Legal reasoning and the jurisprudence of vertical restraints: the limitations of neoclassical economic analysis in the resolution of antitrust disputes

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Publication Type Journal Article
School or College College of Law
Department Law (College of)
Creator Flynn, John J.
Other Author Ponsoldt, James F.
Title Legal reasoning and the jurisprudence of vertical restraints: the limitations of neoclassical economic analysis in the resolution of antitrust disputes
Date 1987
Description The question of how antitrust policy "ought" to treat vertical distribution restraints in the 1980s under section 1 of the Sherman Act(1) embodies the difficulties entailed when any field of law becomes captive to a single paradigm. (2) Inherently political assumptions concerning the proper scope of property and contract rights and government power to regulate the economy, and unrealistic factual assumptions concerning the nature of vertical economic relationships have come to the fore in currently fashionable analysis of vertical restraints.(3)
Type Text
Publisher New York University Law Review
Volume 62
First Page 1125
Last Page 1152
Dissertation Institution University of Utah
Language eng
Bibliographic Citation Flynn, J. J. & Ponsoldt, J. F.(1987). Legal reasoning and the jurisprudence of vertical restraints: the limitations of neoclassical economic analysis in the resolution of antitrust disputes. New York University Law Review, 62, 1125-52.
Rights Management (c)New York University Law Review
Format Medium application/pdf
Format Extent 2,089,801 bytes
Identifier ir-main,1782
ARK ark:/87278/s65435xr
Setname ir_uspace
Date Created 2012-06-13
Date Modified 2013-02-04
ID 704653
Reference URL https://collections.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s65435xr
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