{"responseHeader":{"status":0,"QTime":7,"params":{"q":"{!q.op=AND}id:\"1211165\"","hl":"true","hl.simple.post":"","hl.fragsize":"5000","fq":"!embargo_tdt:[NOW TO *]","hl.fl":"ocr_t","hl.method":"unified","wt":"json","hl.simple.pre":""}},"response":{"numFound":1,"start":0,"docs":[{"modified_tdt":"2017-03-15T16:29:23Z","thumb_s":"/c9/b9/c9b96479fa52607cdeed04ea1b96423b46c82bce.jpg","setname_s":"uum_mlds_public","file_s":"/b9/18/b9180aafe715bd0afc9f6482b9cd7c71b9b6fe77.pdf","restricted_i":0,"title_t":"Page 153","ocr_t":"Chapter III. The Concept of a Genuine Preference 122 (10) Alonzo prefers charcoal and Alonzo does not prefer lead pencil, since Alonzo's preference in (9) may depend on being offered a pairwise comparison between them.6 Such counterexamples are familiar motivators for intensional logics, for example, of belief. Similar counterexamples for preference claims could be given for each of the standard Boolean connectives under conventional, natural-language interpretations. What these counterexamples show is that in order to understand and symbolize appropriately the logic of preference, more of the subsentential structure of preference claims need to be exposed. Only then can we answer the questions posed above, i.e. (i) Can [the logical analogues of] F>H and H>F both be true together? (ii) Can [the logical analogues of] (T) and (C) be true together? As they stand, (T) and (C) express intentional preference relations between individual alternatives F, G and H. (T) and (C) also express seemingly straightforward truth-functional relations among such sentential propositions as \"F is preferred to G\" and \"G is preferred to H,\" in which these alternatives are intentionally related. In order to answer (i), we need a notation that can express the difference in intentional status between F and H at least as well as Savage's does. In order to answer (ii), we need a notation that also can reflect the sentential relationships among conjuncts, antecedents, and consequents in (T) and (C) at least as well as Savage's does. An adequate notation will use familiar Boolean connectives under a standard, natural-language interpretation to express both types of relation simultaneously. 4. Some Further Limitations of Standard Quantificational Notation One possibility that I do not endorse would be to interpret a relational predicate Fxy as \"x selects F over y,\" and (T) as (T1) (∀x){[(((Fxg v Gxf).~(Fxg.Gxf)).~Gxf). (((Gxh v Hxg).~(Gxh.Hxg))).~Hxg)] (((Fxh v Hxf).~(Fxh.Hxf)).~Hxf)}. With the addition of an axiom of asymmetry such that However, it should be noted that not all preferences are comparative. A gentleman who prefers blondes, for example, is one who is always physically attracted to blondes - not one who always selects blondes whenever offered a pairwise comparison between a blonde and everybody else. 6 © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin","id":1211165,"created_tdt":"2017-03-15T16:29:23Z","format_t":"application/pdf","parent_i":1211012,"_version_":1664094337254817793}]},"highlighting":{"1211165":{"ocr_t":[]}}}