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Show HINCKLEY JOURNAL OF POLITICS SPRING 2001 concern over the motives of these states in seeking nuclear weapons due to their history of disregarding international norms, including suspected state-sponsored terrorism and ties to terrorist organizations. In addition, their largely authoritarian regimes and past aggressive behavior fuel the international community's commitment to prevent nuclear technology from proliferating to these states (Power 1995, 193). Although they cite self-protection, both against each other and against Israel, as a major reason for pursuing nuclear weapons, it is believed by many in the international community that these states do not seek such weapons primarily for defensive purposes. Rather, it is feared that nuclear weapons would serve more of an offensive purpose to threaten other states and assert themselves as the regional hegemon, as well as to extend their influence outside of the Middle East. These states are also considered more likely to be involved in the proliferation of nuclear technology to other countries. Subsequently, greater efforts-including economic sanctions, political pressure, and even the use offeree-have been made by the international community, particularly the United States, to prevent these states from gaining a nuclear capability (Feldman 1997, 180). With regard to Israel, a number of states in the Middle East perceive Israeli possession of nuclear weapons as destabilizing to the region and are concerned about the possible offensive use of such weapons or as a tool of political blackmail. In following with realist thought, a major motivation (or at least justification) for states such as Iran and Iraq to acquire nuclear weapons is to counter Israel's nuclear monopoly in the region and thus increase their own security. This mentality is further heightened by their perception of a discriminatory approach from much of the Western world that tolerates Israel's nuclearization while actively hindering similar pursuits by Arab states. In addition, these states are motivated by a desire to overthrow a sense of technological and cultural inferiority, particularly in light of Israel's technological accomplishments and efforts to maintain its nuclear monopoly in the region (Feldman 1997, 123-126). The efforts by both Iran and Iraq to obtain nuclear weapons are propelled in part by each state's desire to assert itself as the region's hegemon, as well as by the fear of allowing the other to gain a military advantage. In light of such ambitions, particularly after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, an Arab state gaining possession of nuclear weapons would alarm not only Israel, but also other Arab states and could trigger an accelerated regional arms race and increase the risk of such weapons being used (Feldman 1997, 135-138). From the late 1980s through the early 1990s, Iranian leaders expressed interest in obtaining nuclear weapons in order to protect their state against Iraq and Israel. Concern over Iran increased due to factors such as the existence of a secret military research unit and the importation of questionable nuclear goods and dual-use items. Concern was further heightened by Iran's testing of a long-range missile in mid-1998. Some U.S. and Israeli sources have estimated that Iran could possess a nuclear-weapon capability within the next several years. Iran, however, holds that allegations about its alleged bomb-making intentions have been largely fabricated in an attempt to distract attention from Israel's bomb threat (Power 1995, 198-199). In comparison with the attention given to Iran, the nuclear designs of Iraq are subject to an even greater amount of scrutiny. International weapon inspectors had made regular inspections of suspected Iraqi nuclear facilities since the end of the Gulf War in 1991 until 1998, when the operations were suspended. Looking back, it appears that the true extent of Iraq's nuclear program prior to the Gulf War was largely underestimated. Although Iraq would still have lacked the means to deliver the bomb, analysts now believe that when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the country was roughly two years away from producing an atom bomb with indigenous facilities. Although the allied bombings during the Gulf War and the subsequent weapon inspections set back the Iraqi nuclear program considerably, reports from weapon inspectors and Iraqi defectors lead many of the major powers and the United Nations to believe that Iraq is still on the nuclear path, prompting fear that Iraq could go nuclear after sanctions are lifted (Venter 1999, 45-50). This is a scenario that neither Iraq's Middle East neighbors nor the United States and its European allies want to face. THE FUTURE OF PROLIFERATION As an analysis of the dynamics of the Middle East can attest, there is no easy solution to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As long as a self-help system exists, states will pursue policies they believe are best able to provide protection. Fortunately, there are a number of states that either do not have designs of acquiring a nuclear capability or are unlikely to have the resources necessary for such an undertaking in the foreseeable future. While not every country will pursue nuclear weapons, a number of states will see them as necessary, or at least desirable, particularly when a potentially hostile neighbor has a nuclear capability. In reality, arguments for either complete disarmament or for universal proliferation are unrealistic. Due to the anarchic nature of the international system, which has only increased since the end of the Cold War, current nuclear states will be unwilling to risk compromising security by giving up all of their nuclear weapons. Coupled with the resources required for such an undertaking, particularly in the face of Russia's ongoing economic crisis, universal disarmament is not a viable option. Likewise, those who believe that universal proliferation would create a secure world are overly optimistic. The dangers inherent in an increasing number of nuclear states throughout the world are readily apparent in the risks posed by the tensions and dynamics present in the Middle East. Also, simple logic dictates that as the number of nuclear 47 |