests (67.8 percent, 70.4 percent, and 68 percent, respectively) were directed at the executive.

Despite the predominance of the executive branches as a target of protest events across issue categories, the evidence demonstrates some different relationships between the targets and the issues raised by the protests. Protests pertaining to civil and political rights were more likely to be directed at foreign actors compared to economic and social protests. In fact, a great deal of protests targeting foreign governments and international organizations were related to anti-imperialist and anti-American activism. Economic issues and social issues were not meaningfully associated with foreign actors that were irrelevant in the improvement of working conditions or educational reforms, major themes in these protest events.

On the other hand, economic and social protests challenged nonstate actors more often than civil-political protests. In the case of economic protests, businesses and employers were chosen with much more frequency as important targets of action. Protests related to social issues such as the environment, education, and social participation were organized against businesses, schools, and civic associations.

During the 1980s and the 1990s, neither the legislative nor the judiciary was chosen as viable targets of popular protest. The absence of the parliament and the court in contentious politics in this period indicates that activists did not have confidence in the ability of these institutions to change public policy or to respond to popular demand.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that protest event analysis is a valuable research method of describing and quantifying developments in the behavioral aspects of social movement activity. Protest event analysis produces a constructed reality by using media reports of protest events, and thus what it tells us about contentious politics does not represent the universe of protests actually taking place. Nevertheless, this constructed reality is what a great majority of ordinary citizens and policymakers understand as the reality regarding popular participation in unconventional political actions such as demonstrations and violence.

The proceeding analysis of contentious politics in the 1980s and the 1990s produces several important findings. First, it was revealed through protest event analysis that there was a general correlation between changes in opportunity structures and changes in the frequency of protest. The transition to democracy and economic liberalization in particular empowered nonstate actors in civil society, and in turn they started to mobilize disruptive collective actions on the street to demand further democratization or oppose the government's economic policies. Second, the development of contentious politics did not evenly encourage different groups in society. What my dataset suggests is that workers more frequently participated in protest than students during this period. Third, protest events in the 1980s and 1990s were directed toward the national government, related to economic and political rights rather than social rights, and employed disruptive but not violent forms of action.



Source: *Cumhuriyet*.

Figure 4.1: The Number of Protest Events Reported by *Cumhuriyet*, 1981-1999



Source: *Cumhuriyet*.

Figure 4.2: The Number of Protests per Month Reported by *Cumhuriyet*, 1981-1999



Source: *Cumhuriyet*.

Figure 4.3: The Size of Protest Events Reported by *Cumhuriyet*, 1981-1999

Table 4.1

The Spatial Distribution of Protest Events in Turkey, 1981-1999 (Percentages)

	1981	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total
Ankara	0.0	100.0	20.0	33.3	15.3	7.9	10.8	18.3	12.8	16.5	15.7	24.7	25.6	23.1	12.1	21.0	14.9	16.9
Istanbul	50.0	0.0	60.0	36.4	61.0	52.6	37.4	43.1	46.5	45.1	51.2	47.3	48.7	44.0	69.7	50.6	33.6	46.1
Izmir	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.1	1.7	3.9	6.2	7.3	9.3	8.8	9.1	12.9	10.3	5.5	9.1	3.7	9.7	7.6
Marmara	0.0	0.0	20.0	12.1	5.1	6.6	12.3	9.2	5.8	2.2	4.1	3.2	2.6	6.6	1.5	8.6	12.7	7.2
Central Anatolia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.4	2.6	4.6	0.0	2.3	3.3	2.5	0.0	1.3	8.8	0.0	2.5	3.7	2.8
Aegean	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.1	3.4	3.9	3.6	3.7	0.0	1.1	5.0	3.2	0.0	1.1	0.0	1.2	3.0	2.6
Black Sea	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	1.7	3.9	3.1	4.6	5.8	5.5	2.5	5.4	2.6	1.1	3.0	2.5	9.7	4.1
Mediterranean	50.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	3.4	9.2	10.8	3.7	9.3	6.6	5.0	3.2	6.4	3.3	0.0	4.9	5.2	5.9
Eastern Anatolia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.4	0.0	5.1	0.9	3.5	2.2	3.3	0.0	1.3	0.0	4.5	2.5	3.0	2.4
Southeastern Anatolia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	9.2	6.2	9.2	4.7	8.8	1.7	0.0	1.3	6.6	0.0	2.5	4.5	4.5
Total *N* of events	2	1	5	33	59	76	195	109	86	91	121	93	78	91	66	81	134	1321

Source: *Cumhuriyet*.

Table 4.2

The Spatial Distribution of Protest Events in Turkey, 1981-1999 (Percentages)

Compared with Population

Region	Percentage of protest events	Population[a]	Percentage of population	Index of representation[b]
Ankara	16.9	3,236,626	5.7	2.95
Istanbul	46.1	7,309,190	12.9	3.56
Izmir	7.6	2,694,770	4.8	1.59
Marmara[c]	7.2	5,986,417	10.6	0.68
Aegean[d]	2.6	4,900,451	8.7	0.30
Central Anatolia[e]	2.8	6,706,167	11.9	0.24
Mediterranean	5.9	7,026,489	12.4	0.47
Black Sea	4.1	8,107,253	14.4	0.29
Eastern Anatolia	2.4	5,347,659	9.5	0.25
Southeastern Anaotolia	4.5	5,158,013	9.1	0.49
Total *N*	1,331	56,473,035	100	

Notes:

[a] Population figures for 1990 were obtained from the 1990 national census available from the Turkish Statistical Institute.

[b] "Index of representation" is a figure calculated by dividing the number of protests by the number of protests expected from the ratio of the total number of events to total.

[c] Istanbul is excluded. [d] Izmir is excluded. [e] Ankara is excluded.

Table 4.3

The Actors Participating in Protest Events in Turkey, 1981-1999 (Percentages)

	1981	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total
Student	50.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	38.9	19.2	12.9	12.8	6.3	9.0	8.0	7.4	14.3	13.2	24.2	9.9	9.9	13.6
Worker	0.0	0.0	20.0	24.2	16.7	29.5	51.0	42.2	50.6	18.3	46.4	55.8	44.2	18.7	19.7	32.1	44.3	40.2
Civil servant	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3
Professional	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	1.9	0.0	3.1	9.2	3.8	0.0	6.3	2.1	0.0	2.2	1.5	1.2	0.0	2.6
Peasant	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	2.2	0.0	0.0	1.3	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4
Prisoner	50.0	0.0	0.0	12.1	16.7	25.6	9.3	1.8	15.2	4.5	5.4	5.3	6.5	28.6	9.1	19.8	16.0	12.0
Self-employed	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	3.7	0.0	1.0	7.3	2.5	4.5	0.0	1.1	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6
Teacher	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.4	0.0	2.2	3.0	2.5	2.3	1.2
Gecekondu resident	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.0	2.2	3.6	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.9
Urban popular	0.0	100.0	40.0	15.2	16.7	20.5	19.1	23.9	21.5	25.8	30.4	20.0	31.2	33.0	39.4	32.1	27.5	25.5
Others	0.0	0.0	40.0	9.1	1.9	5.1	0.5	2.8	0.0	2.2	0.0	1.1	1.3	0.0	3.0	1.2	0.0	1.6
Total *N* of events	2	1	5	33	54	78	194	109	79	89	112	95	77	91	66	81	131	1297

Source: *Cumhuriyet*.

Table 4.4

Claims Raised in Protest Events in Turkey, 1981-1999 (Percentages)

	1981	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total
Economic	*0.0*	*0.0*	*20.0*	*31.3*	*26.3*	*36.8*	*57.4*	*47.2*	*48.1*	*53.5*	*42.6*	*59.3*	*43.7*	*14.8*	*27.3*	*33.8*	*44.7*	*42.9*
Concrete economic	0.0	0.0	20.0	18.8	21.1	34.2	20.2	32.4	46.8	40.7	33.9	25.3	21.1	4.5	4.5	15.6	9.9	23.4
Economic	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.3	1.8	1.3	0.5	7.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.7	2.8	2.3	10.6	6.5	0.0	3.6
Labor	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.3	3.5	1.3	34.4	6.5	1.3	7.0	4.3	7.7	19.8	4.5	4.5	3.9	25.0	12.0
Land	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.2	0.9	0.0	5.8	2.6	0.0	0.0	1.1	4.5	3.9	7.6	2.4
Privatization	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	7.7	0.0	2.3	3.0	3.9	2.3	1.5
Civil-political	*100.0*	*0.0*	*80.0*	*34.4*	*50.9*	*59.2*	*33.9*	*48.1*	*40.3*	*38.4*	*46.1*	*29.7*	*46.5*	*76.1*	*60.6*	*58.4*	*47.8*	*47.3*
Freedom of thought	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	0.5	0.9	0.0	0.0	2.6	0.0	0.0	1.1	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.8
Corruption	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	2.3	19.7	5.2	0.8	1.7
Repression	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.0	25.0	22.4	26.0	36.4	18.6	26.1	13.2	28.2	54.5	25.8	30.0	26.6	25.1
Minorities	0.0	100.0	0.0	3.1	5.3	2.6	1.6	1.9	2.6	5.8	4.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	15.6	2.3	2.9
Human rights	50.0	0.0	80.0	28.1	17.5	25.0	3.3	2.8	3.9	2.3	2.6	0.0	4.2	2.3	3.0	2.6	2.3	5.5
Democratic process	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	2.6	1.1	5.6	7.8	0.0	0.9	1.1	4.2	1.1	0.0	2.6	0.0	1.5
Secularism/Islam	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.1	12.3	1.3	4.9	4.6	6.5	10.5	6.1	13.2	4.2	6.8	7.6	2.6	11.4	6.5
Peace/imperialism	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.5	9.1	1.2	2.6	2.2	5.6	8.0	1.5	2.6	4.5	3.3
Social	*0.0*	*100.0*	*0.0*	*34.4*	*22.9*	*3.9*	*8.7*	*4.6*	*11.7*	*8.1*	*11.3*	*11.0*	*9.9*	*9.1*	*12.1*	*5.2*	*7.6*	*9.9*
Education	0.0	0.0	0.0	28.1	15.8	2.6	4.4	0.9	2.6	4.7	3.5	6.6	5.6	5.7	9.1	1.3	1.5	5.1
Environment	0.0	100.0	0.0	3.1	1.8	0.0	3.8	1.9	3.9	3.5	5.2	3.3	2.8	3.4	3.0	2.6	5.3	3.6
Participation	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.1	1.8	1.3	0.5	1.9	5.2	0.0	2.6	1.1	1.4	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.8	1.3
Total *N* of events	2	1	5	32	57	76	183	108	77	86	115	91	71	88	66	77	132	1267

Source: *Cumhuriyet*.

Note: Broad categories of issue are in italics; subcategories in roman.

Table 4.5

Forms of Protest Events in Turkey, 1981-1999 (Percentages)

	1981	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total
Procedural	0.0	0.0	40.0	3.0	6.8	6.3	3.6	4.5	4.7	3.3	6.6	6.4	0.0	2.2	3.0	2.5	3.8	4.2
Petition	0.0	100.0	0.0	12.1	11.9	2.5	2.6	4.5	4.7	2.2	4.1	2.1	3.8	5.5	1.5	4.9	0.8	3.8
Boycott	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.1	11.9	20.3	36.1	26.1	18.6	14.1	12.4	13.8	20.5	4.4	1.5	4.9	8.3	16.4
Demonstration	50.0	0.0	60.0	36.4	28.8	32.9	43.8	47.7	45.3	57.6	58.7	63.8	52.6	59.3	79.1	69.1	69.2	54.0
Occupation	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.3	2.1	0.0	1.2	0.0	2.5	2.1	5.1	4.4	1.5	1.2	2.3	2.2
Hunger strike	0.0	0.0	0.0	36.4	32.2	30.4	9.3	11.7	17.4	17.4	10.7	9.6	10.3	13.2	6.0	4.9	2.3	12.8
Vandalism	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.9	2.3	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4
Violence	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.5	0.0	0.5	4.5	5.8	3.3	2.5	1.1	2.6	2.2	0.0	2.5	1.5	2.3
Riot	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	1.0	0.0	0.0	2.2	0.8	0.0	3.8	6.6	3.0	8.6	11.3	2.9
Others	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	1.1	1.3	2.2	4.5	1.2	0.8	1.1
Total *N* of events	2	1	5	33	59	79	194	111	86	92	121	94	78	91	67	81	133	1327

Source: *Cumhuriyet*.

Table 4.6

Associations between Claims and Forms of Protest Events in Turkey, 1981-1999 (Percentages)

	Conventional	Demonstrative	Confrontational	Violent	Total *N* of events
Economic	35.0	56.9	7.2	0.9	543
Civil-political	17.1	50.0	26.1	9.5	598
Social	20.5	61.4	15.7	2.4	127
Total *N* of events	318	686	199	65	1,268

Table 4.7

Targets of Protest Events in Turkey, 1981-1999 (Percentages)

	1981	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total
National government	0.0	100.0	20.0	30.3	43.1	39.0	55.7	52.3	38.6	43.8	39.3	60.2	51.9	72.5	76.1	60.5	71.6	53.9
Local government	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.1	13.8	9.1	13.9	6.4	12.0	18.0	17.9	9.7	9.1	8.8	7.5	4.9	5.2	10.7
Police	50.0	0.0	0.0	12.1	1.7	6.5	5.7	2.8	4.8	2.2	3.4	0.0	3.9	1.1	0.0	1.2	0.0	3.1
Court	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	2.6	1.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.7	0.7
Parliament	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
Political party	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.1	3.4	1.3	0.5	0.0	1.2	0.0	3.2	3.2	1.3	1.1	1.5	1.2	4.5	1.8
Foreign government	50.0	0.0	60.0	18.2	1.7	3.9	3.1	11.0	4.8	6.7	0.9	4.3	7.8	5.5	1.5	6.2	3.7	5.3
Int'l organization	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.4
Business	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	2.8	2.4	0.0	0.9	2.2	2.6	1.1	3.0	1.2	0.7	1.2
Employer	0.0	0.0	20.0	12.1	12.1	23.4	9.8	15.6	30.1	21.3	8.5	10.8	11.7	0.0	0.0	8.6	3.7	11.5
Mass media	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.0	1.3	1.0	0.0	1.2	2.2	1.7	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.8
Rival group	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.6	1.3	0.5	4.6	0.0	2.2	3.4	5.4	6.5	7.7	4.5	6.2	3.7	3.7
School	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.1	10.3	7.8	5.2	0.0	0.0	2.2	3.4	1.1	1.3	1.1	3.0	0.0	1.5	2.8
Others	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.4	2.6	3.1	2.8	4.8	1.1	14.5	3.2	2.6	1.1	3.0	7.4	3.0	4.0
Total *N* of events	2	1	5	33	58	77	194	109	83	89	117	93	77	91	67	81	134	1311

Source: *Cumhuriyet*.

Table 4.8

Associations between Claims and Targets of Protest Events in Turkey, 1981-1999 (Percentages)

	Executive	Legislative	Judiciary	Foreign	Non-state	Total *N* of events
Economic	67.8	0.4	0.4	0.4	31.0	538
Civil-political	70.4	0.0	1.2	9.1	19.4	604
Social	68.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	31.2	125
Total *N* of events	875	2	9	58	323	1,267

CHAPTER 5

TOWARD A MOVEMENT SOCIETY?

5.1 Introduction

Over the past decade, some social movement scholars have argued that Western democracies have become a "movement society" where protest activities of social movements are becoming more popular, diffused, and institutionalized as a form of political participation.[166] Citizens in advanced democracies such as the United States and Germany now see protest activities as conventional, legitimate, and acceptable forms of political participation.[167] Although Robert Putnam has pointed out that citizens in these

[166] David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, "A Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century," in *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century*, ed. David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Dieter Rucht, "The Structure and Culture of Collective Protest in Germany since 1950," in *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century*, ed. David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Sarah A. Soule and Jennifer Earl, "A Movement Society Evaluated: Collective Protest in the United States, 1960-1986," *Mobilization* 10, no. 3 (2005); Dieter Rucht and Friedhelm Neidhardt, "Towards a 'Movement Society'? On the Possibilities of Institutionalizing Social Movements," *Social Movement Studies* 1, no. 1 (2002); Verta Taylor, "Mobilizing for Change in a Social Movement Society," *Contemporary Sociology* 29, no. 1 (2000).

[167] Soule and Earl, "A Movement Society Evaluated: Collective Protest in the United States, 1960-1986."; Rucht and Neidhardt, "Towards a 'Movement Society'? On the Possibilities of Institutionalizing Social Movements."

countries have become less involved in civil society and politics,[168] Russell Dalton finds that citizen participation in politics is not decreasing but the "forms of political action are changing."[169] Traditional and conventional forms of political participation such as voting and party activities are in decline, but new forms including communal participation, direct democracy, and protest are increasing over time. In her recent study on political participation in Canada and Belgium, Quintelier has demonstrated that young people do participate in politics but they prefer different forms of participation such as protest than those chosen by older people.[170] Thus, a transition toward a movement society highlights an important change in the mode of political participation among citizens in democracies. As McCarthy and McPhail argue, social movements in the United States experienced the "institutionalization" of protest activities that had been considered "unconventional" in the previous decades.[171]

This "social movement society" thesis emphasizes the geographic expansion of social movement activities, in particular, protest participation across countries. Originally, the United States was viewed as the best example of the emergence of a movement

---

[168] Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone : The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000); Robert D. Putnam, ed. *Democracy in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

[169] Russell J. Dalton, *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2008), 73.

[170] Ellen Quintelier, "Differences in Political Participation between Young and Old People," *Contemporary politics* 13, no. 2 (2007).

[171] John D. McCarthy and Clark McPhail, "The Institutionalization of Protest in the Us," in *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for the New Century*, ed. David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).

society as protest participation rates began to increase in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but citizens in Western Europe also became frequent participants in protest activities in the late 1960s. Yet, despite movement society scholars' claims of protest diffusion in recent years, there are only handful of empirical studies investigating the emergence and development of movement societies and testing the hypotheses of the movement society thesis.[172] These studies have provided partial, but mixed, support for the social movement society thesis, but they tend to limit their focus to consolidated democracies in North America and Western Europe. Therefore, it is unclear whether the transition toward a social movement society is a global phenomenon that goes beyond advanced democracies.

Although the social movement society thesis initially argued that protest participation was spreading primarily among Western democracies, recent development of protest activities and globalization of social movements indicates that citizens in democratizing countries and even authoritarian countries are now more frequently employing protest activities and adopting protest tactics from advanced democracies. Ranging from antiglobalization campaigns in Latin America to antinuke protests in Tokyo to the Arab Spring, it seems that protest has become a conventional form of political participation in non-European societies.

In this chapter, I contribute to the debate over the existence and development of a movement society by addressing two gaps in the empirical literature on the movement society thesis. First, this chapter tests the applicability of the movement society thesis

---

[172] J. Craig Jenkins, Michael Wallace, and Andrew S. Fullerton, "A Social Movement Society? A Cross-National Analysis of Protest Potential," *International Journal of Sociology* 38, no. 3 (2008); Kyle Dodson, "The Movement Society in Comparative Perspective," *Mobilization* 16, no. 4 (2011); Soule and Earl, "A Movement Society Evaluated: Collective Protest in the United States, 1960-1986."; Taylor, "Mobilizing for Change in a Social Movement Society."

developed from American and European experiences of social movements in a predominantly Muslim society. While Turkey has a secular and democratic multiparty system, political culture and popular perception on protest politics are different from those in Europe. Yet, several scholars have claimed that social movements have become more diffused to new groups of people and more diverse in terms of goals and demands of the movements. For instance, Yavuz argues that Islamic social movements in public sphere were reinvigorated because of the expansion of political opportunity spaces and new communication networks in the 1990s.[173] Şimşek argues that Turkish society has experienced the development of new social movements such as feminist, Kurdish, Alevi social movements since 1980 with significant political impacts since 1980.[174] These studies strongly suggest that Turkey is witnessing the rise of protest participation as well as the diffusion of protest goals and tactics as social movement scholars have observed in North America and Western Europe. Thus, this chapter advances scholarship by extending the scope of the movement society thesis to a case that is culturally and geographically distinct from the original cases with which social movement scholars have developed the thesis.

Second, this chapter pays particular attention to demographic factors of protest activities. While some social movement researchers examined the patterns of protest diffusion with quantitative methods, their focus tends to be on the temporal and geographical diffusion of protest participation rather than the demographic diffusion by

---

[173] Yavuz.

[174] Şimşek, "New Social Movements in Turkey since 1980."

which I mean new groups of the population become active participants of disruptive collective action.[175]

This chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the social movement society thesis and draws some testable hypotheses. Then, I will present some of the recent protest episodes in Turkey that indicates the diffusion of protest to new groups of the population. The subsequent section attempts to answer whether Turkey is moving toward a movement society analyzing the World Values Survey conducted in 1990, 1996, 2001, and 2007 in Turkey.

5.2 The Social Movement Society Thesis

In the book entitled *The Movement Society*, David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow proposed a "social movement society" thesis.[176] The main argument of this book is that protest activities have become widespread among citizens in advanced democracies and "the last thirty years have seen a generalization of the repertoire of contention across age groups, from men to women, from left to right, and from workers and students to other social groups."[177] According to Meyer and Tarrow, in a movement society, protest activities are becoming a perpetual element of politics, more frequently employed by more diverse sectors of the population with more diverse claims and goals, and

---

[175] For example, see Jenkins et al., "A Social Movement Society? A Cross-National Analysis of Protest Potential."

[176] David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, eds., *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).

[177] Meyer and Tarrow, "A Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century," 11.

institutionalized as well as routinized among social movement organizations. In a nutshell, protest actions, which used to be considered "unconventional" forms of participation by political scientists, become more "conventional" and "acceptable" in democracies.[178]

More specifically, the movement society thesis claims that a social movement society experiences two forms of protest diffusion. First, according to Meyer and Tarrow, the shift toward a movement society is associated with social and demographic diffusion of protest.[179] The second characteristic of the shift is spatial diffusion of protest across nations. Although the second characteristic offers an important research question for those scholars who are interested in transnational social movement networks, my current research limits its focus to the first form of protest diffusion and investigates whether such diffusion of protest has occurred in Turkey.[180]

Meyer and Tarrow have identified protest diffusion in terms of age, gender, ideology, and employment. In the past, these individual factors largely determined who would more likely to participate in protest activities, but they are losing explanatory power over time as protest has spread across social groups.

---

[178] Inglehart similarly claims that protest is losing its unconventionality as more and more people now see it as a legitimate action repertoire to influence politics. See Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization : Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

[179] Meyer and Tarrow, "A Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century," 10.

[180] For the development of transnational social movements, see Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, "Transnational Advocacy Networks in the Movement Society," in *The Movement Society*, ed. David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Peter Evans, "Counterhegemonic Globalization: Transnational Social Movements in the Contemporary Global Political Economy," in *The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization*, ed. Thomas Janoski et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Age has been one of the most important determinants of protest participation in the social movement literature. In Dalton's words, "protest is the domain of the young."[181] In particular, radical protest movements that shattered Western Europe and the United States in the 1960s were primarily organized and carried out by young students. Young people became an important political actor in politics among developing countries during this period as they adopted protest tactics from the civil rights movements and student movements in the US, France, and other democracies. Because adolescence is a life stage of enthusiasm and activism, young people are more likely to join protest. Yet, the relationship between age and protest is not linear but curvilinear. People tend to lose willingness to join protests as they become older because marriage, employment, and other social responsibilities will discourage them from taking high-risk political actions. Furthermore, free time, an important resource for protest politics, becomes less available with age.

The social movement society thesis directly challenges the age-based explanation of protest participation in contemporary politics. Meyer and Tarrow claim that "In environmental protests, in tax revolts, in the peace movements of the 1980s and the activities of the religious right in the 1990s, age no longer seems to be a bar to participation in contentious politics."[182] As protest has diffused to various social groups, people are more likely to join protest than before in a social movement society regardless of their age. Young students still constitute the largest constituent of protest participation,

---

[181] Dalton, 71.

[182] Meyer and Tarrow, "A Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century," 10.

but they do protest along with middle-aged shop owners and retired pensioners. Thus, the movement society thesis suggests that the relationship between age and protest participation should have become weaker over time. In other words, age cannot predict who will protest in a movement society.

Second, Meyer and Tarrow suggest that the gender gap in protest participation is narrowing over the last decade.[183] Although men still join protest events more often than women, the emergence of feminist movements in the 1960s and 1970s made female protesters more visible in the public sphere.[184] Women are not only participants of protest politics but also step into to the leadership role in feminist social movements in democracies. Women also become an important actor in contentious politics in democratizing or authoritarian countries. From Latin America to the Middle East, women actively participate in challenging political actions against torture, violence, and dictatorship. The increased visibility of women in protest gatherings, therefore, narrows the gender gap of protest, making a gender category less relevant for predicting protest participation.

Third, the social movement society thesis argues that protest is not monopolized by a progressive political persuasion in a movement society.[185] According to this view, in a movement society, ideological positions of individuals do not determine protest

---

[183] Ibid.

[184] Myra Marx Ferree and Carol McClurg Mueller, "Feminism and the Women's Movement: A Global Perspective," in *The Blackwell Companion of Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).

[185] Meyer and Tarrow, "A Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century," 10-11.

participation because not only those with a leftist political orientation but also those of a conservative orientation organize various social movements ranging from the anti-abortion movement in the United States to the anti-immigrant movement in Europe.[186] Furthermore, many new social movements such as animal rights movements and anti-globalization movements do not fit the conventional left-right political spectrum. Finally, as some scholars have claimed, some important protest movements are not primarily driven by ideological orientations but by pragmatic claims of citizens.

Lastly, the movement society thesis argues for the diffusion of protest to new occupational groups.[187] In earlier periods of modern social movements, it was university students and blue-collar workers who most actively took part in contentious politics by gathering around schools and factories. In contrast, recent large-scale protest campaigns mobilize thousands of professionals, white-collar workers, immigrant workers, and other social groups who did not play a prominent role in protest politics in the past. For instance, shop owners and the middle class citizens organize antitax protest demonstrations. Mothers and housewives join antiwar movements on the street. The unemployed and pensioners chant slogans demanding social security and welfare. Thus, employment status becomes less significant in understanding determinants of protest participation in a movement society.

---

[186] For examples of these protest movements by the conservative and the extreme right, see Ruud Koopmans and Susan Olzak, "Discursive Opportunities and the Evolution of Right-Wing Ciolence in Germancy," *American Journal of Sociology* 110, no. 1 (2004); Mary Blanchard, *The Anti-Abortion Movement and the Rise of the Religious Right: From Polite to Fiery Protest* (New York: Twayne, 1994).

[187] Meyer and Tarrow, "A Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century," 1-2.

To summarize, if the movement society thesis is correct, we have to observe not only long-term increases in protest participation rates but also the declining primacy of these demographic factors as determinants of protest participation. Theoretically, the diffusion of protest to new actors with diverse backgrounds makes it difficult for researchers to find strong relationships between protest participation and age, gender, ideology, and employment status.

5.3 Protest Diffusion in Contemporary Turkish Politics

As the previous section clarifies, Meyer, Tarrow, and other researchers proposing the movement society thesis have assumed that the transition toward a movement society has occurred only in advanced democracies. Indeed, Soule and Ear demonstrate that the movement society thesis is largely supported by the dataset of over 19,000 protest events occurring in the United States between 1960 and 1986.[188] Rucht and Neidhardt have advanced an argument that social transformation in modern societies increases the probability that social movements will "occupy a secure place in the set of intermediary institutions with which modern societies are equipped."[189] Jenkins, Wallace, and Fullerton, using the 1990 World Values Survey, have concluded that the development of

[188] Soule and Earl, "A Movement Society Evaluated: Collective Protest in the United States, 1960-1986."

[189] Rucht and Neidhardt, "Towards a 'Movement Society'? On the Possibilities of Institutionalizing Social Movements," 23.

the social movement society is associated with postindustrialism and affluence, but they failed to specify the extent to which the movement society is growing.[190]

Yet, other social movement scholars have demonstrated how contentious politics has proliferated from Europe and North America to other parts of the globe in the last decade. The development of transnational advocacy networks for human rights, women's rights, the environment, and peace, for instance, have contributed to the geographical diffusion of protest politics in the world.[191]

In Turkey, recent scholarship on social movements and political participation has hinted at the diffusion of protest to new groups of people whose parents were unlikely to join protest in decades ago. In the 1960s and 1970s in Turkey, protest participation mainly occurred with male university students and unionized workers with a leftist political orientation. As the previous chapters have demonstrated, these protesters frequently resorted to violent tactics to challenge the government. Although the period between the late 1960s and the 1970s witnessed the unprecedented proliferation of political violence across the country, protest participation was confined to groups of students and workers.

In contrast, the actors of protest politics in today's Turkey have become more diverse and plural. Protest participants now include young and old, men and women, leftists and Islamists, and students and other occupational groups. Secular young citizens have rallied with middle-aged people and the elderly to show their allegiance to Kemalism. A group of mothers has organized sit-ins in Istanbul every Saturday to draw

---

[190] Jenkins et al., "A Social Movement Society? A Cross-National Analysis of Protest Potential."

[191] Keck and Sikkink.

public attention to their sons who mysteriously disappeared or were killed during detention after the military coup in 1980. The rightist groups and the leftist groups worked together to mobilize hundreds of people into anti-Iraq war protest gatherings in 2003. Anti-globalization movements were introduced to Turkish politics in the 1990s from Europe and North America. The following examinations of these examples may support the movement society thesis with qualitative evidence.

5.3.1 Protest Diffusion to Religious Women

The first example of contentious politics that demonstrated the diffusion of protest to new groups is civil disobedience and rallies in the 1980s and 1990s organized by religious students who demanded freedom to wear beards or headscarves. State regulation on universities was tightened after the 1980 military coup. The establishment of the Higher Education Council, which was designed to administer higher education, resulted in the development of grievances among religious youth who were denied access to higher education because of their piety. As the Higher Education Council demanded that university rectors strictly enforce the secular dress code at universities, Islamic female students, supported by male students with beards, began to protest with various tactics and claimed the right to education. The students framed the prohibition of wearing headscarves on campus as human rights violation in education.

The wave of Islamic student activism reached its peak in 1998. In the previous year, the military carried out a soft coup to force Necmettin Erbakan of the Islamist RP to resign from the office of Prime Minister and issued an administrative decree that obliged university administrators to ban the wearing of headscarves on campus. The military

generals claimed that secularism of the country was threatened by "religious fundamentalism" and targeted Islamic students who were increasingly visible in higher educational institutions.

The strict enforcement of the dress code resulted in a massive expulsion of female students from universities who refused to stop covering their head. MAZLUMDER, an Islamic human rights organization, claimed that the strict enforcement of the headscarf ban resulted in the expulsion of more than 10,000 women from universities in Istanbul alone.[192] The female students who had been turned away by university administrators employed a variety of nonviolent tactics to oppose the headscarf ban ranging from sit-ins, hunger strikes, and demonstrations. In October 1998, thousands of university students who opposed the ban organized nationwide demonstrations and formed human chains throughout the country. According to MAZLUMDER, it was reported that at least 2.5 million people attended the human chain protests.[193]

Contentious politics that evolved around the headscarf ban demonstrates the emergence of religious women as new protesters in the public sphere. The scale and severity of the demonstrations against the headscarf policy that shattered Turkey in the 1990s was unprecedented. As the social movement society thesis suggests, Turkey seems to experience a transition toward a movement society in which not only secular Kemalist women but also Islamic women have become important actors in political protest since the 1980s.

---

[192] Tabitha Morgan, "Scarf Conundrum Grips Turkey", BBC NEWS http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3513259.stm (accessed January 3 2013).

[193] Mustafa F. Gurbuz, "Over the Bodies of the T-Girls: The Headscarf Ban as a Secular Effort to Monopolize Islam in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Critique* 18, no. 3 (2009): 237.

5.3.2 The Saturday Mothers

Another example of contentious politics by women is the Saturday Mothers of Turkey, a group of women who have been gathering in the Galatasaray Square of Istanbul every Saturday since 1995 to accuse government officials of violating the human rights of their sons. The mothers hold the photographs of sons and daughters who had disappeared in police custody in the 1990s. Many of them were journalists and Kurdish activists critical of the government's policy toward the Kurdish population. According to Amnesty International and Turkey's human rights organizations, there were hundreds of reports of disappearances between 1992 and 1996 when the Turkish government was fiercely fighting the Kurdish terrorist organization known as PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) in the eastern part of Turkey. Many of those disappeared are believed to have been killed by security forces or ultranationalist death squads, and the Saturday Mothers have demanded bringing to justice the officials responsible for the human rights abuses.

The main tactic of the Saturday Mothers of Turkey has been regular Saturday vigils on the main boulevard of Istanbul. Every Saturday afternoon, the mothers come together, sit silently, hold the photographs of their lost sons, and protest the human rights violations by the Turkish government. Silence is very important because it helps the mothers to protest longer and preempts police intervention.[194] Local and international human rights associations support them by spreading their stories and broadcasting their gatherings. The mass media has regularly reported the public protests against the

---

[194] Zeynep Gülru Göker, "Presence in Silence: Feminist and Democratic Implications of the Saturday Vigils in Turkey," in *Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Joel Beinin and Frédéric Vairel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 119.

disappearances. The European Parliament decided to award the Saturday Mothers with the Carl von Ossietzky medal in 1996.[195] The protest act of vigils by the mothers of the disappeared in Turkey had its precedents in the "Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo" in Argentina.[196] The Saturday Mothers have been visited by other women who are anti-disappearance activists in Bosnia, Chile, and Lebanon, expanding a loose transnational network.

Political activism of the women in the Saturday Mothers of Turkey constitutes a cultural and political challenge to paternalistic political culture in Turkish society. These women demonstrated that mothers, wives, and sisters can make their voices heard in the public space. This is a revolutionary change in the image of women because "women had a long history of lacking autonomous agency in Turkey."[197]

5.3.3 Republican Meetings

The third example of protest gatherings that lend some support to the movement society thesis is the "republican meetings" organized by secular civil society organizations in various cities in early 2007. These rallies brought together more than a million people who were opposed to the Islamic Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) government. The huge rallies organized by secularist civil society associations in early 2007 were nonviolent mass gatherings in Ankara, Istanbul,

---

[195] Yeşim Arat, "Democracy and Women in Turkey: In Defense of Liberalism," *Social Politics* 6, no. 3 (1999): 376.

[196] Umut Arifcan, "The Saturday Mothers of Turkey," *Peace Review* 9, no. 2 (1997): 265.

[197] Gülsüm Baydar and Berfin İvegen, "Territories, Identities, and Thresholds: The Saturday Mothers Phenomenon in İstanbul," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture & Society* 31, no. 3 (2006): 694.

Izmir, Manisa, Samsun, and other cities in Turkey in support of a principle of secularism. The participants in the Republican Meetings were worried about the rise of political Islam and the gradual erosion of secularism under the Islamic-rooted AKP government. Although the AKP had enjoyed high approval rating, the secularist sectors of civil society believed that the AKP government's religious agendas posed a major threat to the country.

In April, foreign minister Abdullah Gül was declared the AKP's candidate for presidency. Turkey's presidency is a ceremonial position without strong executive power, but the president is considered the symbol of secular Turkey. Yet, Gül was a controversial politician because he came from the tradition of political Islamism of former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, who had been forced to leave office by the military in 1997. In addition, Gül's wife was a woman who covered her head with the hijab, another symbol of political Islam.

Secularists had already been alerted even before the AKP officially announced Gül's candidacy on April 24 because there was a rumor that prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan would run for presidency. Thus, on 14 April, hundreds of thousands of people visited Anıtkabir, the mausoleum of Ataturk in Ankara. After the huge rally in Anıtkabir, the Republican Meetings spread to other cities such as Istanbul and Izmir, gathering numerous secular associations. The crowds enveloped town squares with national flags and chanted slogans defending secularism. The protesters argued that the AKP's candidate for the presidency was not fit to be a president who must be committed to secular principles. One protester shouted "Turkey is secular and it will remain secular!" Another participant "We do not want an imam in Turkey!"

Yavuz and Özcan point out that "Although these rallies were all organized by retired military officers, illiberal Kemalist associations and secular women's groups, the majority of the protesters were the new middle class, who responded to perceived threats to their lifestyle."[198] This new middle class was the product of economic transformations that Turkey has undergone during the last two decades. Members of this new class include professionals in the service, banking, and information sectors. These individuals commonly emphasized that their modern lifestyle was threatened under the Islamic government and the AKP was seeking to Islamicize their society gradually. These republican meetings became the first occasion in the history of Turkey's social movements that civil society associations succeeded in mobilizing such numbers of ordinary citizens to the streets to defend their lifestyle and values.

5.3.4 Anti-Iraq War Protests

The anti-Iraq War protest campaigns in 2003 offer more empirical support for the movement society thesis. As the Iraq War was approaching in 2003, thousands of citizens stepped onto the streets in order to put pressure on the Turkish government not to cooperate with Washington to invade Iraq. This antiwar protest movement of 2003 was organized not only by the leftist groups but also nationalists and religious sectors of the population, and nonideological urban popular groups in major cities. Indeed, the Iraq War and the rising tide of anti-Americanism caused the diffusion of protest to new groups of the population and the new coalitional networks among groups with different ideological and political orientations. The protest campaigns against the Iraq War also revealed how

[198] M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, "Crisis in Turkey: The Conflict of Political Languages," *Middle East Policy* 14, no. 3 (2007): 122-123.

Turkish peace activism became transnational by coordinating the actions and strengthening international networks with foreign peace activists.

For instance, the "Anti-War Greater Istanbul Meeting" in April 2003 showed how ideologically diverse groups acted together to oppose the war.[199] This protest event gathered more than twenty organizations and 45,000 people who marched in the central square of Istanbul. These organizations included radical leftist political parties, labor unions, professional associations, feminists, environmentalists, LGBT organizations, the retired workers' association, and local residents. Such a cross-ideological coalition was rare in the history of Turkish social movements. Second, the so-called Red Apple Coalition (Kızıl Elma Koalisyonu), which was established by the leftists and ultra-nationalists, also offered another example in which ideologically different, and even opposing groups, coordinated a series of public meetings to oppose anti-Americanism. These groups were fighting and killing each other during the 1970s, yet, in 2003, they discovered that they had something in common: Turkish nationalism and anti-Americanism. Thus, despite different political persuasion, some leftists and ultra-nationalists came into the same coalition with common goals. The Anti-Iraq War protest campaigns thus indicate the declining relevance of the Cold War ideologies among Turkish social movements.[200]

---

[199] Kakizaki, "Anti-Iraq War Protests in Turkey: Global Networks, Coalitions, and Context."

[200] Antiwar protests in 2002-3 in Turkey were also related to anti-globalization movements that had diffused from Europe and North America to Turkey in the 1990s. In his in-depth interviews with the organizers and participants of the anti-war campaigns, Gümrükçü revealed that anti-Iraq war protests and the anti-globalization movements were mobilized by those who shared the "same anti-capitalist consciousness." See Gümrükçü,

5.3.5 Social Protests by Merchants and Artisans

Gemici's study about social protests after the 2001 economic crisis shows that unorganized shopkeepers and artisans rather than organized labor played an active role in antigovernment campaigns.[201] The economic crisis caused by a political row between Turkey's prime minister and president caused a sudden depreciation of the Turkish lira, a sudden contraction of GDP, and a massive outflow of foreign capital from the Turkish market.[202]

Gemici, using newspaper sources, recorded 170 social protests against the government's economic policy after the crisis. The examination of the patterns of protest participation in the case of the 2001 financial crisis revealed that it was unorganized shopkeepers and artisans who organized about 65 percent of the protest events. Furthermore, Gemici found that these shopkeepers and artisans were ideologically conservative and did not have prior experience in contentious politics.[203] In short, the wave of social protests in early 2001 was mainly organized by those who, according to social movement theories, were unlikely to protest. Gemici's in-depth analysis of

---

"The Rise of a Social Movement: The Emergence of Anti-Globalization Movements in Turkey."

[201] Kurtuluş Gemici, "Moral Economy Redux: Social Protests in Turkey after the 2001 Economic Crisis," *Mobilization: An International Journal* 18, no. 2 (2013).

[202] On the 2001 financial crisis, see Ziya Öniş, "Domestic Politics Versus Global Dynamics: Towards a Political Economy of the 2000 and 2001 Financial Crises in Turkey," *Turkish Studies* 4, no. 2 (2003); Hakan Tunç, "The Lost Gamble: The 2000 and 2001 Turkish Financial Crises in Comparative Perspective," *Turkish Studies* 4, no. 2 (2003).

[203] Gemici, "Moral Economy Redux: Social Protests in Turkey after the 2001 Economic Crisis," 145.

shopkeepers' mobilization strategy indicates that economic liberalization reforms of the 1980s and 1990s weakened the Turkish state's paternalistic role that had traditionally protected the livelihood of shopkeepers and artisans. Thus, the 2001 economic crisis that reduced the state's capacity to protect small tradespeople resulted in "moral outrage and resentment, motivating shopkeepers to blame the government for the economic difficulties they experienced."[204]

5.3.6 Gezi Protests

Antigovernment protests in June-July 2013 called the Gezi Resistance were the most recent example of the protest diffusion within the country. The wave of the protests originally contested an urban development program to demolish Istanbul's Taksim-Gezi Park, but the brutal crackdown of peaceful demonstrators by police resulted in the diffusion of antigovernment protests in many cities throughout the country. The protests addressed a wide range of issues including local environmental concerns, freedom of expression and the press, corruption, and the government's Islamic orientations. Constanze Letsch reported that "eight people died, at least four as a result of police violence."[205] According to numerous accounts on the protests, the majority of participants were "new comers" who had never participated in street protests and who had not been members of political parties and other political organizations. Participants were demographically diverse including men and women, young and old, and radical leftists and pious Muslims. Although there is no scientifically credible survey about the

[204] Ibid., 152.

[205] Constanze Letsch, "A Year after the Protests, Gezi Park Nurtures the Seeds of a New Turkey," *Guardian*, May 29, 2014.

composition of the participants in this revolt, anecdotal evidence suggests the heterogeneity of the protesters. Elite professionals, university students, unionized workers, and informal workers constituted the core groups of the protest, but there were various social groups including ethnic, religious, sexual minorities and numerous NGOs and civil society associations supporting the resistance. Cihan Tuğal situates the Gezi revolt in global perspective, arguing that this antigovernment protest should be understood as part of a global wave of revolt that had occurred in Europe such as Greece and Iceland, the Arab Springs in the Middle East, and Occupy Wall Street in the United States.[206]

In each of the above examples, it is suggested that citizens who were unlikely to protest in the past began to engage in contentious politics in the 1990s and 2000s. Female students are demanding the right to wear headscarves in school. Mothers are holding silent vigils for their lost sons on Saturdays. Kemalist middle class citizens are defending the principle of secularism. Urban popular group organize antiwar campaigns. Unorganized small shopkeepers are challenging the neoliberal economic reforms. Combined, the diffusion of protest politics has contributed to the process of democratization on the streets. Protest participation by new groups of citizens since the 1990s expanded the realm of direct democracy and empowered individuals as agents for political and social change.

These case studies on recent protest movements in Turkey seem to support Meyer and Tarrow's movement society thesis, but there is no research that systematically and quantitatively demonstrates Turkey's transition toward a movement society.

---

[206] Cihan Tuğal, "Commentary: "Resistance Everywhere": The Gezi Revolt in Global Perspective," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 49, (2013).

5.4 Continuity and Change in Protest Participation in Turkey, 1990-2007

This section statistically examines the degree to which protest participation has diffused to different social groups in contemporary Turkey as the movement society thesis suggests using the data from World Values Surveys. First, we will analyze the diffusion of protest participation through cross-tabulations that show how protest actions and the four demographic variables including sex, age, political ideology, and employment status are associated with each other. Second, binary logistic analyses will be conducted to determine the effects of these variables on protest potential. It is expected that, as the movement society scholars have hypothesized, relationships between the demographic variables and protest potential become weaker over time as Turkey transits to a movement society.

5.4.1 Bivariate Analysis

A series of bivariate analyses on protest participation produced mixed results, but the overall patterns between the demographic variables and protest participation suggest that protest has not as widely diffused to new actors as we have expected in contemporary Turkey. Table 5.1 presents a cross-tabulation of protest participation by sex. Men sign a petition, join a boycott, attend a lawful demonstration, take part in an unofficial strike, and occupy buildings more often than do women. In particular, collective petitions and lawful demonstrations in 1996 indicate that there was a significant gender gap with an almost 10-percentage point difference between men and women. The gender gap for protest participation remains the same for 2001 and 2007 for

less confrontational actions such as petitions, boycotts, and lawful demonstrations. Unofficial strikes and occupying of buildings, by contrast, are not related to sex because neither men nor women actively participate in these more disruptive activities.

Table 5.2 presents relationships between age and protest participation. The respondents of World Values Survey were categorized into six age groups. The bivariate analysis indicates a curvilinear relationship between age and protest engagement, with individuals in the middle age categories are more likely to engage than the younger and the older categories. Individuals in the age category of 35-44 are particularly active participants in all forms of contentious politics, challenging a conventional understanding about protest participation in Turkey that assumes the primacy of youth in protest participation.

The relationship between political ideology and protest participation in Turkey is very strong as shown in Table 5.3, with individuals who position themselves on the left and center-left attending protest activities more often than do those on the right and center-right. For instance, while 42.4 percent of the respondents with leftist ideology signed a petition in 1996, only 11.8 percent on the right did so. In 1996, 11 percent of the leftists attended an unofficial strike, only 0.5 percent on the right did so. The finding is inconsistent with the movement society thesis because ideology is still strongly associated with protest engagement in Turkey. In short, the ideological factor of protest participation has remained significant in Turkish politics.

Table 5.4 demonstrates the relationship between employment status and protest participation. Consistent with the existing literature and the past patterns of protest engagement in Turkey, students and the employed constitute the body of protest

constituents. Housewives and the retired are the least active citizens in protest politics. The presence of relatively large percentage point differences between occupational groups suggest that protest has not diffused to new groups of citizens in Turkey.

Table 5.5 presents summary statistics about the relationship between protest participation and the four demographic variables for 1990, 1996, 2001, and 2007. The movement society thesis hypothesized that the association between protest participation and sex, age, ideology, and employment status would become weaker over time, but the analyses produced mixed results. First, political ideology has remained the most important determinant of protest participation in all types of protest between 1990 and 2007. For instance, ideology has a statistically significant and moderate relationship with collective petitions, boycotts, lawful demonstrations, and unofficial strikes in 2007. Despite some recent case studies on protest activities in Turkey that emphasize non-ideological and more pragmatic aspects of contention, the data from World Values Surveys suggest that ideology is still the most relevant individual factor of protest participation. Second, sex and age do not appear to be relevant factors of protest participation. The relationships between sex and petitions, boycotts, demonstrations, and strikes have been statistically significant, but too weak to be meaningful. Age has lost statistical significance in 2001 and 2007. Employment status was moderately related to protest participation in the 1990s, but the relationship has become weaker in the 2000s.

5.4.2 Logistic Regression Analysis

In the next stage of the analysis, a series of binary logistic regressions were carried out in order to determine the effect of demographic variables on protest

participation for 1990, 1996, 2001, and 2007. It is also aimed at testing if patterns of protest participation changed over time by comparing the results from 1990 through 2007.

The dependent variable for the subsequent analysis is protest potential that measures a respondent's propensity to participate in contentious activities. Respondents who "have done" or "might do" at least one of the following protest actions were coded 1 and those who "would never do" were coded 0: signing petitions, joining boycotts, and attending lawful demonstrations. Thus, the dependent variable in this analysis is a dichotomous one.[207]

To test the movement society thesis, sex, age, political ideology, and employment status are used as independent variables. Men are coded 1 while women are coded 0. The variable age indicates age groups ranging from 1 ("18-24") to 6 ("65 or older"). The political ideology variable ranges from 1 ("right") to 2 ("center-right"), 3 ("center-left"), and 4 ("left"). Employment status of respondents are coded as students= 1; employed = 2; retired = 3; housewife = 4; unemployed = 5.

Because our dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, I used binary logistic regression to estimate the effects of the independent variables on respondents' protest potential. In order to test the hypothesis of the movement society thesis that protest has diffused to diverse groups of citizens over time, I ran logistic regression for the four survey years including 1990, 1996, 2001, and 2007 separately.

Table 6 summarizes the results of binary logistic regression analysis for 1990, 1996, 2001, and 2007. The overall findings from the analyses indicate that the

[207] "Unofficial strikes" and "occupying buildings" were excluded from the regression analyses because the 2007 World Values Survey did not ask respondents if they had participated in these activities.

demographic variables are still meaningful and relevant to understand who are more likely to participate in protest in Turkey. Age, ideology, and employment status, in particular, have been important determinants of protest potential among Turkish citizens over time. Compared to younger cohorts, old people are significantly less likely to have high protest potential although the youngest does not necessarily hold higher protest potential than the middle-aged groups. Nevertheless, those who are 45 years old and over tend to withdraw from contentious politics. Ideology is the most important determinant of protest potential in 1996, 2001, and 2007, but not in 1990. Those who have a leftist orientation are more likely to participate in and accept protest actions as a legitimate form of political participation than those who position themselves on the right side of the ideological scale. The employment variable is similarly a significant factor of protest potential. As it was in the past, students and workers are most active participants of protest politics except 1996. Turkish citizens who are retired, unemployed, and housewives are less likely to engage in contentious politics.

Among the four survey years, protest was most diffused to various groups of citizens in 1990. Sex and political ideology were not associated with protest potential at all, indicating that there was no difference between men and women and the leftists and rightists in terms of protest propensity. Among age groups, it was only the 45-54 age group that was significantly less likely to protest than the young. Employment status was similarly proved not a significant determinant of protest potential except housewives who were less likely to engage in contentious political activities than students. Overall, the 1990 model tells us that protest potential was not affected by sex, age, ideology, and employment status. The absence of meaningful relationships between protest potential

and the independent variables implies that biological and demographic differences specified in this analysis do not determine whether a respondent has high or low protest potential. Thus, protest was diffused to various groups of the population in 1990.

In 1996 and 2001, and less significantly in 2007, protest politics seems to be skewed toward particular groups of Turkish citizens. Namely, the young, leftists, and students were the leading participant of protest activities. For example, middle-aged and older citizens were significantly less likely to protest than the youngest in 1996 and in 2001. Political ideology was not associated with protest potential in 1990, but it emerged as one of the most important variables in the subsequent years. People with leftist persuasion were more likely to have high protest potential than those with rightist orientation. In terms of employment status, if a respondent was not a student, then he or she was unlikely to protest regardless of his or her occupation.

It is noteworthy that, contrary to the movement thesis, the patterns of protest potential in Turkey suggest that Turkey was closer to a social movement society in 1990 than recent years. In 1990, men and women, the young and the old, the conservative and the leftists, and students, workers, and the retired showed interest in contentious politics at the same level. People with diverse backgrounds had the disposition to protest as a means of influencing politics in 1990, yet as we move from 1990 to 1996 and 2001, it becomes clear that the older, the conservatives, and nonstudents began to withdraw from contentious politics.

5.5 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to examine whether Turkish society has moved toward a social movement society in which protest activities have diffused to new groups of people. The proponents of this thesis such as Meyer and Tarrow have argued that protest activities, which had been employed by particular groups such as students and workers in the 1960s and 1970s, have become more conventional, popular, and acceptable in a movement society.[208] In such a society, sex, age, ideology, and employment status should become less relevant to explain why some people protest and others do not. Regardless of their demographic characteristics, they do protest when they have resentment against authorities.

Meyer and Tarrow proposed the transition toward the movement society within the context of advanced democratic societies, yet the recent literature on political contention in Turkey also suggests that the diffusion of protest has also occurred among Turkish citizens. The episodes of various recent mass protest gatherings such as the Saturday Mothers, the anti-Iraq War campaigns, the Republican meetings, and the Gezi Park protest show that there were many newcomers such as traditional mothers, middle class professionals, religious girls, and senior citizens who now see protest as a legitimate and even useful tool to influence what their representatives and state officials decide.

Despite these major protest campaigns that lend support to the movement society thesis, the empirical analyses of this chapter find the opposite pattern of protest participation. In Turkey, protest was more widely diffused to different sectors of the population at the beginning of the survey (1990) than the later periods. During the 1990s

---

[208] Meyer and Tarrow, "A Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century."

and 2000s, protest became less popular among the old, the conservatives, and non-students. This finding indicates that we are not necessarily moving toward a social movement society and, instead, we can move away from the movement society if protest becomes irrelevant or unpopular among particular social groups, as we have seen in Turkey.

How can we explain the decreasing popularity of protest politics among the old, conservative, and nonstudent citizens? First, we can speculate that nontraditional protesters who had contributed to the diffusion of protest in the 1990s failed to maintain dynamism of their social movement activities and make their organizations sustainable. Second, it is also possible to argue that societal groups that had protested in the early 1990s exited from contentious politics because they either achieved their goals or found reliable partners in political society.

In conclusion, it is premature to argue that a movement society has emerged in Turkish society as it has happened in advanced democracies. There were still significant participatory disparities among different sectors of the population and these disparities were not diminishing between 1990 and 2007. Contrary to the expectation of the movement society thesis, Turkey was not transitioning toward a movement society. Rather, Turkey was travelling away from such a society in the 1990s and the 2000s.



Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007.

Figure 5.1: Percentages of Turkish Citizens Participating in Protests, 1990-2007

Table 5.1

Percentages of Protest Participation by Sex, 1990-2007

	Petitioning		Boycotting		Demonstrating		Striking		Occupying Buildings	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
1990	16.8	10.3	6.5	4.7	6.9	4.5	1.6	1.3	1.2	1.3
	(83)	(49)	(32)	(22)	(34)	(21)	(8)	(6)	(6)	(6)
1996	24.5	14.6	12.6	5.4	13.3	4.6	3.2	1.2	0.9	0.5
	(231)	(134)	(119)	(49)	(127)	(42)	(30)	(11)	(9)	(5)
2001	18.8	12.0	8.8	4.0	9.9	5.4	3.0	1.5	0.9	0.4
	(320)	(201)	(150)	(67)	(167)	(90)	(50)	(25)	(16)	(7)
2007	14.7	10.2	7.4	3.5	7.4	4.7	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	(99)	(67)	(50)	(23)	(50)	(31)	(88)	(42)	(31)	(18)

Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007.
Note: ( ) = (valid)

Table 5.2

Percentages of Protest Participation by Age, 1990-2007

Petitioning

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 and over
1990	13.6 (33)	13.5 (36)	16.5 (33)	11.3 (16)	12.2 (10)	11.8 (4)
1996	21.8 (98)	22.0 (111)	20.7 (91)	15.4 (37)	16.5 (23)	3.8 (3)
2001	18.2 (126)	14.9 (144)	16.5 (138)	15.5 (71)	10.2 (26)	9.7 (15)
2007	12.6 (35)	13.3 (56)	13.2 (38)	11.6 (22)	10.0 (8)	9.7 (7)

Boycotting

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 and over
1990	5.4 (13)	5.6 (15)	10.1 (20)	2.1 (3)	3.8 (3)	0.0 (0)
1996	6.0 (27)	12.1 (61)	13 (57)	5.4 (13)	4.3 6)	2.6 (2)
2001	5.2 (36)	6.3 (61)	7.6 (64)	8.1 (37)	3.9 (10)	5.2 (8)
2007	5.8 (16)	4.5 (19)	7.6 (22)	5.8 (11)	5.0 (4)	1.4 (1)

Demonstrating

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 and over
1990	3.3 (8)	8.3 (22)	7.6 (15)	4.3 (6)	3.7 (3)	3.0 (1)
1996	7.3 (33)	11.2 (57)	11.3 (50)	7.0 (17)	5.7 (8)	2.5 (2)
2001	7.5 (52)	7.3 (71)	8.7 (73)	9.4 (43)	4.8 (12)	3.2 (5)
2007	6.2 (17)	6.4 (27)	6.6 (19)	6.8 (13)	5.0 (4)	1.4 (1)

Table 5.2 Continued

Striking

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 and over
1990	0.8 (2)	1.1 (3)	2.5 (5)	2.1 (3)	1.2 (1)	0.0 (0)
1996	0.9 (4)	2.8 (14)	3.6 (16)	2.1 (5)	1.4 (2)	0.0 (0)
2001	2.2 (15)	1.7 (16)	3.0 (25)	3.1 (14)	1.6 (4)	0.6 (1)
2007	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Occupying Buildings

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 and over
1990	0.4 (1)	1.1 (3)	2.0 (4)	2.1 (3)	1.2 (1)	0.0 (0)
1996	1.1 (5)	0.4 (2)	1.1 (5)	0.8 (2)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)
2001	0.4 (3)	0.6 (6)	1.1 (9)	0.9 (4)	0.4 (1)	0.0 (0)
2007	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007.
Note: ( ) = (valid)

Table 5.3

Percentages of Protest Participation by Ideology, 1990-2007

Petitioning				
	Left	Center-left	Center-right	Right
1990	31.3 (21)	13.1 (66)	12.3 (26)	15.2 (12)
1996	42.2 (73)	23.5 (182)	12.9 (60)	11.8 (38)
2001	32.3 (116)	14.1 (214)	15.3 (116)	11.1 (242)
2007	31.6 (42)	13.1 (39)	10.1 (46)	9.3 (23)

Boycotting				
	Left	Center-left	Center-right	Right
1990	19.7 (13)	5.0 (25)	3.9 (8)	9.1 (7)
1996	31.2 (54)	10.3 (80)	3.2 (15)	4.4 (14)
2001	19.7 (71)	5.8 (88)	5.0 (38)	3.0 (18)
2007	19.5 (26)	4.7 (14)	4.4 (20)	2.8 (7)

Demonstrating				
	Left	Center-left	Center-right	Right
1990	19.7 (13)	4.6 (23)	5.2 (11)	7.7 (6)
1996	33.3 (58)	9.4 (73)	4.5 (21)	3.4 (11)
2001	25.7 (93)	6.0 (91)	5.5 (42)	4.9 (29)
2007	23.3 (31)	5.4 (16)	4.4 (20)	2.8 (7)

Striking				
	Left	Center-left	Center-right	Right
1990	4.7 (3)	0.6 (3)	1.9 (4)	2.6 (2)
1996	12.7 (22)	2.3 (18)	0.2 (1)	0.0 (0)
2001	11.0 (40)	1.5 (22)	1.2 (9)	0.5 (3)
2007	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Occupying Buildings				
	Left	Center-left	Center-right	Right
1990	1.6 (1)	1.0 (5)	1.4 (3)	1.3 (1)
1996	4.1 (7)	0.5 (4)	0.2 (1)	0.6 (2)
2001	2.0 (7)	0.5 (8)	0.5 (4)	0.7 (4)
2007	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007.
Note: ( ) = (valid)

Table 5.4

Percentages of Protest Participation by Employment Status, 1990-2007

Petitioning

	Student	Employed	Retired	Housewife	Unemployed
1990	28.6 (16)	14.6 (60)	24.5 (13)	8.2 (26)	12.6 (11)
1996	36.6 (48)	27.7 (232)	18.0 (31)	6.2 (36)	15.1 (11)
2001	33.5 (67)	20.0 (293)	18.4 (48)	5.7 (61)	12.9 (37)
2007	21.0 (25)	15.8 (82)	12.8 (16)	7.3 (33)	7.3 (6)

Boycotting

	Student	Employed	Retired	Housewife	Unemployed
1990	9.4 (5)	7.5 (31)	7.5 (4)	2.5 (8)	4.7 (4)
1996	10.8 (14)	14.7 (123)	8.0 (14)	1.4 (8)	8.1 (6)
2001	9.5 (19)	9.5 (139)	6.5 (17)	1.5 (16)	7.0 (20)
2007	10.2 (12)	7.5 (39)	4.0 (5)	3.3 (15)	2.4 (2)

Demonstrating

	Student	Employed	Retired	Housewife	Unemployed
1990	3.8 (2)	8.1 (33)	5.6 (3)	3.2 (10)	5.7 (5)
1996	13.8 (18)	14.1 (119)	9.2 (16)	1.4 (8)	8.1 (6)
2001	13.0 (26)	10.7 (156)	7.7 (20)	2.0 (22)	8.7 (25)
2007	13.4 (16)	6.9 (36)	4.8 (6)	4.2 (19)	3.7 (3)

Striking

	Student	Employed	Retired	Housewife	Unemployed
1990	1.9 (1)	1.7 (7)	3.8 (2)	0.9 (3)	0.0 (0)
1996	0.8 (1)	3.9 (33)	2.3 (4)	0.0 (0)	1.4 (1)
2001	2.5 (5)	3.0 (44)	3.8 (10)	0.6 (6)	2.5 (7)
2007	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Occupying Buildings

	Student	Employed	Retired	Housewife	Unemployed
1990	1.9 (1)	0.7 (3)	1.9 (1)	1.9 (6)	0.0 (0)
1996	0.8 (1)	1.2 (10)	0.6 (1)	0.3 (2)	0.0 (0)
2001	0.5 (1)	0.9 (13)	1.2 (3)	0.4 (4)	0.7 (2)
2007	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007.
Note: ( ) = (valid)

Table 5.5

Correlation between Protest Participation and Demographic Variables, 1990-2007

Petitioning	1990	1996	2001	2007
Sex	.096*	.124*	.094*	.068*
Age	.048	.103*	.065*	.034
Ideology	.228*	.299*	.211*	.216*
Employment status	.163*	.264*	.218*	.142*

Boycotting	1990	1996	2001	2007
Sex	0.04	.125*	.099*	.086*
Age	.117*	.130*	.051	.066
Ideology	.171*	.271*	.189*	.213*
Employment status	.106*	.202*	.146*	.107*

Demonstrating	1990	1996	2001	2007
Sex	.053	.152*	.084*	.057*
Age	.094	.088*	.057	.050
Ideology	.166*	.288*	.235*	.250*
Employment status	.095	.197*	.152*	.110*

Striking	1990	1996	2001	2007
Sex	.015	.067*	.049*	N/A
Age	.059	.076	.049	N/A
Ideology	.100*	.237*	.209*	N/A
Employment status	.068	.121*	.081*	N/A

Occupying Buildings	1990	1996	2001	2007
Sex	.002	.023	.032	N/A
Age	.061	.047	.035	N/A
Ideology	.022	.123*	.053*	N/A
Employment status	.062	.047	.032	N/A

Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007.
Note: Entries are values of Cramer's V.
* $p < .05$

Table 5.6

Turkish Respondents in World Values Surveys (1990-2007)

by Demographic Characteristics

	1990 (n = 1030)	1996 (n = 1907)	2001 (n = 3401)	2007 (n = 1346)
Sex				
Male	49.7	50.2	50.0	50.2
Female	50.3	49.8	50.0	49.8
Age				
18-24	24.7	24.0	20.5	20.7
25-34	27.1	27.2	28.7	31.8
35-44	20.9	23.8	24.8	21.8
45-54	14.6	13.0	13.7	14.3
55-64	8.6	7.8	7.5	6.1
65 <	4.0	4.3	4.8	5.4
Ideology				
Right	9.6	18.7	18.3	21.9
Center-right	24.9	26.6	23.5	40.0
Center-left	57.8	44.8	47.0	26.3
Left	7.7	9.9	11.2	11.8
Employment				
Student	5.8	7.2	6.0	9.0
Employed	43.2	46.3	44.3	40.0
Retired	5.8	9.5	7.9	9.7
Housewife	35.5	32.9	33.2	35.1
Unemployed	9.6	4.1	8.6	6.2

Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007.

Table 5.7

Results of Binary Logistic Regression for Protest Potential, 1990-2007

	1990			1996			2001			2007		
	B	S.E.	Sig.	B.	S.E.	Sig.	B	S.E.	Sig.	B	S.E.	Sig.
Sex[a]	.233	1.263		.044	.169		-.166	.117		-.508	.209	**
Age[b]												
25-34	.187	1.206		-.056	.172		.007	.125		.435	.204	*
35-44	-.049	.952		.115	.182		-.099	.129		.527	.226	*
45-54	-.553	.575	*	-.291	.209		-.328	.148	**	.394	.255	
55-64	-.536	.585		-.956	.261	***	-.590	.181	**	.348	.333	
65 <	-.544	.580		-.863	.329	**	-.708	.224	**	.476	.378	
Ideology[c]												
Center-right	-.367	.693		.425	.164	**	.282	.119	*	.098	.168	
Center-left	-.381	.683		.561	.152	***	.130	.105		.550	.186	**
Left	.665	1.945		1.251	.252	***	1.264	.176	***	1.139	.245	***
Employment[d]												
Employed	-.470	.625		-.818	.326	**	-.422	.222		-.107	.270	
Retired	-.022	.978		-.591	.393		-.591	.273	**	-.721	.370	***
Housewife	-1.078	.340	*	-2.009	.346	***	-1.589	.240	***	-1.665	.314	
Unemployed	-.429	.651		-1.060	.412	**	-.699	.246	**	-.513	.342	
Constant	1.539	4.661	***	1.663	.334	***	1.452	.233	***	.347	.293	
Valid N	797			1663			3127			1101		
-2LL	966.829			1844.628			3754.551			1401.597		
Nagelkerke R2	.096			.162			.123			.142		

Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007. * P < 0.05 ** P < 0.01 *** P < 0.001

[a]Male is the reference category; [b]18-24 is the reference category; [c]Right is the reference category; [d]Student is the reference category

CHAPTER 6

EFFECTS OF POLITICAL GENERATION, LIFE CYCLE, AND PERIOD ON PROTEST POTENTIAL IN TURKEY

6.1 Introduction

This chapter explores how age-related variables affect an individual's participation in protest politics in Turkey, a secular, but predominantly Muslim society. The case of Turkey can offer a unique contribution to the study of political participation, social movements, and protest politics because the majority of the previous studies on nonconventional political participation such as boycotts, demonstrations, strikes are based on the experiences of Western Europe and North America. Among the Middle Eastern countries, Turkey is the only Muslim country where progress toward democracy has been sustained and vibrant associationalism and civil society activities have been growing since the late 1980s.[209]

In the history of modern Turkish politics, political and social protest has constituted an important means for ordinary citizens to influence what politicians decide and to make their voice heard in the public sphere. Especially the transition from the prior single-party system to the multiparty system in 1950 ushered in a new era in which

[209]Sefa Şimşek, "The Transformation of Civil Society in Turkey: From Quantity to Quality," *Turkish Studies* 5, no. 3 (2004).

people discovered the utility of contentious politics in Turkey. Turkish politics in the 1960s and 1970s saw the rise of protest movements organized by leftist students, right-wing nationalists, labor unionists, and urban residents. These movements intensified in the early 1970s and reached the level of a civil war in the late 1970s, breeding fear and chaos in society. The military decided to intervene in politics to restore political order, which the military leaders believed had collapsed because of incompetent and selfish civilian politicians. Thus, the military regime which had carried out the 1980 military intervention created a new constitution and political systems which were intended to discourage citizens' participation in antisystem political movements. Nevertheless, the process of democratic transition and political liberalization that started in the late 1980s and 1990s once again created opportunities for citizens to join protest activities.

While political activism that involved unconventional political participation has been one of the most important elements of Turkish politics, there is a paucity of systematic empirical studies of protest politics.[210] One reason for this lack of prior research on the trends in protest participation can be attributed to the limited availability of longitudinal data on political behavior in Turkey. Nevertheless, the recent development and expansion of survey research organized by international networks of scholars such as the World Values Survey offers new opportunities for us to examine how the mode of political participation has changed over time in Turkey.

Also, there is a conventional narrative regarding the trends in popular participation in protest activities in Turkey. This narrative emphasizes either political

[210] But see Kalaycıoğlu, "Unconventional Political Participation in Turkey and Europe: Comparative Perspectives."; Kalaycıoğlu, "Religiosity and Protest Behaviour: The Case of Turkey in Comparative Perspective."; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu.

generation or youth as a main factor that influences one's willingness to take part in protest politics. The generational approach posits that whether an individual is more likely to join protest is largely determined by one's membership to a political generation. In the case of Turkey, prior research has suggested that those who were socialized in the politically turbulent period (1965-1980) tend to demonstrate higher levels of protest participation compared with those belonging to other generational categories. The second approach focuses on the effects of aging and maturation as a major factor of protest participation. According to this approach, youth is positively related to higher levels of protest participation, and old age exhibits alienation or exit from contentious political action.

6.2 Theoretical Background

There are three major approaches on the relationship between age and protest participation. One important approach is the generational approach which posits that birth cohorts with the shared political experiences during the formative years display a particular pattern of political involvement. The second approach is the life cycle approach which argues that protest participation is highest at the beginning of adulthood and gradually declines as individuals become older. The third approach emphasizes historical and political events and macrostructural changes that universally influence individuals' propensity to join protest regardless of one's location in the life cycle or one's membership in political generations.

6.2.1 Generation Effects

The generation approach argues that cohorts of individuals who were born during the same time and shared the same political experience tend to think and behave differently from people born in other periods. According to this view, what individuals experience during their formative years leave lasting influences on their political thinking and behavior in the rest of life. Certain attitudes, values, and predispositions shaped in adolescence and early adulthood, during which young people are more susceptible to new environments, remain as powerful cognitive frameworks to sort out information and interpret new experiences. Once this framework is developed during the formative years, it becomes relatively stable in the later periods of life. Older people are more likely to interpret new experiences in a way that resonate with and fit into the already established framework.

As Abramson and Inglehart show, the replacement of one generation by another with new values and attitudes is a major cause of social and political change.[211] According to them, generational replacement in the 1970s and 1980s contributed to the growth of postmaterialism, which affected what European citizens value as their political needs and demands. Younger generations which spent their formative years in affluence in the post WWII period exhibit postmaterial value orientations which are clearly distinguishable from political culture held by older generations which experienced wars and economic uncertainty during early adolescence.

---

[211] Paul R. Abramson and Ronald Inglehart, "Generational Replacement and Value Change in Eight West European Societies," *British Journal of Political Science* 22, no. 2 (1992); Paul R. Abramson and Ronald Inglehart, "Generational Replacement and the Future of Post-Materialist Values," *Journal of Politics* 49, (1987).

Turkish politics can be a useful case to test the generational effects on political behavior. Turkey has experienced major socioeconomic and political changes, which help us examine to what extent each period of Turkish political history affects the political behavior of citizens. We can find five periods in Turkey's history since the establishment of the Republic in 1923. Each period is associated with major transformations in the relationship between citizens and the state. The single party period (1923-1950) is characterized by the consolidation of the new nation-state in which the CHP created by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk monopolized political power, eliminating its opponents through repression and tribunals. During this period, civil society was controlled by institutional arrangements which discouraged people to organize but political elites were supposed to represent their collective interests around the CHP. Turkey experienced a transition to multiparty politics in 1950 with political liberalization. From 1950 and 1964, civic associations started to emerge in the public sphere, and students, workers, and urban residents found opportunities to influence politics through unconventional political participation, although protest activities during this period were rather moderate and did not resort to violence.[212] The next period from 1965 to 1980 witnessed the intensification of protest movements as a result of severe economic and political crises and politicization of citizens as we analyzed in Chapter 2. Leftist and ultranationalist students carried out disruptive forms of political participation such as illegal demonstrations, civil disobedience, campus occupations, and violent attacks on their rival organizations. Peasants occupied land, and workers started strikes and sabotage in workplace.

[212] Mardin, "Youth and Violence in Turkey," 230.

The military intervened in 1980 to stop radical politics and clean up the mess created by unstable civilian governments during the late 1970s. Subsequently, from 1981 to the mid-1990s, Turkish citizens were depoliticized under the 1982 constitution, which limited civil and political rights under the military's tutelary supervision and neoliberal economic policies.[213] Since the mid-1990s, the military has gradually retreated from civilian politics, which led to political liberalization and the growth of civil society. Not only leftist students, which constituted a major basis of protest movements in the previous periods, religious-conservative segments of the population, women, ethnic, religious, and cultural minorities, and a variety of urban residents started to participate in protest activities such as petitions, boycotts, sit-ins, and demonstrations. The European Accession talks have significantly influenced the emergence of active citizens since the beginning of the 2000s.[214]

This study hypothesizes that what I term "members of the confrontation period," those who spent their formative years in the late 1960s and the 1970s, demonstrate the highest level of protest potential compared to other generations. Turkish citizens who spent their formative years in this period were exposed to the surge of radical, disruptive, and even violent protest actions carried out by university students, workers, and urban dwellers.

---

[213] Lüküslü.

[214] Pınar Enneli, "The Turkish Young People as Active Citizens: Equal Participation or Social Exclusion?," in *Societal Peace and Ideal Citizenship for Turkey*, ed. Rasim Özgür Dönmez and Pınar Enneli (Lexington Books, 2011).

6.2.2 Lifecycle Effects

Lifecycle effects refer to the consequences of growing older or moving from one life cycle to another. There are numerous analyses demonstrating that maturation or aging of subgroups in the population are causally related to changes in political behavior and beliefs. This line of argument posits that each life cycle is associated with a particular political disposition and psychological orientation. In their pioneer work on the effects of life cycle on mass political participation in Austria, India, Japan, Nigeria, and the United States, Verba and Nie showed that there is a nonlinear relationship between age and the frequency of participation in electoral as well as nonelectoral processes such as involvements in community projects and contacts with political officials.[215] Levels of political participation increased in the early years, peaked in middle life, and declined in old age.[216] Higher rates of political participation among the middle-aged is explained by a variety of cognitive skills, political resources, and political experience, all of which are acquired through aging and are necessary for individuals to feel a sense of political efficacy and maintain political interests.[217] In terms of conventional modes of participation such as voting, political campaigns, and party membership, several studies indicate that youth are less likely to participate than older citizens. For instance, Biorcio and Mannheimer demonstrated that the relationship between citizens and political parties

---

[215] Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and Jae-on Kim, "Political Participation and the Life Cycle," *Comparative Politics* 6, no. 3 (1974).

[216] M. Kent Jennings and Gregory B. Markus, "Political Involvement in the Later Years: A Longitudinal Survey," *American Journal of Political Science* 32, no. 2 (1988).

[217] Roberto Biorcio and Renato Mannheimer, "Relationships between Citizens and Political Parties," in *Citizens and the State*, ed. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

is weaker among young people than the middle-aged and the elderly. Relying on the life cycle approach, Biorcio and Mannheimer suggested that older people are more likely to establish a stable relationship with political parties because it takes a long time for identification with a political party to develop.[218]

Participation in unconventional political behavior, in contrast, is skewed to young people. Unconventional forms of participation such as demonstrations, protest marches, boycotts, and political strikes require more energy and motivation to challenge what political elites decide than mainstream politics. As Marsh and Kaase note, "Young people enjoy the physical vigor, the freedom from day-to-day responsibilities of career and family, and have the time to participate in the pursuit of the energetic kinds of political activity implied by a high protest potential."[219] These actions also involve higher risks and costs to carry out including arrest by the security forces and networks and organizations for mobilization. Thus, those middle-aged and older individuals are less likely to protest than young people. In their cross-national comparison with the United States, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria, Marsh and Kaase found that levels of protest participation decline as one grows older and unconventional political participation peaks in the early life cycle between ages of 16 and 25.[220] Watts's survey research on protest participation among German young adults indicates that approval of unconventional political actions increases in the adolescent years and early 20s but falls

---

[218] Ibid.

[219] Max Kaase and Alan Marsh, "Political Action: A Theoretical Perspective," in *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*, ed. Samuel H. Barnes et al. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979), 101.

[220] Ibid.

in the late 20s.[221] More recently, Norris, who analyzed the pooled World Values Survey sample across all societies in the mid-1990s, found the curvilinear relationship between age and protest activism.[222] Norris contends that "It was the middle-aged who proved the strongest protest activists, with a fall-off among both the youngest and the oldest cohorts."[223] Norris's cross-sectional analysis cannot differentiate a life-cycle effect from a generational effect, but this finding implies that protest activism today is not confined to youth as was the case in the 1960s and 1970s.

In Turkey, youths, particularly university students, have constituted a main base of social mobilization in politics throughout its history. In the early years of the Republic, urban and educated youths played an important role in disseminating new secular, nationalist, and Western values among citizens and they embodied the new nation. In the late 1950s, massive student demonstrations in Ankara and Istanbul challenged the incumbent government, which was eventually topped by the 1960 military intervention. During the 1960s and 1970s, student movements caused widespread political violence between rightists and leftists. Although they saw themselves as acting in the national interest to defend the nation and create a better society, the public image of the youth shifted as the Republic's children, children supportive and obedient to the Turkish state,

---

[221] Meredith W. Watts, "Are There Typical Age Curves in Political Behavior? The "Age Invariance" Hypothesis and Political Socialization," *Political Psychology* 20, no. 3 (1999).

[222] Pippa Norris, *Democratic Pheonix: Reinventing Political Activism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 200-202.

[223] Ibid., 202.

to rebels and troublemakers threatening the state.[224] Thus, the lifecycle model hypothesizes that young people are more likely to protest than older counterparts in Turkish society.

6.2.3 Period Effects

In contrast to the cohort model, which posits that historical events influence individuals' attitudes and behavior only when these are experienced during formative years, the period model argues that the impacts of social and cultural transformations affect and change attitudes and behavior of people of all ages and cohorts. Particular events with high political saliency at particular periods in society may affect all individuals of the population in a uniform way.

For instance, macrolevel events and changes in political and economic structures are associated with life-cycle-wide as well as cohort-wide influences, potentially offsetting effects that would be brought about aging and cohort replacement. Converse suggested that historically significant political shocks such as the rise of Fascism in Italy and Germany had interrupted the development of partisanship over the life cycle of citizens because democratic party politics were denied under Mussolini and Hitler.[225] Beck and Jennings demonstrate that the early 1970s characterized by the anti-Vietnam

---

[224] Neyzi, "Object or Subject? The Paradox of Youth in Turkey."; Neyzi, "The Construction of "Youth" in Public Discourse in Turkey: A Generational Approach."; Leyla Neyzi, "Türkiye'de Kamusal Söylemde Gençlik Kurgusunun Değişimi," in *Katılımın "E-Hali": Gençlerin Sanal Alemi*, ed. Aslı Telli Aydemir (İstanbul: Alternatif Bilişim, 2011).

[225] Philip E. Converse, "Of Time and Partisan Stability," *Comparative Political Studies* 2, no. 2 (1969): 150-152.

War movement, civil rights movements, and the surge of left-wing politics disrupted the conventional pattern of political participation in the United States.[226] Nikolayenko's study on protest participation in Yeltsin's Russia finds that protest participation declined between 1990 and 1999 as enthusiasm for political and economic liberalization in the year of 1990 withered away and citizens came to accept the status quo consolidated by Yeltsin.[227]

In Turkey, I hypothesize that protest participation increased during the 1990s as a result of gradual political liberalization and economic crises. Political liberalization created ample opportunities for citizens to affect political processes through unconventional modes of political participation. Citizens used these new opportunities to express their grievances that were mounting because of a series of economic crises and chronic inflation. However, it is unclear if this trend sustained in the early 2000s because Turkey emerged as a newly emerging economy and the JDP created a government on its own, ending coalition-based unstable politics. It is possible to expect the level of protest participation dropped in the 2000s due to these macrostructural transformations, but it is also reasonable to speculate that protest participation further rose because the democratization process sustained in the country, encouraging people to raise their voices on the streets.

---

[226] Paul Allen Beck and M. Kent Jennings, "Political Periods and Political Participation," *American Political Science Review* 73, no. 3 (1979).

[227] Olena Nikolayenko, "Life Cycle, Generational and Period Effects on Protest Potential in Yeltsin's Russia," *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique* 41, no. 2 (2008).

6.3 Data, Method, and Variables

6.3.1 Data and Method

I test the hypotheses using individual-level survey data from the World Values Survey conducted in Turkey four times (1990, 1996, 2001, and 2007) during the last two decades. In total, 7,627 individuals from 18 to 92 years old joined the survey. Binary logistic regressions were run to test if age-related variables including political generation, lifecycle, and period (the year of survey) have discernible impacts on protest potential controlling for socioeconomic status as well as political attitudes of the individuals surveyed.

6.3.2 Dependent Variables

Protest potential in this study is nominally defined as a respondent's experience in protest activities and/or willingness to participate in protest. Thus, protest potential is a composite concept that taps people's actual participation as well as their recognition and acceptance of protest as a legitimate means which they can potentially use to influence what political elites decide in government. Social movement organizations need not only mobilize citizens into collective action but also demonstrate in the eyes of bystanders that protest is a legitimate and useful means to influence political decisions. In the survey, respondents were asked to indicate whether they "have actually participated," "might participate," or "would never participate" under any circumstances, in any of the following five activities of protest: (1) petitioning, (2) boycotts, (3) lawful demonstrations, (4) unofficial strikes, and (5) occupation of buildings or factories. Respondents who either participated or might participate in one of these protest activities

are coded as 1, and the value of "0" is assigned to those who "would never participate" in protest. For the subsequent logistic analysis, the additive index of protest potential is created by combining the responses to the first three forms of protest, excluding unofficial strikes and occupation of buildings or factories because the 2007 WVS did not include these two categories in the questionnaire. The omission of these two activities from the analysis does not seriously impair the measurement of protest potential because there are very few respondents who have joined or might consider participation in these contentious activities in Turkey.

6.3.3 Independent Variables

Political generation is operationalized as follows. This study defines one's "formative years" as the age range between 15 and 23. The operationalization of formative years is inevitably arbitrary as many scholars have noted. Nevertheless, the age range between 15 and 23 as the formative years can be considered appropriate in Turkey because this age span includes early adolescence, secondary school education, and university education. Turkish citizens also experience their first participation in elections and are likely to have their first employment opportunities during this age span. Many young people also marry during this period although average marriage age is on the rise recently.

Using this age range as an indicator of a particular cohort, individuals who spent at least five of the nine years between 15 and 23 within a particular historical period are considered to constitute a specific political generation. In this study, Turkish modern political history is divided into five distinct periods which I have already identified in the

previous section: single-party period, post-WWII, confrontation, post-1980, and liberalization. Table 6.1 represents how individuals are assigned to one of these generational groups based on their birth year, their ages when surveys were conducted, and proportions of each political generation in the sample.

The single party period ranges from 1923 to 1950 in which the CHP established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk governed the nation single-handedly. The post-WWII period spans from 1951 and 1964 in which Turkey achieved multiparty competitive politics and rapid economic development. The confrontation period refers to the years in which protest movements gained momentum (1965 and 1980). The post-1980 period is the years after the 1980 military intervention which suppressed political activism and state-challenging organizations. The liberalization period taps the span between 1996 and 2001 in which Turkey gradually shifted to political and economic liberalization.

For the logistic regression presented below, I created dummy variables to represent one's membership in a political generation. For instance, respondents who belong to the single party generation are coded 1, and those who belong to other generations are coded 0.

The second independent variable is life cycle. Respondents are categorized into six age groups: 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65 and older. An individual's biological age indicates how many years he or she has been alive. Therefore, age measures one's maturation in cognitive skills and political knowledge, but also it indicates one's position in the life stage.

The last independent variable is period. Turkish components of World Values Survey were conducted in the country in 1990, 1996, 2001, and 2007. In subsequent

regression analysis, the year 1990 is treated as the reference category to investigate if protest potential in 1996, 2001, and 2007 was higher or lower compared to 1990.

6.3.4 Control Variables

My regression models include several control variables, which the existing literature has found relevant in explaining protest potential. The first set of control variables represents socio-demographic variations across respondents such as gender, education and income. Prior research shows that women are less likely to participate in protest than men. Thus, it is expected that being male positively affects the odds of unconventional political participation. Numerous research demonstrate the positive relationship between socioeconomic status and protest participation. This study controls the effects of socioeconomic status by including two indicator variables. First, respondents' education level is measured on a three-point scale (lower = 1, middle = 2, higher =3). Second, I categorize respondents into three groups based on their income (lower = 1, middle = 2, higher =3).

The second set of control variables includes three indicators of respondents' interest in politics, trust in the national government, and political ideology. The survey asked respondents if they were very interested, somewhat interested, not interested, or not at all interested. Political interest is recoded as a dichotomous variable that distinguishes between those with low levels of political interest ("not interested" or "not at all interested") and those with high levels of interest in politics ("somewhat interested" or "very interested"). Similarly, political trust in terms of one's confidence in the national government of Turkey is coded as a dichotomous variable distinguishing between low

("none at all" or "not very much") and high ("quite a lot" or "a great deal") levels of trust. Lastly, respondents are classified as "right," "center right," "center left," or "center" as self-positioning of their ideological position on the left-right spectrum.

6.4 Results

First, we examine the relationship between protest potential by political generations. The findings presented in Table 6.2 demonstrate that the single-party generation is associated with the least protest potential. For instance, among those who belong to this generation, only 8.6 percent actually signed a petition while 16.4 percent of respondents from the confrontation generation and 16.9 percent of respondents from the liberalization generation did. Similarly, the proportions of respondents who did attend a demonstration, join a strike, and occupy a building were the smallest for this first generation compared to other generations.

Second, Table 6.2 shows that, although the post-1980 coup generation is often described as depoliticized generation in the existing literature, protest potential increases as we move from the older generations to the post-1980 coup generation. It is also found that the liberalization generation displays the highest levels of protest potential. The last important finding is that the generation of the confrontational period participated in contentious protest activities such as a lawful demonstration, a boycott, an unofficial strike, and occupying a building most often among the five political generations. Although the respondents from this generation are more likely to choose a "never do" category than the post-1980 and liberalization generations, they did participate in protest activities more often than other generations. It implies that individuals who spent their

formative years during the late-1960 and 1970s were active participants in protest, but they have lost propensity to protest as they get older. The association between the confrontation generation and actual involvement in these disruptive actions may reflect the fact that contentious politics reached its peak during the 1970s in Turkey.

Research on the relationship between age and protest participation has paid particular attention to the effect of life cycle. A number of research projects show that younger people are more likely to join protests than older people. In other words, as people move from their formative years to the age of maturity, they gradually lose interest in unconventional political participation and gain more attachment to conventional political participation such as elections and party politics. The bivariate relationship between protest potential and life cycle in Turkey shown in Table 6.3 confirms this conventional explanation. Those who are 55 years old or older are the least inclined to engage in unconventional political action. Actual participation rates of respondents who had done one of these protest actions were the lowest among those who are older (the "55-64" and "65 <" categories). By the same token, the proportions of those who "would never" join political action increase as one shifts from a younger life stage to an older stage. However, if we look at the proportions of respondents who actually participated in protest action, we notice that the middle-aged respondents ("35-44") slightly more often participate in protest than younger respondents except petitioning. 8.9 percent of respondents from the "35-44" cohort attended a lawful demonstration compared to 6.6 percent from the youngest cohort; 3.1 percent from the "35-44" cohort joined an unofficial strike compared to 1.5 percent from the youngest cohort.

Table 6.2 and 6.3, thus, suggest that there are some generational and life cycle effects on protest potential among Turkish citizens. It is not clear, however, to what extent we can differentiate the impact of political generation from the effect of life cycle because both variables, which are based on one's age, are correlated each other.

Table 6.4 cross-tabulates respondents' protest potential by survey years to see if protest potential has increased or decreased over time. The cross tabulation indicates that people became slightly more willing to take part in protest activity in 1996 and 2001 compared to 1990. The number of those who "would never" join unconventional political participation declines between 1990 and 1996 except occupying a building, implying that the impact of depoliticization intended by the state after the 1980 military intervention was disappearing and that civil society was gaining vibrancy in the mid-1990s. For example, the reported proportion of those who "would never" sign a petition dropped by eight percentage points between 1990 and 1996. Similarly, the proportion of those who "would never" join a boycott and demonstration decreased from 71.5 percent and 62.7 percent in 1990 to 68.1 percent and 57.3 percent in 1996, respectively. In fact, for all forms of protest, the number of respondents who considered joining protest increased between 1990 and 2001, suggesting that Turkish civil society became more accepting contentious political actions than before. The rise of protest potential recorded in the 1990s, however, disappeared in the 2000s. Although the WVS did not measure respondents' involvement in unofficial strikes and occupation of buildings in 2007, but it clearly shows that people became less willing to participate in a petition, a boycott, and a demonstration in 2007 as the percentages of those who "would never join" these activities increased between 2001 and 2007.

This study further analyzes the relationship between protest potential and life cycle controlling for political generation. Table 6.5 highlights that the protest potential of respondents declines as they move from one life stage to another. But the negative correlation between protest potential and life cycle is not a linear relationship. At earlier life stages, the protest potential for less contentious actions remains relatively stable. In contrast, the protest potential for more disruptive actions including an unofficial strike and occupation of a building increases until they enter their middle life. Once they hit old age, the protest potential tends to decline but there are some cases in which it further increases. For instance, the "65 <" life cohort of the single party generation exhibits higher levels of protest potential than the "55-64" cohort of the same generation for all protest activities except a demonstration.

Table 6.5 also shows that political generations have some impacts on protest potential across stages of the respondents' life cycle. As youth (17-24), for instance, members of the liberalization generation are more likely to engage in protest activity than their counterparts in the post-1980 generation. The middle aged (45-54) members of the confrontation generation exhibit higher levels of protest potential than the members of the other generations at the same life stage except for the occupation of a building.
Table 6.5, however, does not clearly establish the relationship between protest potential and the effects of lifecycle controlling for political generation because the association between protest potential and lifecycle is either statistically insignificant or very weak. Furthermore, the preceding tabulation analyses do not consider how the age-related variables affect protest potential controlling for other socioeconomic and demographic factors and political orientations of respondents.

These bivariate analyses on the interaction between protest potential and life cycle, period, and generation highlight that it is necessary to unpack the impact of age on unconventional political participation. While these analyses reconfirm the previous findings on the discouraging effect of life cycle on protest participation, they also demonstrate that two other faces of time including periods and political generations also influence individuals' willingness to protest.

The last analysis of this study on the impact of age-related factors includes political interest, trust in the national government, political ideology, and socio-demographic factors for control. Political interest is expected to be positively related to protest potential because protesters have keen interests in what politicians decide in government. If they have no interest in political affairs, there is no reason for them to protest. Trust in the government, in contrast, would reduce protest potential because individuals who have a great amount of confidence in the government are more likely to be satisfied with how their representatives are working. Political ideology will also affect protest potential. In the contemporary history of Turkish politics, it was leftist individuals and groups that have constituted the core of protest movements. Although rightists also organize protest gatherings sporadically, the left has occupied the scene of contentious politics in Turkey. Thus, it is hypothesized that individuals with leftist orientations are more likely to show higher levels of protest potential than those on the center on the conventional left-right spectrum and those who position themselves on the right.

Table 6.6 presents the results of binary logistic regression analysis. The dependent variable is protest potential, which has two categorical values (0=low; 1=high). Political generation, life cycle, and period constitute our independent variables. Gender, education,

income, political interest, trust in the government, and political ideology are included for control.[228]

The results find significant effects of life cycle and period but not generations. First, the results demonstrate that the regression coefficients for older age categories are negative and statistically significant in all models. Compared to younger and middle-aged citizens, older citizens are less inclined to participate in protest activities in Turkey. More specifically, compared to the youngest (18-24) cohort, early adulthood (25-34) and middle life (35-44) are not statistically different in terms of their propensity to protest, although the regression coefficients for these two categories are negative, but statistically insignificant. The effects of life cycle become salient only once individuals hit their mid-40s and 50s as the regression coefficients turn negative and significant. This means that protest potential remains stable until an individual reaches the late mature stage, and then it starts to decline.

The results also confirm the importance of period effects on people's protest potential. Across the models, Turkish citizens showed lower levels of protest potential in 2007 than in the previous survey years. The period effect of macrolevel events around 2007 decreases one's likelihood of protesting regardless of which political generation one belongs to and at which life stage one is located. This finding that protest potential dropped in 2007 deserves further analysis, but one possible explanation is that Turkish citizens in 2007 became more confident in conventional political participation instead of

[228] Exponential beta in binary logistic regression tells us the odds ratio of a row independent variable with the dependent variable (political confidence in this study). If the odds ratio equals 1, there is no impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable. The odds ratio greater than 1 indicates that a unit increase in the independent variable increases the probability of political confidence occurring and the odds ratio less than 1 decreases it.

protest participation as a means to represent their demands in politics under the stable AKP administration.

Table 6.6 also shows that one's membership in a political generation is not related to protest potential at all. There is no model in which generational effects are discernible for protest potential. This negative finding in this study challenges the conventional wisdom in the literature on Turkish politics that assumes that one's membership in a particular political generation has a significant influence on his or her political disposition. Although numerous observers of contemporary Turkish politics have emphasized that Turkey's 1968 generation, which this study categorizes as the confrontation generation, has been particularly prone to protest politics whereas the post-1980 generation has been "apolitical" or "depoliticized" due to the repressive military tutelage, my study does not produce any empirical finding that support these arguments.

All of the control variables have statistically significant impacts on protest potential as expected. The results show that men are more likely to engage in unconventional political participation than women. Similarly, higher education attainment strongly encourages people to protest. Higher income also increases the probability of having "high" protest potential. Higher education and higher income as the strong determinants of protest potential suggest that unconventional political participation is a weapon of the socially and economically advantaged individuals in Turkey, implying that protest activity is basically used by university students or university graduates who are economically better off. The results also confirm that political interest is the strongest predictor of protest potential; protest activity is carried out by those who follow political affairs with intense interest. Distrust in the national government, by the same token, leads

to higher protest potential as the conventional accounts on protest participation have demonstrated. Lastly, citizens who positioned themselves on the left on the ideological spectrum are more willing to join protest activity than those who are on the right or center.

6.5 Conclusion

Using data from the Turkish components of the World Values Survey conducted in 1990, 1996, 2001, and 2007, this research has presented a cohort analysis of protest potential in contemporary Turkey. It examines the interplay of three interrelated phenomena: a generational effect, a lifecycle effect, and a period effect. The primary goal of this study has been to determine the relative importance of each of these age-related variables on individuals' propensity to join protest in Turkey over the seventeen-year study period.

This study demonstrates that a generational effect does not help us explain the patterns of protest participation. The existing literature on Turkish politics, particularly social movements and contentious politics, has constructed several generational categories such as the children of the Republic and the 1968 generation with the assumption that individuals who experience the same historical events during their formative years produce distinguishable political dispositions and maintain these unique characteristics even when they get mature. My empirical analysis, however, does not support the generational explanation of protest participation in Turkey, and instead finds the lifecycle and period approaches can better explain the trends in protest potential. My analysis reflects the withdrawal of the elderly from contentious politics. It also shows aggregate period effect changes in the population as a whole.

Furthermore, this paper reconfirms the primacy of higher socio-demographic status and political orientations as the main causes of higher protest potential. The findings reported above imply that people are more likely to engage in protest activities when they achieve higher socio-economic status in society with strong interest in politics. As previous research has long demonstrated, educational attainment, political interest, and leftist ideology constitute the most important predictors of protest potential in Turkey, suggesting that protest is employed by those who possess political resources, access to political information, and sense of efficacy regardless of one's membership to a political generation.

The discussion regarding the impact of age-related variables on protest potential presented in this research can be elaborated by some additional analyses. First, we need to consider if what Karl Manheim calls "generational units" – subgroups within a political generation – do exist. If political events do divide a birth cohort into two or more groups rather than produce a single generation, it will directly challenge the use of generations as a main framework of analysis. Second, it is important to contextualize the period effect on protest potential that this study finds. Tentatively, I speculate that Turkish citizens have become less inclined to use protest as a means to influence political decisions in the mid-2000s because Turkish national politics moved away from uncertainty and instability, two main characteristics of Turkey's 1990s under the AKP government, but this remains an agenda for future research. Third, we need to examine if the real issue of political generations is that although youth in their formative years really exhibited the discernible characteristics as a generation that was associated higher levels of protest participation but they lost the distinctiveness at later stages of their lifecycle.

Table 6.1

Classification of Respondents by Political Generations

Political Generation	Historical Period	Year Born	Age in 1990	Age in 1996	Age in 2001	Age in 2007	Percent of Respondents
Single-party	1923-1950	1905-1931	59-85	65-91	70-96	76-102	3.4 (260)
post-WWII	1951-1964	1932-1945	45-58	51-64	56-69	62-75	10.6 (807)
Confrontation	1965-1980	1946-1961	29-44	35-50	40-55	46-61	28.1 (2144)
Post-1980	1981-1995	1962-1976	14-28	20-34	25-39	31-45	39.2 (2992)
Liberalization	1996-2001	1977-1988	2-13	8-19	13-24	19-30	18.7 (1424)
Total							100 (7627)

Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007.

Note: ( ) = N

Table 6.2 Protest Potential by Political Generation (Percentages)

		Political Generation				
Protest Potential		Single Party	Post-WWII	Confrontation	Post-1980	Liberalization
Sign a petition	Never	54.3	53.5	42.5	40.1	39.2
	Might	37.0	34.5	41.1	43.8	43.9
	Done	8.6	12.0	16.4	16.1	16.9
						Cramer's V: .069***
Join a boycott	Never	84.3	77.8	65.2	63.6	61.7
	Might	11.2	19.3	26.1	29.0	33.4
	Done	4.5	3.0	8.7	7.4	4.9
						Cramer's V: .097***
Attend a demonstration	Never	75.3	70.8	59.1	55.8	54.1
	Might	20.6	24.9	31.9	36.7	38.8
	Done	4.1	4.4	9.0	7.5	7.2
						Cramer's V: .086***
Join an unofficial strike	Never	97.0	94.6	88.2	85.1	82.0
	Might	2.6	3.7	8.8	13.1	16.0
	Done	0.4	1.7	3.0	1.8	2.0
						Cramer's V: .095***
Occupy a building	Never	99.6	97.9	95.8	94.8	94.5
	Might	0.4	1.3	3.0	4.6	4.8
	Done	0.0	0.9	1.2	0.6	0.7
						Cramer's V: .055***
Total		(260)	(807)	(2,144)	(2,992)	(1,424)

*p < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001

Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007.

Table 6.3

Protest Potential by Life Cycle (Percentages)

		Life Cycle					
Protest Potential		17-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 <
Sign a petition	Never	36.5	40.8	40.7	48.7	53.5	55.0
	Might	46.0	43.1	42.3	37.1	34.4	36.5
	Done	17.6	16.1	17.0	14.2	12.1	8.5
						Cramer's V:	.082***
Join a boycott	Never	63.3	63.6	62.6	69.4	75.9	81.7
	Might	31.1	29.2	28.2	24.4	19.9	15.0
	Done	5.6	7.2	9.3	6.2	4.2	3.2
						Cramer's V:	.085***
Attend a demonstration	Never	53.7	56.4	56.4	63.8	68.2	77.1
	Might	39.7	35.4	34.7	28.5	26.9	20.2
	Done	6.6	8.2	8.9	7.7	4.9	2.6
						Cramer's V:	.090***
Join an unofficial strike	Never	84.4	85.6	85.5	91.4	93.7	95.9
	Might	14.1	12.5	11.4	5.9	4.9	3.7
	Done	1.5	1.9	3.1	2.6	1.5	0.4
						Cramer's V:	.085***
Occupy a building	Never	94.8	95.0	94.8	96.4	98.9	99.2
	Might	4.5	4.3	4.0	2.5	0.6	0.8
	Done	0.7	0.6	1.2	1.1	0.4	0.0
						Cramer's V:	.054***
Total		(1,683)	(2,195)	(1,799)	(1,054)	(573)	(357)

*p < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001

Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007.

Table 6.4

Protest Potential by Period (Percentages)

		Period			
Protest Potential		1990	1996	2001	2007
Sign a petition	Never	45.6	37.6	40.3	52.9
	Might	40.8	42.8	44.2	34.6
	Done	13.6	19.9	15.5	12.5
					Cramer's V: .083***
Join a boycott	Never	71.5	68.1	63.3	64.9
	Might	22.9	22.8	30.2	29.6
	Done	5.6	9.1	6.4	5.5
					Cramer's V: .065***
Attend a demonstration	Never	62.7	57.3	56.3	63.5
	Might	31.6	33.6	36.0	30.4
	Done	5.7	9.0	7.6	6.1
					Cramer's V: .049***
Join an unofficial strike	Never	92.1	89.7	84.4	N/A
	Might	6.4	8.1	13.4	N/A
	Done	1.5	2.2	2.2	N/A
					Cramer's V: .070***
Occupy a building	Never	96.0	96.8	94.8	N/A
	Might	2.7	2.5	4.5	N/A
	Done	1.2	0.8	0.7	N/A
					Cramer's V: .040***
Total		(1,030)	(1,907)	(3,401)	(1,346)

*p < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001

Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007.

Table 6.5

Protest Potential by Lifecycle Controlling for Generation (Percentages)

		Life Cycle						
Protest Potential	Generation	17-24	25-34	45-44	45-54	55-64	65 <	Cramer's V
Sign a petition	Single party					40.5	46.8	.048
	Post-WWII				46.8	47.8	42.4	.039
	Confrontation		63.1	61.5	52.5	43.8		.107***
	Post-1980	63.4	60.6	56.1	52.4			.056
	Liberalization	63.9	49.5					.125***
Join a boycott	Single party					12.0	16.5	.048
	Post-WWII				18.7	24.5	20.9	.061
	Confrontation		37.6	35.7	33.8	28.1		.038
	Post-1980	32.4	36.2	40.0	33.3			.053
	Liberalization	38.7	36.8					.027
Attend a demonstration	Single party					33.3	22.9	.092
	Post-WWII				29.7	31.1	22.9	.067
	Confrontation		45.8	42.7	38.2	34.8		.056
	Post-1980	44.2	44.0	45.0	28.6			.032
	Liberalization	47.6	33.9					.068*
Join an unofficial strike	Single party					2.4	3.1	.017
	Post-WWII				3.2	6.3	6.6	.065
	Confrontation		5.8	13.4	10.4	14.3		.070*
	Post-1980	11.7	15.3	17.3				.051*
	Liberalization	18.0						N/A

Table 6.5 Continued

		Life Cycle						
Protest Potential	Generation	17-24	25-34	45-44	45-54	55-64	65 <	Cramer's V
Occupy a building	Single party					0.0	0.5	.031
	Post-WWII				4.1	1.2	1.3	.092
	Confrontation		3.9	4.8	3.4	0.0		.040
	Post-1980	4.7	5.1	6.3				.023
	Liberalization	5.5						N/A
Total		(1,683)	(2,195)	(1,799)	(1,054)	(573)	(357)	

Note: Column entries are percentages combining the response categories “might” and “have done.”

*p < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001

Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007.

Table 6.6

Results of Binary Logistic Regression of Protest Potential

		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
		B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Political Generation	Single Party	-.172 (.223)	.842								
	Post-WWII			-0.117 (.129)	0.889						
	Confrontation					.070 (.088)	1.072				
	Post-1980							-.008 (.075)	0.992		
	Liberalization									.039 (.119)	1.040
Life Cycle	18-24(rc)		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0
	25-34	-.048 (.086)	.953	-.048 (.086)	.953	-.054 (.087)	.948	-.045 (.093)	.956	-.028 (.108)	.973
	35-44	-.043 (.091)	.958	-.044 (.091)	.957	-.086 (.105)	.918	-.044 (.091)	.957	-.018 (.122)	.982
	45-54	-.235 (.103)*	.791	-.211 (.107)*	.810	-.290 (.123)*	.748	-.238 (.106)**	.788	-.209 (.131)	.811
	55-64	-.410 (.124)**	.664	-.332 (.158)*	.717	-.434 (.124)***	.648	-.426 (.125)**	.653	-.397 (.146)**	.672
	65 <	-.350 (.120)	.705	-.403 (.159)**	.668	-.453 (.149)**	.636	-.455 (.151)**	.635	-.425 (.170)**	.654
Period	1990(rc)		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0
	1996	-.037 (.107)	.964	-.036 (.107)	.965	-.026 (.107)	.974	-.028 (.107)	.973	-.031 (.107)	.969
	2001	-.011 (.102)	.989	-.009 (.102)	.991	.009 (.101)	1.009	.003 (.101)	1.003	-.005 (.103)	.995
	2007	-.636 (.120)***	.529	-.636 (.119)***	.529	-.609 (.119)***	.544	-.620 (.118)***	.538	-.637 (.129)***	.529
Gender	Female(rc)		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0
	Male	.399 (.059)***	1.49	.399 (.059)***	1.490	.399 (.059)***	1.491	.399 (.059)***	1.490	.398 (.059)***	1.489
Education	Lower(rc)		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0
	Middle	.569 (.073)***	1.766	.567 (.073)***	1.762	.568 (.073)***	1.764	.556 (.073)***	1.762	.565 (.073)***	1.760
	Higher	1.077 (.122)***	2.936	1.070 (.122)***	2.915	1.073 (.122)***	2.926	1.073 (.122)***	2.925	1.073 (.122)***	2.924
Income	Lower(rc)		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0
	Middle	.332 (.067)***	1.394	.330 (.066)***	1.391	.330 (.067)***	1.391	.332 (.067)***	1.393	.332 (.067)***	1.394
	Higher	.664 (.108)***	1.905	.643 (.108)***	1.902	.643 (.108)***	1.902	.643 (.108)***	1.902	.643 (.108)***	1.902
Political Interest	Low(rc)		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0
	High	.922 (.061)***	2.515	.923 (.061)***	2.517	.922 (.061)***	2.514	.923 (.061)***	2.516	.923 (.061)***	2.517
Political Trust	Low(rc)		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0
	High	-.366 (.060)***	.714	-.339 (.060)***	.713	-.338 (.060)***	.713	-.338 (.060)***	.713	-.338 (.060)***	.713

Table 6.6 Continued

		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
		B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Ideology	Right(rc)		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0
	Center Right	.216 (.085)**	1.242	.216 (.085)**	1.241	.216 (.085)**	1.241	.217 (.085)*	1.242	.217 (.085)*	1.242
	Center Left	.212 (.080)**	1.236	.212 (.080)**	1.237	.211 (.080)**	1.235	.212 (.080)*	1.237	.212 (.080)**	1.236
	Left	.953 (.128)***	2.593	.951 (.128)***	2.589	.952 (.128)	2.590	.952 (.128)***	2.590	.951 (.128)***	2.589
Constant		-.428 (.147)**		-.425 (.147)**		-.440 (.147)**		-.434 (.148)**		-.455 (.158)**	
-2 Log Likelihood		7033.108		7032.879		7033.062		7033.688		7033.592	
Nagelkerke R-Square		.221		.221		.221		.221		.221	

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

rc: reference category

Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Protests and demonstrations are essential elements of democracy. While these forms of contentious politics were regarded as irrational, unconventional, and even dangerous to the stability of democracy, they have become institutionalized and widely accepted in contemporary democracy. Protest disrupts public order, but it can expand the horizon of popular participation in politics in the long run.[229]

Protests and demonstrations also occur in semidemocratic or democratizing societies. Nevertheless, citizens in these societies have higher risks and costs in protest participation than those in consolidated democracies because protests and demonstrations are not considered legitimate forms of political activities by authoritarian, illiberal governments. The protesters are likely to face state sanctions designed to harass, intimidate, and silence social opposition.

Turkish politics has long been defined by the state elite who looked down on ordinary citizens and perceived popular mobilization and social groupings threatening to the unity and stability of the Turkish polity. Hence, the scholars of Turkish politics have

---

[229] Tarrow; Charles Tilly, *Social Movements, 1768-2004* (Boulder, CO; London: Paradigm, 2004).

paid a great deal of attention to the governing institutions including the bureaucracy, the military, and political parties. Because of Turkey's long history of electoral democracy, the study of electoral behavior has been another dominant research agenda. The Turkish state, however, has faced insistent challenges from various sectors of the society which attempt to make a difference in national and local politics. Kurdish groups have challenged the Turkish state in pursuit of cultural recognition and political autonomy. Islamist associations have resisted the militant secularist principle of Kemalism, presenting their religious demands as human rights. Workers have fought for the workers' rights, job security, and distribution of wealth. In addition to these major actors in contentious politics in Turkey, we have witnessed the emergence of new social actors starting to organize protest activities with a large number of supporters including women, sexual minorities, and environmentalists. Furthermore, it is undeniable in recent years that ordinary men and women without prior experience in contentious politics or any affiliation with social movement organizations do participate in street politics from time to time. Despite the increasing significance of protests and demonstrations in explaining Turkish politics, the systematic study of protest participation has been underdeveloped in the field of Turkish studies. Thus, this dissertation examined the patterns of popular participation in contentious collective actions in Turkey between the late 1940s and the 2000s in order to fill this gap in the literature.

In order to systematically record and analyze the changing patterns of protest events which were organized by a group of citizens in the public space, I used the data drawn from the *World Handbook of Social and Political Indicators* and created my original dataset from a Turkish national newspaper, *Cumhuriyet*. In addition, my

dissertation aimed to understand popular participation in protest at the individual level by analyzing the Turkish components of World Values Survey conducted in 1990, 1996, 2001, and 2007.

7.1 Major Findings

Chapter 1 defined the research agenda for this dissertation and highlighted the significance and expected contribution of my focus on protest participation to the study of Turkish politics which has emphasized the role of the state elite. I contended that Turkish politics is not only shaped by the elite but also popular mobilization and participation in contentious activities on the street.

Chapter 2 reviewed the recent literature on the state, civil society, and contentious politics in Turkey. It revealed that the state-society relations have been defined by the dichotomy between a strong state and a weak state, but the process of political and economic liberalization since the 1980s have empowered civil society organizations to challenge and influence political decisions. It also demonstrated that a systematic investigation of protest participation has been missing in the field of Turkish Politics although there are numerous idiographic case studies on particular social movements.

Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 analyzed protest events that people organized in the public space between 1945 and 1999 in Turkey. Chapter 3 described how the levels of protest and state sanction changed and how the nature of state-society relations evolved from 1948 and 1980. It appeared that the 1970s witnessed not only the intensification of protest activities challenging the state but also the level of protest overwhelmed that of state sanctions. Thus, the 1980 military intervention, the most brutal coup in the history

of Turkish politics, should be understood as one consequence of the development of a "dual power" situation in which civil society became too contentious vis-à-vis the state.

Chapter 4 presented my protest event analysis that demonstrated how the various characteristics of protest gatherings including the frequency, actors, forms, claims, and targets did or did not change in the 1980s and 1990s. The data drawn from a Turkish newspaper, *Cumhuriyet*, suggested that the process of redemocratization in the 1980s was correlated with the rise of protest politics but the 1990s witnessed the cyclical rise and fall of protest events, suggesting that contentious politics did not monotonically increase despite the gradual and sustainable opening of the opportunity space for greater political participation. It was also found that protest events in Turkey were highly skewed toward larger cities, workers and students, economic and civil-political issues, and demonstrative forms of mobilization.

Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 turned to individuals instead of protest events as the unit of analysis in order to examine demographic, political, and socio-economic factors in explaining protest potential using the data drawn from the World Values Survey. Chapter 5 examined to what extent Turkish civil society has moved to a social movement society—a society in which protest has become a conventional, routine, and institutionalized way of political influencing. My statistical analysis suggests the underdevelopment of the social movement society in contemporary Turkey (1990-2007), challenging a growing body of literature that claims the emergence and diffusion of protest activities.

Chapter 6 attends to the impacts of age-related predictors of protest potential including lifecycle, political generation, and period. I evaluated the dominant approach to

protest participation in Turkey that associates political activism with either youth or a political generation to which one belongs. My longitudinal analysis fails to support the generational approach and suggests that one's age and a particular historic moment have significant impacts on protest potential. It also demonstrated that regardless of a generational membership, people with higher socio-economic status are more likely to protest.

7.2 Implications

This dissertation started with the question of the patterns of popular participation in contentious political actions on the streets in Turkey. The preceding chapters showed that Turkish civil society has demonstrated its resilience against occasional state suppression and harsh state control. It is true that Turkish politics has suffered from disruptions and breakdowns caused by military interventions, economic crises, and the escalation of social, ideological, and ethnic tensions. These changes in political opportunity structures significantly discouraged citizens to publicly challenge state authority. Turkish citizens, however, often assert their power again once state control is relaxed. What we can observe in the contemporary history of Turkey is that civil society has become more vibrant and diverse in terms of its activities, participants, and demands over time.

It is implied that the patterns of contentious politics is shaped by regime type. During the 1960s and 1970s, democracy in Turkey was frequently threatened by military interventions. Harsh state sanctions against political activists resulted in the decline of state legitimacy, contributing to radicalization of protest movements. In fact, most of the

leftist groups actively organizing protest actions during this period held antisystemic objectives including the overthrow of the existing parliamentary system and overhauling the political economy of Turkey as a whole. In contrast, most of the popular protest actions that we have observed since the 1990s are operating within the system. The protesters do not aim at overthrowing the current democratic and capitalist order consolidated in Turkey. They have trust in the existing system and they do protest in order to ask the government to change or preserve something such as public policies and social benefits. Although there are still ideologically committed groups, they are marginal in civil society.

Long-term changes in protest politics can be better understood by systematic investigation rather than idiographic case studies as my dissertation demonstrated. Case studies are useful for understanding specific protest events with thick description, but we cannot see how protest politics has changed over time and what factors have persistently defined popular participation in protest even if we collect a number of case studies. Thus, my dissertation, which employed quantitative and systematic research methods such as protest event analysis and statistical analysis contributes to enrich our understanding about contentious politics in Turkey. This does not mean that I reject the value of case studies in the study of Turkish politics, but it means that my dissertation complements the existing literature largely relied on case studies.

7.3 Limitations

In closing, I need to address three important issues that my dissertation left as the agendas for the future research. The first is the impact of protest events on policy making

and democratic consolidation.[230] Treating protest as a dependent variable and attempting to explain how the mode of protest participation changed and how socio-demographic factors influenced protest potential in Turkey, my dissertation did not explore the role of protest participation in the process of policy formulation and democratic consolidation. Özen and Özen recently analyzed the impacts of protest movements on mining policy in Turkey and suggested that the state's intolerant attitude toward protest groups tends to increase popular mobilization rather than decreasing it.[231] I believe that further studies are needed in order to better understand how and under what condition protest activities on the street contribute to policy change and democratization in Turkey.

The second issue is related to the relationship between elections and protest politics. My dissertation did not consider the influence of electoral campaigns on popular mobilization in protest events, but it will be an interesting research agenda as some scholars have asked whether national elections encourage or discourage both political protest and state repression.[232]

Third, we need to conceptually distinguish protest potential from protest participation. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 used protest potential, one's willingness to participate in protest, as the dependent variable assuming the correlation between potential and participation. This is a bold assumption because not all individuals who are

---

[230] Uba, "Political Protest and Policy Change: The Direct Impacts of Indian Anti-Privatization Mobilizations, 1990-2003."; Foweraker and Landman.

[231] Özen and Özen, "Public Policies and Social Movements: The Influences of Protest Movements on Mining Policy in Turkey."

[232] For instance, Christian Davenport, "Liberalizing Event or Lethal Episode?: An Empirical Assessment of How National Elections Affect the Suppression of Political and Civil Liberties," *Social Science Quarterly* 79, no. 2 (1998).

willing to protest do actually protest. There should be some factors that turn potential protesters into actual protesters. A further research on these factors will contribute to understand what factors make a difference between those who actually protest and those who do not despite their declared willingness to do so.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abramson, Paul R. and Ronald Inglehart. "Generational Replacement and the Future of Post-Materialist Values." *Journal of Politics* 49, (1987): 231-241.

Abramson, Paul R. and Ronald Inglehart. "Generational Replacement and Value Change in Eight West European Societies." *British Journal of Political Science* 22, no. 2 (1992): 183-228.

Ahmad, Feroz. *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977.

Ahmad, Feroz. *The Making of Modern Turkey* The Making of the Middle East Series. London: Routledge, 1993.

Ahmad, Feroz. *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003.

Ahmad, Feroz and Bedia Ahmad. *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi 1945-1971*. Ankara: Bilgi, 1976.

Akaş, Cem. *Guarding the State: Collective Political Action in Turkey, 1950-1980*. Istanbul: g yayın grubu, 2004.

Alesina, Alberto and Roberto Perotti. "Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment." *European Economic Review* 40, no. 6 (1996): 1203-1228.

Alpay, Şahin. "Journalists: Cautious Democrats." In *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities*, edited by Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü and Heinz Kramer, 69-91. London: I.B. Tauris, 1993.

Alpay, Şahin. "Two Faces of the Press in Turkey: The Role of the Media in Turkey's Modernisation and Democracy." In *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem and Philip Robins, 370-387. Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Alper, Emin. "Reconsidering Social Movements in Turkey: The Case of the 1968-71 Protest Cycle." *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 43 (2010): 63-96.

Altunışık, Meliha Benli and Özlem Tür. *Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change*. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005.

Anderson, Patrick. "'To Lie Down to Death for Days': The Turkish Hunger Strike, 2000-2003." *Cultural Studies* 18, no. 6 (2004): 816-846.

Arat, Yesim. "Toward a Democratic Society: The Women's Movement in Turkey in the 1980s." *Women's Studies International Forum* 17, no. 2/3 (1994): 241-248.

Arat, Yeşim. "Democracy and Women in Turkey: In Defense of Liberalism." *Social Politics* 6, no. 3 (1999): 370-387.

Arato, Andrew. "Civil Society against the State: Poland 1980-1981." *Telos* 47, (1981): 23-47.

Arifcan, Umut. "The Saturday Mothers of Turkey." *Peace Review* 9, no. 2 (1997): 265-272.

Axelrod, Robert. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books, 1985.

Aydın, Aylin and Cerem I. Cenker. "Public Confidence in Government: Empirical Implications from a Developing Democracy." *International Political Science Review* 33, no. 2 (2011): 230-250.

Aydın, Zülküf. "The State, Civil Society, and Environmentalism." In *Environmentalism in Turkey: Between Democracy and Development?*, edited by Fikret Adaman and Murat Arsel, 53-69. Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005.

Bal, İhsan and Sedat Laçiner. "The Challenge of Revolutionary Terrorism to Turkish Democracy 1960-80." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 4 (2001): 90 - 115.

Banks, David L. "New Patterns of Oppression: An Updated Analysis of Human Rights Data." In *Human Rights and Statistics: Getting the Record Straight*, edited by Thomas B. Jabine and Richard Pierre Claude, 364-391. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991.

Barchard, David. "The Intellectual Background to Radical Protest in Turkey in the 1960s." In *Aspects of Modern Turkey*, edited by William Hale, 21-37. London: Bowker, 1976.

Barkey, Henri J. "The Struggles of a 'Strong' State." *Journal of International Affairs* 54, no. 1 (2000): 87-105.

Baydar, Gülsüm and Berfin İvegen. "Territories, Identities, and Thresholds: The Saturday Mothers Phenomenon in İstanbul." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture & Society* 31, no. 3 (2006): 689-715.

Baykan, Barış Gençer and Gülçin Erdi Lelandais. "Cross-Readings of the Anti-Globalisation Movement in Turkey and Beyond. Political Culture in the Making." *International Social Science Journal* 56, no. 182 (2004): 519-528.

Beck, Paul Allen and M. Kent Jennings. "Political Periods and Political Participation." *American Political Science Review* 73, no. 3 (1979): 737-750.

Beissinger, M. R. "Nationalist Violence and the State - Political Authority and Contentious Repertoires in the Former Ussr." *Comparative Politics* 30, no. 4 (1998): 401-422.

Beissinger, Mark R. "Event Analysis in Transitional Societies: Protest Mobilization in the Former Soviet Union." In *Acts of Dissent: New Developments in the Study of Protest*, edited by Dieter Rucht, Ruud Koopmans and Friedhelm Neidhardt, 284-316. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999.

Beynon, Joe. "Hunger Strike in Turkish Prisons." *Lancet* 348, no. 9029 (1996): 737.

Biorcio, Roberto and Renato Mannheimer. "Relationships between Citizens and Political Parties." In *Citizens and the State*, edited by Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, 206-226. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Blanchard, Mary. *The Anti-Abortion Movement and the Rise of the Religious Right: From Polite to Fiery Protest*. New York: Twayne, 1994.

Blind, Peride Kaleağasi. "A New Actor in Turkish Democratization: Labor Unions." *Turkish Studies* 8, no. 2 (2007): 289-311.

Brunetti, Aymo. "Political Variables in Cross-Country Growth Analysis." *Journal of Economic Surveys* 11, no. 2 (1997): 163-190.

Çaha, Ömer. "The Inevitable Coexistence of Civil Society and Liberalism: The Case of Turkey." *Journal of Economic & Social Research* 3, no. 2 (2001): 35.

Cam, Surhan. "Neo-Liberalism and Labour within the Context of an 'Emerging Market' Economy--Turkey." *Capital & Class*, no. 77 (2002): 89-114.

Carey, Sabine C. "The Dynamic Relationship between Protest and Repression." *Political Science Quarterly* 59, no. 1 (2006): 1-11.

Çarkoğlu, Ali. "Macro Economic Determinants of Electoral Support for Incumbents in Turkey, 1950-1995." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 17, (1997): 75-96.

Çarkoğlu, Ali and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu. *Turkish Democracy Today : Elections, Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society*. London: I.B Tauris, 2007.

Çoban, Melih. "Rising Anti-Americanism in Turkey." *Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies* 4, (2004): 63-82.

Converse, Philip E. "Of Time and Partisan Stability." *Comparative Political Studies* 2, no. 2 (1969): 139-171.

Cowell, Alan. "Hunger Strike in Turkish Jails Reveals Nation's Divisions." *New York Times*, July 28, 1996, 1, 3.

Criss, Bilge. "Mercenaries of Ideology: Turkey's Terrorism War." In *Terrorism and Politics*, edited by Barry Rubin, 123-150. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

Criss, Nur Bilge. "A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case." *The Journal of American History* 89, no. 2 (2002): 472-484.

Dalton, Russell J. *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. 4th ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2008.

Davenport, Christian. "Liberalizing Event or Lethal Episode?: An Empirical Assessment of How National Elections Affect the Suppression of Political and Civil Liberties." *Social Science Quarterly* 79, no. 2 (1998): 321-340.

Davenport, Christian. "Introduction." In *Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious Politics*, edited by Christian Davenport, 1-24. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.

Diez, Thomas, Apostolos Agnantopoulos and Alper Kaliber. "File: Turkey, Europeanization and Civil Society: Introduction." *South European Society and Politics* 10, no. 1 (2005): 1-15.

Dikici-Bilgin, Hasret. "Civil Society and State in Turkey: A Gramscian Perspective." In *Gramsci and Global Politics : Hegemony and Resistance*, edited by Mark McNally and John Schwarzmantel, 107-119: London: Routledge, 2009.

Dodd, Clement H. "The Containment of Terrorism: Violence in Turkish Politics 1965-1980." In *Terrorism, Ideology, and Revolution*, edited by Noel O'Sullivan, 132-149. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986.

Dodson, Kyle. "The Movement Society in Comparative Perspective." *Mobilization* 16, no. 4 (2011): 475-494.

Dogan, Mustafa G. "When Neoliberalism Confronts the Moral Economy of Workers: The Final Spring of Turkish Labor Unions." *European Journal of Turkish Studies* 11, (2010).

Edwards, Bob and John D. McCarthy. "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization." In *The Blackwell Companion of Social Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, 116-152. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004.

Eisinger, Peter K. "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities." *The American Political Science Review* 67, no. 1 (1973): 11-28.

Ekiert, G. and J. Kubik. "Contentious Politics in New Democracies - East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, 1989-93." *World Politics* 50, no. 4 (1998): 547-581.

Enneli, Pınar. "The Turkish Young People as Active Citizens: Equal Participation or Social Exclusion?" In *Societal Peace and Ideal Citizenshio for Turkey*, edited by Rasim Özgür Dönmez and Pınar Enneli, 257-280: Lexington Books, 2011.

Erdoğan, Necmi. "Kemalist Non-Governmental Organizations: Troubled Elites in Defence of S Sacred Heritage." In *Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism: Studies on Political Culture in Contemporary Turkey*, edited by Stefanos Yerasimos, Günter Seufert and Karin Vorhoff, 251-282. Istanbul: Orient-Institut, 2000.

Esmer, Yılmaz. "Parties and the Electorate: A Comparative Analysis of Voter Profiles of Turkish Political Parties." In *Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s*, edited by Çiğdem Bağlam, Ersin Kalaycioğglu, Cevat Karataş, Gareth Winrow and Feroz Yasamee, 74-89. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995.

Evans, Peter. "Counterhegemonic Globalization: Transnational Social Movements in the Contemporary Global Political Economy." In *The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization*, edited by Thomas Janoski, Robert Alford, Alexander Hicks and Mildred A. Schwartz, 655-670. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Ewing, Jonathan. "Long Hunger Strike in Turkey Speeds Prison Reforms." *Christian Science Monitor*, July 30, 1996, 6.

Ferree, Myra Marx and Carol McClurg Mueller. "Feminism and the Women's Movement: A Global Perspective." In *The Blackwell Companion of Social Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, 576-607. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004.

Fillieule, Olivier. "'Plus Ça Change, Moins Ça Change.' Demonstrations in France During the Nineteen-Eighties." In *Acts of Dissent: New Developments in the Study of*

Protest, edited by Dieter Rucht, Ruud Koopmans and Friedhelm Neidhardt, 199-226. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999.

Fillieule, Olivier and Manuel Jimenez. "Appendix A: The Methodology of Protest Event Analysis and the Media Politics of Reporting Environmental Protests." In *Environmental Protest in Western Europe*, edited by Christopher Rootes, 258-279. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Foley, Michael W. and Bob Edwards. "The Paradox of Civil Society." *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 3 (1996): 38-52.

Foweraker, Joe and Todd Landman. *Citizenship Rights and Social Movements : A Comparative and Statistical Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Frey, Frederick W. *The Turkish Political Elite*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965.

Göker, Zeynep Gülru. "Presence in Silence: Feminist and Democratic Implications of the Saturday Vigils in Turkey." In *Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa*, edited by Joel Beinin and Frédéric Vairel, 107-124. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011.

Göle, Nilüfer. "Toward an Autonomization of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey." In *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, edited by Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, 213-222. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.

Gümrükçü, Selin Bengi. "The Rise of a Social Movement: The Emergence of Anti-Globalization Movements in Turkey." *Turkish Studies* 11, no. 2 (2010): 163-180.

Güney, Aylin. "Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present." *Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no. 3 (2008): 471-487.

Gamson, William A. *The Strategy of Social Protest*. Second ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1990.

Gemici, Kurtuluş. "Moral Economy Redux: Social Protests in Turkey after the 2001 Economic Crisis." *Mobilization: An International Journal* 18, no. 2 (2013): 143-160.

Grigoriadis, Ioannis N. *Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political Culture and the European Union*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Gurbuz, Mustafa F. "Over the Bodies of the T-Girls: The Headscarf Ban as a Secular Efforts to Monopolize Islam in Turkey." *Middle Eastern Critique* 18, no. 3 (2009): 231-249.

Gurr, Ted Robert. "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using News Indices." *American Political Science Review* 62, (1968): 1104-1124.

Harris, George S. "The Left in Turkey." *Problems of Communism* 29, (1980): 26-41.

Harris, George S. "Military Coups and Turkish Democracy, 1960–1980." *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 2 (2011): 203-213.

Hazama, Yasushi. "Civil Society in Turkey." In *Aspects of Democratization in Turkey*, edited by Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, Ruşen Keleş and Yasushi Hazama, 2-21. Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies Japan External Trade Organization, 1999.

Heper, Metin. *The State Tradition in Turkey*. Beverley, North Humberside: Eothen Press, 1985.

Heper, Metin and Tanel Demirel. "The Press and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey." In *Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics*, edited by Sylvia Kedourie, 109-123. London: Routledge, 1998.

Hirai, Yukiko and Yutaka Tsujinaga. "The Structure of Civil Society in Turkey: Profile and Behaviour of Turkish Civil Society Organization." *Journal of Modern Cultures and Public Policies* 7, (2007): 117-142.

Hooper, John. "Struggle to Save Dying Jail Fasters." *The Guardian*, July 29, 1996, 110.

Hunt, Alan and Ceylan Tokluoğlu. "State Formation from Below: The Turkish Case." *Social Science Journal* 39, no. 4 (2002): 617.

Huntington, Samuel P. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968.

Inglehart, Ronald. *Modernization and Postmodernization : Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.

Jackman, Robert W. *Power without Force: The Political Capacity of Nation-States*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993.

Jenkins, J. Craig, Michael Wallace and Andrew S. Fullerton. "A Social Movement Society? A Cross-National Analysis of Protest Potential." *International Journal of Sociology* 38, no. 3 (2008): 12-35.

Jennings, M. Kent and Gregory B. Markus. "Political Involvement in the Later Years: A Longitudianl Survey." *American Journal of Political Science* 32, no. 2 (1988): 302-316.

Kaase, Max and Alan Marsh. "Political Action: A Theoretical Perspective." In *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*, edited by Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase, Klaus R. Allerbeck, Barbara G. Farah, Felix Heunks, Ronald Inglehart, Hans D. Jennings, Alan Marsh and Leopold Rosenmayer, 27-57. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979.

Kakizaki, Masaki. "Anti-Iraq War Protests in Turkey: Global Networks, Coalitions, and Context." *Middle Eastern Studies* 47, no. 1 (2011): 81-99.

Kakizaki, Masaki. "Determinants of Political Confidence in a Time of Political Realignment: Religion, Economy, and Politics in Turkey." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (2012): 67-88.

Kakizaki, Masaki. "The Republican People's Party and the Military in 1970s Turkey." *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 19, no. 1-2 (2013): 57-73.

Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. "Unconventional Political Participation in Turkey and Europe: Comparative Perspectives." *Il Politico* 59, no. 3 (1994): 503-524.

Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. "Civil Society in Turkey: Continuity or Change?" In *Turkish Transformation: New Century New Challenges*, edited by Brian W. Beeley, 59-78. Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 2002.

Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. "State and Civil Society in Turkey: Democracy, Development and Protest " In *Civil Society in the Muslim World: Contemporary Perspectives*, edited by Amyn B. Sajoo, 247-272. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2002.

Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. "Religiosity and Protest Behaviour: The Case of Turkey in Comparative Perspective." *Journal of Southern Europe & the Balkans* 9, no. 3 (2007): 275-291.

Karadeniz, Harun. *Olaylı Yıllar Ve Gençlik*. İstanbul: May Yayınları, 1975.

Karpat, Kemal H. *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959.

Katz, Hagai. "Gramsci, Hegemony, and Global Civil Society Networks." *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 17, no. 4 (2006): 333-348.

Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. "Transnational Advocacy Networks in the Movement Society." In *The Movement Society*, edited by David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, 217-238. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.

Keleş, Ruşen and Artun Ünsal. *Kent Ve Siyasal Şiddet*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi S.B.F. Basın ve Yayın Yüksek Okulu Basımevi, 1982.

Keyman, E. Fuat and Ahmet Icduygu. "Globalization, Civil Society and Citizenship in Turkey: Actors, Boundaries and Discourses." *Citizenship Studies* 7, no. 2 (2003): 219.

Kışlalı, Ahmet Taner. *Öğrenci Ayaklanmaları*. Ankara: Bilgi, 1974.

Kışlalı, Ahmet Taner. "Siyasal Tutumlarda Kuşak Ve Cinsiyet Etkenleri." *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 31, no. 1 (1976): 117-130.

Kitschelt, Herbert P. "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* 16, no. 1 (1986): 57-85.

Koç, Yıldırım. *Workers and Trade Unions in Türkiye*. Ankara: Confederation of Trade Unions of Turkey, 1999.

Koçan, Gürcan and Ahmet Öncü. "From the Morality of Living to the Morality of Dying: Hunger Strikes in Turkish Prisons." *Citizenship Studies* 10, no. 3 (2006): 349-372.

Koopmans, Ruud. *Democracy from Below : New Social Movements and the Political System in West Germany*. Boulder, CO; Oxford: Westview Press, 1995.

Koopmans, Ruud. "The Use of Protest Event Data in Comparative Research: Cross-National Comparability, Sampling Methods and Robustness." In *Acts of Dissent: New Developments in the Study of Protest*, edited by Dieter Rucht, Ruud Koopmans and Friedhelm Neidhardt, 90-110. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999.

Koopmans, Ruud and Susan Olzak. "Discursive Opportunities and the Evolution of Right-Wing Ciolence in Germancy." *American Journal of Sociology* 110, no. 1 (2004): 198-230.

Koopmans, Ruud and Dieter Rucht. "Protest Event Analysis." In *Methods of Social Movement Research*, edited by Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg, 231-259. Minneapolis, MN ; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2002.

Kousis, Maria. "Environmental Protest Cases: The City, the Countryside, and the Grassroots in Southern Europe." *Mobilization: An International Journal* 4, no. 2 (1999): 223-238.

Kramer, Heinz. *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000.

Kurita, Nobuyoshi. *Shakai Undo No Keiryo Shakaigakuteki Bunseki [Quantitative Sociological Analysis of Social Movements]*. Tokyo: Nihonhyoronsha, 1993.

Kuzmanovic, Daniella. *Refractions of Civil Society in Turkey*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Lüküslü, Demet. *Türkiye'de "Gençlik Miti": 1980 Sonrası Türkiye Gençliği*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2009.

Lüküslü, G. Demet. "Constructors and Constructed: Youth as a Political Actor in Modernising Turkey." In *Revisiting Youth Political Participation: Challenges for Research and Democratic Practice in Europe*, edited by Joerg Forbrig, 29-35. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2005.

Landau, Jacob M. *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974.

Landau, Jacob M. "Radicalism in Turkish Domestic Politics." In *Die Turkische Krise : Beitrage Eines Expertengesprachs Der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 24.-26. September 1980*, edited by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 97-106. Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1981.

Landau, Jacob M. "The Nationalist Action Party in Turkey." *Journal of Contemporary History* 17, no. 4 (1982): 587-606.

Letsch, Constanze. "A Year After the Protests, Gezi Park Nurtures the Seeds of a New Turkey. Guadian, May 29, 2014.

Mardin, Serif. "Youth and Violence in Turkey." *European Journal of Sociology* 19, no. 2 (1978): 229-254.

Mardin, Şerif. "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus*, no. 102 (1973): 169-190.

Margulies, Ronnie and Ergin Yildizoglu. "Trade Unions and Turkey's Working Class." *MERIP Reports* 121, (1984): 15-31.

McAdam, Doug. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.

McCarthy, J. D. and Mayer N. Zald. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." *American Journal of Sociology* 82, no. 6 (1977): 1212-1241.

McCarthy, John D. and Clark McPhail. "The Institutionalization of Protest in the Us." In *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for the New Century*, edited by David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, 83-110. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.

McCarthy, John D., Clark McPhail, Jackie Smith and Louis J. Crishock. "Electronic and Print Media Representation of Washington D.C. Demonstrations, 1982 and 1991:

A Demography of Description Bias." In *Acts of Dissent: New Developments in the Study of Protest*, edited by Dieter Rucht, Ruud Koopmans and Friedhelm Neidhardt, 113-130. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999.

Mello, Brian. "Political Process and the Development of Labor Insurgency in Turkey, 1945-80." *Social Movement Studies* 6, no. 3 (2007): 207-225.

Melucci, Alberto. *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Meyer, David S. and Sidney Tarrow. "A Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century." In *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century*, edited by David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, 1-28. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.

Meyer, David S. and Sidney Tarrow, eds. *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.

Meyer, James H. "Politics as Usual: Ciller, Refah and Susurluk: Turkey's Troubled Democracy." *East European Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (1998): 489-502.

Monceau, Nicolas. "The 75th Anniversary of the Republic of Turkey and the 700th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Ottoman Empire: Celebrating Past and Present Modernity." In *Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism*, edited by Stefanos Yerasimos, Günter Seufert and Karin Vorhoff, 283-334. Istanbul: Orient-Institut, 2000.

Morgan, Tabitha, "Scarf Conundrum Grips Turkey", BBC NEWS http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3513259.stm (accessed January 3 2013).

Mousseau, Demet Yalcin. "Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?" *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 5 (2001): 547-567.

Neyzi, Leyla. "Object or Subject? The Paradox of Youth in Turkey." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33, no. 03 (2002): 411-432.

Neyzi, Leyla. "The Construction of "Youth" in Public Discourse in Turkey: A Generational Approach." In *Youth and Youth Culture in the Contemporary Middle East*, edited by Jorgen Slmonsen, 107-115. Arhus: Arhus University Press, 2005.

Neyzi, Leyla. "Türkiye'de Kamusal Söylemde Gençlik Kurgusunun Değişimi." In *Katılımın "E-Hali": Gençlerin Sanal Alemi*, edited by Aslı Telli Aydemir, 25-47. İstanbul: Alternatif Bilişim, 2011.

Nie, Norman H., Sidney Verba and Jae-on Kim. "Political Participation and the Life Cycle." *Comparative Politics* 6, no. 3 (1974): 319-340.

Nikolayenko, Olena. "Life Cycle, Generational and Period Effects on Protest Potential in Yeltsin's Russia." *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique* 41, no. 2 (2008): 437-460.

Norris, Pippa. *Democratic Pheonix: Reinventing Political Activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Offe, Claus. "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics." *Social Research* 52, no. 4 (1985): 817-868.

Olson, Robert W. "Al-Fatah in Turkey: Its Influence on the March 12 Coup." *Middle Eastern Studies* 9, no. 2 (1973): 197-205.

Olzak, S. "Ethnic Protest in Core and Periphery States." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21, no. 2 (1998): 187-217.

Öniş, Ziya. "Domestic Politics Versus Global Dynamics: Towards a Political Economy of the 2000 and 2001 Financial Crises in Turkey." *Turkish Studies* 4, no. 2 (2003): 1-30.

Orlow, Dietrich. "Political Violence in Pre-Coup Turkey." *Terrorism: An International Journal* 6, no. 1 (1982): 53-71.

Özbudun, Ergun. "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations." In *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*, edited by Ergun Özbudun, 1-58. Ankara: Sevinç Matbaaşı, 1988.

Özbudun, Ergun. *Contemporary Turkish Politics : Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.

Özen, Hayriye and Şükrü Özen. "Public Policies and Social Movements: The Influences of Protest Movements on Mining Policy in Turkey." *Review of Public Administration* 43, no. 2 (2010): 33-64.

Pevsner, Lucille W. *Turkey's Political Crisis: Background, Perspectives, Prospects*. New York: Praeger, 1984.

Putnam, Robert D. *Bowling Alone : The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000.

Putnam, Robert D., ed. *Democracy in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Quintelier, Ellen. "Differences in Political Participation between Young and Old People." *Contemporary politics* 13, no. 2 (2007): 165-180.

Roos, Leslie L. Jr, Noralou P. Roos and Gary E. Field. "Students and Politics in Turkey." *Daedalus* 97, (1968): 184-203.

Roos, Leslie L. and Noralou P. Roos. *Managers of Modernization: Organizations and Elites in Turkey, 1950-1969*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Rootes, Christopher. "Britain." In *Environment Protest in Western Europe*, edited by Christopher Rootes, 20-58. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Rootes, Christopher, ed. *Environmental Protest in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Rucht, Dieter. "The Structure and Culture of Collective Protest in Germany since 1950." In *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century*, edited by David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, 29-57. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.

Rucht, Dieter. "On the Sociology of Protest Marches." In *The Street as Stage: Protest Marches and Public Rallies since the Nineteenth Century*, edited by Matthias Reiss, 49-57. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Rucht, Dieter, Ruud Koopmans and Friedhelm Neidhardt, eds. *Acts of Dissent: New Developments in the Study of Protest*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & LittleField, 1999.

Rucht, Dieter and Friedhelm Neidhardt. "Towards a 'Movement Society'? On the Possibilities of Institutionalizing Social Movements." *Social Movement Studies* 1, no. 1 (2002): 7-30.

Rucht, Dieter and Thomas Ohlemacher. "Protest Event Data: Collection, Uses and Perspectives." In *Studying Collective Action*, edited by Mario Diani and Pon Eyerman, 76-106. London: Sage, 1992.

Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio. "Revolutionary Dreams and Terrorist Violence in the Developed World: Explaining Country Variation." *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 5 (2009): 687-706.

Samin, Ahmet. "The Tragedy of the Turkish Left." *New Left Review*, no. 126 (1981): 60-85.

Sancar, Fahriye Hazer and Yücel Can Severcan. "In Search of Agency: Participation in a Youth Organisation in Turkey." In *A Handbook of Children and Young People's Participation: Perspectives from Theory and Practice*, edited by Barry Percy-Smith and Nigel Thomas, 277-286. London: Routledge, 2010.

Sayarı, Sabri. *Generational Changes in Terrorist Movements: The Turkish Case*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1985.

Sayarı, Sabri. "Patterns of Political Terrorism in Turkey." *TVI Journal* 6, no. 1 (1985): 39-44.

Sayarı, Sabri. "The Terrorist Movement in Turkey: Social Composition and Generational Changes." *Journal of Conflict Studies* 7, no. 1 (1987): 21-32.

Sayarı, Sabri. "Turgut Ozal." In *Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa: A Biographical Dictionary*, edited by Bernard Reich, 395-401. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.

Sayarı, Sabri. "Adnan Menderes: Between Democratic and Authoritarian Populism." In *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, edited by Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı, 65-85. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002.

Sayarı, Sabri. "Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976-1980: A Retrospective Analysis." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 2 (2010): 198-215.

Sayarı, Sabri and Yılmaz Esmer. *Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002.

Scott, James C. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Heaven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985.

Sevinç, Murat. "Bir İnsan Halkarı Sorunu Olarak: Açlık Revleri." *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 57, no. 1 (2002): 111-135.

Sevinç, Murat. "Hunger Strikes in Turkey." *Human Rights Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (2008): 655-679.

Shmuelevitz, Aryeh. "Adnan Menderes." In *Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa: A Biographical Dictionary*, edited by Bernard Reich, 332-340. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.

Şimşek, Sefa. "New Social Movements in Turkey since 1980." *Turkish Studies* 5, no. 2 (2004): 111-139.

Şimşek, Sefa. "The Transformation of Civil Society in Turkey: From Quantity to Quality." *Turkish Studies* 5, no. 3 (2004): 46-74.

Soule, Sarah A. and Jennifer Earl. "A Movement Society Evaluated: Collective Protest in the United States, 1960-1986." *Mobilization* 10, no. 3 (2005): 345-364.

Sunar, İlkay. *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey's Development*. Ankara: Ankara University Faculty of Political Science Publication, 1974.

Türkmen, Füsun. "Anti-Americanism as a Default Ideology of Opposition: Turkey as a Case Study." *Turkish Studies* 11, (2010): 329-345.

Takşın, Ahmet. "Ceza İnfaz Kurumlarında Açlık Grevleri." *Adalet Dergisi* 93, no. 11 (2002): 1-34.

Tarrow, Sidney *Democracy and Disorder : Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965-1975*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989.

Taylor, Charles Lewis and Michael C. Hudson. *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*. 2nd ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972.

Taylor, Charles Lewis and David A. Jodice. *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*. Vol. II. 3rd ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983.

Taylor, Verta. "Mobilizing for Change in a Social Movement Society." *Contemporary Sociology* 29, no. 1 (2000): 219-230.

Tilly, Charles. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA; London: Addison-Wesley, 1978.

Tilly, Charles. *Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834*. Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 1995.

Tilly, Charles. *Social Movements, 1768-2004*. Boulder, CO; London: Paradigm, 2004.

Tokluoğlu, Ceylan. "The Impact of Resistance on the State-Building Process in Turkey." *Asian and African Studies* 9, no. 1 (2000): 110-120.

Tong, Yanqi. "State, Society, and Political Change in China and Hungary." *Comparative Politics* 26, no. 3 (1994): 333-353.

Toprak, Binnaz. "Civil Society in Turkey." In *Civil Society in the Middle East*, edited by Augustus Richard Norton, II, 87-118. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996.

Touraine, Alain. "Triumph or Downfall of Civil Society." In *Humanities in Review*, edited by David Reiff, 218-234. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Trimberger, Ellen Kay. *Revolution from Above : Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1978.

Tuğal, Cihan. "Commentary: "Resistance Everywhere": The Gezi Revolt in Global Perspective." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 49, (2013): 157-172.

Tunç, Asli. "Faustian Acts in Turkish Style: Structural Change in National Newspapers as an Obstacle to Quality Journalism in 1990-2003." In *Quality Press in Southeast Europe*, edited by Orlin Spassov. Sofia: Southeast European Media Center (SOEMZ), 2004.

Tunç, Hakan. "The Lost Gamble: The 2000 and 2001 Turkish Financial Crises in Comparative Perspective." *Turkish Studies* 4, no. 2 (2003): 31-52.

Turan, İlter. "Policymakers' Assumptions About Peasant Society: Myth or Reality?" *Policy Studies Review* 4, no. 1 (1984): 99-109.

Uba, Katrin. "Political Protest and Policy Change: The Direct Impacts of Indian Anti-Privatization Mobilizations, 1990-2003." *Mobilization* 10, no. 3 (2005): 383-396.

Uysal, Ayşen. "Riot Police and Policing Protest in Turkey." In *Policing and Prisons in the Middle East*, edited by Laleh Khalili and Jillian Schwedler, 191-206. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.

Wada, Takeshi. "Civil Society in Mexico: Popular Protest Amid Economic and Political Liberalization." *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 25, no. 1/2 (2005): 87-117.

Wada, Takeshi. "Claim Network Analysis: How Are Social Protests Transformed into Political Protest in Mexico?" In *Latin American Social Movements: Globalization, Democratization, and Transnational Networks*, edited by Hank Johnston and Paul Almeida, 95-111. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Little Field, 2006.

Wada, Takeshi. "Who Are the Active and Central Actors in the 'Rising Civil Society' in Mexico?" *Social Movement Studies* 13, no. 1 (2014): 127-157.

Watts, Meredith W. "Are There Typical Age Curves in Political Behavior? The "Age Invariance" Hypothesis and Political Socialization." *Political Psychology* 20, no. 3 (1999): 477-499.

Watts, Nicole F. "Activists in Office: Pro-Kurdish Contentious Politics in Turkey." *Ethnopolitics* 5, no. 2 (2006): 125-144.

Weiker, Walter F. *The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961: Aspects of Military Politics*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1963.

White, James W. *Ikki : Social Conflict and Political Protest in Early Modern Japan*. Ithaca ; London: Cornell University Press, 1995.

Yaraşır, Volkan. *Sokakta Politika*. İstanbul: Gendaş, 2002.

Yavuz, M. Hakan. "The Assassination of Collective Memory: The Case of Turkey." *The Muslim World* 89, no. 3-4 (1999): 193-207.

Yavuz, M. Hakan. *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Yavuz, M. Hakan. "Opportunity Spaces, Identity, and Islamic Meaning in Turkey." In *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, edited by Quintan Wiktrowicz, 270-288. Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indianapolis University Press, 2004.

Yavuz, M. Hakan and Nihat Ali Özcan. "Crisis in Turkey: The Conflict of Political Languages." *Middle East Policy* 14, no. 3 (2007): 118-135.

Yerasimos, Stefanos, Günter Seufert and Karin Vorhoff, eds. *Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism: Studies on Political Culture in Contemporary Turkey*. Istanbul: Orient-Institute, 2000.

Zürcher, Erik J. *Turkey: A Modern History*. 3rd ed. London: I.B. Tauris, 2004.

Zileli, Gün. *Yarılma (1954-1972)*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2002.