Do caps on non-economic damages decrease medical malpractice insurance premiums?

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Publication Type honors thesis
School or College College of Social & Behavioral Science
Department Political Science
Faculty Mentor Daniel Levin
Creator Mortensen, Matthew
Title Do caps on non-economic damages decrease medical malpractice insurance premiums?
Year graduated 2015
Date 2015-04
Description This paper examines whether tort reform, like caps on non-economic damages for medical malpractice claims, actually lower insurance premiums for physicians. Proponents of tort reform argue that large jury awards against physicians have driven up physician insurance premiums, and as a result, overall health care costs. Tort reform is backed by conservative pro-business groups like the Chamber of Commerce, while the opposition consists of Democrats and the American Trial Lawyers Association. This paper endeavors to show that medical malpractice insurance premiums rise in response to other factors, independent of litigation, contrary to the arguments made by conservative politicians and associations. Premiums change in response to determinants such as under reserved insurance companies or, most importantly, in response to losses incurred in the investment market by insurance companies. Under reserved insurance companies and losses incurred in the investment market affect medical malpractice premiums because premiums rise in response to changes in capital reserve requirements and declines in investment income. This paper shows that litigation is not the cause of increasing medical malpractice insurance rates, but instead increases in medical malpractice insurance rates respond to changes in the insurance underwriting cycle due to fluctuations in the investment market. Conservative backed tort reform is a misguided attempt to control medical malpractice insurance premiums and overall health care spending.
Type Text
Publisher University of Utah
Subject Physicians' malpractice insurance - United States; Insurance premiums - United States
Language eng
Rights Management Copyright © Matthew Mortensen 2015
Format Medium application/pdf
Format Extent 104,778 bytes
Identifier etd3/id/3597
Permissions Reference URL https://collections.lib.utah.edu/details?id=1281826
ARK ark:/87278/s6x09gbk
Setname ir_htoa
ID 197149
Reference URL https://collections.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6x09gbk
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