Representing ourselves as rational agents

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Publication Type dissertation
School or College College of Humanities
Department Philosophy
Author Mosdell, Matthew D.
Title Representing ourselves as rational agents
Date 2012-12
Description It is often assumed that rational agents are unified agents. As a normative feature of agency, the idea that fully rational creatures are, in a certain sense, unified, suggests that understanding ourselves as rational creatures requires understanding our reasons for acting as reasons that can be represented with a single account of agency. In this dissertation, I argue against such a view by showing that features of our own agency preclude constructing such a representation. To be the type of creatures we are, we have to act in ways that cannot be represented with a single, unified theory of rational agency. Instead, making sense of ourselves as rational creatures requires a number of different models that cannot be nicely fitted together. The upshot is that a unified account of rational agency may not be possible.
Type Text
Publisher University of Utah
Subject Action; Knowledge-how; Practical knowledge; Rational agency; Representation; Unified agency
Dissertation Institution University of Utah
Dissertation Name Doctor of Philosophy
Language eng
Rights Management Copyright © Matthew D. Mosdell 2012
Format Medium application/pdf
Format Extent 560,203 bytes
ARK ark:/87278/s6jt058d
Setname ir_etd
Date Created 2013-01-03
Date Modified 2017-11-20
ID 195754
Reference URL