{"responseHeader":{"status":0,"QTime":6,"params":{"q":"{!q.op=AND}id:\"1210513\"","hl":"true","hl.simple.post":"","hl.fragsize":"5000","fq":"!embargo_tdt:[NOW TO *]","hl.fl":"ocr_t","hl.method":"unified","wt":"json","hl.simple.pre":""}},"response":{"numFound":1,"start":0,"docs":[{"modified_tdt":"2017-03-15T16:29:23Z","thumb_s":"/0c/ec/0cec292b79e71d9d01ffae8ec88f5b11af157bac.jpg","setname_s":"uum_mlds_public","file_s":"/9e/e0/9ee080a59e247deef94bc0571e4352e23dce756a.pdf","restricted_i":0,"title_t":"Page 176","ocr_t":"Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception 151 unaffected by the possible truth or falsity of s, I am equally indifferent between the following two options: (iii) the truth of s secures F and its falsity secures I; and (iv) the truth of s secures G and its falsity secures H. That is, if nothing of consequence for my ranking of F and I turns on the truth or falsity of s, then similarly nothing of consequence for my ranking of G and H does, either. And similarly, this amounts to indifference between the following two cases: (iii') (1, F) and (0, I); (iv') (1, G) and (0, H); i.e. my ranking of F and I relative to G and H remains similarly unaffected. In this case the value intervals between F and G, and between H and I are the same. Then define as a value any set of outcomes I prefer to a given outcome, such that if I prefer outcome F to G, then I prefer any outcome with the same value as F to any outcome with the same value as G. In this case the value of F to me is greater than the value of G, and I can be said to rank total outcomes F, G, … in an ordinal series. Also define as an ethically neutral sentence (or proposition) s one whose truth or falsity makes no difference to the equal value of two possible worlds identical in all other respects. Ramsey's first axiom (A1) stipulates the existence of such an s believed to a degree of .5, i.e. of an ethically neutral toss-up belief. His second axiom, (A2) if s, t are such sentences and the option F if s, I if not-s is equivalent to G if s, H if not-s, then F if t, I if not-t is equivalent to G if t, H if not-t replaces the indifference relation between (iii) and (iv) above with an equivalence relation, and derives from it similarly equal value intervals for total outcomes F, G, H and I with respect to a second ethically neutral toss-up belief t. This establishes that the equality of the value intervals between F and G and between H and I is independent of the content of the ethically neutral toss-up belief on the truth of which I am willing to bet either way for the same stakes; and so, by definition, the equivalence of the intervals FG and HI. From this equivalence plus the operations of transposition and distribution, Ramsey derives the equivalence of the ordinal rankings F>G and H>I and of the equalities F=G and H=I. The consistency of these intervals is secured by Ramsey's third and fourth axioms: © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin","id":1210513,"created_tdt":"2017-03-15T16:29:23Z","format_t":"application/pdf","parent_i":1210337,"_version_":1642982477866729473}]},"highlighting":{"1210513":{"ocr_t":[]}}}