OCR Text |
Show Hinckley Journal of Politics Autumn 1998 legislation, bringing sanctions upon foreign companies that do business with Teheran. This is an example of how divisive dual containment has been for Trans-Atlantic relations (Amuzegar 1997, 36). Japan, which imports over 90 percent of its oil from the Persian Gulf, takes a cautious approach toward Iraq and Iran. Though it has supported U.S. actions against Iraq, it has been reserved in its praise, while calling for greater consultation by the United States of its allies before taking action (Grier 1996, 8). With Iran, Japan has maintained trade relations, refusing calls by the United States to enforce sanctions, due to both its need for oil and its view of Iran as a lucrative market for Japanese goods. Russia, which has had a somewhat reserved relationship with the United States over the past several years, also has charted its own policy. This is due to the fact that Russia, while a major power, can hardly match the United States in terms of global influence and national (military, economic, diplomatic) strength. Moscow has called for relaxing sanctions against Baghdad, which owes Russia $7 billion in debts (Grier 1996). Russia, as the leading member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, has made oil and natural gas deals with Iran, and U.S. sanctions have not prevented it from doing so (Amuzegar 1997, 36). America's allies in the Middle East also have been less than enthusiastic about dual containment. Turkey, a member of NATO whose bases played a major role in the Gulf War and are vital regarding the enforcement of the northern no-fly zone over Iraq, has sought to expand its influence in Central Asia. This has brought it into competition with Iran, but it has led to some cooperation in areas of common interest. Turkey recently concluded a $23 billion, 22-year gas deal to build a pipeline from Ankara to Turkmenistan, which passes through Iran, and of course goes against the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, which penalizes companies for any investment of over $40 million a year in Iranian oil or gas production (Myddelton 1996, 6). Some members of the GCC, most notably Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, also have expanded commercial links with Iran (Amuzegar 1997, 36). Iraq has received delegations from Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Turkey, countries which believe that U.N. sanctions will be lifted in the near future and hope to cash in on economic ties when this happens (Myddelton 1996, 6-7). For these countries, a pragmatic approach toward Iraq and Iran, meant to bring economic profit and perhaps-at least in the case of Iran-political links, is preferable to a rigid, uncompromising policy of dual containment. The current policy of dual containment has led to undeniable rifts between the United States and its allies. Some experts have suggested a modification of U.S. Persian Gulf policy in order for the NATO allies-and perhaps the GCC nations-to play a more active role in a common effort in the region. A recent RAND Corporation study called for a combined American-European effort regarding Iran and Iraq. This would maintain a balance of power between the two countries while discouraging the acquisition of long-range missiles and nuclear weapons by them (Khalilzad 1996, 13). With the European allies playing a role in its formulation and implementation, it probably would see an abandonment of strident rhetoric and economic sanctions against these nations. Such an approach, given the divisions caused by dual containment and the fact that many of its provisions are ineffective due to allied non-compliance, would give the United States a far stronger position in the Persian Gulf, as well as a policy of greater clarity toward the region. An Alternative Approach in the Persian Gulf The policy of dual containment that has been pursued by the United States since 1993 has managed to prevent overt Iraqi and Iranian aggression toward the Persian Gulf. It has done so at a serious price, however. Economic sanctions, particularly those leveled against Iran, have strained relations between the United States and its allies, whose support is necessary for dual containment to work. Furthermore, it ignores the very real differences between Iraq and Iran, and goes against U.S. interests in the Gulf. It has become clear that an alternative approach to Persian Gulf security by the United States is needed, changing some elements of policy while maintaining others in a modified form. Iraq, as Anthony Cordesman has argued, will remain a threat to Gulf security as long as Saddam's regime remains in power (1996, 1). Moreover, his brutal network of overlapping police and security services means that opposition to his rule is swiftly-and ruthlessly-crushed whenever it manifests itself. Iraq has, in the words of Omar Kader, become a state "in which all loyalties-personal, tribal, etc.-have been destroyed" by Saddam (Telephone interview, August 28, 1997). Dual containment will not change this fact. The only hope in creating an Iraqi state that will cease to be a threat to regional security (or at least will be a significantly reduced one), lies in the overthrow of Saddam's regime and its replacement by more moderate elements. Saddam has plenty of enemies inside Iraq, but the rather weak (and now significantly reduced) efforts by the CIA to weaken his regime, which have been confined largely to the dropping of anti-Saddam leaflets from aircraft (Richelson 1995, 357), do little to assist them in their efforts. An amnesty issued by the United States for all Iraqi political and military leaders, except Saddam, for actions taken during his regime, as Kader has suggested, would vastly broaden the opposition to his rule, undermining his authority considerably, to say the least. Such measures should be pursued by the United States toward Iraq, so as to eliminate the threat it poses to Gulf security. An effort like this also would require other steps, such as promises of diplomatic and trade relations and a lifting of sanctions for a post-Saddam regime. As for the Kurds, an autonomous region in northern Iraq-one in which Kurds are able to manage their own political affairs and maintain their cultural integrity-is also nec- 85 |