Thick ethical concepts and the fact-value distinction

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Publication Type Journal Article
School or College College of Humanities
Department Philosophy
Creator Millgram, Elijah
Title Thick ethical concepts and the fact-value distinction
Date 1995
Description Over the last few years, the ‘fact-value distinction' (FVD) has become increasingly unfashionable, due in part to a number of arguments adduced against it. I myself do not believe the FVD can be maintained, and I think there are good arguments against it. But I have my doubts about the cogency of one of the arguments often invoked against it. This argument turns on ‘thick ethical concepts' (TECs); I will refer to it as the ‘TEC-argument'. The TEC-argument is attractive because it proceeds from an uncontroversial premise-that we grasp and use TECs-to a substantive and controversial conclusion-that something is wrong with the FVD.2 This sounds too good to be true; and it is. I intend to show that although the TEC-argument is frequently invoked, it has never actually been made.
Type Text
Publisher Suhrkamp
First Page 1
Last Page 24
Subject Philosophy;; Ethics
Subject LCSH Ethics; Value
Language eng
Bibliographic Citation Millgram, E. (1995). Thick Ethical Concepts and the Fact-Value Distinction, 1-24.
Rights Management (c) 1995 Suhrkamp
Format Medium application/pdf
Format Extent 131,677 Bytes
Identifier ir-main,845
Source Published as "Inhaltsreiche ethische Begriffe und die Unterscheidung zwischen Tatsachen und Werten," in C. Fehige and G. Meggle, Zum moralischen Denken (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1995):354-388.
ARK ark:/87278/s6c82th3
Setname ir_uspace
Date Created 2012-06-13
Date Modified 2021-05-06
ID 703578
Reference URL https://collections.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6c82th3
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