{"responseHeader":{"status":0,"QTime":7,"params":{"q":"{!q.op=AND}id:\"1211183\"","hl":"true","hl.simple.post":"","hl.fragsize":"5000","fq":"!embargo_tdt:[NOW TO *]","hl.fl":"ocr_t","hl.method":"unified","wt":"json","hl.simple.pre":""}},"response":{"numFound":1,"start":0,"docs":[{"modified_tdt":"2017-03-15T16:29:23Z","thumb_s":"/46/57/46572da5cb8e9906d15334d778bf463f49fefdc1.jpg","setname_s":"uum_mlds_public","file_s":"/e3/a6/e3a6abd47b957305b0af90c57f4dc7626721df26.pdf","restricted_i":0,"title_t":"Page 171","ocr_t":"Chapter III. The Concept of a Genuine Preference 140 6.2.1 Occasional Truth Tables for Subsentential Constituents In conventional logic, a truth table enables us to assess whether two (or more) complex statements, structured by the Boolean connectives, are consistent, equivalent, tautological, self-contradictory, or contingent, by consistently assigning the values T or F to each sentence letter that each such complex statement contains. The reason we can do this is that classical logic is an extensional symbolic language whose connectives relate sentences or propositions that are reasonably assumed to be true or false independently of the complex statements in which they are embedded. The variable term calculus I am proposing here requires modification of this assumption. On the one hand we can, analogously, assign truth-values to terms and variables within a single intentional attitude in order to fix the truth or falsity of preferences the agent may have at a particular moment. A true preference Ps(a.~b) would be one that assigns T to a and F to b. A false preference Ps(a.~b) would be one that assigns F either to a or to ~b. Instead of speaking of true or false sentences or propositions as denoting or failing to denote a state of affairs, we would speak of true or false preferences as denoting or failing to denote a particular intentional state of the agent. On the other hand, because we are working within the constraints of an intensional language, there can be no guarantee that the truth-value of a variable or term that occurs within the scope of one intentional attitude (i.e. such that its occurrences are enclosed within the outermost brackets governed by Pw or its instantiations) will be the same as its truth-value within the scope of a different one. So, for example, it is possible that in the following statement (1) Ps(a.~b).Ps(a.~c).Ps(c.~a), the truth assignments in the third conjunct might be the reverse of what they are in the first two. Because this is always a possibility, the usefulness of truth tables for intentional attitudes such as preferences - and indeed for the variable term calculus more generally - is limited. Truth tables for subsentential constituents are reliable only on those occasions in which the truth assignments to variables or terms are consistent over the range of intentional attitudes related by the Boolean connectives within a complex statement such as (1). Hence the description of these truth tables as occasional. However, only under this restriction are the criteria of horizontal and vertical consistency fully satisfied. Since, as we have seen in Chapter II, satisfaction of these two criteria are necessary conditions of unified agency, presupposing them in this ideal scenario does not seem too much of a stretch (even though in reality, as I argue in Part II below, we often fail to satisfy these conditions). This presupposition, in turn, enables us to compare the truth-values of two different intentional attitudes related by a Boolean connective, i.e. in the case in which each intentional attitude functions as © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin","id":1211183,"created_tdt":"2017-03-15T16:29:23Z","format_t":"application/pdf","parent_i":1211012,"_version_":1642982356882030592}]},"highlighting":{"1211183":{"ocr_t":[]}}}