Controlling democracy: the principal-agent problems in election administration

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Publication Type Working Paper
School or College College of Social & Behavioral Science
Department Political Science
Creator Hall, Thad
Other Author Alvarez, R. Michael
Title Controlling democracy: the principal-agent problems in election administration
Date 2006-07-20
Description Election reform has become a major issue since the 2000 election, but little consideration has been given to the issues associated with managing them. In this article, we use principal agent theory to examine the problems associated with Election Day polling place voting. We note that Election Day voting manifests problems that agency theory shows are difficult to overcome, including adverse selection of and shirking by poll workers. We then examine alternate methods of voting, such as early, absentee, and Internet voting, and show how these reforms can mitigate many of the more severe principal agent problems in election management.
Type Text
Publisher University of Utah
Volume 8
First Page 1
Last Page 40
Subject Election reform; Public management; Principal-Agent Theory
Subject LCSH Elections; Voting
Language eng
Bibliographic Citation Alvarez, R.M. & Hall, T. (2006). Controlling Democracy: The Principal-Agent Problems in Election Administration. Institute of Public & International Affairs, 8, 1-40.
Series Institute of Public and International Affairs Working Papers
Rights Management (c) R. Michael Alvarez & Thad E. Hall
Format Medium application/pdf
Format Extent 259,089
Identifier ir-main,
ARK ark:/87278/s6sq9hvq
Setname ir_uspace
Date Created 2012-06-13
Date Modified 2021-05-06
ID 705441
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