OCR Text |
Show mm OfCOMMoN-WE ALTH. claim; his politique Perfon to procure the common interclii -, ycltfhC [1s more, or no lef‘fc carefull to procure the private good of Illmic 1:1,; 115 am. 1y, kindred and friends 5 and for the moi't part, i _t 16 PUf fill"? i303refi chance to croife the private, he preferrs the private . 0‘} t it al- fions of men, are'commonly more potent than their Rea on: From whence it follows, that where the publique and private inteieit are mofi clofely united, there is the publique moi} advancedl._ Now in Monarchy, the private intereft is the fame with the fpub "We", The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arife onely mm the "Cites, firength and reputation of his Subjeots. For no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor fecure ,whofe SubJCé‘ts are either poore, or con- temptible, or too weak through want,or diffention,to maintain a war againfi their enemies: Whereas in a Democracy, or Ariftocracy, the publique profperity conferres not fo much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, asdoth many times a perfidious ad- "u‘ ‘m‘t ‘VIBA "1:. '. ' vice, atreacherous aetion, or a erll warre . Secondly, that a Monarch receiveth counfell ofwhom, when,and where he pleafeth, and confequently may heare the opinion of men verfed in the matter about which he deliberateswof what rank or quility foever , and as long before the time of action , and with as much fecrecy, as he will. But when a Soveraigne AIfembly has need ofCounfell,none are admitted but fuch as have a Right thereto from the be inning; which for the moft part are of thofe who have beene verfefmore in the acquifition of Wealth than of Knowledge, and are to give their advice in long difcourfes, which may, and do common' 1 excite men to acrion, but not governe them in it. For the underjLnding is by the flame of the Paflions, never enlightned,but dazled: Nor is there any place, or time , wherein an Aifemblie can receive Counfell with fecrecie, becaufe oftheir owne Multitude i Thirdly, that the Refolutions of a Monarch, are fubject to no 0ther Inconflancy,than that of Humane Nature-,but in Affemblies,be- fides that of Nature, there arifeth an Inconftancy from the Number. For the abfcnce ofa few, that would have the Refolution once taken, continue firme, (Which may happen by fecurity, negligence, or private impediments, ) or the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary Opinion, undoes to day, all that was concluded yeiterday. Fourthly, that a Monarch cannot difagree with himfelfe , out of enVy, or intercfi ; but an Aifembly may; and that to fuch a height, as may roducc aCivill Warre . Fi thly,that in Monarchy there is this inconvenience, that any Sub- ject , by the power ofone man, for the enriching favourite or flat' terer, may be deprived ofall he polfeifeth, whichofI aconfeife is a great and inevitable inconvenience,But the fame may as well happen,where the Soveraigne P0wer is in an Aflembly: For their power is the fame; and they are as fubjee‘t to evillCounfell, and to be feduced by Orators, as a Monarch by Flatterers, and becomino one an others tCl'Cl‘S,ferv<‘. one anothers Covetoufneife and. Kmbition by Flatturnes. And whereas the Favorites ofMonarchs, are few, and 615 to advance but their owne Kind red; the Favorites they have none of an Alfembly, are szi OfCOMMON-WEALTH. Clmpup. are many ; and the Kindred much more numerous, than of any M5; narch. Bciich, there is no Favourite ofa Monarch, which cannor as well fuccour his friends. as him his enemies: But Orators, that is to fay, Favouritm of Soverztigne AffemblieS, though they have great power to hurt, have little to fave . For to accufe, requires leffe Eloquence ( fuch is mans l‘Iaturc ) than to excufe, and condemnation, than abfolution more reinnbles Jufltice . . Sixtly, that itis aninconvenience in Monarchie , that the Sove- raigntie may defcend upon an Infantaor one that cannot difcerne between Good and Evill: and confideth in this, that the ufe of his Power, mufl be in the hand ofanother Man,or offome Affembly ofmen,‘ which are to govei'ne by his right, and in his name; as Curators, and Protectors of his Perfon,and Authority, But to fay there is incon- venience, in putting the ufe of the Soveraign Power, into the of a Man, or an Aifembly of men 3 is to fay that all Government hand is more Inconvenient, than Confufion, and Civill Warre. And therefor the dancer that can be pretended, muff arife from the Content e all ion of thofe, that for an oflice 0f fo great honour, and profit, may become Competitors. To make it appear, that this inconVenience, eth not from that forme of Government we call Monarchy, proceed we are to confidcr, that the precedent Monarch, hath appointed who {hall have the Tuition ofhis Infant Succefibr, eitherexpreffely by Teflame nr, or tacitly,by not controlling the Cuflome in that cafe received : And then fuch inconvenience ( ifit happen ) is to be attribut ed, not to the Monarchy, but to the Ambition, and Injuflice of the Subjects in all kinds ofGovernment, where the people are not well , which inflruéted in their Duty1and the Rivhrs ofSoveraignty, is the fame. Or elfe the precedent Monarch, hat 1 not at all taken order for fuch Tuition ; And then the liilwof Nature hath provided this fuiiicient rule, That the Tuition ih ill be in him, that hath by Nature molt intereft in the preiei ration of the Authority of the Infant, and to whom leaf‘t bene- iit can accrue by his death,0r diminution. For feeing every man by nature feeketh his own benefit, and promotion 5 to put an Infant into the power of thofe, that can romote theinfelves by his deflruc‘iion, or dammage, is not Tuitionffiut Trechcry. Sothat fufficient proviiion being taken, againfl: all juit quarrell, aboutthe Govern ment under :1 Child, ifany contention arife to the diiturbance of the publiqu c Peace, it is not to be attributed to the forme of Monarchy, butto the ambition of Subjects, and ignorance oftheir Duty.0n the other fide, there is no great Common-wealth, the Soveraigniy whereof is in a great Affembly, which is not, as to confultations of Peace, and Warren and making of Lawes, in the fame condition, as if the Go- vernment were in a Child. For as a Child wants the judgement to diil'ent from counfellgiven him, and is thereby neceifitarcd to take the advife ofthem, or him, to whom he is committ ed: So an Affem- bly u'anteth the liberty,to diffent from the counfcll ofthe major part, be it good,or bad. And asaChild has need of a Tutor, or Protcw cm, to preferve his I'erfon, and Authority: 80 alfo( in great Conitiion-u'ealtlis,;tltc Soveruign Ailembly, in all great dangers and troubles, |