{"responseHeader":{"status":0,"QTime":6,"params":{"q":"{!q.op=AND}id:\"1211200\"","hl":"true","hl.simple.post":"","hl.fragsize":"5000","fq":"!embargo_tdt:[NOW TO *]","hl.fl":"ocr_t","hl.method":"unified","wt":"json","hl.simple.pre":""}},"response":{"numFound":1,"start":0,"docs":[{"modified_tdt":"2017-03-15T16:29:23Z","thumb_s":"/6e/e0/6ee041a127456c7ff49602a4b75289aa8b74654f.jpg","setname_s":"uum_mlds_public","file_s":"/98/97/9897cc7aeecde361b2fd11726cd851b1188f825c.pdf","restricted_i":0,"title_t":"Page 188","ocr_t":"Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conception 157 to the putative extensionality of standard decision-theoretic notation. Using the foregoing account of subsentential predication, by contrast, the work of ordering choice alternatives can be performed just as well by the same quantificational apparatus and sequence of Boolean connectives as is used to order the predicates ascribed to them, while at the same time avoiding these objections. Alice's preference for house d1 over d2 can be written as follows, where Rx is \"has a roof,\" Qx is \"is of good quality,\" and Nx is \"is in a good neighborhood\": (5) Ps(Rd1 v Rd2). Ps(~Qd1 v ~Qd2). Ps(Nd1.~Nd2) On my account, it is not necessary to stipulate the problematic, antecedent mathematical ordering of constraints as a precondition for applying the subsequent first-order logical definition of preference, as De Jongh and Liu do, because the standard Boolean connectives and quantificational laws of first-order, classical predicate logic are all we need. 10. The Intensionality of Genuine Preference Conjointly, (Asy), (Con), (Irr), (T3), and (O') and constitute a conceptual truth about what it means for someone to have a genuine preference. Its status as a preference is stable relative to the rejected alternative (Asy); it has been compared to all other alternatives in the given set (Con); it satisfies horizontal consistency, i.e. is not self-contradictory (Irr); it is consistently preferred to all other alternatives in the set (T3); and it is well-ordered relative to the least member of the set (O'). Together these five criteria insure that something is a genuine preference if it is consistent both with itself and with each of the other alternatives to which it is preferred. Notice that the suggested notational revisions do not require any sacrifice of content in the expression of probabilistic axioms. For example, the Von Neumann-Morgenstern independence axiom discussed in Volume I, Chapter IV.1.2, (Ind) if F > G and 0 < p < 1 then F(p) + H(1 - p) > G(p) + H(1 - p) for any H in the set S of all probability distributions or gambles on a set of outcomes can be rewritten in the variable term calculus as follows, where x, y, and z are alternatives and \"Sz\" denotes any z in the set S of all probability distributions etc.: (Ind') (∀z){(Sz {[Pw(x.~y).( 0 < p < 1)] {Pw[x(p) + z(1 - p)].~[y(p) + z(1 - p)]}}}. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin","id":1211200,"created_tdt":"2017-03-15T16:29:23Z","format_t":"application/pdf","parent_i":1211012,"_version_":1642982356888322050}]},"highlighting":{"1211200":{"ocr_t":[]}}}